Notes on European Guide to Good Practice in Knowledge Management – Part 1: Knowledge Management Framework

Successful KM implementations in business settings prioritize attention on soft issues – including human and cultural aspects, personal motivations, change management methodologies, new and improved business processes enabling multidisciplinary knowledge sharing, communication and collaboration – and see technology as an enabler. 

Despite this, most efforts so far at addressing the challenge of KM in business environments have typically taken a “technology-push” approach, concentrating major effort on putting in place IT tools that will “solve the knowledge creation, sharing and reuse problem”. 

The overall intention has been to provide meaningful and useful guidelines to companies, and notably SMEs (see below), as to how they might align their organizations culturally and socially to take advantage of the opportunities of knowledge sharing within and beyond their organizational boundaries. 

If the Framework helps an organization achieve a common understanding of KM, align and focus its actions, identify what KM aspects are relevant to that organization, understand what is the right combination of these aspects, which processes should be tackled and how to develop KM both an organizational and individual level – then it has value. 

Why KM in SMEs? 

Owners and managers of SMEs differ in what they term success. Survival and continuity, profit, return on capital employed, numbers of employees and customers, pride in product, skills and service, employment for family members, and enjoyable work life, are frequently mentioned criteria. 

This European KM Framework is designed to promote a common European understanding of KM, show the value of the emerging KM approach and help organizations towards its successful implementation. 

The Framework should be considered as a starting point for developing, if appropriate, an organization-specific framework that serves best the needs of a particular organization’s KM approach. 

The KM Framework considers three layers as most important for KM: 

a)  The business focus should be in the centre of any KM initiative and represents the value-adding processes of an organization, which may typically include strategy development, product/service innovation and development, manufacturing and service delivery, sales and customer support.

b)  Five core knowledge activities have been identified as most widely used by organizations in Europe: identify, create, store, share and use.

c) The enablers represent the third layer and comprise two main categories, called personal and organizational knowledge capabilities, which complement each other. These capabilities should be seen as the enablers for the knowledge activities outlined above. 

Core value-adding processes

In addition to supporting the improvement of the core processes of an organization, KM methods can also be applied within its supporting processes: competence management is one such example from the HR arena; developing best practice databases to capture and exchange knowledge about optimum procedures throughout the organization is another example from the area of continuous improvement processes; methods for intellectual property management (e.g. patents, copyrights) is a further example from the area of management of financial and non-financial assets. 

Small and medium sized enterprises(SMEs) in particular are increasingly building networks to supply their products, to share their resources and to learn from each other. Long-term partnerships are established in order to develop new products and services that a single organization could not cope with alone. Therefore partners and suppliers, as well as clients, should often be involved within the scope 

Empirical research, practical experiences and the analysis of more than 150 KM frameworks worldwide have shown that the following areas are, in most cases, the most important to address: 

1. describe how knowledge is used
2. raise awareness about the required KM activities
3. reduce complexity
4. design a KM solution.

The five core knowledge activities are: 

  • Identify knowledge
  • Create New Knowledge
  • Store Knowledge
  • Share Knowledge
  • Use Knowledge

Two important requirements have to be fulfilled to achieve improvements from these core knowledge activities: 

  • First, the core activities have to be aligned or integrated into the organizational processes and daily tasks.
  • Second, the core activities have to be carefully balanced in accordance with the specificities of each business process and organization. A KM solution should not focus only on one or two activities in isolation.

4.1 Personal knowledge capabilities 

the following personal knowledge capabilities are usually required for a successful implementation of a KM solution: 

  • a)  Ambition;
  • b)  Skills;
  • c)  Behaviour;
  • d)  Methods, T ools and T echniques;
  • e)  Time management;
  • f)  Personal knowledge.

Just asking simple questions like… 

  • Is there somebody else who might have knowledge that could help me further here? 
  • What did we learn in this project? 
  • With whom should we share what we learn?
    …could have a significant impact on the way knowledge is developed, shared and used in an organization. 

An often-used saying related to KM is “an hour of work in the library could save you a month of work …”. 

Research indicates that the pressures of knowledge-based work are increasing in modern societies. These can include the need to solve unforeseen problems, taking greater levels of personal self-responsibility and decision-making, carrying out more coordination tasks in cooperative work settings, a greater number of information processing tasks and a higher dependency on the speed of input from colleagues and clients. 

Organizational knowledge capabilities 

Organizational knowledge capabilities describe the conditions that the leadership of an organization has to establish in order to facilitate effective knowledge use within its value-adding processes, by its managers, employees and other stakeholders. 

The following organizational knowledge capabilities are typically relevant for a successful implementation of a KM solution: 

  • g)  Mission, Vision & Strategy; 
  • h)  Culture; 
  • i)  Process & Organization; 
  • j)  Measurement; 
  • k)  Technology & Infrastructure; 
  • l)  Knowledge Assets.

Culture 

Since most knowledge processes are on a more or less voluntary basis and knowledge is to a large degree personal, there needs to be within an organization a culture of motivation, a sense of belonging, empowerment, trust and respect before people really start to engage themselves in developing, sharing and using knowledge. It requires a culture in which people are respected, based on the knowledge they have and the way they are putting it to use for the organization. 

4.2.6 Knowledge Assets 

The biggest challenge for any organization is to develop and make optimal use of the employees’ knowledge (their so-called “human capital”) and that of their external stakeholders (their so-called “customer capital”) by transforming this know-how into shared knowledge assets (so-called “structural capital”). Knowledge assets are those , which remain with the company when the employees walk out through the door –such as manuals, customer databases, process descriptions, patents etc. Typically, human capital is more related to the internal or tacit component of knowledge (experience, skills, attitude) and structural capital more related to explicit information. 

Notes from European Guide to Good Practice in Knowledge Management – Part 5: Knowledge Management Terminology

European Guide to good Practice in Knowledge Management – Part 5: KM Terminology 

Best/Good Practices: KM practices that have produced outstanding results in other situations, inside or outside of a particular organization and which can be validated, codified and shared with others and recommended as models to follow. 

Chief Knowledge Officer (CKO): The individual with overall leadership of KM in an organization. Typically, the CKO will articulate and champion the KM vision, provide leadership for implementing and sustaining KM initiatives, and has the ultimate responsibility for knowledge creation, sharing and application. 

Community of Practice (CoP): Informal, self-organized, collaboration of people, within or between organizations, who share common practices, interests or aims. When the CoP proves useful to its members over time, they may formalize its status by adopting a group name and a regular system of interchange through enabling tools. (Other types of KM communities include Communities of Interest and Communities of Purpose). 

Core Competences: The set of skills, experience and attributes recognized by an organization as critical to their success in KM. – for example: information literacy, a sharing culture etc. 

Customer Capital: Refers to the value of an organization’s network of satisfied clients, and their loyalty to the organization. 

Data: Discrete, objective facts (numbers, symbols, figures) without context and interpretation. 

Explicit Knowledge: Individual and collective knowledge that has been codified, typically in objects, words, and numbers, in the form of graphics, drawings, specifications, manuals, procedures etc. and can therefore be easily shared and understood. 

Human Capital: Describes the value of the know-how and competencies of an organization’s employees. An organization which systematically develops its Human Capital is more likely to become a successful learning organization (see definition 23). 

nformation: Is based on data, and adds value to the understanding of a subject and in context, is the basis for knowledge. 

Information Management: Covers the processes of selecting, capturing, categorizing, indexing and storing information. Typically this involves active and continuous review of content stored in, or distributed through a range of tools (databases, taxonomies (see definition 30), human networks etc). 

Intangible Assets: Assets that can have a great value to an organization, but which typically have no physical presence and have traditionally not been recognized from a financial perspective, except when sometimes grouped together as “goodwill” on balance sheets. Comprises assets such as reputation, brand value, monopoly rights and other non-balance sheet items such as “potential” –i.e. the capacity to generate competitive advantage in the future. 

Intellectual Capital: Intellectual Capital (IC), a subset of the intangible assets (see definition 11) is commonly accepted to include three sub-categories: Human Capital, Structural Capital, Customer Capital (see definitions [8, 28 and 5 respectively). IC can include the knowledge of employees, data and information about processes, experts, products, customers and competitors; and intellectual property such as patents or regulatory licenses. 

Knowledge: A set of data and information (when seen from an Information Technology point of view), and a combination of, for example know-how, experience, emotion, believes, values, ideas, intuition, curiosity, motivation, learning styles, attitude, ability to trust, ability to deal with complexity, ability to synthesize, openness, networking skills, communication skills, attitude to risk and entrepreneurial spirit to result in a valuable asset which can be used to improve the capacity to act and support decision making. Knowledge may be explicit and/or tacit (see definitions 7 and 29 respectively), individual and/or collective. 

Knowledge Audit: A systematic review, typically based on questionnaires, interviews or narrative techniques, of the knowledge within an organization. Often also includes a mapping of knowledge interactions and flows within and between organizations, teams and individuals. 

Knowledge-Based Economy: A recently coined term that refers to the stage of economic evolution in which knowledge is considered as the key factor of production and competitiveness. This major change has significant implications for the strategy, operations, and structure of all types of organization, large or small, public or private, commercial, not-for-profit or academic. 

Knowledge Management (KM): Planned and ongoing management of activities and processes for leveraging knowledge to enhance competitiveness through better use and creation of individual and collective knowledge resources. 

KM Framework: Describes the most essential factors (assets, people, processes, tools) influencing the success or failure of a KM initiative, and their interdependent relationships. Typically, a framework is built up into a pictorial representation which serves as an aide-memoire for implementing KM within an organization, helping users to position individual KM initiatives with within a wider context (see also booklet 1 of this CEN guide). 

Knowledge Life Cycle: Describes the principle phases of managing knowledge, such as selecting, maintaining, measuring, sharing and applying knowledge in given contexts. 

KM Measurement: One of the KM life cycle phases (see definition 18) Aims to help organizations measure the value created by their KM projects, programmes and strategies. For example, measuring return on investment in KM is often possible through a range of both quantitative and qualitative techniques (see also booklet 4 of this CEN guide). 

KM Roles: To implement KM successfully sometimes requires specific and clearly- defined roles. These are not always formal, but can include such roles as CKO (see definition 2), content managers, change management experts, knowledge brokers and harvesters etc. 

KM Strategy: A declaration of how the organization will use KM methods, tools, processes, and practices to achieve business objectives by leveraging its content, people and processes and how KM will support the organization’s overall strategy. 

KM Tools: The generic sets of tools that enable implementation of KM processes. These can be either IT systems (e.g. databases, intranets, extranets, portals), or methodologies, or human networks (e.g. CoPs – see definition 3). 

Learning Organization: An organization that views its future competitive advantage as based on continuous learning and use of knowledge and an ability to adapt its behaviour to changing circumstances. 

Narrative Techniques: Techniques employed in the context of KM to describe complicated issues, explain events, communicate lessons learned, or bring about cultural change (see also booklet 2 of this CEN guide). Such techniques include oral story-telling, drama and some styles of written knowledge capture., which can richness to communication and carry more complex messages and sub-text than non-narrative techniques. 

Organizational Culture: The way of perceiving, thinking and feeling, shared and transmitted among organizational members. Often referred to as: “the way things are done around here” (see also booklet 2 of this CEN guide). 

Organizational KM: Unlike personal KM (see definition 27), which centres on the individual, organizational KM depends upon an enterprise-wide strategic decision to actively manage knowledge through a range of processes, tools and people. 

Personal KM: A set of concepts, disciplines and tools for organizing often previously unstructured knowledge, to help individuals take responsibility for what they know and who they know. 

Structural Capital: Describes the knowledge that has been captured and institutionalised within the structure, processes and culture of an organization. SC is a subset of explicit knowledge (see definition 7). It could include patents, copyrights, proprietary software, trademarks, trade secrets etc. It can be stored in the form of documented procedures, databases, expert systems, decision-support software and KM systems. SC is everything left at the office when the employees go home, and can clearly be regarded as an organization’s property.

Tacit Knowledge: Tacit knowledge (sometimes also called implicit knowledge) consists of mental models, behaviours and perspectives, largely based on experience. This knowledge is difficult to codify, but KM techniques such as learning by doing or collaboration between communities (see definition 3) can help people to share this knowledge.

Taxonomy: An outcome from knowledge mapping and structuring processes. A taxonomy is a hierarchical classification which helps users understand how explicit knowledge can be grouped and categorized. A good taxonomy helps users of knowledge by improving their search and retrieval experiences. 

Notes from European Guide to Good Practices in Knowledge Management – Part 2: Organizational Culture 

You can read the entire European Guide to Good Practice in Knowledge Management – Part 2 Organizational Culture here.

Below are some of the passages I found most valuable.

*

Culture is perhaps the most important factor in successfully managing knowledge. It is a key influence on behaviours. This booklet looks at what culture is, how it develops and how you can work with it to ensure your KM programme is successful. It attempts to give some answers to:

1)  How to get the support and active involvement of the members of the organization (issues related to human resources: motivation, competencies, etc). 

2)  How to organize for the implementation of KM (issues related to the formal and informal structure of the organization). 

3)  How to get the appropriate climate for KM implementation (issues related to specific activities and tools to be used). 

Organizations, even small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), rarely involve a single culture; there will be subcultures (groups which exhibit cultural characteristics, i.e. values, norms and practices that differ from the main organizational culture and from other subcultures). One common manifestation is “departmental differences”, which can lead to the phenomenon of departmentalization or so-called “silo thinking”.

There are personal, team and organizational ‘agendas’ containing conflicting aspirations. This gives rise to the complexity of human relationships in organizations and organizations’ behaviour as so-called “complex adaptive systems”. 

Individuals employment puts them in a contractual relationship in which there are expectations and responsibilities. Individuals’ “psychological contract” (i.e. their beliefs about what they owe the organization and what the organization owes them) drives them to seek, to find and to modify the culture to better serve their psychological contract. This does not necessarily imply a selfish or self-seeking motive. Public service, duty, or care for others may well be a strong value within the individual, group, or organization. The more supportive the culture the more productivity, trusting and sharing will be exhibited by individuals. 

People’s identity is fundamental to their motivation and commitment. It drives what they feel is important knowledge, what, how and with whom they will share that knowledge and how they value their contribution to colleagues and the organization. It is important when mapping knowledge to identify those people whose self- worth is related to being perceived as key personnel in knowledge flows.

Managing the boundaries between individual and corporate knowledge requires negotiation and high emotional intelligence, particularly if tacit knowledge is to be exchanged, and for KM tools such as expertise directories or “lessons learned” to be comprehensive. 

Some obstructive properties of groupthink include the following:

• Illusion of invulnerability: members believe that past successes guarantee future successes and so take extreme risks.
• Collective rationalization: members collectively rationalize away information that contradicts their assumptions.
• Illusion of morality: members believe that they are all moral and so could not make a bad decision.
• Shared stereotypes: members dismiss evidence that is contradictory by discrediting the source of that information.
• Direct pressure: sanctions are placed on members who dissent from the majority opinion by, for example, using assertive language to enforce compliance.
• Self-censorship: members keep quiet about any misgivings they have so that they do not voice concerns.
• “Mind guards”: members screen out information from outsiders where this might challenge the group’s assumptions and beliefs.
• Illusion of unanimity: given these other symptoms, it appears that there is consensus within the group, even though there may be many of those involved who do not agree with the group decision.

There are three common types of community, which can be found both within an organization and across organizations:

• Communities of interest are groups with a mutual interest in a particular topic whose members wish to learn more and further develop their interest in the subject.
• Communities of Practice (CoPs) bring together people to share insights, develop expertise and to foster good practice through the exchange and creation of knowledge in a specific area. They are often a focus for building specific capability in their organization and ensuring that this is protected and retained in the organization as people move on. Formal functions (e.g. Finance, Marketing, Human Resources) often offer excellent potential for inter-organizational CoPs. 
• Communities of purpose have a shorter time horizon and are accountable for delivering a specific business goal. These could include project teams, steering groups and task forces.

When individuals are asked to introduce their knowledge into an organizational system, e.g. a client database, they often tend to think that they have lost the ownership of know-how that until then remained exclusive to them. The objectives set for KM in the organization therefore need to take into account the rules and habits concerning the ownership and control of specific knowledge, in order to encourage the transition from personal to organizational knowledge. 

A positive experience normally means that there has been a positive and important gain for the individual; it might be increased credibility, recognition, monetary or promotional reward etc. 

There are two main categories of trust, personal trust and competence (or identity) based trust. For effective KM it does not need to be at the level of personal trust, but can be competence-based. So it can take a number of forms: 

• Identity based – I trust you because of your role or position – e.g. a doctor. 

• Reciprocity based – I engage in trust behaviour because I believe you will too.
• Elicitative Trust – By engaging in acts of trust I will elicit trust from the other person.
• Compensatory trust – Some, but not all, will fail to engage in the needed behaviour and therefore I must take a lead.
• Moralistic Trust – I will act in a trustworthy way irrespective of what others do.

Leaders should provide purpose, direction and behavioral role models. They share ideas with, walk among and listen to members of the enterprise, customizing the message and sensing employees’ understanding of the enterprise’s direction. These qualities are important at all levels in the organization, but have more impact the higher the position held. Management involves interpreting the enterprise vision and mission in a way that makes sense and resonates with employees. Managers guide performance and offer suggestions for corrective action. KM frequently involves guiding people’s actions rather than directing; managers therefore need the skills and competences to create a climate that fosters the creation, sharing, and application of knowledge; i.e. a broader basis of leadership skills.

Credibility is strongly related to trust and qualities of leadership, both already recognized as fundamental to a knowledge–enabled organization.

• High credibility and reliability means that when you give advice or make a judgment on your area of credible expertise it is based on sound knowledge or wisdom;
• People in the organization know that when you say something will happen, it will;
• People in the organization know that when you say something will not happen, it will not;
• People accept that you have the necessary judgment, skill and insight to be able to choose correctly between what should and should not happen;
• People accept that you have the necessary backing, levers of influence, resources and if necessary weapons at your disposal to ensure certainty of chosen outcome, once determined;
• When you obtain agreement or commitment from them to deliver something, they know they have to deliver it.

For a KM intervention to succeed, those involved must feel it is important enough that they must participate, that mistakes made in learning will be accepted and that time for change will be allowed.

In a consulting company, where the members of the organization viewed knowledge as their personal possession, and therefore refused to share, the management team encouraged knowledge sharing by changing the new project allocation process. Rather than giving projects to individual consultants, they were given to a group of consultants with the necessary expertise, forcing the consultants to network and market their expertise internally to participate on projects. Only by getting invited to join new projects could they be rewarded, thus giving them a built-in incentive to advertise their expertise internally. As a result the competition for status drove knowledge sharing rather than hoarding.

The iterative process for knowledge creation involves:

Empathizing – sharing and developing ideas together through social exchange 

Articulating – into explicit form

Connecting – using different explicit forms to help the idea move forward 

Embodying- incorporating into a product/process/service that has value.

Part of your KM program should therefore involve mapping existing competencies, e.g. by means of “knowledge skill tests” and deciding what to do about those that are missing, by offering training or including learning by doing programs in the organization. 

For sharing knowledge to become a cultural norm, the benefits of sharing must exceed the benefits of retention in the eyes of the individuals concerned. This may mean that they are better known and get invited to do more interesting work, or are more visible (e.g. leading to promotion), or enjoy being helpful to others, or receive rewards etc. Individual preferences will suggest what sort of benefits will be important for any one individual. 

One electronics company developed a so-called “virtual Hollywood“ and asked “directors” (employees) to present “scripts” (improvement ideas) to “investors” (general managers) who would choose the ones to “produce” (implement). The project promoted out-of-the-box thinking and in the first year generated over 200 submissions, addressing process improvement and product development.

A learning organization is an organization creating, acquiring and transferring competence and being able to change its behavior according to new knowledge and views. (Garvin, 1993)

What does a learning organization learn?

• To use learning to reach its goals.
• To help people value the effects of their learning upon their organization.
• To avoid making the same mistakes again.
• To share information in ways that prompt appropriate action.
• To link individual performance with organizational performance.
• To tie rewards to key measures of performance.
• To take in a lot of environmental information at all times.
• To create structures and procedures that support the learning process.
• To foster ongoing and orderly dialogues.
• To make it safe for people to share openly and take risks.

What does a learning organization look like?
• Learns collaboratively, open and across boundaries.
• Values how it learns as well as what it learns.
• Invests in staying ahead of the learning curve in its industry.
• Gains a competitive edge by learning faster and smarter than competitors.
• Turns data into useful knowledge quickly and at the right time and place.
• Enables every employee to feel that every experience provides him/her a chance to learn something potentially useful, even if only for leveraging future learning.
• Exhibits little fear and defensiveness.
• Takes risks but avoids jeopardizing the basic security of the organization.
• Invests in experimental and seemingly tangential learning (related but not conforming to existing learning patterns) and in serendipity.
• Supports people and teams who want to pursue action-learning projects.
• Depoliticizes learning by not penalizing individuals and groups for sharing information and conclusions.

How does a learning organization evolve? By…

• Questioning current assumptions about learning.
• Getting an outside perspective.
• Tying the goal of becoming a learning company to organizational vision.
• Funding or creating a champion in top management.
• Looking for the `pain’ in the organization – the place(s) where more effective learning could help.
• Articulating learning organization ideas plainly.
• Rewarding group as well as individual learning success and failure.
• Finding an external competitor or other focus point to spur greater co-operative learning.
• Finding ways to collaborate internally, unhampered by boundaries.

In order to drive the community forward one should consider:

• Identifying or electing a coordinator.
• Establishing the community infrastructure – tools available to support interaction between community members – such as e-mail, discussion groups, an intranet, other tools to build/share knowledge resources.
• A launch aimed at attracting potential members, securing commitment, agreeing initial priorities and actions and consolidating the active members.
• Move into ongoing community operation, ensuring that the steering group, the sponsor and the community coordinator work with members to deliver the community’s goals.
• Evaluate outcomes, celebrate and communicate success within and outside the community, in order to keep interest and energy levels high.

The process of creating a community cannot be rushed because some self-adjusting mechanisms first need to be put in place, in order to make the community robust. The general stages that communities go through are:

• Excitement when forming – something new
• Confusion – about the purpose
• Clarification – who is to do what
• Growing – trust and respect building up
• Arrival – the community is self-directing.

Mentoring involves matching new or inexperienced employees with more experienced senior personnel, so that the intangible, tacit knowledge of an industry or organization can be passed on effectively. It allows the newer employees to grow without necessarily just learning the hard way and should create a bond between mentor and protégé. This technique can be particularly useful for organizations with a substantial proportion of employees approaching retirement age, or where there are steep learning curves, or high turnover rates.

When researching, designing, implementing or evaluating any KM program, consider using story, since it can:

• Enable organizations to value, capture and translate individual experiences into a shared resource (lessons learned).

• Develop a culture that values rich, effective and meaningful dialogue both in conversation and in records.
• Develop tools and techniques to capitalize on project team experiences.
• Explore roles and relationships.
• Tangible objects provide meaningful ‘hooks’, thereby stimulating the creation of new meanings, communities and memories.
• Provide the ‘cultural glue’ for communities and networks.
• Help explore the risks and opportunities presented by any KM experience.

Dialogue, rather than discussion, usually provides the best environment for surfacing true experiences safely and dealing with them. Therefore an environment that encourages dialogue must establish ground rules for behavior. It requires those involved to be willing to work towards co-creating an outcome and a willingness to listen without provoking justification or defensiveness. 

Each community is a subculture within an organization which has developed its own cultural norms. These norms encourage or limit the acceptance of processes, technology or trust-based relationships. The experience of using technology can affect the norms of the community. The implementation of technology provides experiences for the individuals within the community and their experiences thereby modify the cultural norms. If the experience is beneficial the move towards a knowledge sharing culture is enhanced. If the experience is frustrating, more difficult than existing methods, or in other ways unrewarding, it will be seen as detrimental.

Facebook’s Plan for Radical Transparency was Too Radical

Alex Pasternack recently wrote an article for Fast Company titled Facebook’s plan for radical transparency was too radical which features several quotes from me about my perspective on the Social Science One project and my research on TeleSUR and Venezeula’s longstanding attempts to export revolution to the United States.

I highly recommend anyone interested in foreign-directed disinformation efforts to give it a read.

Notes On Designing an Integrated Methodology for Knowledge Management Strategic Planning: The Roadmap Toward Strategic Alignment 

 

The main aim of the study is to develop a new methodology for KM strategic planning to navigate KM projects strategically. The mixed-method approach was used to develop KM strategic planning methodology. 

The main focus of the proposed methodology is KM strategic alignment by considering internal and external environment of business and adopting a top-down approach in strategic planning which was less seen in the previous studies. 

The proposed methodology helps organizations to know what processes and activities must be emphasized in KM project adoption. Application of the proposed integrated methodology assists organizations to gain strategic alignment and fit KM investment with a business requirement. 

the proposed methodology is general in nature; it is recommended to develop customized KM strategic methodologies in specific domains, for example, public organization, SCM and virtual organization. 

The majority of investments in the field of KM do not meet organizations’ knowledge needs and expected benefits, and therefore, it leads to loss of investments (Ale et al., 2014). Some of the important reasons for the failure of KM projects are the lack of an appropriate roadmap or methodology to implement KM initiatives (Kim et al., 2003; Wiig, 1998; Bolisani and Scarso, 2015), the lack of clear distinction between data, information and knowledge, ignorance of unique features of knowledge and knowledge workers (Kim et al., 2003), lack of clear KM strategies and vision (Beiryaei and Jamporazmay, 2010; Martinsons et al., 2017), lack of KM strategic alignment (Martinsons et al., 2017) and ignorance of consequences of KM (Lopez-Nicolás and Meroño-Cerdán, 2011). Many organizations use IT planning techniques to identify the core knowledge, design KM procedures and implement KM, while KM cannot rely solely on technical approaches because of the multi-dimensional nature of KM (Akram et al., 2015). This challenge reveals the necessity of a specialized strategic planning methodology for KM 

one of the most cited KM failure reasons is the lack of strategic planning and poor strategic alignment of these initiatives (Shankar et al., 2003; Ale et al., 2014; Patil and Kant, 2014; Bolisani and Scarso, 2015). Considering that strategic alignment and strategic planning are regarded as the primary requirements of successful KM implementation (Ale et al., 2014; Beiryaei and Jamporazmay, 2010), the main purpose of this paper is to develop a new integrated methodology for KM strategic planning which could be applied as a roadmap for implementation of knowledge initiatives with a strategic approach. 

KM is defined as the process of identifying, creating, absorbing and applying organizational knowledge to exploit new opportunities and enhance productivity 

KM barriers were grouped in five categories, including knowledge characteristics, knowledge source, knowledge receiver, contextual factor and mechanisms. Patil and Kant (2014) believed that KM barriers can be grouped in strategic barriers, organizational barriers, technological barriers, cultural barriers and individual barriers. They found that strategic barriers were the most important barriers to KM adaptation. 

KM strategy is the high-level plan which identifies KM processes, tools and infrastructures and guarantees the effective circulation of knowledge in the organizations. 

On the KM focus dimension, KM strategies can be grouped as explicit- oriented and tacit-oriented. On the other dimension, KM strategies can be categorized as internal orientation and external orientation. 

Selecting the appropriate KM strategy by considering organizational conditions and business knowledge requirements is a core concern of KM strategic planning methodologies. 

Strategic planning of KMS has been important for the following reasons:

better support for business objects
enhancement of integration and consolidation of KMS
appropriate use of KMS to get competitive advantage
prioritization of KMS development projects
better executive supports of KMS operations
decision-making facilitation related to KMS investments
improvement of resource allocation in KM area
prediction of needed resources
improvement of the communication with top managers
identification of key problematic areas

  • According to APQC’s KM strategic planning methodology, there are seven steps to KM strategic planning success: 
    • (1)  establish organizational goals and strategic objectives for KM; 
    • (2)  identify KM strategies (that support those goals and objectives); 
    • (3)  identify KM priorities;
    • (4)  confirm the scope for each strategy; 
    • (5)  identify the roles needed and skill requirements for those roles;
      (6)  define measures and expectations; and
      (7)  assess critical success factors, gaps and potential risks

The first phases of the integrated methodology include internal and external environment analysis of business and KM, which these strategic practices were emphasized by Kim et al. (2003), Beiryaei and Jamporazmay (2010) and Martinsons et al. (2017). 

The second main phase is KM strategic orientation which is mentioned by strategic researchers in strategic management and IS strategic planning (Hoque et al., 2016). This phase encompasses activities such as setting KM vision, setting KM mission, identifying strategic knowledge gap, prioritizing knowledge-oriented processes and identifying KM strategy. 

The third main phase is KM strategy implementation which is an important phase in strategic planning approaches (Hashim et al., 2015). In this phase, some activities like allocating the KM resources, identifying appropriate KM mechanism, identifying KM processes and developing detailed action plan must be performed to implement strategic formulation in the previous stage. 

The last phase of the KM strategic planning methodology is KM strategic control which is considered as the vital phase of the most strategic model (Wiig, 1998). This phase encompasses activities such as identifying Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), evaluation scheduling, reviewing strategic priorities regarding the emerging changes and taking corrective actions. 

References

Abou-Zeid, E.S. (2009), “Alignment of business and knowledge management KM strategy”, Encyclopedia of Information Science and Technology, 2nd ed., Information Science Reference, Hershey, PA, pp. 124-129. doi: 10.4018/978-1-60566-026-4.ch022.

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Further reading

Becerra-Fernandez, I. and Sabherwal, R. (2014), Knowledge Management: Systems and Processes, Routledge.

Peppard, J. and Ward, J. (2004), “Beyond strategic information systems: towards an IS capability”, The Journal of Strategic Information Systems, Vol. 13 No. 2, pp. 167-194.

Mark Zuckerberg Testified Before Congress: The Good, The Bad and the Ugly

As someone that is a strong supporter of Libra, even though it has not yet been launched, I decided to watch Mark Zuckerberg provide Congressional testimony on the matter.  It was 5 hours long, and I wasn’t taking notes while watching – I was making spaghetti sauce – but I did snap a few screen shots and make mental notes.

Rather than summing it all up I broke it down the questioners into three sections – the good, the bad and the ugly…

The Good

No surprise, the Congressmen with some background within the technology and business field asked genuinely insightful questions related to the launch of Libra. Hearing them speak, I wished that they had more time to ask questions as it was clear that they were “in the know”.

Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing is, of course, one of the major issues as it relates to launching Libra. Both of these Congressman clearly recognized this and, to his credit, Mark Zuckerberg answered their questions well. Unfortunately, Zuckerberg doesn’t seem to know what I do about the birth of Bitcoin – as if he did and if he brought this up then and there – I think it would have radically changed how the proceedings went with these two.

The Bad

When I saw a few hours after the hearing a number of videos and memes making it appear as if Ocasio-Cortez had “pwned” Mark Zuckerberg I couldn’t help but laugh.

Her questions related to fact-checking of politicians speech were not insightful – she appears to be endorsing a patently anti-Constitutional stance – and the antagonistic tone added to the questions was rude. The way in which she closed trying to characterize Mark Zuckerberg as racist and Facebook as an enterprise supporting white supremacism was absurd and her inability to recognize that the Independent Fact Check Network is not within Facebook’s purview – althought they do contract with them – was sad.

The Ugly

When Mr. Green started to speak I thought for a moment that perhaps my video feed had switched to the same smooth jazz radio station I’d be forced to listen to after my mom would pick me up from late-night baseball practice, while the content of his comments made me think that I was witnessing a Critique session run by Bay Area Maoists.

I’m sure that this Congressman from Texas has a passionate base of supporters – and I’m also sure that they don’t support him for his subject area knowledge of anything related to the field of technology.

Review of Red Cocaine: The Drugging of America

“The war on drugs has not failed: it has never existed. There has been no war on drugs in the United States.”

– Joseph D Douglass, Jr.

*

The extent of money spent by the United States Federal Government on drug enforcement and interdiction nationally and internationally would make the above quote from Joseph D Douglass, Jr.’s book Red Cocaine: The Drugging of America seem intuitively false. And yet in this highly documented tome the  author shows how it is that numerous government agencies have prioritized working relations with Communist governments such as China, Russia and Cuba over open conflict with them over facilitation of drug trafficking as a form of irregular warfare. Given the gravity of the claims made within the text I found myself constantly looking up references, and sure enough a geopolitical world-view that I was not at all familiar with started to emerge.

I don’t normally provide background on the authors I read, but given the topic it seems important to do so here…

Dr. Joseph Douglass is a national security analyst and author with expertise in defence policy, threat assessment, deception, intelligence and political warfare, nuclear strategy, terrorism, advanced chemical and biological warfare agents and applications, and international narcotics trafficking. Since the mid-1980s, his primary focus has been research into various dimensions of cultural warfare and notably into the illegal drugs plague, with emphasis on its origins, support structures, and marketing.

Narcotics Trafficking as Irregular Warfare

The case that is laid out in Red Cocaine is that China and the Soviet Union were involved at the state level in the faciltation of trafficking narcotics to the United States. Citing a variety of data points, including several high-ranking Communist Party members, Douglass shows how destroying American youth through drugs and corruption was covert Communist policy. Potential traffickers were identified for training and marketing of drugs and then various government agents – from those monitoring inports/exports to those involved with policing – were encouraged to support their comrades by turning a blind eye or, if they were sufficiently compromised, by themselves actively facilitating such activities.

The case study stemming from the Vietnamese war and Chinese heroin being distributed to the American military was particularly insightful in demonstrating the manner in which the claim that large scale drug-production is just done by individuals is particularly compelling. The war became a sort of social science experiment – with the military being the subjects. Far-below market-value drugs were offered in order to test how this would affect military readiness and morale.

Cuba and Bulgaria are singled out specifically as entrepots for these activities, the former for cocaine and the latter for opium. Fidel Castro’s role in helping  the Andean region industrialize cocaine-producers operations is shown to be  extensive.

The book also examines issues of strategy. For instance the reason why it is that so many radical leftist groups within Colombia and Venezuela were formed with the encouragement of Fidel. Their development – to whit – created multiple service suppliers should there ever be political periods akin to those of the FARC-EP peace accords. While one snakes head, the FARC, avows not to continue such activity another, the ELN, can take their place.

Narcotics and Corruption as a Vector for Societal Disruption

This By Any Means Necessary approach to political change allowed for foreign intelligence operatives to track and manage Americans that could be used, wittingly or not, to disrupt the country’s economy and political system. Furthermore, it became a means by which to raise funds in order to support these and other military intelligence operations. While the Chinese, Soviets and the Cubans sought to avoid their role in such activities from becoming overtly known, the Americans had an incentive not to look too deeply lest the relationships between the country’s denegrate further.

Black and Hispanic people are specifically targeted by Fidel Castro to be the manner by which drugs are disseminated in the United States. By focusing the building of connections with drug distributors of such demographics, it helped allow the Drug War to be cast as racist and thus facilitate the increase of  political polarization. Given that some members of the black community laud Fidel Castro and demonize Ronald Regean, this is an example of a rich Orwellian Irony.

There’s a lot of other detailed accounts that are worth going into in detail, but I’ll close instead by saying if drugs, communism, or geopolitics interests you – definitely give this book a read.

Snow Storm in the Jungle

Quotes from Red Cocaine

     

Brief Excerpt about Drug Revenue’s Impact

‘In 1996, annual revenues derived from global criminalist activities were estimated by the World Bank’s experts at $1.2 trillion, of which $500 billion were thought to represent profits. These were and remain highly conservative estimates. The narcotics trade alone is in the $500 billion or more range. A more realistic estimate today would probably be of the order of $2 trillion per year – with $1 trillion, more or less, by way of straight profit; and some experts would raise these estimates further, towards $3.0 trillion annually in turnover. That is to say, governments, banks and the global criminalists are arranging the transfer of at least $1.0 trillion every year of national and private wealth into the bank accounts of the global criminal fraternity – a massive transfer of wealth for which there has been no historical parallel. This scandalous state of affairs has been continuing for several decades on an ever expanding scale, and the power conferred as a consequence threatens to destroy governments, democracy and the international banking system itself. Drug money also weakens and corrodes competition by favouring some economic agents at the expense of others’.

‘Two trillion+ dollars a year (a conservative figure, as noted) over the past two decades, excluding interest, would imply that more than $40 trillion will have been added to the wealth of the global criminal classes, including the managers and representatives of Lenin’s continuing world socialist revolution. Most of this money has been invested in property, bonds and stocks, and each year a further trillion or more dollars is added to the pool. Given that these data are believed by some experts to understate the position, the probable value of accrued drug money lodged in the international financial system now exceeds this $40 trillion estimate by a considerable margin. The associated corruption among financial institutions, investment advisory services (including stock brokerage houses and mutual funds), prestigious law firms, and among the political classes, has by now long since reached epidemic proportions. And this transformation has been accompanied by minimal publicity, with the exception of extensively publicised, but intermittent, ‘drug busts’…’.

‘It is critical for the survival of Western civilisation, and in order to slow down its rapid descent into pervasive, corrosive globalised criminality and corruption, which is the grim outlook for the 21st century, that Western countries begin, even at this late hour, to understand the true nature of the illegal drug crisis – which means correctly analysing its sources, especially its political origins, its enabling mechanisms, and its related criminal dimensions. Unless the nature and provenance of the challenge is finally understood, the appropriate strategy and tactics to address it will never be formulated. The drugs scourge continues to escalate because the measures so far developed to counter it do not take account of the geopolitical dimension – that is to say, of the malevolent, revolutionary intent which drives it’.

‘As a consequence, the measures taken, in the United States, Britain and elsewhere, to address the scourge, have remained essentially irrelevant and ineffective…. The plague continues to spread because the West is the victim of a deliberate, sustained and relentless offensive planned and directed by enemy intelligence which Western policymakers appear not to begin, or care, to understand. Some Western leaders even share the ideological objectives of the perpetrators of the drugs offensive. To make matters much worse, the values of many policymakers have been fatally eroded; and if one has no real values, one is not emboldened to defend anything at all, let alone with conviction and vigour. Policymakers too often stand for nothing and fall for everything – for every false assessment, for every piece of fashionable disinformation and for every diversionary tactic which is intended to add to the confusion and which clouds the truth: namely, that the West has been targeted as an act of war, and is the victim of a sustained offensive’.

‘Obviously, the longer this perversity and blindness continue, the more powerful and insuperable will the forces which help to perpetuate this blanket offensive, become. Soon, they will wield almost total power in some Western countries. The European Union’s collectivist structures, with their pork-barrel traditions and inclinations, are conspicuously vulnerable to drug-related corruption…’.

Review of The Geopolitics of Emotion: How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation, and Hope are Reshaping the World

In The Geopolitics of Emotion: How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation, and Hope are Reshaping the World by Dominique Moisi the author claims that he’s chosen to write this work in opposition to the optimism of Francis Fukuyama and the pessimism of Samuel Huntington. While geopolitics has traditionally been defined in relation to geography, Moisi uses a number of examples to highlight the need to include an “emotional geography” of those that populate a region within geopolitical investigations. Moisi believes that the three most powerful emotions to assess in order to create a psycho-analytic profile of a national spirit are Hope, Humiliation and Fear. Using this as a framework, Moisi assesses a number of the controversial issues prevalent in modern politics. Worth noting in this introduction is that when looking for other reviews of this work, there are few written by those in the field of geopolitics and far more written by those in performance studies, literary analysis, gender studies, psychology and sociology.

Defining Hope, Humiliation and Fear

Moisi’s choice to focus on geopolitics from the standpoint of emotions stems from his assessment that collective sentiments towards past events, their relation to the present and what is possible in the future all have a strong connections to confidence.

Hope, Humiliation and Fear are all linked to the notion of confidence – a defining factor in the manner in which national bodies address other national bodies, international bodies and their own people.

Fear is the absence of confidence, hope is an expression of confidence and humiliation is injured confidence. Moisi provides a formula for quickly summarizing them:

  1. Hope is “I want to do it, I can do it, and I will do it”
  2. Humiliation is “I can never do it”, which may lead to “I might try as well to destroy you since I cannot join you. ”
  3. Fear: “Oh my god, the world has becomes such a dangerous place; how can I be protected from it?”

One of the anecdotes that I found compelling in showing how it is that emotional valences get consideration within the diplomatic-cores of nations was the government of China’s decision to change their description of themselves from “rising” to “developing” as the former implicates that there will be conflict between them and established power while the latter does not.

From these definitions, Moisi then proceeds to analyze Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East and America according to this rubric. Those that are hopeful are those that have accommodated themselves to this system, those that feel humiliated it are those that have yet to maximize their domestic capacities to do so while those that fear it seem to take an anti-globalization stance which is strongly related to a sense of national or ethnic pride.

Methodological Criticism

While there is certainly value in a number of Moisi’s insights, from a methodological standpoint there is a lot lacking. Even if the claims he makes are intuitively sensible, he provides no real method for determining which indicators are valuable and which are not, no comprehensive process for correctly discerning the emotional valences of a nation and no steps for qualifying intra-national emotional variances (i.e. defining the Opposition/different interpretations of historical/current events).

True, he states in the opening of the text that confidence indicator can be mapped by things such as level of investment, spending patterns and surveys – he neither provides any comprehensive manner for weighing these or other factors nor describes a model other than his own subjective views on issues. This is in sharp contrast to business confidence – an indicator charted by numerous organizations (OECD; the NFIB Business Optimism Index; RMB/BER Business Confidence Index (BCI), etc.) that emerge from scientifically-based survey and analysis.

Globalization, Identity and Emotions

Despite this epistemological weakness, Moisi’s positions ought not to be automatically invalidated. He provides enough case studies wherein emotions are exploited by politicians, diplomats and businessmen are able to mobilize emotions towards the execution of specific activities. One can also look to the words that politicians and geopolitical strategies themselves say – be it Hugo Chavez or Alexander Dugin – and see that frequently it is their emotional appeals that get the support in the forms of votes or a reading audience.

One of the primary anxieties affecting confidence via the emotions is the relationship of national economic structures to the New World Order created following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the transition to a bi-polar world and the transformation of the United States into the global hegemon. It’s following these changes on the world stages that Moisi focuses upon.

The World in 2025

Published in 2009, the last chapter of the book is spent speculating on describing how he sees the emotional developments that Moisi describes as manifesting in the world. A few pages in, it immediately becomes apparent just how problematic the lack of a clear methodology for emotional vigilance and future-planning are – the views provided are so far from what has happened that at multiple times during the chapter I considered skipping it. Moisi forecast a rapid decline of the European union following sub-national revolts (i.e. Calatonia) and national revolts (U.K.) in the early 2010’s followed by its rapid reawakening and expansion (Serbia, Kosovo, etc.) in 2016. Not only has this not happened – Serbia, Turkey, and other still have not transitioned – but at least at the moment is seems as if the European Union project is in a state of decline stemming from lack of national support and existential anxieties on how to define itself in relation to Russian political manipulations and a massive influx of immigrants from the Middle East and Africa.

Moisi also believed that China would invade Taiwan in the early 2010’s and that the United States would be “mature” enough to take a hands off approach. While few projected Donald Trump would win the 2016 presidential election – it’s worth noting that in a number of U.S. poles one of the reasons that he gained such popular support was that there were wide swathes of the American public that even without all of the evidence ready to martial were aware that China had been gaming the financial and manufacturing rules to cause damage to the American economy via every manner possible, be it industrial espionage, dumping or non-enforcement of labor laws. Thus we see here that though China may have historicized their “century of humiliation” and be classified according to Moisi under the banner of “optimism” – which is justifiable considering how many of the country’s population have seen their standards of living increase, a sense of fear a humiliation still guides their actions. And this here is the problem of his account – lacking a specific means by which to determine specific classes of people as having specific emotional attitudes towards things, an “emotional” accounting of geopolitics for guiding policy-making is highly prone to error.

Review of Saving the Americas: The Dangerous Decline of Latin America and What The U.S. Must Do

Saving the Americas: The Dangerous Decline of Latin America and What The U.S. Must Doby Andres Oppenheimer’s books is so masterful a work of investigation into issues of economic, political and social innovation in the context of globalization that I’m now interested in familiarizing myself with the rest of his published work.

The thesis of this book is that while many other parts of the world – such as Ireland, Asia, India – have been able to successfully adjust themselves to the new technological and economic imperatives created by globalization, Latin America has lagged behind. It’s not that the political and economic leaderships within LatAm haven’t felt the need for change – they face declining prices for commodities, rising costs for foreign goods and services, and difficulty gaining anything close to the amount of foreign capital received by the “winners” in the globalization – it’s that they seem stuck in a haughty provincialist populism that is inherently suspicious of anything that they think may harm their sovereignty, be they bi- or multi-national economic agreements or changes to social welfare policies that were barely sustainable when they were first passed and are now burdens that hangs on government expenditure like it was an albatross.

Given the access to politicians and businessmen his role as journalist provides him, Oppenheimer is also able to provide a human context to the trade agreements and international diplomacy in a compassionate manner that allows the reader to see how the personality quirks and worldviews of leaders can have a tremendous impact on the manner in which they get resolved. This perspective is not limited to the Latin American leaders, but also within the United States. The description of the pre-9/11 leadership presents the U.S. government as largely aloof towards all of Latin America and the Caribbean, with the exception of Haiti and Colombia, despite Brazil’s economic might and the possibility for mutually-beneficial economic development. Given Chavez’s disdain for Bush due to the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan and the latter’s apparent readiness to create new partnerships in Latin America, it’s interesting to wonder what would have transpired between them had the terrorist attack not occurred.

The Opening to Capitalism on America’s Nautical Borders

Oppenheimer opens his book on Latin American by examining a number of Asian and European globalizatio success stories. These are the foils to the case studies of Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and Mexico which, in his assessment, have not been able to reach the special “sweet spot” that leads to annual rates of growth higher than 5%.

His assessment of Latin American is not good, and shows how their social and economic policies have not kept pace with the needed changes in a manner sufficient enough to create the high annual growth of their competitors.

Argentina

The portrait Oppenheimer presents of Kirchner as the leader of a nation is not at all flattering, but neither does he receive the type of dismissiveness that Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro receives. In light of his leadership abilities, he is presented almost as a tragic figure in nation which constantly cycles between political extremes. Kirchner, for example, is described as canceling the FTAA negotiations with the United States out of purely personal reasons and breaking schedules talks with other presidents out of antipathy.

Given this description of leadership, Oppenheimer’s description of Kirchner and his supporters as suffering from Maradona Syndrome is apt. Kirchner’s “K Style” may have done much to bolster their emotional needs, but from a practical standpoint it was a failure.

Venezuela

Oppenheimer describes Chavez’s rule as that of a narcissist-Leninist revolution. The image of his arriving to a trade conference in a private jet that he paid millions over cost with a huge entourage of lackey’s was compelling evidence in lights of this. The irregular hours he worked, his lack of self-management skills, the poor manner in which he treats his subordinates, his inability to plan at a macro-economic level and his inability to think deeply on a number of important issues – a claim made by his former mentor and host for several years following his release from prison – are just some of the reasons that helps explain how the economy in Venezuela, once the strongest in the region, became ruined.

Mexico

It is a type of political paralysis which seems to prevent Mexico from getting over the hump needed to achieve a level of dynamism and innovation within their economy. The multi-party system inhibits the enactment of progressive change as there are always those that want to see someone and their policies fail.

Given AMLO is now the president of Mexico, I found the extended background on him to be very interesting. While clearly a passionate politician able to mobilize a large support based – the picture presented does not inspire the sort of confidence required in the age of globalization.

Oppenheimer’s analysis of UNAM – the Autonomous University of Mexico was for me – a former professor and someone that takes professionalization standards seriously – quite shocking. That there are schools within this university – such as the social and political sciences – that categorically refuse to engage with accreditation organizations or professional review boards would be amusing as an example of hubris were it not for the fact that it’s so sad that so much money is wasted as Mexico – unlike Communist China – subsidizes it’s students. Perhaps this is why UNAM students are described as needing more years to graduate college than other countries. More than that, the country is not preparing their population neither for the needs of the knowledge economy NOR for that of the industries which provide high wages – the university graduates 15 times as many therapists as petroleum engineers.

Latin America

One of Oppenheimer’s recurring pieces of advice, which is echoed by his numerous interlocutors involved in the institutional bodies being described, are the benefits of supranational bodies in assisting with political and economic policies. In the populist rhetoric of Latin America this is viewed as the giving up of sovereignty, a preciously valued concept for el pueblo – but the fact that those that have done this are those within the opening success stories seems to be a fact lost on Nationalists and Bolivarians alike.

Regional agreements, such as MercoSur, are agreed upon but according to conditions that removes the capacity to lead to dynamic economic growth. Political support is to be found between nations, but it’s not to reinforce stability and to ensure the rule of law but done by Chavez in order to create pockets of politicians dependent on his largesse and good intentions – which he does not have.

In short, while trade agreements may change – the knowledge economy is now recognized as one of the primary drivers for economic growth and the Latin American focus on the past isn’t helping it have a clear vision for the future. In a geopolitical context where those able to demonstrate their capacity to add value to companies through their knowledge will flee to countries that value such skills, modern governments need to both help create more of such people and provide incentives to stay and apply themselves within their nation of birth. Access to resources and low wages are no longer sufficient – but are sometimes seen as a reason to avoid foreign investment. After all, if you wanted to invest in a research park or a factory that required a large number of complex, technical tasks to complete, where would you invest: Finland, which has 5,000 scientists per million people, or Argentina – with only 712, or Chile with 370 or Mexico, with 225. Given the trajectory of Revolution 4.0, Latin America – they face the choice of rapidly playing catch up or seeing themselves unable to do anything other than provide primary goods or produce light-manufacturing.