Notes from Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Criminalized States in Latin America – An Emerging Tier-One National Security Priority

Douglas Farah is an American journalist, national security consultant, a Senior Fellow of Financial Investigations and Transparency at the International Assessment of Strategy Center and also an adjunct fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Farah served as United Press International bureau chief in El Salvador from 1985 to 1987, and a freelance journalist for The Washington Post, Newsweek, and other publications until being hired as a staff correspondent for The Washington Post in 1992.

These are notes from his monograph published by the Strategic Studies Institute Monograph Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Criminalized States in Latin America – An Emerging Tier-One National Security Priority in August of 2012.

NOTES

The emergence of new hybrid (state and nonstate) transnational criminal and terrorist franchises in Latin America poses a tier-one security threat for the United States. These organizations operate under broad state protection and undermine democratic governance, sovereignty, growth, trade, and stability.

Leaders of these organizations share a publicly articulated doctrine to employ asymmetric warfare against the United States and its allies that explicitly endorses the use of WMD as a legitimate tactic.

illicit forces in Latin America within criminalized states have begun using tactical operations centers as a means of pursuing their view of statecraft. That brings new elements to the “dangerous spaces” where nonstate actors intersect with regions characterized by weak sovereignty and alternative governance systems. This new dynamic fundamentally alters the structure underpinning global order.

Being capable of understanding and mitigating this threat requires a whole-of-government approach, including collection, analysis, law enforcement, policy, and programming. The traditional state/nonstate dichotomy is no longer useful for an adequate illumination of these problems. Similarly, the historical divide between transnational organized crime and terrorism is becoming increasingly irrelevant.

TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORISM, AND CRIMINALIZED STATES IN LATIN AMERICA: AN EMERGING TIER-ONE NATIONAL SECURITY PRIORITY

INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL FRAMEWORK

The Changing Nature of the Threat.

The purpose of this monograph is to identify and discuss the role played by transnational organized crime groups (TOCs) in Latin America, and the inter- play of these groups with criminalizing state structures, “stateless” regions, extra-regional actors, and the multiple networks that exploit them. It particularly focuses on those areas that pose, or potentially pose, a threat to U.S. interests at home and abroad; and, it can be used as a model for understanding similar threats in other parts of the world.

This emerging combination of threats comprises a hybrid of criminal-terrorist, and state and nonstate franchises, combining multiple nations acting in concert, and traditional TOCs and terrorist groups acting as proxies for the nation-states that sponsor them. These hybrid franchises should now be viewed as a tier-one security threat for the United States. Under- standing and mitigating the threat requires a whole- of-government approach, including collection, analysis, law enforcement, policy, and programming. No longer is the state/nonstate dichotomy useful in illuminating these problems, just as the TOC/terrorism divide is increasingly disappearing.

These franchises operate in, and control, specific geographic territories which allow them to function in a relatively safe environment. These pipelines, or recombinant chains of networks, are highly adaptive and able to move a multiplicity of illicit products (cocaine, weapons, humans, and bulk cash) that ultimately cross U.S. borders undetected thousands of times each day. The actors along the pipeline form and dis- solve alliances quickly, occupy both physical and cyber space, and use both highly developed and modern institutions, including the global financial system, as well as ancient smuggling routes and methods.

This totals to some $6.2 trillion— fully 10 percent of the world’s GDP, placing it behind only the United States and the European Union (EU), but well ahead of China, in terms of global GDP ranking.1 Other estimates of global criminal proceeds range from a low of about 4 percent to a high of 15 percent of global GDP.

Latin American networks now extend not only to the United States and Canada, but outward to Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, and Asia, where they have begun to form alliances with other networks. A clear understanding of how these rela- tionships evolve, and the relative benefits derived from the relationships among and between state and nonstate actors, will greatly enhance the understand- ing of this new hybrid threat.

 

There is no universally accepted definition of “transnational organized crime.” Here it is defined as, at a minimum, serious crimes or offenses spanning at least one border, undertaken by self-perpetuating associations of individuals who cooperate transnationally, motivated primarily by the desire to obtain a financial or other material benefit and/or power and influence.3 This definition can encompass a number of vitally important phenomena not usually addressed by studies of TOC:

  • A spectrum or continuum of state participation in TOC, ranging from strong but “criminalized” states to weak and “captured” states, with various intermediate stages of state criminal behavior.
  • A nexus between TOCs on the one hand, and terrorist and insurgent groups on the other, with a shifting balance between terrorist and criminal activity on both sides of the divide.
  • Recombinant networks of criminal agents, potentially including not only multiple TOCs, but also terrorist groups as well as states and proxies.
  • Enduring geographical “pipelines” for moving various kinds of commodities and illicit profits in multiple directions, to and from a major destination.
  • We have also crafted this definition to be broadly inclusive: It can potentially encompass the virtual world of TOC, e.g., cybercrime;
  • It can be applied to other regions; the recombinant pipelines and networks model offers an analytical framework which can be applied to multiple regions and circumstances.

 

The term criminalized state” used in this mono- graph refers to states where the senior leadership is aware of and involved—either actively or through passive acquiescence—on behalf of the state in trans- national criminal enterprises, where TOC is used as an instrument of statecraft, and where levers of state power are incorporated into the operational structure of one or more TOC groups.

New Actors in Latin American TOC-State Relations.

Significant TOC organizations, principally drug trafficking groups, have posed serious challenges for U.S. security since the rise of the Medellín cartel in the early 1980s, and the growth of the Mexican drug trafficking organizations in the 1990s. In addition, Latin America has a long history of revolutionary movements, from the earliest days of independence, to the Marxist movements that sprouted up across the region in the 1960s to 1980s. Within this context, these groups often served as elements of governance, primarily to advance or defeat the spread of Marxism in the region. These Marxist revolutions were victorious in Cuba and Nicaragua, which, in turn, became state sponsors of external revolutionary movements, themselves relying on significant economic and military support from the Soviet Union and its network of aligned states’ intelligence and security services.

With the end of the Cold War, the negotiated end to numerous armed conflicts (the Farabund Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN] in El Salvador; the Contra rebels in Nicaragua; the Popular Liberation Army [EPL], M-19, and other small groups in Colom- bia), and the collapse of Marxism, most of the armed groups moved into the democratic process. However, this was not true for all groups, and armed nonstate groups are again being sponsored in Latin America under the banner of the “Bolivarian Revolution.”4

Other states that traditionally have had little inter- est or influence in Latin America have emerged over the past decade, primarily at the invitation of the self- described Bolivarian states seeking to establish 21st- century socialism. This bloc of nations—led by Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, also including Rafael Correa of Ecuador, Evo Morales of Bolivia, and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua—seeks to break the traditional ties of the region to the United States. To this end, the Bolivar- ian alliance has formed numerous organizations and military alliances—including a military academy in Bolivia to erase the vestiges of U.S. military training— which explicitly exclude the United States.

Over the past decade, China’s trade with Latin America has jumped from $10 billion to $179 billion.11 With the increased presence has come a significantly enhanced Chinese intelligence capacity and access across Latin America. At the same time, Chinese Triads—modern remnants of ancient Chinese secret societies that evolved into criminal organizations—are now operating extensive money laundering services for drug trafficking organizations via Chinese banks.

China also has shown a distinct willingness to bail out financially strapped authoritarian governments if the price is right. For example, China lent Venezuela $20 billion, in the form of a joint venture with a company to pump crude oil that China then locked up for a decade at an average price of about $18 a barrel. The money came as Chávez was facing a financial crisis, rolling blackouts, and a severe liquidity shortage across the economy.12 Since then, China has extended several other significant loans to Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia.

The dynamics of the relationship between China and the Bolivarian bloc and its nonstate proxies will be one of the key determinants of the future of Latin America and the survival of the Bolivarian project. Without significant material support from China, the economic model of the Bolivarian alliance will likely collapse under its own weight of statist inefficiency and massive corruption, despite being richly endowed with natural resources.

Chinese leaders likely understand that any real replacement of the Bolivarian structure leadership by truly democratic forces could result in a significant loss of access to the region, and a cancellation of existing contracts. This, in turn, gives China an incentive to continue to support some form of the Bolivarian project going forward, even if ailing leaders such as Chávez and Fidel Castro are no longer on the scene.

While there have been criminalized states in the past (the García Meza regime of “cocaine colonels” in Bolivia in 1980, and Desi Bouterse in Suriname in the 1980s, for ex- ample), what is new with the Bolivarian structure is the simultaneous and mutually supporting merger of state with TOC activities across multiple state and nonstate platforms. While García Meza, Bouterse, and others were generally treated as international pariahs with little outside support, the new criminalized states offer each other economic, diplomatic, political, and military support that shields them from international isolation and allows for mutually reinforcing structures to be built.

Rather than operating in isolation, these groups have complex but significant interaction with each other, based primarily on the ability of each actor or set of actors to provide a critical service while profiting mutually from the transactions.

While not directly addressing the threat from criminalized states, the Strategy notes that:

  • TOC penetration of states is deepening and leading to co-option in some states and weakening of governance in many others. TOC net- works insinuate themselves into the political process through bribery and in some cases have become alternate providers of governance, security, and livelihoods to win popular support. The nexus in some states among TOC groups and elements of government—including intelligence services and personnel—and big business figures, threatens the rule of law.
  • TOC threatens U.S. economic interests and can cause significant damage to the world financial system by subverting legitimate markets. The World Bank estimates that about $1 trillion is spent each year to bribe public officials. TOC groups, through their state relationships, could gain influence over strategic markets.
  • Terrorists and insurgents increasingly are turn- ing to crime and criminal networks for funding and logistics. In fiscal year (FY) 2010, 29 of the 63 top drug trafficking organizations identified by the Department of Justice had links to terror- ist organizations. While many terrorist links to TOC are opportunistic, this nexus is dangerous, especially if it leads a TOC network to facilitate the transfer of WMD material to terrorists.17

Stewart Patrick and others correctly argue that, contrary to the predominant thinking that emerged immediately after September 11, 2001 (9/11) (i.e., failed states are a magnet for terrorist organizations), failed or nonfunctional states are actually less attractive to terrorist organizations and TOC groups than “weak but functional” states.18 But there is another category, perhaps the most attractive of all to TOC and terrorist groups they are allied with: strong and functional states that participate in TOC activities.

The Unrecognized Role of the Criminalized States.

While it is true that TOC penetration of the state threatens the rule of law, as the administration’s strategy notes, it also poses significant new threats to the homeland. Criminalized states frequently use TOCs as a form of statecraft, bringing new elements to the dangerous spaces where nonstate actors intersect with regions of weak sovereignty and alternative governance systems.19 This fundamentally alters the structure of global order.

As the state relationships consolidate, the recombinant criminal-terrorist pipelines become more rooted and thus more dangerous. Rather than being pursued by state law enforcement and intelligence services in an effort to impede their activities, TOC groups (and perhaps terrorist groups) are able to operate in a more stable, secure environment, something that most businesses, both licit and illicit, crave.

Rather than operating on the margins of the state or seeking to co-opt small pieces of the state machinery, the TOC groups in this construct operate in concert with the state on multiple levels. Within that stable environment, a host of new options open, from the sale of weapons, to the use of national aircraft and ship- ping registries, to easy use of banking structures, to the use of national airlines and shipping lines to move large quantities of unregistered goods, and the acquisition of diplomatic passports and other identification means.

Examples of the benefits of a criminal state can be seen across the globe. For example, the breakaway republic of Transnistria, near Moldova, known as “Europe’s Black Hole,” is a notorious weapons trafficking center from which dozens of surface-to-air missiles have disappeared; it is run by former Russian secret police (KGB) officials.

The FARC needs to move cocaine to U.S. and European markets in order to obtain the money necessary to maintain its army of some 9,000 troops. In order to do that, the FARC, with the help of tra- ditional drug trafficking organizations, must move its product through Central America and Mexico to the United States—the same route used by those who want to move illegal aliens to the United States, and those who want to move bulk cash shipments, stolen cars, and weapons from the United States southward. All of these goods traverse the same territory, pass through the same gatekeepers, and are often inter- changeable along the way. A kilo of cocaine can be traded for roughly one ton of AK-47 assault rifles before either of the goods reaches what would normally be its final destination.

Though the presence of a state government (as op- posed to its absence) is ordinarily considered to be a positive situation, the presence of the state is beneficial or positive only if it meets the needs of its people. If the state, as it is in many parts of Latin America and many other parts of the world, is present but is viewed, with good reason, as corrupt, incompetent, and/or predatory, then its presence is not beneficial in terms of creating state strength or state capacity. In fact, where the state is strongest but least accountable for abuses, people often prefer nonstate actors to exercise authority.25

This has led to an underlying conceptual problem in much of the current literature describing regions or territories as “governed” or “ungoverned,” a frame- work that presents a false dichotomy suggesting that the lack of state presence means a lack of a governing authority. “Ungoverned spaces” connotes a lawless region with no controlling authority. In reality, the stateless regions in question almost always fall under the control of nonstate actors who have sufficient force or popular support (or a mixture of both), to impose their decisions and norms, thus creating alternate power structures that directly challenge the state, or that take the role of the state in its absence.

The notion of ungoverned spaces can be more broadly applied to legal, functional, virtual, and social arenas that either are not regulated by states or are contested by non-state actors and spoilers.26

THE NATURE OF THE THREAT IN THE AMERICAS

Old Paradigms Are Not Enough.

Control of broad swaths of land by these nonstate groups in Latin America not only facilitates the movement of illegal products, both northward and south- ward, through transcontinental pipelines, but also undermines the stability of an entire region of great strategic interest to the United States.

The traditional threat is broadly understood to be posed by the illicit movement of goods (drugs, money, weapons, and stolen cars), people (human traffic, gang members, and drug cartel enforcers), and the billions of dollars these illicit activities generate in an area where states have few resources and little legal or law enforcement capacity .

As Moisés Naim wrote:

Ultimately, it is the fabric of society which is at stake. Global illicit trade is sinking entire industries while boosting others, ravaging countries and sparking booms, making and breaking political careers, desta- bilizing some governments and propping up others.27

The threat increases dramatically with the nesting of criminal/terrorist groups within governments that are closely aligned ideologically, such as Iran and the Bolivarian states in Latin America, and that are identified sponsors of designated terrorist groups, including those that actively participate in the cocaine trafficking trade.

While Robert Killebrew28 and Max Manwaring29 make compelling cases that specific parts of this dangerous cocktail could be defined as insurgencies (narco-insurgency in Mexico and gangs in Central America, respectively), the new combination of TOC, criminalized states, and terrorist organizations presents a new reality that breaks the traditional paradigms.

While Mexico is not the focus of this monograph, the regional convulsions from Mexico through Central America are not viewed as a narco-insurgency. Instead, this hybrid mixture of groups with a variety of motives, including those engaged in TOC, insurgencies, and criminalized states with a declared hatred for the United States, is something new and in many ways more dangerous than a traditional insurgency.

The New Geopolitical Alignment.

The visible TOC threats are only a part of the geo- strategic threats to the United States emerging from Latin America’s current geopolitical alignment. The criminalized states are already extending their grip on power through strengthened alliances with hostile outside state and quasi-state actors such as Iran and Hezbollah. The primary unifying theme among these groups is a deep hatred for the United States.

they have carried out a similar pattern of rewriting the constitution to concentrate powers in the executive and to allow for unlimited reelection; a systematic takeover of the judiciary by the executive and the subsequent criminalizing of the opposition through vaguely worded laws and constitutional amendments that make it illegal to oppose the revolution; systematic attacks on independent news media, and the use of criminal libel prosecutions to silence media critics; and, overall, the increasing criminalization of the state. These measures are officially justified as necessary to ensure the revolution can be carried out without U.S. “lackeys” sabotaging it.

The Model: Recombinant Networks and Geographical Pipelines.

To understand the full significance of the new geopolitical reality in Latin America, it is necessary to think in terms of the geopolitics of TOC. Because of the clandestine nature of the criminal and terrorist activities, designed to be as opaque as possible, one must start from the assumption that, whatever is known of specific operations along the criminal-terrorist pipeline, or whatever combinations of links are seen, represents merely a snapshot in time, not a video of continuing events. Moreover, it is often out of date by the time it is assessed.

Nonstate armed actors as treated in this mono- graph are defined as:

  • Terrorist groups, motivated by religion, politics, ethnic forces, or at times, even by financial considerations;
  • Transnational criminal organizations, both structured and disaggregated, including third generation gangs as defined by Manwaring;35
  • Militias that control “black hole” or “stateless” sectors of one or more national territories; Insurgencies, which have more well-defined and specific political aims within a particular national territory, but may operate from out- side of that national territory.

“In some cases, the terrorists simply imitate the criminal behavior they see around them, borrowing techniques such as credit card fraud and extortion in a phenomenon we refer to as activity appropriation. This is a shared approach rather than true interaction, but it often leads to more intimate connections within a short time.” This can evolve into a more symbiotic relationship, which in turn can (but many do not) turn into hybrid groups.38

While the groups that overlap in different networks are not necessarily allies, and in fact occasionally are enemies, they often can and do make alliances of convenience that are short-lived and shifting. Even violent drug cartels, which regularly engage in bloody turf battles, also frequently engage in truces and alliances, although most end when they are no longer mutually beneficial or the balance of power shifts among them.

Another indication of the scope of the emerging alliances is the dramatic rise of Latin American drug trafficking organizations operating in West Africa, for onward shipment to Western Europe. Among the drug trafficking organizations found to be working on the ground in West Africa are the FARC, Mexican drug cartels, Colombian organizations, and Italian organized crime. It is worth bearing in mind that al- most every major load of cocaine seized in West Africa in recent years has been traced to Venezuela as the point of origin.

This overlapping web of networks was described in a July 2010 federal indictment from the Southern District of New York, which showed that drug trafficking organizations in Colombia and Venezuela, including the FARC, had agreed to move several multi-ton loads of cocaine through Liberia en route to Europe.

The head of Liberian security forces, who is also the son of the president, negotiated the transshipment deals with a Colombian, a Russian, and three West Africans.

On December 8, 2011, it aired footage of the Iranian ambassador in Mexico urging a group of Mexican university students who were hackers to launch broad cyber attacks against U.S. defense and intelligence facilities, claiming such an attack would be “bigger than 9/11.”

Geographical “Pipelines.”

The central feature binding together these disparate organizations and networks which, in aggregate, make up the bulk of nonstate armed actors, is the in- formal (meaning outside legitimate state control and competence) “pipeline” or series of overlapping pipe- lines that these operations need to move products, money, weapons, personnel, and goods. The pipelines often form well-worn, customary, geographical routes and conduits developed during past conflicts, or traditionally used to smuggle goods without paying taxes to the state. Their exploitation by various communities, organizations, and networks yields recognizable patterns of activity.

The geography of the pipelines may be seen as both physical (i.e., terrain and topography), and human (i.e., historical and sociological patterns of local criminal activity).

These regions may develop their own cultures that accept what the state considers to be illicit activities as normal and desirable. This is especially true in areas where the state has been considered an enemy for generations.

The criminal pipeline itself is often a resource in dispute, and one of the primary sources of violence. Control of the pipeline can dramatically alter the relative power among different trafficking groups, as has been seen in the ongoing war between the Juarez and Sinaloa cartels in Mexico.47 Because of the lucrative nature of control of the actual physical space of the pipeline, these types of conflicts are increasingly carried out in gruesome fashion in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.

These states are not collapsing. They risk becoming shell-states: sovereign in name, but hollowed out from the inside by criminals in collusion with corrupt officials in the government and the security services. This not only jeopardizes their survival, it poses a serious threat to regional security because of the trans-national nature of the crimes.

CRIMINALIZING STATES AS NEW REGIONAL ACTORS

While nonstate actors make up the bulk of criminal agents engaged in illicit activities, state actors play an increasingly important yet under-reported role. That role pertains in part to the availability of pipeline territory, and in part to the sponsorship and even direction of criminal activity. TOC groups can certainly exploit the geographical vulnerabilities of weak or failing states, but they also thrive on the services provided by stronger states.

There are traditional categories for describing state performance as developed by Robert Rotberg and others in the wake of state failures at the end of the Cold War. The premise is that that “nation-states fail because they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants.”52 These categories are:

  • Strong, i.e., able to control its territory and offer quality political goods to its people;
  • Weak, i.e., filled with social tensions, the state has only a limited monopoly on the use of force;
  • Failed, i.e., in a state of conflict with a preda- tory ruler, with no state monopoly on the use of force;
  • Collapsed, i.e., no functioning state institutions and a vacuum of authority.

This conceptualization, while useful, is extremely limited, as is the underlying premise. It fails to make a critical distinction between countries where the state has little or no power in certain areas and may be fighting to assert that control, and countries where the government, in fact, has a virtual monopoly on power and the use of force, but turns the state into a functioning criminal enterprise for the benefit of a small elite.

The 4-tier categorization also suffers from a significant omission with regard to geographical areas of operation rather than criminal actors. The model pre- supposes that stateless regions are largely confined within the borders of a single state.

 

State absence can be the product of a successful bid for local dominance by TOC groups, but it can also result from a perception on the part of the local population that the state poses a threat to their communities, livelihoods, or interests.

 

 

A 2001 Naval War College report insightfully described some of the reasons in terms of “commercial” and “political” in- surgencies. These are applicable to organized criminal groups as well and have grown in importance since then:

The border zones offer obvious advantages for political and economic insurgencies. Political insurgents prefer to set up in adjacent territories that are poorly integrated, while the commercial insurgents favor active border areas, preferring to blend in amid business and government activity and corruption. The border offers a safe place to the political insurgent and easier access to communications, weapons, provisions, transport, and banks.

For the commercial insurgency, the frontier creates a fluid, trade-friendly environment. Border controls are perfunctory in ‘free trade’ areas, and there is a great demand for goods that are linked to smuggling, document fraud, illegal immigration, and money laundering.

For the political insurgency, terrain and topography often favor the narco-guerilla. Jungles permit him to hide massive bases and training camps, and also laboratories, plantations, and clandestine runways. The Amazon region, huge and impenetrable, is a clear example of the shelter that the jungle areas give. On all of Colombia’s borders—with Panama, Ecuador, Brazil, and Venezuela—jungles cloak illegal activity.

The Weak State-Criminal State Continuum.

One may array the degree of state control of, or par- ticipation in, criminal activity along a spectrum (see Figure 2). At one end are strong but criminal states, with the state acting as a TOC element or an important component of a TOC group.

In Latin America, the government of Suriname (formerly Dutch Guiana) in the 1980s and early 1990s under Desi Bouterse, a convicted drug trafficker with strong ties to the FARC, was (and perhaps still is) an operational player in an ongoing criminal enterprise and benefited from it.

Bouterse’s only public defender in the region is Hugo Chávez of Venezuela.

Again, the elements of TOC as statecraft can be seen. Chávez reportedly funded Bouterse’s improbable electoral comeback in Suriname, funneling money to his campaign and hosting him in Venezuela on several visits.60 While no other heads of state accepted Bouterse’s invitation to attend his inauguration, Chávez did, although he had to cancel at the last minute. In recompense, he promised to host Bouterse on a state visit to Venezuela.

One of the key differences between the Bolivarian alliance and earlier criminalized states in the region is the mutually reinforcing structure of the alliance. While other criminalized states have been widely viewed as international pariahs and broadly shunned, thus hastening their demise, the new Bolivarian structures unite several states in a joint, if loosely-knit, criminal enterprise. This ensures these mutually sup- porting regimes can endure for much longer.

At the other end are weak and captured states, where certain nodes of governmental authority, whether local or central, have been seized by TOCs, who in turn are the primary beneficiaries of the proceeds from the criminal activity. Penetration of the state usually centers on one or more of three functions: judiciary (to ensure impunity), border control and customs (to ensure the safe passage of persons and goods), and legislature (to codify the structures necessary to TOC organizations, such as a ban on extradition, weak asset forfeiture laws, etc.). It also is more local in its focus, rather than national.

Typically, TOC elements aim at dislodging the state from local territory, rather than assuming the role of the state in overall political authority across the country. As Shelley noted, “Older crime groups, often in long-established states, have developed along with their states and are dependent on existing institution- al and financial structures to move their products and invest their profits.”

By definition, insurgents aim to wrest political control from the state and transfer it to their own leadership.

“Captured states” are taken hostage by criminal organizations, often through intimidation and threats, giving the criminal enterprise access to some parts of the state apparatus. Guatemala would be an example: the government lacks control of roughly 60 percent of the national territory, with the cartels enjoying local power and free access to the border; but the central government itself is not under siege.

In the middle range between the extremes, more criminalized cases include participation in criminal activity by state leaders, some acting out of personal interest, others in the interest of financing the services or the ideology of the state. A variant of this category occurs when a functioning state essentially turns over, or “franchises out” part of its territory to non- state groups to carry out their own agenda with the blessing and protection of the central government or a regional power. Both state and nonstate actors share in the profits and proceeds from criminal activity thus generated. Venezuela under Hugo Chávez is perhaps the clearest example of this model in the region, given his relationship with the FARC.

Hugo Chávez and the FARC: The Franchising Model.

Chávez’s most active support for the FARC came after the FARC had already become primarily a drug trafficking organization vice political insurgency. The FARC has also traditionally earned considerable income (and wide international condemnation) from the kidnapping for ransom of hundreds of individuals, in violation of the Geneva Convention and other international conventions governing armed conflicts. It was impossible, by the early part of the 21st century, to separate support for the FARC from support for TOC, as these two activities were the insurgent group’s primary source of income.

Chávez had cultivated a relationship with the FARC long before becoming president. As one recent study of internal FARC documents noted:

When Chávez became president of Venezuela in February 1999, FARC had not only enjoyed a relationship with him for at least some of the previous seven years but had also penetrated and learned how to best use Venezuelan territory and politics, manipulating and building alliances with new and traditional Venezuelan political sectors, traversing the Colombia-Venezuela border in areas ranging from coastal desert to Amazonian jungle and building cooperative relation- ships with the Venezuelan armed forces. Once Chávez was inaugurated, Venezuelan border security and foreign policies shifted in the FARC’s favor.67

Perhaps the strongest public evidence of the importance of Venezuela to the FARC is the public fingering of three of Chávez’s closest advisers and senior government officials by the U.S Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

OFAC said the three—Hugo Armando Carvajál, director of Venezuelan Military Intelligence; Henry de Jesus Rangél, director of the Venezuelan Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Services; and Ramón Emilio Rodriguez Chacín, former minister of justice and former minister of interior—were responsible for “materially supporting the FARC, a narco-terrorist organization.” It specifically accused Carvajál and Rangél of protecting FARC cocaine shipments moving through Venezuela, and said Rodriguez Chacín, who resigned his government position just a few days before the designations, was the “Venezuelan government’s main weapons contact for the FARC.”

According to the U.S. indictment against him, Makled exported at least 10 tons of cocaine a month to the United States by keeping more than 40 Venezuelan generals and senior government officials on his payroll. “All my business associates are generals. The highest,” Makled said. “I am telling you, we dis- patched 300,000 kilos of coke. I couldn’t have done it without the top of the government.”75 What added credibility to Makled’s claims were the documents he presented showing what appear to be the signatures of several generals and senior Ministry of Interior officials accepting payment from Makled. “I have enough evidence to justify the invasion of Venezuela” as a criminal state, he said.76

The FARC and Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua.

Since the electoral victories of Correa in Ecuador and Morales in Bolivia, and the re-election of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, their governments have actively supported FARC rebels in their war of more than 4 decades against the Colombian state, as well as significant drug trafficking activities.77 While Ecuador and Venezuela have allowed their territory to be used for years as rear guard and transshipment stations for the FARC and other drug trafficking organizations, Bolivia has become a recruitment hub and safe haven; and Nicaragua, a key safe haven and weapons procurement center. In addition, several senior members of both the Correa and Morales administrations have been directly implicated in drug trafficking incidents, showing the complicity of the state in the criminal enterprises.

In Bolivia, the Morales government, which has maintained cordial ties with the FARC at senior levels,78 has, as noted, faced an escalating series of drug trafficking scandals at the highest levels.79 It is worth noting that Alvaro García Linera, the nation’s vice president and a major power center in the Morales administration, was a member of the armed Tupac Katari Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupak Katari [MRTK]), an ally of the FARC, and served several years in prison.

An analysis of the Reyes computer documents concluded that the FARC donated several hundred thousand dollars to Correa’s campaign,84 a conclusion drawn by other national and international investigations.85 The Reyes documents show senior Ecuadoran officials meeting with FARC commanders and offering to remove certain commanders in the border region so the FARC would not be under so much pressure on the Ecuadoran side.

A closer friend, at least for a time, was Hugo Mol- dis, who helped found the MAS and has been one of the movement’s intellectual guides, and was seriously considered for senior cabinet positions. Instead, he was given the job as leader of the government-backed confederation of unions and social groups called the “People’s High Command” (Estado Mayor del Pueblo [EMP]),93 and he maintains a fairly high profile as journalist and writer for several Marxist publications.

The EMP was one of the principal vehicles of the MAS and its supporters in forcing the 2003 resignation of the government of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, and Morales, as president, named it the organization responsible for giving social movements a voice in the government.

Moldiz told the group that “our purpose is to defend the government, defend the political process of change, which we have conquered with blood, strikes, marches, sacrifice, and pain. Our main enemy is called United States imperialism and the Bolivian oligarchy.”95

The Regional Infrastructure.

Brazil and Peru, while not actively supporting the FARC, have serious drug trafficking issues to contend with on their own and exercise little real control over their border regions. Despite this geographic and geopolitical reality, Colombia has undertaken a costly and somewhat successful effort to reestablish state control in many long-abandoned regions of its own national territory. Yet the Colombian experience offers an object lesson in the limits of what can be done even if the political will exists and if significant national treasure is invested in reestablishing a positive state presence. Once nonstate actors have established uncontested authority over significant parts of the national territory, the cost of recouping control and establishing a functional state presence is enormous.

It becomes even more costly when criminal/terrorist groups such as the FARC become instruments of regional statecraft. The FARC has been using its ideological affinity with Correa, Morales, Chávez, and Nicaragua’s Ortega to press for a change in status to “belligerent group” in lieu of terrorist entity or simple insurgency. “Belligerent” status is a less pejorative term and brings certain international protections.

the FARC and its political arm, the Continental Bolivarian Movement (Movimiento Continental Bolivariano[MCB] discussed below), has become a vehicle for a broader-based alliance of nonstate armed groups seeking to end the traditional democratic representative government model and replace it with an ideology centered on Marxism, anti-globalization, and anti-United States.

…not all states are criminal, not all TOCs are engaged in terrorism or collude with terrorist groups, and not all terrorist groups conduct criminal activities. The overlap between all three groups constitutes a small but highly dangerous subset of cases, and ap- plies most particularly to the Bolivarian states.

The TOC-Terrorist State Alliance.

At the center of the nexus of the Bolivarian move- ment with TOC, terrorism, and armed revolution is the FARC, and its political wing, the Continental Boli- varian Coordinator (Coordinadora Continental Bolivari- ana [CCB]), a continental political movement founded in 2003, funded and directed by the FARC. In 2009, the CCB officially changed its name to the MCB to re- flect its growth across Latin America. For purposes of consistency, we refer to the organization as the CCB throughout this monograph.

In a November 24, 2004, letter from Raúl Reyes, the FARC’s second-in-command, to another member of the FARC General Secretariat, he laid out the FARC’s role in the CCB, as well as the Chávez government’s role, in the following unambiguous terms:

The CCB has the following structure: an executive, some chapters by region . . . and a “foreign legion.” Headquarters: Caracas. It has a newspaper called “Correo Bolivariano,” [Bolivarian Mail] and Internet site and an FM radio station heard throughout Caracas. . . . This is an example of coordinated struggle for the creation of the Bolivarian project. We do not exclude any forms of struggle. It was founded in Fuerte Tiuna in Caracas. [Author’s Note: Fuerte Tiuna is the main government military and intelligence center in Venezuela, and this is a clear indication that the Venezuelan government fully supported the founding of the organization.] The political ammunition and the leadership is provided by the FARC. 97

According to an internal FARC report dated March 11, 2005, on the CCB’s activities in 2004, there were already active groups in Mexico, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Chile. International brigades from the Basque region of Spain, Italy, France, and Denmark were operational. Work was underway in Argentina, Guatemala, and Brazil. The number of organizations that were being actively coordinated by the CCB was listed at 63, and there were “political relations” with 45 groups and 25 institutions. The CCB database contained 500 e-mails.

Numerous other documents show that different Bolivarian governments directly supported the CCB, whose president is always the FARC leader.

The government of Rafael Correa in Ecuador of- ficially hosted the second congress of the organization in Quito in late February 2008. The meeting was at- tended by members of Peru’s Tupac Amaru Revolu- tionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru [MRTA]); the Mapuches and MIR of Chile; Spain’s ETA, and other terrorist and insurgent groups.

The 2009 meeting at which the CCB became the MCB was held in Caracas and the keynote address was given Alfonso Cano, the current FARC leader. Past FARC leaders are honorary presidents of the organization.101 This places the FARC—a well-identified drug trafficking organization with significant ties to the major Mexican drug cartels102 and a designated terrorist entity with a broad-based alliance that spans the globe—directly in the center of a state-sponsored project to fundamentally reshape Latin America and its political structure and culture.

The importance of the cocaine transit increase through Venezuela was documented by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, which estimates that the product transit rose fourfold from 2004 to 2007, from 60 metric tons to 240 metric tons.

Finally, the CCB, as a revolutionary meeting house for “anti-imperialist” forces around the world, provides the political and ideological underpinning and justification for the growing alliance among the Bolivarian states, again led by Chávez, and Iran, led by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Hezbollah’s influence extends to the nature of the war and diplomacy pursued by Chávez and his Bolivarian comrades. The franchising model strongly resembles the template pioneered by Hezbollah.

THE BOLIVARIAN AND IRANIAN REVOLUTIONS: THE TIES THAT BIND

The most common assumption among those who view the Iran-Bolivarian alliance as troublesome, and many do not view it as a significant threat at all, is that there are two points of convergence between the radical and reactionary theocratic Iranian government and the self-proclaimed socialist and progressive Bolivarian revolution.

These assumed points of convergence are: 1) an overt and often stated hatred for the United States and a shared belief in how to destroy a common enemy; and 2) a shared acceptance of authoritarian state structures that tolerate little dissent and encroach on all aspects of a citizen’s life.

While Iran’s revolutionary rulers view the 1979 revolution in theological terms as a miracle of divine intervention in which the United States, the Great Satan, was defeated, the Bolivarians view it from a secular point of view as a roadmap to defeat the United States as the Evil Empire. To both, it has strong political con- notations and serves as a model for how asymmetrical leverage, whether applied by Allah or humans, can conjure the equivalent of a David defeating a Goliath on the world stage.

Ortega has declared the Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions to be “twin revolutions, with the same objectives of justice, liberty, sovereignty and peace . . . despite the aggressions of the imperialist policies.” Ahmadinejad couched the alliances as part of “a large anti-imperialist movement that has emerged in the region.”

Among the first to articulate the possible merging of radical Shite Islamic thought with Marxist aspirations of destroying capitalism and U.S. hegemony was Illich Sánchez Ramirez, better known as the terrorist leader, “Carlos the Jackal,” a Venezuelan citizen who was, until his arrest in 1994, one of the world’s most wanted terrorists.

The emerging military doctrine of the “Bolivarian Revolution,” officially adopted in Venezuela and rapidly spreading to Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Ecuador, explicitly embraces the radical Islamist model of asymmetrical or “fourth generation warfare,” and its heavy reliance on suicide bombings and different types of terrorism, including the use of nuclear weapons and other WMD.

Chávez has adopted as his military doctrine the concepts and strategies articulated in Peripheral Warfare and Revolutionary Is- lam: Origins, Rules and Ethics of Asymmetrical Warfare (Guerra Periférica y el Islam Revolucionario: Orígenes, Reglas y Ética de la Guerra Asimétrica ) by the Spanish politician and ideologue, Jorge Verstrynge (see Figure 4).110 The tract is a continuation of and exploration of Sánchez Ramirez’s thoughts, incorporating an explicit endorsement of the use of WMD to destroy the United States. Verstrynge argues for the destruction of the United States through a series of asymmetrical attacks like those of 9/11, in the belief that the United States will simply crumble when its vast military strength cannot be used to combat its enemies.

Central to Verstrynge’s idealized view of terrorists is the belief in the sacredness of fighters sacrificing their lives in pursuit of their goals.

An Alliance of Mutual Benefit.

This ideological framework of a combined Marxism and radical Islamic methodology for successfully attacking the United States is an important, though little examined, underpinning for the greatly enhanced relationships among the Bolivarian states and Iran. These relationships are being expanded, absorbing significant resources despite the fact that there is little economic rationale to the ties and little in terms of legitimate commerce.

One need only look at how rapidly Iran has in- creased its diplomatic, economic, and intelligence presence in Latin America to see the priority it places on this emerging axis, given that it is an area where it has virtually no trade, no historic or cultural ties, and no obvious strategic interests. The gains, in financial institutions, bilateral trade agreements, and state visits (eight state visits between Chávez and Ahmadinejad alone since 2006), are almost entirely within the Bolivarian orbit; and, as noted, the Bolivarian states have jointly declared their intention to help Iran break international sanctions.

The most recent salvo by Iran is the launching of a Spanish language satellite TV station, HispanTV, aimed at Latin America. Bolivia and Venezuela are collaborating in producing documentaries for the station. Mohammed Sarafraz, deputy di- rector of international affairs, said Iran was “launching a channel to act as a bridge between Iran and the countries of Latin America [there being] a need to help familiarize Spanish-speaking citizens with the Iranian nation.” He said that HispanTV was launched with the aim of reinforcing cultural ties with the Spanish- speaking nations and helping to introduce the traditions, customs, and beliefs of the Iranian people.

What is of particular concern is that many of the bilateral and multilateral agreements signed between Iran and Bolivarian nations, such as the creation of a dedicated shipping line between Iran and Ecuador, or the deposit of $120 million by an internationally sanctioned Iranian bank into the Central Bank of Ecuador, are based on no economic rationale.

Iran, whose banks, including its central bank, are largely barred from the Western financial systems, benefits from access to the international financial mar- ket through Venezuelan, Ecuadoran, and Bolivian financial institutions, which act as proxies by moving Iranian money as if it originated in their own legal financial systems.120 Venezuela also agreed to provide Iran with 20,000 barrels of gasoline per day, leading to U.S. sanctions against the state petroleum company.

CONCLUSIONS

Latin America, while not generally viewed as part of the stateless regions phenomenon, or part of the failed state discussion, presents multiple threats that center on criminalized states, their hybrid alliance with extra-regional sponsors of terrorism, and nonstate TOC actors. The groups within this hybrid threat—often rivals, but willing to work in temporary alliances—are part of the recombinant criminal/terrorist pipeline, and their violence is often aimed at gaining control of specific territory or parts of that pipeline, either from state forces or other nonstate groups.

pipelines are seldom disrupted for more than a minimal amount of time, in part because the critical human nodes in the chain, and key chokepoints in the pipelines, are not identified, and the relationships among the different actors and groups are not under- stood adequately. As noted, pipelines are adaptable and versatile as to product—the epitome of modern management systems—often intersecting with formal commercial institutions (banks, commodity exchanges, legitimate companies, etc.), both in a physical and virtual/cyber manner, in ways difficult to determine, collect intelligence on, or disaggregate from protected commercial activities which may be both domestic and international in nature, with built-in legal and secrecy protections.

While the situation is already critical, it is likely to get worse quickly. There is growing evidence of Russian and Chinese organized crime penetration of the region, particularly in Mexico and Central America, greatly strengthening the criminal organizations and allowing them to diversify their portfolios and sup- ply routes—a particular example being precursor chemicals for the manufacture of methamphetamines and cocaine. The Chinese efforts to acquire ports, re- sources, and intelligence-gathering capacity in the region demonstrate just how quickly the situation can develop, given that China was not a major player in the region 5 years ago.

This is a new type of alliance of secular (self-proclaimed socialist and Marxist) and radical Islamist organizations with a common goal directly aimed at challenging and undermining the security of the United States and its primary allies in the region (Colombia, Chile, Peru, Panama, and Guatemala). This represents a fundamental change because both primary state allies in the alliance (the governments of Venezuela and Iran) host and support nonstate actors, allowing the nonstate actors to thrive in ways that would be impossible without state protection.

Under- standing how these groups develop, and how they relate to each other and to groups from outside the region, is vital—particularly given the rapid pace with which they are expanding their control across the continent, across the hemisphere, and beyond. Developing a predictive capacity can be done based only on a more realistic understanding of the shifting networks of actors exploiting the pipelines; the nature and location of the geographic space in which they operate; the critical nodes where these groups are most vulnerable; and their behaviors in adapting to new political and economic developments, market opportunities and setbacks, internal competition, and the countering actions of governments.

In turn, an effective strategy for combating TOC must rest on a solid foundation of regional intelligence which, while cognizant of the overarching transnational connections, remains sensitive to unique local realities behind seemingly ubiquitous behaviors. A one-size-fits-all policy will not suffice.

It is not a problem that is only, or primarily, a matter of state or regional security, narcotics, money laundering, terrorism, human smuggling, weakening governance, democracy reversal, trade and energy, counterfeiting and contraband, immigration and refugees, hostile states seeking advantage, or alterations in the military balance and alliances. It is increasingly a combination of all of these. It is a comprehensive threat that requires analysis and management within a comprehensive, integrated whole-of-government approach. At the same time, however expansive in global terms, a strategy based on geopolitics—the fundamental understanding of how human behavior relates to geo- graphic space—must always be rooted in the local.

ENDNOTES

  1. “Fact Sheet: Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,” Washington, DC: Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, July 25, 2011.
  2. On the lower end, the United Nations (UN) Office of Drugs and Crime estimate transnational organized crime (TOC) earn- ings for 2009 at $2.1 trillion, or 3.6 percent of global gross domes- tic product (GDP). Of that, typical TOC activities such as drug trafficking, counterfeiting, human trafficking, weapons traffick- ing, and oil smuggling, account for about $1 trillion or 1.5 per- cent of global GDP. For details, see “Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from Drug Trafficking and other Transnational Organized Crimes,” Washington, DC: UN Office of Drugs and Crime, September 2011. On the higher end, in a speech to Interpol in Singapore in 2009, U.S. Deputy Attorney General Ogden cited 15 percent of world GDP as total annual turnover of TOC. See Josh Meyer, “U.S. attorney general calls for global effort to fight organized crime,” Los Angeles Times, October 13, 2009, available from articles.latimes.com/print/2009/oct/13/nation/na-crime13.
  3. This definition is adapted from the 1998 UN Conven- tion on Transnational Organized Crime and Protocols Thereto, UNODC, Vienna, Austria; and the 2011 Strategy to Combat Trans- national Organized Crime, available from www.whitehouse.gov/ administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime/definition.
  4. The self-proclaimed “Bolivarian” states (Venezuela, Ecua- dor, Bolivia, and Nicaragua) take their name from Simón Bolivar, the revered 19th-century leader of South American independence from Spain. They espouse 21st-century socialism, a vague notion that is deeply hostile to free market reforms, to the United States as an imperial power, and toward traditional liberal democratic concepts, as will be described in detail.
  5. One of the most detailed cases involved the 2001 weapons transfers among Hezbollah operatives in Liberia, a retired Israeli officer in Panama, and a Russian weapons merchant in Guatema- la. A portion of the weapons, mostly AK-47 assault rifles, ended up with the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidads de Colombia [AUC]), a designated terrorist organization heavily involved in cocaine trafficking. The rest of the weapons, including anti-tank systems and anti-aircraft weapons, likely end- ed up with Hezbollah. For details, see Douglas Farah, Blood From Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror, New York: Broadway Books, 2004.
  6. For a detailed look at this development, see Antonio L. Mazzitelli, “The New Transatlantic Bonanza: Cocaine on High- way 10,” North Miami, FL: Western Hemisphere Security Analy- sis Center, Florida International University, March 2011.
  7. The FARC is the oldest insurgency in the Western hemi- sphere, launched in 1964 by Colombia’s Liberal Party militias, and enduring to the present as a self-described Marxist revolu- tionary movement. For a more detailed look at the history of the FARC, see Douglas Farah, “The FARC in Transition: The Fatal Weakening of the Western Hemisphere’s Oldest Guerrilla Move- ment,” NEFA Foundation, July 2, 2008, available from www.nefa- foundation.org/miscellaneous/nefafarc0708.pdf.
  8. These include recently founded Community of Latin Amer- ican and Caribbean States (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños [CELAC]), and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América [ALBA]).
  9. James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, “Un- classified Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” January 31, 2012, p. 6.
  10. For the most comprehensive look at Russian Organized Crime in Latin America, see Bruce Bagley, “Globalization, Ungov- erned Spaces and Transnational Organized Crime in the Western Hemisphere: The Russian Mafia,” paper prepared for Internation- al Studies Association, Honolulu, HI, March 2, 2005.
  11. Ruth Morris, “China: Latin America Trade Jumps,” Latin American Business Chronicle, May 9, 2011, available from www. latinbusinesschronicle.com/app/article.aspx?id=4893.
  12. Daniel Cancel, “China Lends Venezuela $20 Billion, Se- cures Oil Supply,” Bloomberg News Service, April 18, 2010. By the end of August 2011, Venezuela’s publicly acknowledged debt to China stood at some $36 billion, equal to the rest of its out- standing international debt. See Benedict Mander, “More Chinese Loans for Venezuela,” FT Blog, September 16, 2011, available from blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2011/09/16/more-chinese-loans-4bn- worth-for-venezuela/#axzz1Z3km4bdg.
  13. “Quito y Buenos Aires, Ciudades preferidas para narcos nigerianos” (“Quito and Buenos Aires, Favorite Cities of Narco Nigerians”), El Universo Guayaquil, Ecuador, January 3, 2011.
  14. Louise Shelley, “The Unholy Trinity: Transnational Crime, Corruption and Terrorism,” Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. XI, Issue 2, Winter/Spring 2005.
  15. National Security Council, “Strategy to Combat Trans- national Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security,” Washington, DC: Office of the President, July 2011. The Strategy grew out of a National Intelligence Estimate inititated by the Bush administration and completed in December 2008, and is a comprehensive government review of transnational organized crime, the first since 1995.
  16. “Fact Sheet: Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,” Washington, DC: Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, July 25, 2011.
  17. Ibid.
  18. Stewart Patrick, Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats and International Security, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011.
  19. The phrase “dangerous spaces” was used by Phil Williams to describe 21st-century security challenges in terms of spaces and gaps, including geographical, functional, social, economic, legal, and regulatory holes. See Phil Williams, “Here Be Dragons: Dan- gerous Spaces and International Security,” Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas eds., Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010, pp. 34-37.
  20. For a more complete look at Transnistria and an excellent overview of the global illicit trade, see Misha Glenny, McMafia: A Journey Through the Global Criminal Underworld, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008.
  21. For a complete look at the operations of Taylor, recently convicted in the Special Court for Sierra Leone in the Hague for crimes against humanity, see Douglas Farah, Blood From Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror, New York: Broadway Books, 2004.
  22. For a look at the weapons transfers, see “Los ‘rockets’ Venezolanos” Semana, Colombia, July 28, 2009. For a look at doc- umented financial and logistical support of Chávez and Correa for the FARC, see “The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador, and the Secret Archives of ‘Raúl Reyes,’” An IISS Strategic Dossier, Wash- ington, DC: International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2011. To see FARC connections to Evo Morales, see Douglas Farah, “Into the Abyss: Bolivia Under Evo Morales and the MAS,” Alex- andria, VA: International Assessment and Strategy Center, 2009.
  23. Douglas Farah, “Iran in Latin America: Strategic Security Issues,” Alexandria, VA: International Assessment and Strategy Center, Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concept Office, May 2011.
  24. Rem Korteweg and David Ehrhardt, “Terrorist Black Holes: A Study into Terrorist Sanctuaries and Governmental Weakness,” The Hague, The Netherlands: Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies, November 2005, p. 22.
  25. Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 1990. Jackson defines negative sovereignty as freedom from outside interference, the ability of a sovereign state to act in- dependently, both in its external relations and internally, towards its people. Positive sovereignty is the acquisition and enjoyment of capacities, not merely immunities. In Jackson’s definition, it presupposes “capabilities which enable governments to be their own masters” (p. 29). The absence of either type of sovereignty can lead to the collapse of or absence of state control.
  26. Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas eds., Ungov- erned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010, p. 19.
  27. Moises Naim, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copy- cats are Hijacking the Global Economy, New York: Anchor Books, 2006, p. 33.
  28. Robert Killebrew and Jennifer Bernal, “Crime Wars: Gangs, Cartels and U.S. National Security,” Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, September 2010, available from www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_CrimeWars_ KillebrewBernal_3.pdf.
  29. Max G. Manwaring, Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2005.
  30. As is true in much of Central America and Colombia, in Mexico there are centuries-old sanctuaries used by outlaws where the state had little authority. For a more complete explanation, see Gary Moore, “Mexico, the Un-failed State: A Geography Lesson,” InsightCrime, November 9, 2011, available from insight- crime.com/insight-latest-news/item/1820-mexico-the-un-failed-state-a- geography-lesson.
  31. For a look at the factors that led to the rise of the Bolivarian leaders, see Eduardo Gamarra, “Bolivia on the Brink: Center for Preventative Action, Council on Foreign Relations, February 2007; Cynthia J. Arnson et al., La Nueva Izquierda en América Latina: Derechos Humanos, Participación Política y Sociedad Civil (The New Left in Latin America: Human Rights, Political Participation and Civil Society), Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, January 2009; Farah, “Into the Abyss: Bolivia Under Evo Morales and the MAS”; Farah and Simpson.
  32. See “Iran to Help Bolivia Build Peaceful Nuclear Power Plant,” Xinhua, October 31, 2010; Russia Izvestia Information, September 30, 2008; and Agence France Presse, “Venezuela Wants to Work With Russia on Nuclear Energy: Chávez,” September 29, 2008.
  33. Author interview with IAEA member in November, 2011. The official said the agency had found that Iran possessed enough uranium stockpiled to last a decade. Moreover, he said the evidence pointed to acquisition of minerals useful in missile production. He also stressed that dual-use technologies or items specifically used in the nuclear program had often been shipped to Iran as automotive or tractor parts. Some of the principal investments Iran has made in the Bolivarian states have been in a tractor fac- tory that is barely operational, a bicycle factory that does not seem to produce bicycles, and automotive factories that have yet to be built.
  34. “Venezuela/Iran ALBA Resolved to Continue Economic Ties with Iran,” Financial Times Information Service, July 15, 2010.
  35. Manwaring.
  36. These typologies were developed and discussed more completely, including the national security implications of their growth, in Richard Shultz, Douglas Farah, and Itamara V. Lo- chard, “Armed Groups: A Tier-One Security Priority,” USAF Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, Occasional Paper 57, September 2004.
  37. Louise I. Shelley, John T. Picarelli et al., Methods and Mo- tives: Exploring Links between Transnational Organized Crime and International Terrorism, Washington, DC: Department of Justice, September 2005.
  38. Ibid., p. 5.
  39. While much of Operation TITAN remains classified, there has been significant open source reporting, in part because the Colombian government announced the most important arrests. For the most complete look at the case, see Jo Becker, “Investi- gation into bank reveals links to major South American cartels,” International Herald Tribune, December 15, 2011. See also Chris Kraul and Sebastian Rotella, “Colombian Cocaine Ring Linked to Hezbollah,” Los Angeles Times, October 22, 2008; and “Por Lavar Activos de Narcos y Paramilitares, Capturados Integrantes de Or- ganización Internatcional” (“Members of an International Orga- nization Captured for Laundering Money for Narcos and Parami- litaries”), Fiscalía General de la Republica (Colombia) (Attorney General’s Office of Colombia), October 21, 2008.
  40. Among the reasons for the increase in cocaine trafficking to Western Europe is the price. While the cost of a kilo of cocaine averages about $17,000 in the United States, it is $37,000 in the EU. Shipping via Africa is relatively inexpensive and relatively attractive, given the enhanced interdiction efforts in Mexico and the Caribbean. See Antonio Mazzitelli, “The Drug Trade: Africa’s Expanding Role,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, presentation at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, May 28, 2009.
  41. Benjamin Weiser and William K. Rashbaum, “Liberian Of- ficials Worked with U.S. Agency to Block Drug Traffic,” New York Times, June 2, 2010.
  42. For a history of AQIM, see “Algerian Group Backs al Qaeda,” BBC News, October 23, 2003, available from news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/africa/3207363.stm. For an understanding of the relation- ship among the different ethnic groups, particularly the Tuareg, and AQIM, see Terrorism Monitor, “Tuareg Rebels Joining Fight Against AQIM?” Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 8, Issue 40, November 4, 2010.
  43. Evan Perez, “U.S. Accuses Iran in Plot: Two Charged in Alleged Conspiracy to Enlist Drug Cartel to Kill Saudi Ambas- sador,” The Wall Street Journal, October 12, 2011.
  44. “La Amenaza Iraní” (“The Iranian Threat”), Univision Documentales, aired December 8, 2011.
  45. Sebastian Rotella, “Government says Hezbollah Profits From U.S. Cocaine Market via Link to Mexican Cartel,” ProPubli- ca, December 11, 2011.
  46. For an examination of the “cultures of contraband” and their implications in the region, see Rebecca B. Galemba, “Cultures of Contraband: Contesting the Illegality at the Mexico-Guatemala Border,” Ph.D. dissertation, Brown University Department of An- thropology, May 2009. For a look at the use of traditional smug- gling routes in TOC structures in Central America, see Doug- las Farah, “Mapping Transnational Crime in El Salvador: New Trends and Lessons From Colombia,” North Miami, FL: Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, Florida International Uni- versity, August 2011.
  47. For a more complete look at that conflict and other con- flicts over plazas, see Samuel Logan and John P. Sullivan, “The Gulf-Zeta Split and the Praetroian Revolt,” International Relations and Security Network, April 7, 2010, available from www.isn.ethz. ch/isn/Security-Watch/Articles/Detail/?ots591=4888caa0-b3db-1461- 98b9-e20e7b9c13d4&lng=en&id=114551.
  48. Mazzitelli.
  49. “Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa,” New York: UN Office on Drugs and Crime, October 2008.
  50. For a look at the chaos in Guinea Bissau, see “Guinea- Bissau president shot dead,” BBC News, March 2, 2009, available from news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7918061.stm.
  51. Patrick.
    52. See, for example, Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators,” Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, Washington, DC: Brookings In- stitution, January 2003.
  52. Rotberg.
  53. Rem Korteweg and David Ehrhardt, “Terrorist Black Holes: A Study into Terrorist Sanctuaries and Governmental Weakness,” The Hague, The Netherlands: Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies, November 2005, p. 26.
  54. “The Failed States Index 2009,” Foreign Policy Magazine, July/August 2009, pp. 80-93, available from www.foreignpolicy.com/ articles/2009/06/22/2009_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_ rankings.
  55. Julio A. Cirino et al., “Latin America’s Lawless Areas and Failed States,” in Paul D. Taylor, ed., Latin American Security Chal- lenges: A Collaborative Inquiry from North and South, Newport, RI: Naval War College, Newport Papers 21, 2004. Commercial insur- gencies are defined as engaging in “for-profit organized crime without a predominate political agenda,” leaving unclear how that differs from groups defined as organized criminal organiza- tions.
  56. For details of Taylor’s activities, see Douglas Farah, Blood From Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror, New York: Broadway Books, 2004.
  57. Hannah Stone, “The Comeback of Suriname’s ‘Narco- President’,” Insightcrime.org, Mar 4, 2011, available from insight- crime.org/insight-latest-news/item/865-the-comeback-of-surinames- narco-president.
  58. Simon Romero, “Returned to Power, a Leader Celebrates a Checkered Past,” The New York Times, May 2, 2011.
  59. “Wikileaks: Chávez funded Bouterse,” The Nation (Barba- dos), February 2, 2011.
  60. Harmen Boerboom, “Absence of Chávez a blessing for Su- riname,” Radio Netherlands Worldwide, August 12, 2010.
  61. For a look at the Zetas in Guatemala, see Steven Dudley, “The Zetas in Guatemala,” InSight Crime, September 8, 2011. For a look at Los Perrones in El Salvador, see Douglas Farah, “Organized Crime in El Salvador: Homegrown and Transnational Dimen- sions,” Organized Crime in Central America: The Northern Triangle, Woodrow Wilson Center Reports on the Americas #29, Wash- ington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, November 2011, pp. 104-139, available from www.wilsoncenter.org/ sites/default/files/LAP_single_page.pdf.
  62. Louise Shelley, “The Unholy Trinity: Transnational Crime, Corruption and Terrorism,” Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. XI, Issue 2, Winter/Spring 2005, p. 101.
  63. See Bill Lahneman and Matt Lewis, “Summary of Proceed- ings: Organized Crime and the Corruption of State Institutions,” College Park, MD: University of Maryland, November 18, 2002, available from www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/organizedcrime.pdf.
  64. Author interviews with Drug Enforcement Administra- tion and National Security Council officials; for example, two aircraft carrying more than 500 kgs of cocaine were stopped in Guinea Bissau after arriving from Venezuela. See “Bissau Police Seize Venezuelan cocaine smuggling planes,” Agence France Presse, July 19, 2008.
  65. “FARC Terrorist Indicted for 2003 Grenade Attack on Americans in Colombia,” Department of Justice Press Re- lease, September 7, 2004. available from www.usdoj.gov/opa/ pr/2004/September/04_crm_599.htm; and Official Journal of the European Union, Council Decision of December 21, 2005, available from eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_340/l_ 34020051223en00640066.pdf.
  66. “The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Ar- chives of ‘Raúl Reyes’,” Washington, DC: International Institute for Strategic Studies,” May 2011.
  67. The strongest documentary evidence of Chávez’s support for the FARC comes from the Reyes documents, which contained the internal communications of senior FARC commanders with senior Venezuelan officials. These documents discuss everything from security arrangements in hostage exchanges to the possibil- ity of joint training exercises and the purchasing of weapons. For full details of these documents and their interpretation, see Ibid.
  68. “Treasury Targets Venezuelan Government Officials Sup- port of the FARC,” Washington, DC: U.S. Treasury Department, Office of Public Affairs, September 12, 2008. The designations came on the heels of the decision of the Bolivian government of Evo Morales to expel the U.S. ambassador, allegedly for support- ing armed movements against the Morales government. In soli- darity, Chávez then expelled the U.S. ambassador to Venezuela. In addition to the citations of the Venezuelan officials, the United States also expelled the Venezuelan and Bolivian ambassadors to Washington.
  69. “Chávez Shores up Military Support,” Stratfor, November 12, 2010.
  70. “Venezuela: Asume Nuevo Ministro De Defensa Acusado de Narco por EEUU” (“Venezuela: New Minister Accused by the United States of Drug Trafficking Takes Office”), Agence France Presse, January 17, 2012.
  71. Robert M. Morgenthau, “The Link Between Iran and Ven- ezuela: A Crisis in the Making,” speech at the Brookings Institu- tion, Washington, DC, September 8, 2009.
  72. Colombia, Venezuela: Another Round of Diplomatic Fu- ror,” Strafor, July 29, 2010.
  73. The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Ar- chives of ‘Raúl Reyes’.”
  74. The Colombian decision to extradite Makled to Venezu- ela rather than the United States caused significant tension be- tween the two countries and probably means that the bulk of the evidence he claims to possess will never see the light of day. Among the documents he presented in prison were his checks cashed by senior generals and government officials and videos of what appear to be senior government officials in his home dis- cussing cash transactions. For details of the case, see José de Cór- doba and Darcy Crowe, “U.S. Losing Big Drug Catch,” The Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2011; “Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Indictment of one of World’s Most Significant Narcotics Kingpins,” United States Attorney, Southern District of New York, November 4, 2010.
  75. “Makled: Tengo suficientes pruebas sobre corrupción y narcotráfico para que intervengan a Venezuela” (“Makled: I have Enough Evidence of Corruption and Drug Trafficking to justify an invasion of Venezuela”), NTN24 TV (Colombia), April 11, 2011.
  76. For a more comprehensive look at the history of the FARC; its relations with Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador; and its involvement in drug trafficking, see “The FARC Files: Ven- ezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archives of ‘Raúl Reyes’”; Doug- las Farah, “Into the Abyss: Bolivia Under Evo Morales and the MAS,” Alexandria, VA: International Assessment and Strategy Center, June 2009; Douglas Farah and Glenn Simpson, “Ecuador at Risk: Drugs, Thugs, Guerrillas and the ‘Citizens’ Revolution,” Alexandria, VA: International Assessment and Strategy Center, January 2010.
  77. Farah, “Into the Abyss: Bolivia Under Evo Morales and the MAS.”
  78. Martin Arostegui, “Smuggling Scandal Shakes Bolivia,” The Wall Street Journal, March 3, 2011.
  79. Farah, “Into the Abyss: Bolivia Under Evo Morales and the MAS.”
  80. “The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador, and the Secret Ar- chives of ‘Raul Reyes’’’; Farah and Simpson; and Francisco Huer- ta Montalvo et al., “Informe Comisión de Transparencia y Verdad: Caso Angostura” (“Report of the Commission on Transparency and Truth: The Angostura Case”), December 10, 2009, available from www.scribd.com/doc/24329223/informe-angostura.
  81. Farah and Simpson.
  82. For details of the relationships among these officials the president’s sister, and the Ostaiza brothers, see Farah and Simpson.
  83. “The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Ar- chives of ‘Raúl Reyes’.”
  84. See, for example, Farah and Simpson; Huerta Montalvo; Arturo Torres, Juego del Camaleón: Los secretos de Angostura (The Chameleon’s Game: The Secrets of Angostura), 2009.
  85. “The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Ar- chives of ‘Raúl Reyes’.”
  86. Farah, “Into the Abyss.”
  87. Eugene Roxas, “Spiritual Guide who gave Evo Baton caught with 350 kilos of liquid cocaine,” The Achacachi Post (Bo- livia), July 28, 2010.
  88. “Panama arrests Bolivia ex-drugs police chief Sanabria,” BBC News, February 26, 2011.
  89. “Las FARC Buscaron el Respaldo de Boliva Para Lograr Su Expansión” (“The FARC Looked for Bolivian Support in Order to Expand”).
  90. The MAS is the coalition of indigenous and coca growing organizations that propelled Morales to his electoral victory. The movement, closely aligned with Chávez and funded by the Ven- ezuelan government, has defined itself as Marxist, socialist, and anti-imperilist.
  91. It is interesting to note that Peredo’s brothers Roberto (aka Coco) and Guido (aka Inti) were the Bolivian contacts of Che Gue- vara, and died in combat with him. The two are buried with Gue- vara in Santa Clara, Cuba.
  92. A copy of the founding manifesto of the EMP and its adherents is available from bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/osal/ osal10/documentos.pdf.
  93. Prensa Latina, “President Boliviano Anunica Creación de Estado Mayor Popular” (“Bolivian President Announces the For- mation of a People’s High Command”), February 2, 2006.
  94. “Estado Mayor del Pueblo Convoca a Defender Al Gobi- erno de Evo” (“People’s High Command Calls for the Defense of Evo’s Government”), Agencia Boliviana de Informacion, April 17, 2006, available from www.bolpress.com/art.php?Cod=2006041721.
  95. The situation has changed dramatically with the election of Juan Manuel Santos as President of Colombia in 2010. Despite serving as Uribe’s defense minister during the most successful operations against the FARC and developing a deeply antagonis- tic relationship with Chávez in that capacity, relations between Santos and the Bolivarian heads of state have been surprisingly cordial since he took office. This is due in part to Santos’ agreeing to turn over copies of the Reyes hard drives to Correa, and his ex- pressed desire to normalize relations with Chávez. A particularly sensitive concession was allowing the extradition of Walid Mak- led, a designated drug kingpin by the United States, to be extra- dited to Venezuela rather than to stand trial in the United States.
  96. “The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Ar- chives of ‘Raúl Reyes’.”
  97. March 11, 2005, e-mail from Iván Ríos to Raúl Reyes, pro- vided by Colombia officials, in possession of the author.
  98. April 1, 2006, e-mail from Raúl Reyes to Aleyda, provided by Colombia officials, in possession of the author.
  99. Following Ortega’s disputed electoral triumph in No- vember 2011, the FARC published a congratulatory communiqué lauding Ortega and recalling their historically close relationship. “In this moment of triumph how can we fail to recall that memo- rable scene in Caguán when you gave the Augusto Cesar San- dino medal to our unforgettable leader Manuel Marulanda. We have always carried pride in our chests for that deep honor which speaks to us of the broad vision of a man who considers himself to be a spiritual son of Bolivar.” Available from anncol.info/index. php?option=com_content&view=article&id=695:saludo-a-daniel-orteg a&catid=71:movies&Itemid=589.
  100. Reyes was killed a few days after the CCB assembly when the Colombian military bombed his camp, which was in Ec- uadoran territory. The bombing of La Angostura caused a severe diplomatic rift between Colombia and Ecuador, but the raid also yielded several hundred gigabytes of data from the computers Reyes kept in the camp, where he lived in a hardened structure and had been stationary for several months.
  101. Farah and Simpson.
  102. “U.S. Counternarcotics Cooperation with Venezuela Has Declined,” Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, July 2009, GAO-09-806.
  103. Ibid., p. 12.
  104. For a more detailed look at this debate, see Iran in Latin America: Threat or Axis of Annoyance? in which the author has a chapter arguing for the view that Iran is a significant threat.
  105. “‘Jackal’ book praises bin Laden,” BBC News, June 26, 2003.
  106. See, for example, Associated Press, “Chávez: ‘Carlos the Jackal’ a ‘Good Friend’,” June 3, 2006.
  107. Raúl Reyes (trans.) and Hugo Chávez, “My Struggle,” from a March 23, 1999, letter to Illich Ramirez Sánchez, the Venezuelan terrorist known as “Carlos the Jackal,” from Ven- ezuelan president Hugo Chávez, in response to a previous let- ter from Ramirez, who is serving a life sentence in France for murder. Harper’s, October 1999, available from harpers.org/ archive/1999/10/0060674.
  108. In addition to Operation TITAN, there have been numer- ous incidents in the past 18 months in which operatives being directly linked to Hezbollah have been identified or arrested in Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Aruba, and elsewhere in Latin America.
  109. Verstrynge, born in Morocco to Belgian and Spanish parents, began his political career on the far right of the Spanish political spectrum as a disciple of Manuel Fraga, and served in a national and several senior party posts with the Alianza Popular. By his own admission he then migrated to the Socialist Party, but never rose through the ranks. He is widely associated with radical anti-globalization views and anti-U.S. rhetoric, repeatedly stating that the United States is creating a new global empire and must be defeated. Although he has no military training or experience, he has written extensively on asymmetrical warfare.
  110. Verstrynge., pp. 56-57.
  111. Bartolomé. See also John Sweeny, “Jorge Verstrynge: The Guru of Bolivarian Asymmetric Warfare,” September 9, 2005 available from www.vcrisis.com; and “Troops Get Provocative Book,” Miami Herald, November 11, 2005.
  112. “Turkey holds suspicious Iran-Venezuela shipment,” Associated Press, June 1, 2009, available from www.ynetnews.com/ articles/0,7340,L-3651706,00.html.
  113. For a fuller examination of the use of websites, see Doug- las Farah, “Islamist Cyber Networks in Spanish-Speaking Latin America,” North Miami, FL: Western Hemisphere Security Anal- ysis Center, Florida International University, September 2011.
  114. “Hispan TV begins with ‘Saint Mary’,” Tehran Times, December 23, 2011, available from www.tehrantimes.com/arts-and- culture/93793-hispan-tv-begins-with-saint-mary.
  115. For a more complete look at Iran’s presence in Latin America, see Douglas Farah, “Iran in Latin America: An Over- view,” Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Summer 2009 (to be published as a chapter in Iran in Latin America: Threat or Axis of Annoyance? Cynthia J. Arnson et al., eds., 2010. For a look at the anomalies in the economic relations, see also Farah and Simpson.
  116. “Treasury Targets Hizbullah in Venezuela,” Washing- ton, DC: United States Department of Treasury Press Center, June 18, 2008, available from www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releas- es/Pages/hp1036.aspx.
  117. Orlando Cuales, “17 arrested in Curacao on suspicion of drug trafficking links with Hezbollah,” Associated Press, April 29, 2009.
  118. United States District Court, Southern District of New York, The United States of America v Jamal Yousef, Indictment, July 6, 2009.
  119. For a look at how the Ecuadoran and Venezuelan banks function as proxies for Iran, particularly the Economic Devel- opment Bank of Iran, sanctioned for its illegal support of Iran’s nuclear program, and the Banco Internacional de Desarrollo, see Farah and Simpson.
  120. Office of the Spokesman, “Seven Companies Sanctioned Under Amended Iran Sanctions Act,” Washington, DC: U.S. De- partment of State, May 24, 2011, available from www.state.gov/r/ pa/prs/ps/2011/05/164132.htm.
  121. Russia Izvestia Information, September 30, 2008, and Agence France Presse, “Venezuela Wants to Work With Russia on Nuclear Energy: Chávez,” September 29, 2008.
  122. Simon Romero, “Venezuela Says Iran is Helping it Look for Uranium,” New York Times, September 25, 2009.
  123. Nikolai Spassky, “Russia, Ecuador strike deal on nuclear power cooperation,” RIA Novosti, August 21, 2009.
  124. José R. Cárdenas, “Iran’s Man in Ecuador,” Foreign Pol- icy, February 15, 2011, available from shadow.foreignpolicy.com/ posts/2011/02/15/irans_man_in_ecuador.
  125. The primary problem has been the inability of the Colom- bian government to deliver promised services and infrastructure after the military has cleared the area. See John Otis, “Decades of Work but No Land Titles to Show for It,” GlobalPost, Novem- ber 30, 2009. For a more complete look at the challenges posed by the reemergence and adaptability of armed groups, see Fundación Arco Iris, Informe 2009: El Declive de la Seguridad Democratica? (Re- port 2009: The Decline of Democratic Security?), available from www. nuevoarcoiris.org.co/sac/?q=node/605.

Notes on Methods and Motives: Exploring Links between Transnational Organized Crime & International Terrorism

Notes from Methods and Motives: Exploring Links between Transnational Organized Crime & International Terrorism

In preparation for the work on this report, we reviewed a significant body of academic research on the structure and behavior of organized crime and terrorist groups. By examining how other scholars have approached the issues of organized crime or terrorism, we were able to refine our methodology. This novel approach combines a framework drawn from intelligence analysis with the tenets of a methodological approach devised by the criminologist Donald Cressey, who uses the metaphor of an archeological dig to systematize a search for information on organized crime. All the data and examples used to populate the model have been verified, and our findings have been validated through the rigorous application of case study methods.

While experts broadly accept no single definition of organized crime, a review of the numerous definitions offered identifies several central themes.8 There is consensus that at least two perpetrators are in- volved, but there is a variety of views about the way organized crime is typically organized as a hierarchy or as a network.

Organized crime is a continuing enterprise, so does not include conspiracies that perpetrate single crimes and then go their separate ways. Furthermore, the overarching goals of organized crime groups are profit and power. Groups seek a balance between maximizing profits and minimizing their own risk, while striving for control by menacing certain businesses. Violence, or the threat of violence, is used to enforce obligations and maintain hegemony over rackets and enterprises such as extortion and narcotics smuggling. Corruption is a means of reducing the criminals’ own risk, maintaining control and making profits.

few definitions challenge the common view of organized crime as a ‘parallel government’ that seeks power at the expense of the state but retains patriotic or nationalistic ties to the state. This report takes up that challenge by illustrating the rise of a new class of criminal groups with little or no national allegiance. These criminals are ready to pro- vide services for terrorists as has been observed in European prisons.10

We prefer the definition offered by the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, which defines an organized crime group as “a structured group [that is not randomly formed for the im- mediate commission of an offense] of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences [punishable by a deprivation of liberty of at least four years] established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.

we prefer the notion of a number of shadow economies, in the same way that macroeconomists use the global economy, comprising markets, sectors and national economies, as their basic unit of reference.

terrorism scholar Bruce Hoffman has offered a comprehensive and useful definition of terrorism as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.15 Hoffman’s definition offers precise terms of reference while remaining comprehensive; he further notes that terrorism is ‘political in aims and motives,’ ‘violent,’ ‘designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target,’ and ‘conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure.’ These elements include acts of terrorism by many different types of criminal groups, yet they clearly circumscribe the violent and other terrorist acts. Therefore, the Hoffman definition can be applied to both groups and activities, a crucial distinction for this methodology we propose in this report.

Early identification of terror-crime cooperation occurred in the 1980s and focused naturally on narcoterrorism, a phrase coined by Peru’s President Belaunde Terry to describe the terrorist attacks against anti-narcotics police in Peru.

the links between narcotics trafficking and terror groups exist in many regions of the world but that it is difficult to make generalizations about the terror- crime nexus.

International relations theorists have also produced a group of scholarly works that examine organized crime and terrorism (i.e., agents or processes) as objects of investigation for their paradigms. While in some cases, the frames of reference international relations scholars employed proved too general for the purposes of this report, the team found that these works demonstrated more environmental or behavioral aspects of the interaction.

2.3 Data collection

Much of the information in the report that follows was taken from open sources, including government reports, private and academic journal articles, court documents and media accounts.

To ensure accuracy in the collection of data, we adopted standards and methods to form criteria for accepting data from open sources. In order to improve accuracy and reduce bias, we attempted to corroborate every piece of data collected from one secondary source with data from a further source that was independent of the original source — that is, the second source did not quote the first source. Second, particularly when using media sources, we checked subsequent reporting by the same publication to find out whether the subject was described in the same way as before. Third, we sought a more heterogeneous data set by examining foreign-language documents from non-U.S. sources. We also obtained primary- source materials such as declassified intelligence reports from the Republic of Georgia, that helped to clarify and confirm the data found in secondary sources.

Since all these meetings were confidential, it was agreed in all cases that the information given was not for attribution by name.

For each of these studies, researchers traveled to the regions a number of times to collect information. Their work was combined with relevant secondary sources to produce detailed case studies presented later in the report. The format of the case studies followed the tenets outlined by Robert Yin, who proposes that case studies offer an advantage to researchers who present data illustrating complex relationships – such as the link between organized crime and terror.

2.4. Research goals

This project aimed to discover whether terrorist and organized crime groups would borrow one another’s methods, or cooperate, by what means, and how investigators and analysts could locate and assess crime-terror interactions. This led to an examination of why this overlap or interaction takes place. Are the benefits merely logistical or do both sides derive some long-term gains such as undermining the capacity of the state to detect and curtail their activities?

preparation of the investigative environment (PIE), by adapting a long-held military practice called intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). The IPB method anticipates enemy locations and movements in order to obtain the best position for a commander’s limited battlefield resources and troops. The goal of PIE is similar to that of IPB—to provide investigators and analysts a strategic and discursive analytical method to identify areas ripe for locating terror and crime interactions, confirm their existence and then assess the ramifications of these collaborations. The PIE approach provides twelve watch points within which investigators and analysts can identify those areas most likely to contain crime-terror interactions.

The PIE methodology was designed with the investigator and analyst in mind, and thus PIE demonstrates how to establish investigations in a way that expend resources most fruitfully. The PIE methodology shows how insights can be gained from analysts to help practitioners identify problems and organize their investigations more effectively.

2.5. Research challenges

Our first challenge in investigating the links between organized crime and terrorism was to obtain enough data to provide an accurate portrayal of that relationship. Given the secrecy of all criminal organizations, many traditional methods of quantitative and qualitative research were not viable. Nonetheless we con- ducted numerous interviews, and obtained identified statements from investigators and policy officials. Records of legal proceedings, criminal records, and terrorist incident reports were also important data sources.

The strategy underlying the collection of data was to focus on the sources of interaction wherever they were located (e.g., developing countries and urban areas), rather than on instances of interaction in developed countries like the September 11th or the Madrid bombing investigations. In so doing, the project team hoped to avoid characterizing the problem “from out there.”

All three case studies highlight patterns of association that are particularly visible, frequent, and of lengthy duration. Because the conflict regions in the case studies also contribute to crime in the United States, our view was these models were needed to perceive patterns of association that are less visible in other environments. A further element in the selection of these regions was practical: in each one, researchers affiliated with the project had access to reliable sources with first-hand knowledge of the subject matter. Our hypothesis was that some of the most easy to detect relations would be in these societies that are so corrupted and with such limited enforcement that the phenomena might be more open for analysis and disclosure than in environments where this is more covert.

  1. A new analytical approach: PIE

Investigators seeking to detect a terrorist activity before an incident takes place are overwhelmed by data.

A counterterrorist analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency took this further, noting that the discovery of crime-terror interactions was often the accidental result of analysis on a specific terror group, and thus rarely was connected to the criminal patterns of other terror groups.

IPB is an attractive basis for analyzing the behavior of criminal and terrorist groups because it focuses on evidence about their operational behavior as well as the environment in which they operate. This evidence is plentiful: communications, financial transactions, organizational forms and behavioral patterns can all be analyzed using a form of IPB.

the project team has devised a methodology based on IPB, which we have termed preparation of the investigation environment, or PIE. We define PIE as a concept in which investigators and analysts organize existing data to identify areas of high potential for collaboration between terrorists and organized criminals in order to focus next on developing specific cases of crime-terror interaction—thereby generating further intelligence for the development of early warning on planned terrorist activity.

While IPB is chiefly a method of eliminating data that is not likely to be relevant, our PIE method also provides positive indicators about where relevant evidence should be sought.

3.1 The theoretical basis for the PIE Method

Donald Cressey’s famous study of organized crime in the U.S., with the analogy of an archeological dig, was the starting point for our model of crime-terror cooperation.35 As Cressey defines it, archeologists first examine documentary sources to collect what is known and develop a map based on what is known. That map allows the investigator to focus on those areas that are not known—that is, the archeologist uses the map to focus on where to dig. The map also serves as a context within which artifacts discovered during the dig can be evaluated for their significance. For example, discovery of a bowl at a certain depth and location can provide information to the investigator concerning the date of an encampment and who established it.

The U.S. Department of Defense defines IPB as an analytical methodology employed to reduce un- certainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace builds an extensive database for each potential area in which a unit may be re- quired to operate. The database is then analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on operations and presents it in graphic form.36 Alongside Cressey’s approach, IPB was selected as a second basis of our methodological approach.

Territory outside the control of the central state such as exists in failed or failing states, poorly regulated or border regions (especially those regions surrounding the intersection of multiple borders), and parts of otherwise viable states where law and order is absent or compromised, including urban quarters populated by diaspora communities or penal institutions, are favored locales for crime-terror interactions.

3.2 Implementing PIE as an investigative tool

Organized crime and terrorist groups have significant differences in their organizational form, culture, and goals. Bruce Hoffman notes that terrorist organizations can be further categorized based on their organizational ideology.

In converting IPB to PIE, we defined a series of watch points based on organizational form, goals, culture and other aspects to ensure PIE is flexible enough to compare a transnational criminal syndicate or a traditional crime hierarchy with an ethno-nationalist terrorist faction or an apocalyptic terror group.

The standard operating procedures and means by which military units are expected to achieve their battle plan are called doctrine, which is normally spelled out in great detail as manuals and training regimens. The doctrine of an opposing force thus is an important part of an IPB analysis. Such information is equally important to PIE, but is rarely found in manuals nor is it as highly developed as military doctrines.

Once the organizational forms, terrain and behavior of criminal and terrorist groups were defined at this level of detail, we settled on 12 watch points to cover the three components of PIE. For example, the watch point entitled organizational goals examines what the goals of organized crime and terror groups can tell investigators about potential collaboration or overlap between the two.

Investigators using PIE will collect evidence systematically through the investigation of watch points and analyze the data through its application to one or more indicators. That in turn will enable them to build a case for making timely predictions about crime-terror cooperation or overlap. Conversely, PIE also provides a mechanism for ruling out such links.

The indicators are designed to reduce the fundamental uncertainty associated with seemingly disparate or unrelated pieces of information. They also serve as a way of constructing probable cause, with evidence triggering indicators.

Although some watch points may generate ambiguous indicators of interaction between terror and crime, providing investigators and analysts with negative evidence of collusion between criminals and terrorists also has the practical benefit of steering scarce resources toward higher pay-off areas for detecting cooperation between the groups.

3.3. PIE composition: Watch points and indicators

The first step for PIE is to identify those areas where terror-crime collaborations are most likely to occur. To prepare this environment, PIE asks investigators and analysts to engage in three preliminary analyses. These are first to map where particular criminal and terrorist groups are likely to be operating, both in physical geographic terms and through information traditional and electronic media; secondly, to develop typologies for the behavior patterns of the groups and, when possible, their broader networks (often represented chronologically as a timeline); thirdly, to detail the organizations of specific crime and terror groups and, as feasible, their networks.

The geographical areas where terrorists and criminals are highly likely to be cooperating are known in IPB parlance as named areas of interest, or localities that are highly likely to support military operations. In PIE they are referred to as watch points.

A critical function of PIE is to set sensible priorities for analysts.

The second step of a PIE analysis concentrates on the watch points to identify named areas of inter- action where overlaps between crime and terror groups are most likely. The PIE method expresses areas of interest geographically but remains focused on the overlap between terrorism and organized crime.

the three preliminary analyses mentioned above are deconstructed into watch points, which are broad categories of potential crime-terror interactions.

the use of PIE leads to the early detection of named areas of interest through the analysis of watch points, providing investigators the means of concentrating their focus on terror-crime interactions and thereby enhancing their ability to detect possible terrorist planning.

The third and final step is for the collection and analysis of information that indicates organizational, operational or other nodes whereby criminals and terrorists appear to interact. While watch points are broad categories, they are composed of specific indicators of how organized criminals and terrorists might cooperate. These specific patterns of behavior help to confirm or deny that a watch point is applicable.

If several indicators are present, or if the indicators are particularly clear, this bolsters the evidence that a particular type of terror-crime interaction is present. No single indicator is likely to provide ‘smoking gun’ evidence of a link, although examples of this have occasionally arisen. Instead, PIE is a holistic approach that collects evidence systematically in order to make timely predictions of an affiliation, or not, between specific criminal and terrorist groups.

For policy analysts and planners, indicators reduce the sampling risk that is unavoidable for anyone collecting seemingly disparate and unrelated pieces of evidence. For investigators, indicators serve as a means of constructing probable cause. Indeed, even negative evidence of interaction has the practical benefit of helping investigators and analysts manage their scarce resources more efficiently.

3.4 The PIE approach in practice: Two Cases

the process began with the collection of relevant information (scanning) that was then placed into the larger context of watch points and indicators (codification) in order to produce the aforementioned analytical insights (abstraction).

 

Each case will describe how the TraCCC team shared (diffusion) its findings in or- der to obtain validation and to have an impact on practitioners fighting terrorism and/or organized crime.

3.4.1 The Georgia Case

In 2003-4, TraCCC used the PIE approach to identify one of the largest money laundering cases ever successfully prosecuted. The PIE method helped close down a major international vehicle for money laundering. The ability to organize the financial records from a major money launderer allowed the construction of a significant network that allowed understanding of the linkages among major criminal groups whose relationship has not previously been acknowledged.

Some of the information most pertinent to Georgia included but that was not limited to:

  1. Corrupt Georgian officials held high law enforcement positions prior to the Rose Revolution and maintained ties to crime and terror groups that allowed them to operate with impunity;
  2. Similar patterns of violence were found among organized crime and terrorist groups operating in Georgia;
  3. Numerous banks, corrupt officials and other providers of illicit goods and services assisted both organized crime and terrorists
  4. Regions of the country supported criminal infrastructures useful to organized crime and terrorists alike, including Abkhazia, Ajaria and Ossetia.

Combined with numerous other pieces of information and placed into the PIE watch point structure, the resulting analysis triggered a sufficient number of indicators to suggest that further analysis was warranted to try to locate a crime-terror interaction.

 

The second step of the PIE analysis was to examine information within the watch points for connections that would suggest patterns of interaction between specific crime and terror groups. These points of interaction are identified in the Black Sea case study but the most successful identification was found from an analysis of the watch point that specifically examined the financial environment that would facilitate the link between crime and terrorism.

The TraCCC team began its investigation within this watch point by identifying the sectors of the Georgian economy that were most conducive to economic crime and money laundering. This included such sectors as energy, railroads and banking. All of these sectors were found to be highly criminalized.

Only by having researchers with knowledge of the economic climate, the nature of the business community and the banking sector determined that investigative resources needed to be concentrated on the “G” bank. By knowing the terrain, investigative focus was focused on “G” bank by the newly established financial investigative unit of the Central Bank. A six-month analysis of the G bank and its transactions enabled the development of a massive network analysis that facilitated prosecution in Georgia and may lead to prosecutions in major financial centers that were previously unable to address some crime groups, at least one of which was linked to a terrorist group.

Using PIE allowed a major intelligence breakthrough.

First, it located a large facilitator of dirty money. Second, the approach was able to map fundamental connections between crime and terror groups. Third, the analysis highlighted the enormous role that purely “dirty banks” housed in countries with small economies can provide as a service for transnational crime and even terrorism.

While specific details must remain sealed due to deference to ongoing legal proceedings, to date the PIE analysis has grown into investigations in Switzerland, and others in the US and Georgia.

the PIE approach is one that favors the construction and prosecution of viable cases.

the PIE approach is a platform for starting and later focusing investigations. When coupled with investigative techniques like network analysis, the PIE approach supports the construction and eventual prosecution of cases against organized crime and terrorist suspects.

3.4.2 Russian Closed Cities

In early 2005, a US government agency asked TraCCC to identify how terrorists are potentially trying to take advantage of organized crime groups and corruption to obtain fissile material in a specific region of Russia—one that is home to a number of sensitive weapons facilities located in so-called “closed cities.” The project team assembled a wealth of information concerning the presence and activities of both criminal and terror groups in the region in question, but was left with the question of how best to organize the data and develop significant conclusions.

The project’s information supported connections in 11 watch points, including:

  • A vast increase in the prevalence of violence in the region, especially in economic sectors with close ties to organized crime;
  • Commercial ties in the drug trade between crime groups in the region and Islamic terror groups formerly located in Afghanistan;
  • Rampant corruption in all levels of the regional government and law enforcement mechanisms, rendering portions of the region nearly ungovernable;
  • The presence of numerous regional and transnational crime groups as well as recruiters for Islamic groups on terrorist watch lists;

employment of the watch points prompted creative leads to important connections that were not readily apparent until placed into the larger context of the PIE analytical framework. Specifically, the analysis might not have included evidence of trust links and cultural ties between crime and terror groups had the PIE approach not explained their utility.

When the TraCCC team applied the PIE to the closed cities case, the team found using the technologies reduced time analyzing data while improving the analytical rigor of the task. For example, structured queries of databases and online search engines provided information quickly. Likewise, network mapping improved analytical rigor by codifying the links between numerous actors (e.g., crime groups, terror groups, workers at weapons facilities and corrupt officials) in local, regional and transnational contexts.

3.5 Emergent behavior and automation

The dynamic nature of crime and terror groups complicates the IPB to PIE transition. The spectrum of cooperation demonstrates that crime-terror intersections are emergent phenomena.

PIE must have feedback loops to cope with the emergent behavior of crime and terror groups

when the project team spoke with analysts and investigators, the one deficiency they noted was the ability to conduct strategic intelligence given their operational tempo.

  1. The terror-crime interaction spectrum

In formulating PIE, we recognized that crime and terrorist groups are more diverse in nature than military units. They may be networks or hierarchies, they have a variety of cultures rather than a disciplined code of behavior, and their goals are far less clear. Hoffman notes that terrorist groups can be further categorized based on their organizational ideology.

Other researchers have found significant evidence of interaction between terrorism and organized crime, often in support of the general observation that while their methods might converge, the basic motives of crime and terror groups would serve to keep them at arm’s length—thus the term “methods, not motives.”41 Indeed, the differences between the two are plentiful: terrorists pursue political or religious objectives through overt violence against civilians and military targets. They turn to crime for the money they need to survive and operate.

Criminal groups, on the other hand, are focused on making money. Any use of violence tends to be concealed, and is generally focused on tactical goals such as intimidating witnesses, eliminating competitors or obstructing investigators.

In a corrupt environment, the two groups find common cause.

Terrorists often find it expedient, even necessary, to deal with outsiders to get funding and logistical support for their operations. As such interactions are repeated over time, concerns arise that criminal and terrorist organizations will integrate and might even form new types of organizations.

Support for this point can be found in the seminal work of Sutherland, who has argued that the “in- tensity and duration” of an association with criminals makes an individual more likely to adopt criminal behavior. In conflict regions, where there is intensive interaction between criminals and terrorists, there is more shared behavior and a process of mutual learning that goes on.

The dynamic relationship between international terror and transnational crime has important strategic implications for the United States.

The result is a model known as the terror-crime interaction spectrum that depicts the relationship between terror and criminal groups and the different forms it takes.

Each form of interaction represents different, yet specific, threats, as well as opportunities for detection by law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

An interview with a retired member of the Chicago organized crime investigative unit revealed that it had investigated taxi companies and taxicab owners as cash-based money launderers. Logic suggests that terrorists may also be benefiting from the scheme. But this line of investigation was not pursued in the 9/11 investigations although two of the hijackers had worked as taxi drivers.

Within the spectrum, processes we refer to as activity appropriation, nexus, symbiotic relationship, hybrid, and transformation illustrate the different forms of interaction between a terrorist group and an organized crime group, as well as the behavior of a single group engaged in both terrorism and organized crime.

While activity appropriation does not represent organizational linkages between crime and terror groups, it does capture the merger of methods that were well-documented in section 2. Activity appropriation is one way that terrorists are exposed to organized crime activities and, as Chris Dishman has noted, can lead to a transformation of terror cells into organized crime groups.

Applying the Sutherland principle of differential association, these activities are likely to bring a terror group into regular contact with organized crime. As they attempt to acquire forged documents, launder money, or pay bribes, it is a natural step to draw on the support and expertise of the criminal group, which is likely to have more experience in these activities. It is referred to here as a nexus.

terrorists first engage in “do it yourself” organized crime and then turn to organized crime groups for specialized services like document forgery or money laundering.

In most cases a nexus involves the criminals providing goods and services to terrorists for payment although it can work in both directions. A typically short-term relation- ship, a nexus does not imply that the criminals share the ideological views of the terrorists, merely that the transaction offers benefits to both sides.

After all, they have many needs in common: safe havens, false documentation, evasive tactics, and other strategies to lower the risk of being detected. In Latin America, transnational criminal gangs have employed terrorist groups to guard their drug processing plants. In Northern Ireland, terrorists have provided protection for human smuggling operations by the Chinese Triads.

If the nexus continues to benefit both sides over a period of time, the relationship will deepen. More members of both groups will cooperate, and the groups will create structures and procedures for their business transactions, transfer skills and/or share best practices. We refer to this closer, more sustained cooperation as a symbiotic relationship, and define it as a relationship of mutual benefit or dependence.

In the next stage, the two groups continue to cooperate over a long period and members of the organized crime group begin to share the ideological goals of the terrorists. They grow increasingly alike and finally they merge. That process results in a hybrid or dark network49 that has been memorably described as terrorist by day and criminal by night.50 Such an organization engages in criminal acts but also has a political agenda. Both the criminal and political ends are forwarded by the use of violence and corruption.

These developments are not inevitable, but result from a series of opportunities that can lead to the next stage of cooperation. It is important to recognize, however, that even once the two groups have reached the point of hybrid, there is no reason per se to suspect that transformation will follow. Likewise, a group may persist with borrowed methods indefinitely without ever progressing to cooperation. In Italy and elsewhere, crime groups that also engaged in terrorism never found a terrorist partner and thus remained at the activity appropriation stage. Eventually they ended their terrorist activities and returned to the exclusive pursuit of organized crime.

Interestingly, the TraCCC team found no example where a terrorist group engaging in organized crime, either through activity appropriation or through an organizational linkage, came into conflict with a criminal group.51 Neither archival sources nor our interviews revealed such a conflict over “turf,” though logic would suggest that organized crime groups would react to such forms of competition.

The spectrum does not create exact models of the evolution of criminal-terrorist cooperation. In- deed, the evidence presented both here and in prior studies suggests that a single evolutionary path for crime-terror interactions does not exist. Environmental factors outside the control of either organization and the varied requirements of specific organized crime or terrorist groups are but two of the reasons that interactions appear more idiosyncratic than generalizable.

Using the PIE method, investigators and analysts can gain an understanding of the terror-crime intersection by analyzing evidence sourced from communications, financial transactions, organizational charts, and behavior. They can also apply the methodology to analyze watch points where the two entities may interact. Finally, using physical, electronic, and data surveillance, they can develop indicators showing where watch points translate into practice.

  1. The significance of terror-crime interactions in geographic terms

Some shared characteristics arose from examining this case. First, both neighborhoods shared similar diaspora compositions and a lack of effective or interested policing. Second, both terror cells had strong connections to the shadow economy.

the case demonstrated that each cell shared three factors—poor governance, a sense of ethnic separation amongst the cell (supported by the nature of the larger diaspora neighborhoods), and a tradition of organized crime.

U.S. intelligence and law enforcement are naturally inclined to focus on manifestations of organized crime and terrorism in their own country, but they would benefit from studying and assessing patterns and behavior of crime in other countries as well as areas of potential relevance to terrorism.

When turning to the situation overseas, one can differentiate between longstanding crime groups and their more recently formed counterparts according to their relationship to the state. With the exception of Colombia, rarely do large, established (i.e., “traditional”) crime organizations link with terrorists. These groups possess long-held financial interests that would suffer should the structures of the state and the international financial community come to be undermined. Through corruption and movement into the lawful economy, these groups minimize the risk of prosecution and therefore do not fear the power of state institutions.

Developing countries with weak economies, a lack of social structures, many desperate, hungry people, and a history of unstable government are both relatively likely to provide ideological and economic foundations for both organized crime and terrorism within their borders and relatively unlikely to have much capacity to combat either of them. Conflict zones have traditionally provided tremendous opportunities for smuggling and corruption and reduced oversight capacities, as regulatory and enforcements be- come almost solely directed at military targets. They are therefore especially vulnerable to both serious organized crime and violent activity directed at civilian populations for political goals – as well as cooperation between those engaging in pure criminal activities and those engaging in politically-motivated violence.

Post-conflict zones are also likely to spawn such cooperation; as such areas often retain weak enforcement capacity for some time following an end to formal hostilities.

these patterns of criminal behavior and organization can arise from areas as diverse as conflict zones overseas (which then tend can replicate once they arrive in the U.S.) to neighborhoods in U.S. cities. The problematic combinations of poor governance, ethnic separation from larger society, and a tradition of criminal activity (frequently international) are the primary concerns behind this broad taxonomy of geographic locales for crime-terror interaction.

  1. Watch points and indicators

Taking the evidence of cooperation between organized crime and terrorism, we have generated 12 specific areas of interaction, which we refer to as watch points. In turn these watch points are subdivided into a number of indicators that point out where interaction between terror and crime may be taking place.

These watch points cover a variety of habits and operating modes of organized crime and terrorist groups.

We have organized our watch points into three categories: environmental, organizational, and behavioral. Each of the following sections details one of the twelve watch points.

 

Watch Point 1: Open activities in the legitimate economy

Watch Point 2: Shared illicit nodes

Watch Point 3: Communications

Watch Point 4: Use of information technology (IT)

Watch Point 5: Violence

Watch Point 6: Use of corruption

Watch Point 7: Financial transactions & money laundering

Watch Point 8: Organizational structures

Watch Point 9: Organizational goals

Watch Point 10: Culture

Watch Point 11: Popular support

Watch Point 12: Trust

 

6.1. Watch Point 1: Open activities in the legitimate economy

The many indicators of possible links include habits of travel, the use of mail and courier services, and the operation of fronts.

Organized crime and terror may be associated with subterfuge and secrecy, but both criminal types engage legitimate society quite openly for particular political purposes. Yet in the first instance, criminal groups are likely to leave greater “traces,” especially when they operate in societies with functioning governments, than do terrorist groups.

Terrorist groups usually seek to make common cause with segments of society that will support their goals, particularly the very poor and the disadvantaged. Terrorists usually champion repressed or dis- enfranchised ethnic and religious minorities, describing their terrorist activities as mechanisms to pressure the government for greater autonomy and freedom, even independence, for these minorities… the openly take responsibility for their attacks, but their operational mechanisms are generally kept secret, and any ongoing contacts they may have with legitimate organizations are carefully hidden.

Criminal groups, like terrorists, may have political goals. For example, such groups may seek to strengthen their legitimacy through donating some of their profits to charity. Colombian drug traffickers are generous in their support of schools and local sports teams.5

criminals of all types could scarcely carry out criminal activities, maintain their cover, and manage their money flows without doing legal transactions with legitimate businesses.

Travel: Frequent use of passenger carriers and shipping companies are potential indicators of illicit activity. Clues can be gleaned from almost any pattern of travel that can be identified as such.

Mail and courier services: Indicators of interaction are present in the tracking information on international shipments of goods, which also generate customs records. Large shipments require bills-of-lading and other documentation. Analysis of such transactions, cross-referenced with in- formation on crime databases, can identify links between organized crime and terrorist groups.

Fronts: A shared front company or mutual connections to legitimate businesses are clearly also indicators of interaction.

Watch Point 2: Shared illicit nodes

 

The significance of overt operations by criminal groups should not be overstated. Transnational crime and terror groups alike carry out their operations for the most part with illegal and undercover methods. There are many similarities in these tactics. Both organized criminals and terrorists need forged pass- ports, driver’s licenses, and other fraudulent documents. Dishonest accountants and bankers help criminals launder money and commit fraud. Arms and explosives, training camps and safe houses are other goods and services that terrorists obtain illicitly.

Fraudulent Documents. Groups of both types may use the same sources of false documents,

or the same techniques, indicating cooperation or overlap. A criminal group often develops an expertise in false document production as a business, expanding production and building a customer base.

 

Some of the 9/11 hijackers fraudulently obtained legitimate driver’s licenses through a fraud ring based at an office of DMV in the Virginia suburbs of Washington, DC. Ac- cording to an INS investigator, this ring was under investigation well before the 9/11 attacks, but there was insufficient political will inside the INS to take the case further.

Arms Suppliers. Both terror and organized crime might use the same supplier, or the same distinctive method of doing business, such as bartering weapons or drugs. In 2001 the Basque terror group ETA contracted with factions of the Italian Camorra to obtain missile launchers and ammunition in return for narcotics.

Financial experts. Bankers and financial professionals who assist organized crime might also have terrorist affiliations. The methods of money laundering long used by narcotics traffickers and other organized crime have now been adopted by some terrorist groups.

 

Drug Traffickers. Drug trafficking is the single largest source of revenues for international organized crime. Substantial criminal groups often maintain well-established smuggling routes to distribute drugs. Such an infrastructure would be valuable to terrorists who purchased weapons of mass destruction and needed to transport them.

 

Other Criminal Enterprises. An increasing number of criminal enterprises outside of narcotics smuggling are serving the financial or logistical ends of terror groups and thus serve as nodes of interaction. For example, piracy on the high seas, a growing threat to maritime commerce, often depends on the collusion of port authorities, which are controlled in many cases by organized crime.

These relationships are particularly true of developed countries with effective law enforcement, since criminals obviously need to be more cautious and often restrict their operations to covert activity. In conflict zones, however, criminals of all types feel even less restraint about flaunting their illegal nature, since there is little chance of being detected or apprehended.

Watch Point 3: Communications

 

The Internet, mobile phones and satellite communications enable criminals and terrorists to communicate globally in a relatively secure fashion. FARC, in concert with Colombian drug cartels, offered training on how to set up narcotics trafficking businesses used secure websites and email to handle registration.

Such scenarios are neither hypothetical nor anecdotal. Interviews with an analyst at the US Drug Enforcement Administration revealed that narcotics cartels were increasingly using encryption in their digital communications. In turn, the agent interviewed stated that the same groups were frequently turning to information technology experts to provide them encryption to help secure their communications.

Nodes of interaction therefore include:

  • Technical overlap: Examples exist where organized crime groups opened their illegal communications systems to any paying customer, thus providing a service to other criminals and terrorists among others. For example, a recent investigation found clandestine telephone exchanges in the Tri-Border region of South America that were connected to Jihadist networks. Most were located in Brazil, since calls between Middle Eastern countries and Brazil would elicit less suspicion and thus less chance of electronic eavesdropping.
  • Personnel overlap: Crime and terror groups that recruit common high-tech specialists to their cause. Given their ability to encrypt messages, criminals of all kinds may rely on outsiders to carry the message. Smuggling networks all have operatives who can act as couriers, and terrorists have networks of sympathizers in ethnic diasporas who can also help.

Watch Point 4: Use of information technology (IT)

 

Organized crime has devised IT-based fraud schemes such as online gambling, securities fraud, and pirating of intellectual property. Such schemes appeal to terror groups, too, particularly given the relative anonymity that digital transactions offer. Investigators into the Bali disco bombing of 2002 found that the laptop computer of the ringleader, Imam Samudra, contained a primer he authored on how to use online fraud to finance operations. Evidence of terror groups’ involvement is a significant set of indicators of cooperation or overlap.

Indicators of possible cooperation or nodes of interaction include:

Fundraising: Online fraud schemes and other uses of IT for obtaining ill-gotten gains are already well-established by organized crime groups and terrorists are following suit. Such IT- assisted criminal activities serve as another node of overlap for crime and terror groups, and thus expand the area of observation beyond the brick-and-mortar realm into cyberspace (i.e., investigators now expect to find evidence of collaboration on the Internet or in email as much as through telephone calls or postal services).

  • Use of technical experts: While no evidence exists that criminals and terrorists have directly cooperated to conduct cybercrime or cyberterrorism, they are often served by the same technical experts.

Watch Point 5: Violence

 

Violence is not so much a tactic of terrorists as their defining characteristic. These acts of violence are designed to obtain publicity for the cause, to create a climate of fear, or to provoke political repression, which they hope will undermine the legitimacy of the authorities. Terrorist attacks are deliberately highly visible in order to enhance their impact on the public consciousness. Indiscriminate violence against innocent civilians is therefore more readily ascribed to terrorism.

no examples exist where terrorists have engaged criminal groups for violent acts.

A more significant challenge lies in trying to discern generalities about organized crime’s patterns of violence. Categorizing patterns of violence according to their scope or their promulgation is suspect. In the past, crime groups have used violence selectively and quietly to achieve their goals, but then have also used violence broadly and loudly to achieve other goals. Neither can one categorize organized crime’s violence according to goals as social, political and economic considerations often overlap in every attack or campaign.

Violence is therefore an important watch point that may not yield specific indicators of crime-terror interaction per se but can serve to frame the likelihood that an area might support terror-crime interaction.

Watch Point 6: Use of corruption

 

Both terrorists and organized criminals bribe government officials to undermine the work of law enforcement and regulation. Corrupt officials assist criminals by exerting pressure on businesses that refuse to cooperate with organized crime groups, or by providing passports for terrorists. The methods of corruption are diverse on both sides and include payments, the provision of illegal goods, the use of compromising information to extort cooperation, and outright infiltration of a government agency or other target.

Many studies have demonstrated that organized crime groups often evolve in places where the state cannot guarantee law or order, or provide basic health care, education, and social services. The absence of effective law enforcement combines with rampant corruption to make well-organized criminals nearly invulnerable.

Colombia may be the only example of a conflict zone where a major transnational crime group with very large profits is directly and openly connected to terrorists. The interaction between the FARC and ELN terror groups and the drug syndicates provides crucial important financial resources for the guerillas to operate against the Colombian state – and against each another. This is facilitated by universal corruption, from top government officials to local police. Corruption has served as the foundation for the growth of the narcotics cartels and insurgent/terrorist groups.

In the search for indicators, it would be simplistic to look for a high level of corruption, particularly in conflict zones. Instead, we should pose a series of questions:

Cooperation Are terrorist and criminal groups working together to minimize cost and maximize leverage from corrupt individuals and institutions?

Division of labor Are terrorist and criminal groups purposefully corrupting the areas they have most contact with? In the case of crime groups, that would be law enforcement and the judiciary; in the case of terrorists, the intelligence and security services.

  • Autonomy Are corruption campaigns carried out by one or both groups completely independent of the other?

These indicators can be applied to analyze a number of potential targets of corruption. Personnel that can provide protection or services are often mentioned as the target of corruption. Examples include law enforcement, the judiciary, border guards, politicians and elites, internal security agents and Consular officials. Economic aid and foreign direct investment are also targeted as sources of funds by criminals and terrorists that they can access by means of corruption.

 

Watch Point 7: Financial transactions & money laundering

 

despite the different purposes that may be involved in their respective uses of financial institutions (organized crime seeking to turn illicit funds into licit funds; terrorists seeking to move licit funds to use them for illicit means), the groups tend to share a common infrastructure for carrying out their financial activities. Both types of groups need reliable means of moving, and laundering money in many different jurisdictions, and as a result, both use similar methods to move money internationally. Both use charities and front groups as a cover for money flows.

Possible indicators include:

  • Shared methods of money laundering
  • Mutual use of known front companies and banks, as well as financial experts.

Watch Point 8: Organizational structures

 

The traditional model of organized crime used by U.S. law enforcement is that of the Sicilian Mafia – a hierarchical, conservative organization embedded in the traditional social structures of southern Italy… among today’s organized crime groups the Sicilian mafia is more of an exception than the rule.

Most organized crime now operates not as a hierarchy but as a decentralized, loose-knit network – which is a crucial similarity to terror groups. Networks offer better security, make intelligence-gathering more efficient, cover geographic distances and span diverse memberships more effectively.

Membership dynamics Both terror and organized crime groups – with the exception of the Sicilian Mafia and other traditional crime groups (i.e., Yakuza) – are made up of members with loose, relatively short-term affiliations to each other and even to the group itself. They can readily be recruited by other groups. By this route, criminals have become terrorists.

Scope of organization Terror groups need to make constant efforts to attract and recruit new members. Obvious attempts to attract individuals from crime groups are a clear indication of co- operation. An intercepted phone conversation in May 2004 by a suspected terrorist called Rabei Osman Sayed Ahmed revealed his recruitment tactics: “You should also know that I have met other brothers, that slowly I have created with a few things. First, they were drug pushers, criminals, I introduced them to the faith and now they are the first ones who ask when the moment of the jihad will be…”

Need to buy, wish to sell Often the business transactions between the two sides operate in both directions. Terrorist groups are not just customers for the services of organized crime, but often act as suppliers, too. Arms supply by terrorists is particularly marked in certain conflict zones. Thus, any criminal group found to be supplying outsiders with goods or services should be investigated for its client base too.

Investigators who discovered the money laundering in the above example were able to find out more about the terrorists’ activities too. The Islamic radical cell that planned the Madrid train bombings of 2004 was required to support itself financially through a business venture despite its initial funding by Al Qaeda.

Watch Point 9: Organizational goals

 

In theory, their different goals are what set terrorists apart from the perpetrators of organized crime. Terrorist groups are most often associated with political ends, such as change in leadership regimes or the establishment of an autonomous territory for a subnational group. Even millenarian and apocalyptic terrorist groups, such as the science-fiction mystics of Aum Shinrikyo, often include some political objectives. Organized crime, on the other hand, is almost always focused on personal enrichment.

By cataloging the different – and shifting – goals of terror and organized crime groups, we can develop indicators of convergence or divergence. This will help identify shared aspirations or areas where these aims might bring the two sides into conflict. On this basis, investigators can ask what conditions might prompt either side to adopt new goals or to fall back to basic goals, such as self-preservation.

Long view or short-termism

Affiliations of protagonists

 

Watch Point 10: Culture

 

Both terror and criminal groups use ideologies to maintain their internal identity and provide external justifications for their activities. Religious terror groups adopt and may alter the teachings of religious scholars to suggest divine support for their cause, while Italian, Chinese, Japanese, and other organized crime groups use religious and cultural themes to win public acceptance. Both types use ritual and tradition to construct and maintain their identity. Tattoos, songs, language, and codes of conduct are symbolic to both.

Religious affiliations, strong nationalist sentiments and strong roots in the local community are often characteristics that cause organized criminals to shun any affiliation with terrorists. Conversely, the absence of such affiliations means that criminals have fewer constraints keeping them from a link with terrorists.

In any organization, culture connects and strengthens ties between members. For networks, cultural features can also serve as a bridge to other networks.

  • Religion Many criminal and terrorist groups feature religion prominently.
  • Nationalism Ethno-nationalist insurgencies and criminal groups with deep historical roots are particularly likely to play the nationalist card.
  • Society Many criminal and terrorist networks adapt cultural aspects of the local and regional societies in which they operate to include local tacit knowledge, as contained in narrative traditions. Manuel Castells notes the attachment of drug traffickers to their country, and to their regions of origin. “They were/are deeply rooted in their cultures, traditions, and regional societies. …they have also revived local cultures, rebuilt rural life, strongly affirmed their religious feeling, and their beliefs in local saints and miracles, supported musical folklore (and were rewarded with laudatory songs from Colombian bards)…”

Watch Point 11: Popular support

 

Both organized crime and terrorist groups engage legitimate society in furtherance of their own agendas. In conflict zones, this may be done quite openly, while under the rule of law they are obliged to do so covertly. One way of doing so is to pay lip service to the interests of certain ethnic groups or social classes. Organized crime is particularly likely to make an appeal to disadvantaged people or people in certain professionals though paternalistic actions that make them a surrogate for the state. For instance, the Japanese Yakuza crime groups provided much-needed assistance to the citizens of Kobe after the serious earthquake there. Russian organized crime habitually supports cultural groups and sports troupes.

 

Both crime and terror derive crucial power and prestige through the support of their members and of some segment of the public at large. This may reflect enlightened self-interest, when people see that the criminals are acting on their behalf and improving their well-being and personal security. But it is equally likely to be that people are afraid to resist a violent criminal group in their neighborhood

This quest for popular support and common cause suggests various indicators:

  • Sources Terror groups seek and sometimes obtain the assistance of organized crime based on the perceived worthiness of the terrorist cause, or because of their common cause against state authorities or other sources of opposition. In testimony before the U.S. House Committee on International Relations, Interpol Secretary General Ronald Noble made this point. One of his examples was that Lebanese syndicates in South America send funds to Hezbollah.
  • Means Groups that cooperate may have shared activities for gaining popular support such as political parties, labor movements, and the provision of social services.
  • Places In conflict zones where the government has lost authority to criminal groups, social welfare and public order might be maintained by the criminal groups that hold power.

 

Watch Point 12: Trust

Like business corporations, terrorist and organized crime groups must attract and retain talented, dedicated, and loyal personnel. These skills are at an even greater premium than in the legitimate economy because criminals cannot recruit openly. A further challenge is that law enforcement and intelligence services are constantly trying to infiltrate and dismantle criminal networks. Members’ allegiance to any such group is constantly tested and demonstrated through rituals such as the initiation rites…

We propose three forms of trust in this context, using as a basis Newell and Swan’s model for inter- personal trust within commercial and academic groups.94

Companion trust based on goodwill or personal friendships… In this context, indicators of terror-crime interaction would be when members of the two groups use personal bonds based on family, tribe, and religion to cement their working relationship. Efforts to recruit known associates of the other group, or in common recruiting pools such as diasporas, would be another indicator.

Competence trust, which Newell and Swan define as the degree to which one person depends upon another to perform the expected task.

Commitment or contract trust, where all actors understand the practical importance of their role in completing the task at hand.

  1. Case studies

7.1. The Tri-Border Area of Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina

Chinese Triads such as the Fuk Ching, Big Circle Boys, and Flying Dragons are well established and believed to be the main force behind organized crime in CDE.

CDE is also a center of operations for several terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, Gamaa Islamiya, and FARC.

Watch points

Crime and terrorism in the Tri-Border Area interact seamlessly, making it difficult to draw a clean line be- tween the types of persons and groups involved in each of these two activities. There is no doubt, however, that the social and economic conditions allow groups that are originally criminal in nature and groups whose primary purpose is terrorism to function and interact freely.

Organizational structure

Evidence from CDE suggests that some of the local structures used by both groups are highly likely to overlap. There is no indication, however, of any significant organizational overlap between the criminal and terrorist groups. Their cooperation, when it exists, is ad hoc and without any formal or lasting agreements, i.e., activity appropriation and nexus forms only.

Organizational goals

In this region, the short-term goals of criminals and terrorists converge. Both benefit from easy border crossings and the networks necessary to raise funds.

Culture Cultural affinities between criminal and terrorist groups in the Tri-Border Area include shared ethnicities, languages and religions.

It emerged that 400 to 1000 kilograms of cocaine may have been shipped on a monthly basis through the Tri-Border Area on its way to Sao Paulo and thence to the Middle East and Europe

Numerous arrests revealed the strong ties between entrepreneurs in CDE and criminal and potentially terrorist groups. From the evidence in CDE it seems that the two phenomena operate in rather separate cultural realities, focusing their operations within ethnic groups. But nor does culture serve as a major hindrance to cooperation between organized crime and terrorists.

Illicit activities and subterfuge

The evidence in CDE suggests that terrorists see it as logical and cost-effective to use the skills, contacts, communications and smuggling routes of established criminal networks rather than trying to gain the requisite experience and knowledge themselves. Likewise, terrorists appear to recognize that to strike out on their own risks potential turf conflicts with criminal groups.

There is a clear link between Hong Kong-based criminal groups that specialize in large-scale trafficking of counterfeit products such as music albums and software, and the Hezbollah cells active in the Tri-Border Area. Within their supplier-customer relationship, the Hong Kong crime groups smuggle contraband goods into the region and deliver them to Hezbollah operatives, who in turn profit from their sale. The proceeds are then used to fund the terrorist groups.

Open activities in the legitimate economy

The knowledge and skills potential of CDE is tremendous. While no specific examples exist to connect terrorist and criminal groups through the purchase of legal goods and services, it is obvious that the likelihood of this is high, given how the CDE economy is saturated with organized crime.

Support or sustaining activities

The Tri-Border Area has an usually large and efficient transport infrastructure, which naturally assists organized crime. In turn, the many criminals and terrorists using cover require a sophisticated and reliable document forgery industry. The ease with which these documents can be obtained in CDE is an indicator of cooperation between terrorists and criminals.

Brazilian intelligence services have evidence that Osama bin Laden visited CDE in 1995 and met with the members of the Arab community in the city’s mosque to talk about his experience as a mujahadeen fighter in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union.

Use of violence

Contract murder in CDE costs as little as one thousand dollars, and the frequent violence in CDE is directed at business people who refuse to bend to extortion by terror groups. Ussein Mohamed Taiyen, president of the CDE Chamber of Commerce, was one such victim—murdered because he refused to pay the tax.

Financial transactions and money laundering in 2000, money laundering in the Tri-Border Area was estimated at 12 billion U.S. dollars annually.

As many as 261 million U.S. dollars annually has been raised in Tri-Border Area and sent overseas to fund the terrorist activities of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad.

Use of corruption

Most of the illegal activities in the Tri-Border Area bear the hallmark of corruption. In combination with the generally low effectiveness of state institutions, especially in Paraguay, and high level of corruption in that country, CDE appears to be a perfect environment for the logistical operations of both terrorists and organized criminals.

Even the few bona fide anti-corruption attempts made by the Paraguayan government have been under- mined because of the pervasive corruption, another example being the attempts to crack down on the Chinese criminal groups in CDE. The Consul General of Taiwan in CDE, Jorge Ho, stated that the Chinese groups were successful in bribing Paraguayan judges, effectively neutralizing law enforcement moves against the criminals.122

The other watch points described earlier – including fund raising and use of information technology – can also be illustrated with similar indicators of possible cooperation between terror and organized crime.

In sum, for the investigator or analyst seeking examples of perfect conditions for such cooperation, the Tri-Border Area is an obvious choice.

7.2. Crime and terrorism in the Black Sea region

Illicit or veiled operations Cigarette, drugs and arms smuggling have been major sources of financing of all the terrorist groups in the region.

Cigarette and alcohol smuggling has fueled the Kurdish-Turkish conflict as well as the terrorist violence in both the Abkhaz and Ossetian conflicts.

From the very beginning, the Chechen separatist movement had close ties with the Chechen crime rings in Russia, mainly operating in Moscow. These crime groups provided and some of them still provide financial sup- port for the insurgents.

  1. Conclusion and recommendations

The many examples in this report of cooperation between terrorism and organized crime make clear that the links between these two potent threats to national and global security are widespread, dynamic, and dangerous. It is only rational to consider the possibility that an effective organized crime group may have a connection with terrorists that has gone unnoticed so far.

Our key conclusion is that crime is not a peripheral issue when it comes to investigating possible terrorist activity. Efforts to analyze the phenomenon of terrorism without considering the crime component undermine all counter-terrorist activities, including those aimed at protecting sites containing weapons of mass destruction.

Yet the staffs of intelligence and law enforcement agencies in the United States are already over- whelmed. Their common complaint is that they do not have the time to analyze the evidence they possess, or to eliminate unnecessary avenues of investigation. The problem is not so much a dearth of data, but the lack of suitable tools to evaluate that data and make optimal decisions about when, and how, to investigate further.

Scrutiny and analysis of the interaction between terrorism and organized crime will become a matter of routine best practice. Aware- ness of the different forms this interaction takes, and the dynamic relationship between them, will become the basis for crime investigations, particularly for terrorism cases.

In conclusion, our overarching recommendation is that crime analysis must be central to understanding the patterns of terrorist behavior and cannot be viewed as a peripheral issue.

For policy analysts:

  1. More detailed analysis of the operation of illicit economies where criminals and terrorists interact would improve understanding of how organized crime operates, and how it cooperates with terrorists. Domestically, more detailed analysis of the businesses where illicit transactions are most common would help investigation of organized crime – and its affiliations. More focus on the illicit activities within closed ethnic communities in urban centers and in prisons in developed countries would prove useful in addressing potential threats.
  2. Corruption overseas, which is so often linked to facilitating organized crime and terrorism, should be elevated to a U.S. national security concern with an operational focus. After all, many jihadists are recruited because they are disgusted with the corrupt governments in their home countries. Corruption has facilitated the commission of criminal acts such as the Chechen suicide bombers who bribed airport personnel to board aircraft in Moscow.
  3. Analysts must study patterns of organized crime-terrorism interaction as guidance for what maybe observed subsequently in the United States.
  4. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies need more analysts with the expertise to understand the motivations and methods of criminal and terrorist groups around the globe, and with the linguistic and other skills to collect and analyze sufficient data.

For investigators:

  1. The separation of criminals and terrorists is not always as clear cut as many investigators believe. Crime and terrorists’ groups are often indistinguishable in conflict zones and in prisons.
  2. The hierarchical structure and conservative habits of the Sicilian Mafia no longer serves as an appropriate model for organized crime investigations. Most organized crime groups now operate as loose networked affiliations. In this respect they have more in common with terrorist groups.
  3. The PIE method provides a series of indicators that can result in superior profiles and higher- quality risk analysis for law enforcement agencies both in the United States and abroad. The approach can be refined with sensitive or classified information.
  4. Greater cooperation between the military and the FBI would allow useful sharing of intelligence, such as the substantial knowledge on crime and illicit transactions gleaned by the counterintelligence branch of the U.S. military that is involved in conflict regions where terror-crime interaction is most profound.
  5. Law enforcement personnel must develop stronger working relationships with the business sector. In the past, there has been too little cognizance of possible terrorist-organized crime interaction among the clients of private-sector business corporations and banks. Law enforcement must pursue evidence of criminal affiliations with high status individuals and business professionals who are often facilitators of terrorist financing and money laundering. In the spirit of public-private partnerships, corporations and banks should be placed under an obligation to watch for indications of organized crime or terrorist activity by their clients and business associates. Furthermore, they should attempt to analyze what they discover and to pass on their assessment to law enforcement.
  6. Law enforcement personnel posted overseas by federal agencies such as the DEA, the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, and the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement should be tasked with helping to develop a better picture of the geography of organized crime and its most salient features (i.e., the watch points of the PIE approach). This should be used to assist analysts in studying patterns of crime behavior that put American interests at risk overseas and alert law enforcement to crime patterns that may shortly appear in the U.S.
  7. Training for law enforcement officers at federal, state, and local level in identifying authentic and forged passports, visas, and other documents required for residency in the U.S. would eliminate a major shortcoming in investigations of criminal networks.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A.1 Defining the PIE Analytical Process

In order to begin identifying the tools to support the analytical process, the process of analysis itself first had to be captured. The TraCCC team adopted Max Boisot’s (2003) I-Space as a representation for de- scribing the analytical process. As Figure A-1 illustrates, I-Space provides a three-dimensional representation of the cognitive steps that constitute analysis in general and the utilization of the PIE methodology in particular. The analytical process is reduced to a series of logical steps, with one step feeding the next until the process starts anew. The steps are:

  1. Scanning
    2. Codification 3. Abstraction 4. Diffusion
    5. Validation 6. Impacting

Over time, repeated iterations of these steps result in more and more PIE indicators being identified, more information being gathered, more analytical product being generated, and more recommendations being made. Boisot’s I-Space is described below in terms of law enforcement and intelligence analytical processes.

A.1.1. Scanning

The analytical process begins with scanning, which Boisot defines as the process of identifying threats and opportunities in generally available but often fuzzy data. For example, investigators often scan avail- able news sources, organizational data sources (e.g., intelligence reports) and other information feeds to identify patterns or pieces of information that are of interest. Sometimes this scanning is performed with a clear objective in mind (e.g., set up through profiles to identify key players). From a tools perspective, scanning with a focus on a specific entity like a person or a thing is called a subject-based query. At other times, an investigator is simply reviewing incoming sources for pieces of a puzzle that is not well under- stood at that moment. From a tools perspective, scanning with a focus on activities like money laundering or drug trafficking is called a pattern-based query. For this type of query, a specific subject is not the target, but a sequence of actors/activities that form a pattern of interest.

Many of the tools described herein focus on either:

o Helping an investigator build models for these patterns then comparing those models against the data to find ‘matches’, or

o Supporting automated knowledge discovery where general rules about interesting patterns are hypothesized and then an automated algorithm is employed to search through large amounts of data based on those rules.

The choice between subject-based and pattern-based queries is dependent on several factors including the availability of expertise, the size of the data source to be scanned, the amount of time available and, of course, how well the subject is understood and anticipated. For example, subject-based queries are by nature more tightly focused and thus are often best conducted through keyword or Boolean searches, such as a Google search containing the string “Bin Laden” or “Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi.” Pattern-based queries, on the other hand, support a relationship/discovery process, such as an iterative series of Google searches starting at ‘with all of the words’ terrorist, financing, charity, and hawala, proceeding through ‘without the words’ Hezbollah and Iran and culminating in ‘with the exact phrase’ Al Qaeda Wahabi charities. Regard- less of which is employed, the results provide new insights into the problem space. The construction, employment, evaluation, and validation of results from these various types of scanning techniques will pro- vide a focus for our tool exploration.

A.1.2. Codification

In order for the insights that result from scanning to be of use to the investigator, they must be placed into the context of the questions that the investigator is attempting to answer. This context provides structure through a codification process that turns disconnected patterns into coherent thoughts that can be more easily communicated to the community. The development of indicators is an example of this codification. Building up network maps from entities and their relationships is another example that could sup- port indicator development. Some important tools will be described that support this codification step.

A.1.3. Abstraction

During the abstraction phase, investigators generalize the application of newly codified insights to a wider range of situations, moving from the specific examples identified during scanning and codification towards a more abstract model of the discovery (e.g., one that explains a large pattern of behavior or predicts future activities). Indicators are placed into the larger context of the behaviors that are being monitored. Tools that support the generation and maintenance of models that support this abstraction process

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will be key to making the analysis of an overwhelming number of possibilities and unlimited information manageable.

A.1.4. Diffusion

Many of the intelligence failures cited in the 9/11 Report were due to the fact that information and ideas were not shared. This was due to a variety of reasons, not the least of which were political. Technology also built barriers to cooperation, however. Information can only be shared if one of two conditions is met. Either the sender and receiver must share a context (a common language, background, understanding of the problem) or the information must be coded and abstracted (see steps 2 and 3 above) to extract it from the personal context of the sender to one that is generally understood by the larger community. Once this is done, the newly created insights of one investigator can be shared with investigators in sister groups.

The technology for the diffusion itself is available through any number of sources ranging from repositories where investigators can share information to real-time on-line cooperation. Tools that take advantage of this technology include distributed databases, peer-to-peer cooperation environments and real- time meeting software (e.g., shared whiteboards).

A.1.5. Validation

In this step of the process, the hypotheses that have been formed and shared are now validated over time, either by a direct match of the data against the hypotheses (i.e., through automation) or by working towards a consensus within the analytical community. Some hypotheses will be rejected, while others will be retained and ranked according to probability of occurrence. In either case, tools are needed to help make this match and form this consensus.

A.1.6. Impacting

Simply validating a set of hypotheses is not enough. If the intelligence gathering community stops at that point, the result is a classified CNN feed to the policy makers and practitioners. The results of steps 1 through 5 must be mapped against the opposing landscape of terrorism and transnational crime in order to understand how the information impacts the decisions that must be taken. In this final step, investigators work to articulate how the information/hypotheses they are building impact the overall environment and make recommendations on actions (e.g., probes) that might be taken to clarify that environment. The con- sequences of the actions taken as a result of the impacting phase are then identified during the scanning phase and the cycle begins again.

A.1.7. An Example of the PIE Analytical Approach

While section 4 provided some real-life examples of the PIE approach in action, a retrodictive analysis of terror-crime cooperation in the extraction, smuggling, and sale of conflict diamonds provides a grounding example of Boisot’s six step analytical process. Diamonds from West Africa were a source of funding for various factions in the Lebanese civil war since the 1980s. Beginning in the late 1990s intelligence, law enforcement, regulatory, non-governmental, and press reports suggested that individuals linked to transnational criminal smuggling and Middle Eastern terrorist groups were involved in Liberia’s illegal diamond trade. We would expect to see the following from an investigator assigned to track terrorist financing:

  1. Scanning: During this step investigators could have assembled fragmentary reports to reveal crude patterns that indicated terror-crime interaction in a specific region (West Africa), involving two countries (Liberia and Sierra Leone) and trade in illegal diamonds.
  2. Codification: Based on patterns derived from scanning, investigators could have codified the terror- crime interaction by developing explicit network maps that showed linkages between Russian arms dealers, Russian and South American organized crime groups, Sierra Leone insurgents, the government of Liberia, Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Lebanese and Belgian diamond merchants, and banks in Cyprus, Switzerland, and the U.S.
  3. Abstraction: The network map developed via codification is essentially static at this point. Utilizing social network analysis techniques, investigators could have abstracted this basic knowledge to gain a dynamic understanding of the conflict diamond network. A calculation of degree, betweenness, and closeness centrality of the conflict diamond network would have revealed those individuals with the most connections within the network, those who were the links between various subgroups within the network, and those with the shortest paths to reach all of the network participants. These calculations would have revealed that all the terrorist links in the conflict diamond network flowed through Ibra- him Bah, a Libyan-trained Senegalese who had fought with the mujahadeen in Afghanistan and whom Charles Taylor, then President of Liberia, had entrusted to handle the majority of his diamond deals. Bah arranged for terrorist operatives to buy all diamonds possible from the RUF, the Charles Taylor- supported rebel army that controlled much of neighboring civil-war-torn Sierra Leone. The same calculations would have delineated Taylor and his entourage as the key link to transnational criminals in the network, and the link between Bah and Taylor as the essential mode of terror-crime interaction for purchase and sale of conflict diamonds.
  4. Diffusion: Disseminating the results of the first three analytical steps in this process could have alerted investigators in other domestic and foreign law enforcement and intelligence agencies to the emergent terror-crime nexus involving conflict diamonds in West Africa. Collaboration between various security services at this junction could have revealed Al Qaeda’s move into commodities such as diamonds, gold, tanzanite, emeralds, and sapphires in the wake of the Clinton Administration’s freezing of 240 million dollars belonging to Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Western banks in the aftermath of the August 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In particular, diffusion of the parameters of the conflict diamond network could have allowed investigators to tie Al Qaeda fund raising activities to a Belgian bank account that contained approximately 20 million dollars of profits from conflict diamonds.
  5. Validation: Having linked Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and multiple organized crime groups to the trade in conflict diamonds smuggled into Europe from Sierra Leone via Liberia, investigators would have been able to draw operational implications from the evidence amassed in the previous steps of the analytical process. For example, Al Qaeda diamond purchasing behavior changed markedly. Prior to July 2001 Al Qaeda operatives sought to buy low in Africa and sell high in Europe so as to maximize profit. Around July they shifted to a strategy of buying all the diamonds they could and offering the highest prices required to secure the stones. Investigators could have contrasted these buying patterns and hypothesized that Al Qaeda was anticipating events which would disrupt other stores of value, such as financial instruments, as well as bring more scrutiny of Al Qaeda financing in general.
  6. Impacting: In the wake of the 9/11attacks, the hypothesis that Al Qaeda engaged in asset shifting prior to those strikes similar to that undertaken in 1999 has gained significant validity. During this final step in the analytical process, investigators could have created a watch point involving a terror-crime nexus associated with conflict diamonds in West Africa, and generated the following indicators for use in future investigations:
  • Financial movements and expenditures as attack precursors;
  • Money as a link between known and unknown nodes;
  • Changes in the predominant patterns of financial activity;
  • Criminal activities of a terrorist cell for direct or indirect operational support;
  • Surge in suspicious activity reports.

A.2. The tool space

The key to successful tool application is understanding what type of tool is needed for the task at hand. In order to better characterize the tools for this study, we have divided the tool space into three dimensions:

  • An abstraction dimension: This continuum focuses on tools that support the movement of concepts from the concrete to the abstract. Building models is an excellent example of moving concrete, narrow concepts to a level of abstraction that can be used by investigators to make sense of the past and predict the future.
  • A codification dimension: This continuum attaches labels to concepts that are recognized and accepted by the analytical community to provide a common context for grounding models. One end of the spectrum is the local labels that individual investigators assign and perhaps only that they understand. The other end of the spectrum is the community-accepted labels (e.g., commonly accepted definitions that will be understood by the broader analytical community). As we saw earlier, concepts must be defined in community-recognizable labels before the community can begin to cooperate on those concepts.
  • The number of actors: This last continuum talks in term of the number of actors who are involved with a given concept within a certain time frame. Actors could include individual people, groups, and even automated software agents. Understanding the number of actors involved with the analysis will play a key role in determining what type of tool needs to be employed.

Although they may appear to be performing the same function, abstraction and codification are not the same. An investigator could build a set of models (moving from concrete to abstract concepts) but not take the step of changing his or her local labels. The result would be an abstracted model of use to the single investigator, but not to a community working from a different context. For example, one investigator could model a credit card theft ring as a petty crime network under the loose control of a traditional organized crime family, while another investigator could model the same group as a terrorist logistic sup- port cell.

The analytical process described above can now be mapped into the three-dimensional tool space, represented graphically in Figure A-1. So, for example, scanning (step 1) is placed in the portion of the tool space that represents an individual working in concrete terms without those terms being highly codified (e.g., queries). Validation (step 5), on the other hand, requires the cooperation of a larger group working with abstract, highly codified concepts.

A.2.1. Scanning tools

Investigators responsible for constructing and monitoring a set of indicators could begin by scanning available data sources – including classified databases, unclassified archives, news archives, and internet sites – for information related to the indicators of interest. As can be seen from exhibit 6, all scanning tools will need to support requirements dictated by where these tools fall within the tool space. Scanning tools should focus on:

  • How to support an individual investigator as opposed to the collective analytical community. Investigators, for the most part, will not be performing these scanning functions as a collaborative effort;
  • Uncoded concepts, since the investigator is scanning for information that is directly related to a specific context (e.g., money laundering), then the investigator will need to be intimately familiar with the terms that are local (uncoded) to that context;
  • Concrete concepts or, in this case, specific examples of people, groups, and circumstances within the investigator’s local context. In other words, if the investigator attempts to generalize at this stage, much could be missed.

Using these criteria as a background, and leveraging state-of-the-art definitions for data mining, scanning tools fall into two basic categories:

  • Tools that support subject-based queries are used by investigators when they are searching for specific information about people, groups, places, events, etc.; and
  • Investigators who are not as interested in individuals as they are in identifying patterns of activities use tools that support pattern-based queries.

This section briefly describes the functionality in general, as well as providing specific tool examples, to support both of these critical types of scanning.

A.2.1.1. Subject-based queries

Subject-based queries are the easiest to perform and the most popular. Examples of tools that are used to support subject-based queries are Boolean search tools for databases and internet search engines.

Functionalities that should be evaluated when selecting subject-based query tools include that they are easy to use and intuitive to the investigator. Investigators should not be faced with a bewildering array of ‘ifs’, ‘ands’, and ‘ors’, but should be presented with a query interface that matches the investigator’s cognitive view of searching the data. The ideal is a natural language interface for constructing the queries. An- other benefit is that they provide a graphical interface whenever possible. One example might be a graphical interface that allows the investigator to define subjects of interest, then uses overlapping circles to indicate the interdependencies among the search terms. Furthermore, query interfaces should support synonyms, have an ability to ‘learn’ from the investigator based on specific interests, and create an archive of queries so that the investigator can return and repeat. Finally, they should provide a profiling capability that alerts the investigator when new information is found based on the subject.

Subject-based query tools fall into three categories: queries against databases, internet searches, and customized search tools. Examples of tools for each of these categories include:

  • Queries from news archives: All major news groups provide web-based interfaces that support queries against their on-line data sources. Most allow you to select the subject, enter keywords, specify date ranges, and so on. Examples include the New York Times (at http://www.nytimes.com/ref/membercenter/nytarchive.html) and the Washington Post (at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/search.html). Most of these sources allow you to read through the current issue, but charge a subscription for retrieving articles from past issues.
  • Queries from on-line references: There are a host of on-line references now available for query that range from the Encyclopedia Britannica (at http://www.eb.com/) to the CIA’s World Factbook (at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/). A complete list of such references is impossible to include, but the search capabilities provided by each are clear examples of subject-based queries.
  • Search engines: Just as with queries against databases, there are a host of commercial search engines available for free-format internet searching. The most popular is Google, which combines a technique called citation indexing with web crawlers that constantly search out and index new web pages. Google broke the mold of free-format text searching by not focusing on exact matches between the search terms and the retrieved information. Rather, Google assumes that the most popular pages (the ones that are referenced the most often) that include your search terms will be the pages of greatest interest to you. The commercial version of Google is available free of charge on the internet, and organizations can also purchase a version of Google for indexing pages on an intranet. Google also works in many languages. More information about Google as a business solution can be found at http://www.google.com/services/. Although the current version of Google supports many of the requirements for subject-based queries, its focus is quick search and it does not support sophisticated query interfaces, natural language queries, synonyms, or a managed query environment where queries can be saved. There are now numerous software packages available that provide this level of support, many of them as add-on packages to existing applications.

o Name Search®: This software enables applications to find, identify and match information. Specifically, Name Search finds and matches records based on personal and corporate names, social security numbers, street addresses and phone numbers even when those records have variations due to phonetics, missing words, noise words, nicknames, prefixes, keyboard errors or sequence variations. Name Search claims that searches using their rule-based matching algorithms are faster and more accurate than those based only on Soundex or similar techniques. Soundex, developed by Odell and Russell, uses codes based on the sound of each letter to translate a string into a canonical form of at most four characters, preserving the first letter.

Name Search also supports foreign languages, technical data, medical information, and other specialized information. Other problem-specific packages take advantage of the Name Search functionality through an Application Programming Interface (API) (i.e., Name Search is bundled). An example is ISTwatch. See http://www.search-software.com/.

o ISTwatch©: ISTwatch is a software component suite that was designed specifically to search and match individuals against the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s (OFAC’s) Specially Designated Nationals list and other denied parties lists. These include the FBI’s Most Wanted, Canadian’s OSFI terrorist lists, the Bank of England’s consolidated lists and Financial Action Task Force data on money-laundering countries. See

http://www.intelligentsearch.com/ofac_software/index.html

All these tools are packages designed to be included in an application. A final set of subject-based query tools focus on customized search environments. These are tools that have been customized to per- form a particular task or operate within a particular context. One example is WebFountain.

o WebFountain: IBM’s WebFountain began as a research project focused on extending subject- based query techniques beyond free format text to target money-laundering activities identified through web sources. The WebFountain project, a product of IBM’s Almaden research facility in California, used advanced natural language processing technologies to analyze the entire internet – the search covered 256 terabytes of data in the process of matching a structured list of people who were indicted for money laundering activities in the past with unstructured in- formation on the internet. If a suspicious transaction is identified and the internet analysis finds a relationship between the person attempting the transaction and someone on the list, then an alert is issued. WebFountain has now been turned into a commercially available IBM product. Robert Carlson, IBM WebFountain vice president, describes the current content set as over 1 petabyte in storage with over three billion pages indexed, two billion stored, and the ability to mine 20 million pages a day. The commercial system also works across multiple languages. Carlson stated in 2003 that it would cover 21 languages by the end of 2004 [Quint, 2003]. See: http://www.almaden.ibm.com/webfountain

o Memex: Memex is a suite of tools that was created specifically for law enforcement and national security groups. The focus of these tools is to provide integrated search capabilities against both structured (i.e., databases) and unstructured (i.e., documents) data sources. Memex also provides a graphical representation of the process the investigator is following, structuring the subject-based queries. Memex’s marketing literature states that over 30 percent of the intelligence user population of the UK uses Memex. Customers include the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), whose Memex network that includes over 90 dedicated intelligence servers pro- viding access to over 30,000 officers; the U.S. Department of Defense; numerous U.S. intelligence agencies, drug intelligence Groups and law enforcement agencies. See http://www.memex.com/index.shtml.

A.2.1.2. Pattern queries

Pattern-based queries focus on supporting automated knowledge discovery (1) where the exact subject of interest is not known in advance and (2) where what is of interest is a pattern of activity emerging over time. In order for pattern queries to be formed, the investigator must hypothesize about the patterns in advance and then use tools to confirm or deny these hypotheses. This approach is useful when there is expertise available to make reasonable guesses with respect to the potential patterns. Conversely, when that expertise is not available or the potential patterns are unknown due to extenuating circumstances (e.g., new patterns are emerging too quickly for investigators to formulate hypotheses), then investigators can auto- mate the construction of candidate patterns by formulating a set of rules that describe how potentially interesting, emerging patterns might appear. In either case, tools can help support the production and execution of the pattern queries. The degree of automation is dependent upon the expertise available and the dynamics of the situation being investigated.

As indicated earlier, pattern-based query tools fall into two general categories: those that support investigators in the construction of patterns based on their expertise, then run those patterns against large data sets, and those that allow the investigator to build rules about patterns of interest and, again, run those rules against large data sets.

Examples of tools for each of these categories include

  1. Megaputer (PolyAnalyst 4.6): This tool falls into the first category of pattern-based query tools, helping the investigator hypothesize patterns and explore the data based on those hypotheses. PolyAnalyst is a tool that supports a particular type of pattern-based query called Online Analytical Processing (OLAP), a popular analytical approach for large amounts of quantitative data. Using PolyAnalyst, the investigator defines dimensions of interest to be considered in text exploration and then displays the results of the analysis across various combinations of these dimensions. For example, an investigator could search for mujahideen who had trained at the same Al Qaeda camp in the 1990s and who had links to Pakistani Intelligence as well as opium growers and smuggling networks into Europe. See http://www.megaputer.com/.
  2. Autonomy Suite: Autonomy’s search capabilities fall into the second category of pattern-based query tools. Autonomy has combined technologies that employ adaptive pattern-matching techniques with Bayesian inference and Claude Shannon’s principles of information theory. Autonomy identifies the pat- terns that naturally occur in text, based on the usage and frequency of words or terms that correspond to specific ideas or concepts as defined by the investigator. Based on the preponderance of one pattern over another in a piece of unstructured information, Autonomy calculates the probability that a document in question is about a subject of interest [Autonomy, 2002]. See http://www.autonomy.com/content/home/
  3. Fraud Investigator Enterprise: The Fraud Investigator Enterprise Similarity Search Engine (SSE) from InfoGlide Software is another example of the second category of pattern search tools. SSE uses ana- lytic techniques that dissect data values looking for and quantifying partial matches in addition to exact matches. SSE scores and orders search results based upon a user-defined data model. See http://www.infoglide.com/composite/ProductsF_2_1.htm

Although an evaluation of data sources available for scanning is beyond the scope of this paper, one will serve as an example of the information available. It is hypothesized in this report that tools could be developed to support the search and analysis of Short Message Service (SMS) traffic for confirmation of PIE indicators. Often referred to as ‘text messaging’ in the U.S., the SMS is an integrated message service that lets GSM cellular subscribers send and receive data using their handset. A single short message can be up to 160 characters of text in length – words, numbers, or punctuation symbols. SMS is a store and for- ward service; this means that messages are not sent directly to the recipient but via a network SMS Center. This enables messages to be delivered to the recipient if their phone is not switched on or if they are out of a coverage area at the time the message was sent. This process, called asynchronous messaging, operates in much the same way as email. Confirmation of message delivery is another feature and means the sender can receive a return message notifying them whether the short message has been delivered or not. SMS messages can be sent to and received from any GSM phone, providing the recipient’s network supports text messaging. Text messaging is available to all mobile users and provides both consumers and business people with a discreet way of sending and receiving information
Over 15 billion SMS text messages were sent around the globe in January 2001. Tools taking advantage of the stored messages in an SMS Center could:

  • Perform searches of the text messages for keywords or phrases,
  • Analyze SMS traffic patterns, and
  • Search for people of interest in the Home Location Register (HLR) database that maintains information about the subscription profile of the mobile phone and also about the routing information for the subscriber.

A.2.2. Codification tools

As can be seen from exhibit 6, all codification tools will need to support requirements dictated by where these tools fall within the tool space. Codification tools should focus on:

  • Supporting individual investigators (or at best a small group of investigators) in making sense of the information discovered during the scanning process.
  • Moving the terms with which the information is referenced from a localized organizational context (uncoded, e.g., hawala banking) to a more global context (codified, e.g., informal value storage and transfer operations).
  • Moving that information from specific, concrete examples towards more abstract terms that could support identification of concepts and patterns across multiple situations, thus providing a larger context for the concepts being explored.

Using these criteria as a background, the codification tools reviewed fall into two major categories:

  1. Tools that help investigators label concepts and cluster different concepts into terms that are recognizable and used by the larger analytical community; and
  2. Tools that use this information to build up network maps identifying entities, relationships, missions, etc.

This section briefly describes codification functionality in general, as well as providing specific tool examples, to support both of these types of codification.

A.2.2.1. Labeling and clustering

The first step to codification is to map the context-specific terms used by individual investigators to a taxonomy of terms that are commonly accepted in a wider analytical context. This process is performed through labeling individual terms, clustering other terms and renaming them according to a community- accepted taxonomy.

In general, labeling and clustering tools should:

  • Support the capture of taxonomies that are being developed by the broader analytical community; Allow the easy mapping of local terms to these broader terms;
    Support the clustering process either by providing algorithms for calculating the similarity between concepts, or tools that enable collaborative consensus construction of clustered concepts;
  • Label and cluster functionality is typically embedded in applications support analytical processes, not provided separately as stand-alone tools.

Two examples of such products include:

COPLINK® – COPLINK began as a research project at the University of Arizona and has now grown into a commercially available application from Knowledge Computing Corporation (KCC). It is focused on providing tools for organizing vast quantities of structured and seemingly unrelated information in the law enforcement arena. See COPLINK’s commercial website at http://www.knowledgecc.com/index.htm and its academic website at the University of Arizona at http://ai.bpa.arizona.edu/COPLINK/.

Megaputer (PolyAnalyst 4.6) – In addition to supporting pattern queries, PolyAnalyst also pro- vides a means for creating, importing and managing taxonomies which could be useful in the codification step and carries out automated categorization of text records against existing taxonomies.

A.2.2.2. Network mapping

Terrorists have a vested interest in concealing their relationships, they often emit confusing or intentionally misleading information and they operate in self-contained and difficult to penetrate cells for much of the time. Criminal networks are also notoriously difficult to map, and the mapping often happens after a crime has been committed than before. What is needed are tools and approaches that support the map- ping of networks to represent agents (e.g., people, groups), environments, behaviors, and the relationships between all of these.

A large number of research efforts and some commercial products have been created to automate aspects of network mapping in general and link analysis specifically. In the past, however, these tools have provided only marginal utility in understanding either criminal or terrorist behavior (as opposed to espionage networks, for which this type of tool was initially developed). Often the linkages constructed by such tools are impossible to disentangle since all links have the same importance. PIE holds the potential to focus link analysis tools by clearly delineating watch points and allowing investigators to differentiate, characterize and prioritize links within an asymmetric threat network. This section focuses on the requirements dictated by PIE and some candidate tools that might be used in the PIE context.

In general, network mapping tools should:

  • Support the representation of people, groups, and the links between them within the PIE indicator framework;
  • Sustain flexibility for mapping different network structures;
  • Differentiate, characterize and prioritize links within an asymmetric threat network;
  • Focus on organizational structures to determine what kinds of network structures they use;
  • Provide a graphical interface that supports analysis;
  • Access and associate evidence with an investigator’s data sources.

Within the PIE context, investigators can use network mapping tools to identify the flows of information and authority within different types of network forms such as chains, hub and spoke, fully matrixed, and various hybrids of these three basic forms.
Examples of network mapping tools that are available commercially include:

Analyst Notebook®: A PC-based package from i2 that supports network mapping/link analysis via network, timeline and transaction analysis. Analyst Notebook allows an investigator to capture link information between people, groups, activities, and other entities of interest in a visual format convenient for identifying relationships, dependencies and trends. Analyst Notebook facilitates this capture by providing a variety of tools to review and integrate information from a number of data sources. It also allows the investigator to make a connection between the graphical icons representing entities and the original data sources, supporting a drill-down feature. Some of the other useful features included with Analyst Note- book are the ability to: 1) automatically order and depict sequences of events even when exact date and time data is unknown and 2) use background visuals such as maps, floor plans or watermarks to place chart information in context or label for security purposes. See http://www.i2.co.uk/Products/Analysts_Notebook/default.asp. Even though i2 Analyst Notebook is widely used by intelligence community, anti-terrorism and law enforcement investigators for constructing network maps, interviews with investigators indicate that it is more useful as a visual aid for briefing rather than in performing the analysis itself. Although some investigators indicated that they use it as an analytical tool, most seem to perform the analysis using either another tool or by hand, then entering the results into the Analyst Notebook in order to generate a graphic for a report or briefing. Finally, few tools are available within the Analyst Notebook to automatically differentiate, characterize and prioritize links within an asymmetric threat network.

Patterntracer TCA: Patterntracer Telephone Call Analysis (TCA) is an add-on tool for the Analyst Notebook intended to help identify patterns in telephone billing data. Patterntracer TCA automatically finds repeating call patterns in telephone billing data and graphically displays them using network and timeline charts. See http://www.i2.co.uk/Products/Analysts_Workstation/default.asp

Memex: Memex has already been discussed in the context of subject-based query tools. In addition to supporting such queries, however, Memex also provides a tool that supports automated link analysis on unstructured data and presents the results in graphical form.

Megaputer (PolyAnalyst 4.6): In addition to supporting pattern-based queries, PolyAnalyst was also designed to support a primitive form of link analysis, by providing a visual relationship of the results.

A.2.3. Abstraction tools

As can be seen from exhibit 6, all abstraction tools will need to support requirements dictated by where these tools fall within the tool space. Abstraction tools should focus on:

  • Functionalities that help individual investigators (or a small group of investigators) build abstract models;
  • Options to help share these models, and therefore the tools should be defined using terms that will be recognized by the larger community (i.e., codified as opposed to uncoded);
  • Highly abstract notions that encourage examination of concepts across networks, groups, and time.

The product of these tools should be hypotheses or models that can be shared with the community to support information exchange, encourage dialogue, and eventually be validated against both real-world data and by other experts. This section provides some examples of useful functionality that should be included in tools to support the abstraction process.

A.2.3.1. Structured argumentation tools

Structured argumentation is a methodology for capturing analytical reasoning processes designed to address a specific analytic task in a series of alternative constructs, or hypotheses, represented by a set of hierarchical indicators and associated evidence. Structured argumentation tools should:

  • Capture multiple, competing hypotheses of multi-dimensional indicators at both summary and/or detailed levels of granularity;
  • Develop and archive indicators and supporting evidence;
  • Monitor ongoing activities and assess the implications of new evidence;
  • Provide graphical visualizations of arguments and associated evidence;
  • Encourage a careful analysis by reminding the investigator of the full spectrum of indicators to be considered;
  • Ease argument comprehension by allowing the investigator to move along the component lines of reasoning to discover the basis and rationale of others’ arguments;
  • Invite and facilitate argument comparison by framing arguments within common structures; and
  • Support collaborative development and reuse of models among a community of investigators.
  • Within the PIE context, investigators can use structured argumentation tools to assess a terrorist group’s ability to weaponize biological materials, and determine the parameters of a transnational criminal organization’s money laundering methodology.

Examples of structured argumentation tools that are available commercially include:

Structured Evidential Argument System (SEAS) from SRI International was initially applied to the problem of early warning for project management, and more recently to the problem of early crisis warning for the U.S. intelligence and policy communities. SEAS is based on the concept of a structured argument, which is a hierarchically organized set of questions (i.e., a tree structure). These are multiple-choice questions, with the different answers corresponding to discrete points or subintervals along a continuous scale, with one end of the scale representing strong support for a particular type of opportunity or threat and the other end representing strong refutation. Leaf nodes represent primitive questions, and internal nodes represent derivative questions. The links represent support relationships among the questions. A derivative question is supported by all the derivative and primitive questions below it. SEAS arguments move concepts from their concrete, local representations into a global context that supports PIE indicator construction. See http://www.ai.sri.com/~seas/.

A.2.3.2. Modeling

  • By capturing information about a situation (e.g., the actors, possible actions, influences on those actions, etc.), in a model, users can define a set of initial conditions, match these against the model, and use the results to support analysis and prediction. This process can either be performed manually or, if the model is complex, using an automated tool or simulator.
  • Utilizing modeling tools, investigators can systematically examine aspects of terror-crime interaction. Process models in particular can reveal linkages between the two groups and allow investigators to map these linkages to locations on the terror-crime interaction spectrum. Process models capture the dynamics of networks in a series of functional and temporal steps. Depending on the process being modeled, these steps must be conducted either sequentially or simultaneously in order for the process to execute as de- signed. For example, delivery of cocaine from South America to the U.S. can be modeled as process that moves sequentially from the growth and harvesting of coca leaves through refinement into cocaine and then transshipment via intermediate countries into U.S. distribution points. Some of these steps are sequential (e.g., certain chemicals must be acquired and laboratories established before the coca leaves can be processed in bulk) and some can be conducted simultaneously (e.g., multiple smuggling routes can be utilized at the same time).

Corruption, modeled as a process, should reveal useful indicators of cooperation between organized crime and terrorism. For example, one way to generate and validate indicators of terror-crime interaction is to place cases of corrupt government officials or private sector individuals in an organizational network construct utilizing a process model and determine if they serve as a common link between terrorist and criminal networks via an intent model with attached evidence. An intent model is a type of process model constructed by reverse engineering a specific end-state, such as the ability to move goods and people into and out of a country without interference from law enforcement agencies.

This end-state is reached by bribing certain key officials in groups that supply border guards, provide legitimate import-export documents (e.g., end-user certificates), monitor immigration flows, etc.

Depending on organizational details, a bribery campaign can proceed sequentially or simultaneously through various offices and individuals. This type of model allows analysts to ‘follow the money’ through a corruption network and link payments to officials with illicit sources. The model can be set up to reveal payments to officials that can be linked to both criminal and terrorist involvement (perhaps via individuals or small groups with known links to both types of network).

Thus investigators can use a process model as a repository for numerous disparate data items that, taken together, reveal common patterns of corruption or sources of payments that can serve as indicators of cooperation between organized crime and terrorism. Using these tools, investigators can explore multiple data dimensions by dynamically manipulating several elements of analysis:

  • Criminal and/or terrorist priorities, intent and factor attributes;
  • Characterization and importance of direct evidence;
  • Graphical representations and other multi-dimensional data visualization approaches.

There have been a large number of models built over the last several years focusing on counter- terrorism and criminal activities. Some of the most promising are models that support agent-based execution of complex adaptive environments that are used for intelligence analysis and training. Some of the most sophisticated are now being developed to support the generation of more realistic environments and interactions for the commercial gaming market.

In general, modeling tools should:

  • Capture and present reasoning from evidence to conclusion;
  • Enable comparison of information across situation, time, and groups;
  • Provide a framework for challenging assumptions and exploring alternative hypotheses;
  • Facilitate information sharing and cooperation by representing hypotheses and analytical judgment, not just facts;
  • Incorporate the first principle of analysis—problem decomposition;
  • Track ongoing and evolving situations, collect analysis, and enable users to discover information and critical data relationships;
  • Make rigorous option space analysis possible in a distributed electronic context;
  • Warn users of potential cognitive bias inherent in analysis.

Although there are too many of these tools to list in this report, good examples of some that would be useful to support PIE include:

NETEST: This model estimates the size and shape of covert networks given multiple sources with omissions and errors. NETEST makes use of Bayesian updating techniques, communications theory and social network theory [Dombroski, 2002].

The Modeling, Virtual Environments and Simulation (MOVES) Institute at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, is using a model of cognition formulated by Aaron T. Beck to build models capturing the characteristics of people willing to employ violence [Beck, 2002].

BIOWAR: This is a city scale multi-agent model of weaponized bioterrorist attacks for intelligence and training. At present the model is running with 100,000 agents (this number will be increased). All agents have real social networks and the model contains real city data (hospitals, schools, etc.). Agents are as realistic as possible and contain a cognitive model [Carley, 2003a].

All of the models reviewed had similar capabilities:

  • Capture the characteristics of entities – people, places, groups, etc.;
  • Capture the relationships between entities at a level of detail that supports programmatic construction of processes, situations, actions, etc. these are usually “is a” and “a part of” representations of object-oriented taxonomies, influence relationships, time relationships, etc.;
  • The ability to represent this information in a format that supports using the model in simulations. The next section provides information on simulation tools that are in common use for running these types of models.
  • User interfaces for defining the models, the best being graphical interfaces that allow the user to define the entities and their relationships through intuitive visual displays. For example, if the model involves defining networks or influences between entities, graphical displays with the ability to create connections and perform drag and drop actions become important.

A.2.4. Diffusion tools

As can be seen from exhibit 6, all diffusion tools will need to support requirements dictated by where these tools fall within the tool space. Diffusion tools should focus on:

  • Moving information from an individual or small group of investigators to the collective community;
  • Providing abstract concepts that are easily understood in a global context with little worry that the terms will be misinterpreted;
  • Supporting the representation of abstract concepts and encouraging dialogues about those concepts.

In general diffusion tools should:

  • Provide a shared environment that investigators can access on the internet;
  • Support the ability for everyone to upload abstract concepts and their supporting evidence (e.g., documents);
  • Contain the ability for the person uploading the information to be able to attach an annotation and keywords;
  • Possess the ability to search concept repositories;
  • Be simple to set up and use.

Within the PIE context, investigators could use diffusion tools to:

  • Employ a collaborative environment to exchange information, results of analysis, hypotheses, models, etc.;
  • Utilize collaborative environments that might be set up between law enforcement groups and counterterrorism groups to exchange information on a continual and near real-time basis. Examples of diffusion tools run from one end of the cooperation/dissemination spectrum to the other. One of the simplest to use is:
  • AskSam: The AskSam Web Publisher is an extension of the standalone AskSam capability that has been used by the analytical community for many years. The capabilities of AskSam Web Publisher include: 1) sharing documents with others who have access to the local net- work, 2) anyone who has access to the network has access to the AskSam archive without the need for an expensive license, and 3) advanced searching capabilities including adding keywords which supports a group’s codification process (see step 2 in exhibit 6 in our analytical process). See http://www.asksam.com/.

There are some significant disadvantages to using AskSam as a cooperation environment. For example, each document included has to be ‘published’. The assumption is that there are only one or two people primarily responsible for posting documents and these people control all documents that are made available, a poor assumption for an analytical community where all are potential publishers of concepts. The result is expensive licenses for publishers. Finally, there is no web-based service for AskSam, requiring each organization to host its own AskSam server.

There are two leading commercial tools for cooperation now available and widely used. Which tool is chosen for a task depends on the scope of the task and the number of users.

  • Groove: virtual office software that allows small teams of people to work together securely over a network on a constrained problem. Groove capabilities include: 1) the ability for investigators to set up a shared space, invite people to join and give them permission to post documents to a document repository (i.e., file sharing), 2) security including encryption that protects content (e.g., upload and download of documents) and communications (e.g., email and text messaging), investigators can work across firewalls without a Virtual Private Network (VPN) which improves speed and makes it accessible from outside of an intranet, 4) investigators are able to work off-line, then synchronize when they come back on line, 5) includes add- in tools to support cooperation such as calendars, email, text- and voice-based instant messaging, and project management.

Although Groove satisfies most of the basic requirements listed for this category, there are several drawbacks to using Groove for large projects. For example, there is no free format search for text documents and investigators cannot add on their own keyword categories or attributes to the stored documents. This limits Groove’s usefulness as an information exchange archive. In addition, Groove is a fat client, peer-to-peer architecture. This means that all participants are required to purchase a license, download and install Groove on their individual machines. It also means that Groove requires high bandwidth for the information exchange portion of the peer-to-peer updates. See http://www.groove.net/default.cfm?pagename=Workspace.

  • SharePoint: Allows teams of people to work together on documents, tasks, contacts, events, and other information. SharePoint capabilities include: 1) text document loading and sharing, 2) free format search capability, 3) cooperation tools to include instant messaging, email and a group calendar, and 4) security with individual and group level access control. The TraCCC

team employed SharePoint for this project to facilitate distributed research and document

generation. See http://www.microsoft.com/sharepoint/.
SharePoint has many of the same features as Groove, but there are fundamental underlying differences. Sharepoint’s architecture is server based with the client running in a web browser. One ad- vantage to this approach is that each investigator is not required to download a personal version on a machine (Groove requires 60-80MB of space on each machine). In fact, an investigator can access the SharePoint space from any machine (e.g., at an airport). The disadvantage of this approach is that the investigator does not have a local version of the SharePoint information and is unable to work offline. With Groove, an investigator can work offline, and then resynchronize with the remaining members of the group when the network once again becomes available. Finally, since peer-to-peer updates are not taking place, SharePoint does not necessarily require a high-speed internet access, except perhaps in the case where the investigator would like to upload large documents.

Another significant difference between SharePoint and Groove is linked to the search function. In Groove, the search capability is limited to information that is typed into Groove directly, not to documents that have been attached to Groove in an archive. A SharePoint support not only document searches, but also allows the community of investigators to set up their own keyword categories to help with the codification of the shared documents (again see step 2 from exhibit 6). It should be noted, however, that SharePoint only supports searches for Microsoft documents (e.g., Word, Power- Point, etc.) and not ‘foreign’ document formats such as PDF. This fact is not surprising given that SharePoint is a Microsoft tool.

SharePoint and Groove are commercially available cooperation solutions. There are also a wide variety of customized cooperation environments now appearing on the market. For example:

  • WAVE Enterprise Information Integration System– Modus Operandi’s Wide Area Virtual Environment (WAVE) provides tools to support real-time enterprise information integration, cooperation and performance management. WAVE capabilities include: 1) collaborative workspaces for team-based information sharing, 2) security for controlled sharing of information, 3) an extensible enterprise knowledge model that organizes and manages all enterprise knowledge assets, 4) dynamic integration of legacy data sources and commercial off-the-shelf (COtS) tools, 5) document version control, 6) cooperation tools, including discussions, issues, action items, search, and reports, and 7) performance metrics. WAVE is not a COtS solution, however. An organization must work with Modus Operandi services to set up a custom environment. The main disadvantage to this approach as opposed to Groove or SharePoint is cost and the sharing of information across groups. See http://www.modusoperandi.com/wave.htm.

Finally, many of the tools previously discussed have add-ons available for extending their functionality to a group. For example:

  • iBase4: i2’s Analyst Notebook can be integrated with iBase4, an application that allows investigators to create multi-user databases for developing, updating, and sharing the source information being used to create network maps. It even includes security to restrict access or functionality by user, user groups and data fields. It is not clear from the literature, but it appears that this functionality is restricted to the source data and not the sharing of network maps generated by the investigators. See http://www.i2.co.uk/Products/iBase/default.asp

The main disadvantage of iBase4 is its proprietary format. This limitation might be somewhat mitigated by coupling iBase4 with i2’s iBridge product which creates a live connection between legacy databases, but there is no evidence in the literature that i2 has made this integration.

A.2.5. Validation tools

As can be seen from exhibit 6, all validation tools will need to support requirements dictated by where these tools fall within the tool space. Validation tools should focus on:

  • Providing a community context for validating the concepts put forward by the individual participants in the community;
  • Continuing to work within a codified realm in order to facilitate communication between different groups articulating different perspectives;
  • Matching abstract concepts against real world data (or expert opinion) to determine the validity of the concepts being put forward.

Using these criteria as background, one of the most useful toolsets available for validation are simulation tools. This section briefly describes the functionality in general, as well as providing specific tool examples, to support simulations that ‘kick the tires’ of the abstract concepts.

Following are some key capabilities that any simulation tool must possess:

  • Ability to ingest the model information that has been constructed in the previous steps in the

analytical process;

  • Access to a data source for information that might be required by the model during execution;
  • Users need to be able to define the initial conditions against which the model will be run;
  • The more useful simulators allow the user to “step through” the model execution, examining

variables and resetting variable values in mid-execution;

  • Ability to print out step-by-step interim execution results and final results;
  • Change the initial conditions and compare the results against prior runs.

Although there are many simulation tools available, following are brief descriptions of some of the most promising:

  • Online iLink: An optional application for i2’s Analyst Notebook that supports dynamic up- date of Analyst Notebook information from online data sources. Once a connection is made with an on-line source (e.g., LexisNexistM, or D&B®) Analyst Notebook uses this connection to automatically check for any updated information and propagates those updates throughout to support validation of the network map information. See http://www.i2inc.com.

One apparent drawback with this plug-in is that Online iLink appears to require that the line data provider deploy i2’s visualization technology.

  • NETEST: A research project from Carnegie Mellon University, which is developing tools

that combine multi-agent technology with hierarchical Bayesian inference models and biased net models to produce accurate posterior representations of terrorist networks. Bayesian inference models produce representations of a network’s structure and informant accuracy by combining prior network and accuracy data with informant perceptions of a network. Biased net theory examines and captures the biases that may exist in a specific network or set of net- works. Using NETEST, an investigator can estimate a network’s size, determine its member- ship and structure, determine areas of the network where data is missing, perform cost/benefit analysis of additional information, assess group level capabilities embedded in the network, and pose “what if” scenarios to destabilize a network and predict its evolution over time [Dombroski, 2002].

  • REcursive Porous Agent Simulation toolkit (REPAST): A good example of the free, open-source toolkits available for creating agent-based simulations. Begun by the University of Chicago’s social sciences research community and later maintained by groups such as Argonne National Laboratory, Repast is now managed by the non-profit volunteer Repast Organization for Architecture and Development (ROAD). Some of Repast’s features include: 1) a variety of agent templates and examples (however, the toolkit gives users complete flexibility as to how they specify the properties and behaviors of agents), 2) a fully concurrent discrete event scheduler (this scheduler supports both sequential and parallel discrete event operations), 3) built-in simulation results logging and graphing tools, 4) an automated Monte Carlo simulation framework, 5) allows users to dynamically access and modify agent properties, agent behavioral equations, and model properties at run time, 6) includes libraries for genetic algorithms, neural networks, random number generation, and specialized mathematics, and 7) built-in systems dynamics modeling.

More to the point for this investigation, Repast has social network modeling support tools. The Repast website claims that “Repast is at the moment the most suitable simulation framework for the applied modeling of social interventions based on theories and data,” [Tobias, 2003]. See http://repast.sourceforge.net/.

A.2.6. Impacting tools

As can be seen from exhibit 6, all impacting tools will need to support requirements dictated by where these tools fall within the tool space. Impacting tools should focus on:

  • Helping law enforcement and intelligence practitioners understand the implications of their validated models. For example, what portions of the terror-crime interaction spectrum are relevant in various parts of the world, and what is the likely evolutionary path of this phenomenon in each specific geographic area?

Support for translating abstracted knowledge into more concrete local execution strategies. The information flows feeding the scanning process, for example, should be updated based on the results of mapping local events and individuals to the terror-crime interaction spectrum. Watch points and their associated indicators should be reviewed, updated and modified. Probes can be constructed to clarify remaining uncertainties in specific situations or locations.

The following general requirements have been identified for impacting tools:

  • Probe management software to help law enforcement investigators and intelligence community analysts plan probes against known and suspected transnational threat entities, monitor their execution, map their impact, and analyze the resultant changes to network structure and operations.
  • Situational assessment software that supports transnational threat monitoring and projection. Data fusion and visualization algorithms that portray investigators’ current understanding of the nature and extent of terror-crime interaction, and allow investigators to focus scarce collection and analytical resources on the most threatening regions and networks.

Impacting tools are only just beginning to exit the laboratory, and none of them can be considered ready for operational deployment. This type of functionality, however, is being actively pursued within the U.S. governmental and academic research communities. An example of an impacting tool currently under development is described below:

DyNet – A multi-agent network system designed specifically for assessing destabilization strategies on dynamic networks. A knowledge network (e.g., a hypothesized network resulting from Steps 1 through 5 of Boisot’s I-Space-driven analytical process) is given to DyNet as input. In this case, a knowledge network is defined as an individual’s knowledge about who they know, what resources they have, and what task(s) they are performing. The goal of an investigator using DyNet is to build stable, high performance, adaptive networks with and conduct what-if analysis to identify successful strategies for destabilizing those net- works. Investigators can run sensitivity tests examining how differences in the structure of the covert net- work would impact the overall ability of the network to respond to probe and attacks on constituent nodes. [Carley, 2003b]. See the DyNet website hosted by Carnegie Mellon University at http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/projects/DyNet/.

A.3. Overall tool requirements

This appendix provides a high-level overview of PIE tool requirements:

  • Easy to put information into the system and get information out of it. The key to the successful use of many of these tools is the quality of the information that is put into them. User interfaces have to be easy to use, context based, intuitive, and customizable. Otherwise, investigators soon determine that the “care and feeding” of the tool does not justify the end product.
  • Reasonable response time: The response time of the tool needs to match the context. If the tool is being used in an operational setting, then the ability to retrieve results can be time- critical–perhaps a matter of minutes. In other cases, results may not be time-critical and days can be taken to generate results.
  • Training: Some tools, especially those that have not been released as commercial products, may not have substantial training materials and classes available. When making a decision regarding tool selection, the availability and accessibility of training may be critical.

Ability to integrate with the enterprise resources: There are many cases where the utility of the tool will depend on its ability to access and integrate information from the overall enterprise in which the investigator is working. Special-purpose tools that require re-keying of information or labor-intensive conversions of formats should be carefully evaluated to determine the man- power required to support such functions.

  • Support for integration with other tools: Tools that have standard interfaces will act as force multipliers in the overall analytical toolbox. At a minimum, tools should have some sort of a developer’s kit that allows the creation of an API. In the best case, a tool would support some generally accepted integration standard such as web services.
  • Security: Different situations will dictate different security requirements, but in almost all cases some form of security is required. Examples of security include different access levels for different user populations. The ability to be able to track and audit transactions, linking them back to their sources, will also be necessary in many cases.
  • Customizable: Augmenting usability, most tools will need to support some level of customizability (e.g., customizable reporting templates).
  • Labeling of information: Information that is being gathered and stored will need to be labeled (e.g., for level of sensitivity or credibility).
  • Familiar to the current user base: One characteristic in favor of any tool selected is how well the current user base has accepted it. There could be a great deal of benefit to upgrading existing tools that are already familiar to the users.
  • Heavy emphasis on visualization: To the greatest extent possible, tools should provide the investigator with the ability to display different aspects of the results in a visual manner.
  • Support for cooperation: In many cases, the strength of the analysis is dependent on leveraging cross-disciplinary expertise. Most tools will need to support some sort of cooperation.

A.4. Bibliography and Further Reading

Autonomy technology White Paper, Ref: [WP tECH] 07.02. This and other information documents about Autonomy may be downloaded after registration from http://www.autonomy.com/content/downloads/

Beck, Aaron T., “Prisoners of Hate,” Behavior research and therapy, 40, 2002: 209-216. A copy of this article may be found at http://mail.med.upenn.edu/~abeck/prisoners.pdf. Also see Dr. Beck’s website at http://mail.med.upenn.edu/~abeck/ and the MOVES Institute at http://www.movesinstitute.org/.

Boisot, Max and Ron Sanchez, “the Codification-Diffusion-Abstraction Curve in the I-Space,” Economic Organization and Nexus of Rules: Emergence and the Theory of the Firm, a working paper, the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Barcelona, Spain, May 2003.

Carley, K. M., D. Fridsma, E. Casman, N. Altman, J. Chang, B. Kaminsky, D. Nave, & Yahja, “BioWar: Scalable Multi-Agent Social and Epidemiological Simulation of Bioterrorism Events” in Proceedings from the NAACSOS Conference, 2003. this document may be found at http://www.casos.ece.cmu.edu/casos_working_paper/carley_2003_biowar.pdf

Carley, Kathleen M., et. al., “Destabilizing Dynamic Covert Networks” in Proceedings of the 8th International Command and Control Research and technology Symposium, 2003. Conference held at the National Defense War College, Washington, DC. This document may be found at http://www.casos.ece.cmu.edu/resources_others/a2c2_carley_2003_destabilizing.pdf

Collier, N., Howe, T., and North, M., “Onward and Upward: the transition to Repast 2.0,” in Proceedings of the First Annual North American Association for Computational Social and Organizational Science Conference, Electronic Proceedings, Pittsburgh, PA, June 2003. Also, read about REPASt 3.0 at the REPASt website: http://repast.sourceforge.net/index.html

DeRosa, Mary, “Data Mining and Data Analysis for Counterterrorism,” CSIS Report, March 2004. this document may be purchased at http://csis.zoovy.com/product/0892064439

Dombroski, M. and K. Carley, “NETEST: Estimating a Terrorist Network’s Structure,” Journal of Computational and Mathematical Organization theory, 8(3), October 2002: 235-241.
http://www .casos.ece.cmu.edu/conference2003/student_paper/Dombroski.pdf

Farah, Douglas, Blood from Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror, New York: Broadway Books, 2004.

Hall, P. and G. Dowling, “Approximate string matching,” Computing Surveys, 12(4), 1980: 381-402. For more information on phonetic string matching see http://www.cs.rmit.edu.au/~jz/fulltext/sigir96.pdf. A good summary of the inherent limitations of Soundex may be found at http://www.las-inc.com/soundex/?source=gsx.

Lowrance, J.D., Harrison, I.W., and Rodriguez, A.C., “Structured Argumentation for Analysis,” Proceedings of the 12th Inter- national Conference on Systems Research, Informatics, and Cybernetics, (August 2000).

Quint, Barbara, “IBM’s WebFountain Launched – the Next Big Thing?” September 22, 2003 – from the Information today, Inc. website at http://www.infotoday.com/newsbreaks/nb030922-1.shtml Also see IBM’s WebFountain website at http://www.almaden.ibm.com/webfountain/ and the WebFountain Application Development Guide at
http://www .almaden.ibm.com/webfountain/resources/sg247029.pdf.

Shannon, Claude, “A mathematical theory of communication,” Bell System technical Journal, (27), July and October 1948: 379- 423 and 623-656.

Tobias, R. and C. Hofmann, “Evaluation of Free Java-libraries for Social-scientific Agent Based Simulation,” Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, University of Surrey, 7(1), January 2003 may be found at http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/7/1/6.html.

Notes from Networking Futures: The Movements against Corporate Globalization

Networking Futures: The Movements against Corporate Globalization by Jeffrey S. Juris

 

Barcelona has emerged as a critical node, as Catalans have played key roles within the anarchist ­inspired Peoples’ Global Action (PGA) and the World Social Forum (WSF) process, both of which unite diverse movements in opposition to corporate globaliza­tion. Anti–corporate globalization movements involve an increasing conflu­ence among network technologies, organizational forms, and political norms, mediated by concrete networking practices and micropolitical struggles. Activists are thus not only responding to growing poverty, inequality, and environmental devastation; they are also generating social laboratories for the production of alternative democratic values, discourses, and practices.

Computer ­supported networks, including activist media projects, Listservs, and websites, were mobilizing hundreds of thousands of protesters, constituting “transnational counterpublics” (Olesen 2005) for the diffusion of alternative information. Indeed, media activism and digital networking more generally had become critical features of a transna­tional network of movements against corporate globalization, involving what Peter Waterman (1998) calls a “communications internationalism.” Moreover, emerging networking logics were changing how grassroots movements orga­nize, and were inspiring new utopian imaginaries involving directly demo­cratic models of social, economic, and political organization coordinated at local, regional, and global scales.

 

Jeff : How is PGA going?
Laurent: It’s the most interesting political process I’ve ever been a part of, but it’s kind of ambiguous.

Jeff : What do you mean?
Laurent: Well, you never really know who is involved.
Jeff : How can that be?
Laurent: It’s hard to pin down because no one can speak for PGA, and the ones who are most involved sometimes don’t even think they are part of it!

 

 

I really wanted to study the networks behind these demonstrations during their visible and “submerged” phases (Melucci 1989). It seemed that if activists wanted to create sustainable movements, it was important to learn how newly emerging digitally powered networks operate and how periodic mass actions might lead to long­ term social transformation. After several days, I finally realized what should have been apparent all along: my focus was not really a specific network, but rather the concrete practices through which such networks are constituted. Indeed, contemporary activist networks are fluid processes, not rigid structures. I would thus conduct an ethnographic study of transnational networking prac tices and the broader cultural logics, shaped by ongoing interactions with new digital technologies, that generate them.

To answer these questions, I turned to the traditional craft of the anthropologist: long­ term participant observation within and among activist networks themselves.

“Anti-globalization” is not a particularly apt label for a movement that is in­ternationalist in perspective, organizes through global communication net­ works, and whose participants travel widely to attend protests and gatherings. Moreover, most activists do not oppose globalization per se, but rather corpo­rate globalization, understood as the extension of corporate power around the world, undermining local communities, democracy, and the environment.

they [anti-globalization activists] are specifically challenging a concrete political and eco­ nomic project and a discourse that denies the possibility of an alternative (Weiss 1998). In examining anti–corporate globalization movements, it is thus impor­tant to consider how globalization operates along several distinct registers.

At the broadest level, globalization refers to a radical reconfiguration of time and space. It is thus a multidimensional process encompassing economic, so­cial, cultural, and political domains.8 With respect to the economic sphere, the current phase of globalization features several defining characteristics.9 First, there has been an unprecedented rise in the scope and magnitude of global fi­nance capital facilitated by digital technologies and market deregulation. Second, economic production and distribution are increasingly organized around decentralized global networks, leading to high ­volume, flexible, and custom commercialization. Finally, the global economy now has the capability to op­erate as a single unit in real time. More generally, contemporary globalization generates complex spatial patterns as flows of capital, goods, and people have come unbound, even as they are reinscribed within concrete locales.

globalization also provides a concrete enemy and symbolic framework, generating metonymic links among diverse struggles. In this sense, anti–corporate globalization networks such as PGA or the WSF help forge a global frame of reference. As the PGA slogan de­clares: “May the struggle be as transnational as capital!”

Neo­ liberal projects have facilitated the penetration of corporate capitalism across space, bringing new areas into global production, consumption, and labor circuits while commodifying healthcare, education, the environment, and even life itself.

 

At least since the Zapatista uprising against the Mexican government on January 1, 1994, the day the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect, activists have forged an alter­ native project of “grassroots globalization” (Appadurai 2000), combining placed ­based resistance and transnational networking (cf. Escobar 2001). Anti–corporate globalization movements have mounted a highly effective symbolic challenge to the legitimacy of neoliberalism. As the former World Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz (2002) suggests: “Until protesters came along there was little hope for change and no outlets for complaint. . . . It is the trade unionists, students, and environmentalists—ordinary citizens— marching in the streets of Prague, Seattle, Washington, and Genoa who have put the need for reform on the agenda of the developed world” (9).

Stiglitz is not alone among global elites in supporting activist demands. The international financier George Soros has consistently denounced “market fundamentalism” while the Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs has been a vocal critic of the Bretton Woods institutions. Moreover, leftist political parties in France, Spain, Italy, Brazil, and elsewhere have embraced the popular slogan of the World Social Forum: “Another World Is Possible.”

this book is not about the politics of globalization. Rather, it ex­plores emerging forms of organization among anti–corporate globalization movements, particularly in light of recent social, economic, and technological transformations. Although the activists explored in this book seek to influence contemporary political debates, they are also experimenting with new organi­zational and technological practices.

The rise of new digital technologies has profoundly altered the social movement landscape. Activists can now link up directly with one another, communicating through global communications networks without the need for a central bureaucracy. In what follows, I examine how activists are building local, regional, and global networks that are both instru­mental and prefigurative, facilitating concrete political interventions while reflecting activists’ emerging utopian ideals.1

the world and regional social forums and other grassroots networking processes have increasingly come to the fore. Although not as spectacular as direct actions, these projects have provided relatively sustainable platforms for generating alternative ideas, discourses, and practices, allowing activists to pursue their strategic and prefigurative goals in more lasting ways.

Technology, Norm, and form

Shortly after the Bolshevik revolution, the Russian anarchist Voline outlined a bold vision for an alternative, directly democratic society: “Of course . . . society must be organized. . . . the new organization . . . must be established freely, socially, and, above all, from below. The principle of organization must not issue from a center created in advance to capture the whole and impose it­ self upon it but on the contrary, it must come from all sides to create nodes of coordination, natural centers to serve all these points.” What strikes today’s reader about this passage is its resonance with the contemporary discourse of activist networking. Although the top­ down Leninist model of organization won out in the Soviet Union, consolidating a revolutionary paradigm that would be exported around the world, the past few decades have witnessed a resurgence of decentralized, networked organization and utopian visions of autonomy and grassroots counterpower. As we will see, these emerging network forms and imaginaries have been greatly facilitated by the rise of new digital technologies. Shaped by the networking logic of the Internet and broader dynamics associated with late capitalism, social movements are in­creasingly organized around flexible, distributed network forms (Castells 1997; cf. Bennett 2003; Hardt and Negri 2004). Observers have pointed to the rise of “social netwars” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001) or an “electronic fabric of struggle” (Cleaver 1995), but such abstract depictions tell us little about con­crete networking practices.

This book outlines a practice­ based approach to the study of networks, linking structure and practice to larger social, economic, and technological forces.20 I employ the term “cultural logic of networking” as a way to conceive the broad guiding principles, shaped by the logic of informational capitalism, that are internalized by activists and generate concrete networking practices.21 Networking logics specifically entail an embedded and embodied set of social and cultural dispositions that orient actors toward (1) the building of hori­zontal ties and connections among diverse autonomous elements, (2) the free and open circulation of information, (3) collaboration through decentralized coordination and consensus­ based decision making, and (4) self-directed networking. At the same time, networking logics represent an ideal type. As we shall see, they are unevenly distributed in practice and always exist in dy­namic tension with other competing logics, generating a complex “cultural politics of networking” within particular spheres.

In what follows, I argue that anti–corporate globalization movements involve a growing confluence among networks as computer­ supported infrastructure (technology), networks as organizational structure (form), and networks as political model (norm), mediated by concrete activist practice. Computer networks provide the technological infrastructure for the emer­gence of transnational social movements, constituting arenas for the produc­tion and dissemination of activist discourses and practices. These networks are in turn produced and transformed by the discourses and practices circu­lating through them.24 Such communication flows follow distinct trajectories, reproducing existing networks or generating new formations. Contemporary social movement networks are thus “self­-reflexive” (Giddens 1991), constructed through communicative practice and struggle. Beyond social morphology, the network has also become a powerful cultural ideal, particularly among more radical activists, a guiding logic that provides a model of, and model for, emerging forms of directly democratic politics.

contemporary norms and forms are shaped by technological change and, further, how they reflect emerging utopian imaginaries.

Computer-Supported Social Movements

Although the wide­ spread proliferation of individualized, loosely bounded, and fragmentary social networks predates cyberspace, computer­ mediated communication has reinforced such trends, allowing communities to sustain interactions across vast distances. The Internet is also being incorporated into more routine aspects of daily social life as virtual and physical activities are increas­ingly integrated. The Internet thus facilitates global connectedness even as it strengthens local ties.

Build­ing on the pioneering use of digital technologies by the Zapatistas, as well as early free trade campaigns, anti–corporate globalization activists have used computer networks to organize actions and mobilizations, share information and resources, and coordinate campaigns by communicating at a distance.

Computer ­mediated communication is thus most effective when it is moderated, clearly focused, and used together with traditional modes of communication. Accordingly, activists generally use e­mail to stay informed about activities and perform concrete logistical tasks, while complex planning, political discussions, and relationship building occur within physical settings.

Network-Based organizational Forms

Beyond providing a technological medium, the Internet’s reticulate struc­ture reinforces network-­based organizational forms.

Networking logics have given rise to what many activists in Spain and Catalonia refer to as a “new way of doing politics.” By this they mean a mode of organizing involving horizontal coordination among autonomous groups, grassroots participation, consensus decision making, and the free and open exchange of information, although, as we shall see, this ideal is not always conformed to in practice. While the command-oriented logic of traditional parties and unions involves recruiting new members, developing unified strat­egies, pursuing political hegemony, and organizing through representative structures, network politics revolve around the creation of broad umbrella spaces, where diverse collectives, organizations, and networks converge around a few common principles while preserving their autonomy and identity­ based specificity. The objective becomes enhanced “connectivity” and horizon­tal expansion by articulating diverse movements within flexible, decentralized information structures that facilitate transnational coordination and com­munication. Key “activist­ hackers” (Nelson 1999) operate as relayers and exchangers, receiving, interpreting, and routing information to diverse net­ work nodes. Like computer hackers, activist ­hackers combine and recombine cultural codes—in this case political signifiers, sharing information about projects, mobilizations, strategies, and tactics within global communication networks.33

At the same time, discourses of open networking often conceal other forms of exclusion based on unequal access to information or technology. As a grassroots activist from India suggested to me at the 2002 WSF in Porto Alegre, “It’s not enough to talk about networks; we also have to talk about democracy and the distribution of power within them.”

what many observers view as a single, unified anti– corporate globalization movement is actually a congeries of competing yet sometimes overlapping social movement networks that differ according to is­ sue addressed, political subjectivity, ideological framework, political culture, and organizational logic.

Social movements are complex fields shot through with internal differen­tiation (Burdick 1995). Struggles within and among specific movement net­ works shape how they are produced, how they develop, and how they relate to one another within broader movement fields. Cultural struggles involv­ing ideology (anti-globalization versus anticapitalism), strategies (summit hopping versus sustained organizing), tactics (violence versus nonviolence), organizational form (structure versus non-structure), and decision making (consensus versus voting), or what I refer to as the cultural politics of network­ing, are enduring features of anti–corporate globalization landscapes. In the following chapters, I thus emphasize culture, power, and internal conflict.34 As we shall see, discrepant organizational logics often lead to heated struggles within broad “convergence spaces” (Routledge 2003), including the “unitary” campaigns against the World Bank and EU in Barcelona or the World Social Forum process more generally.

Networks as Emerging Ideal

Expanding and diversifying networks is more than a concrete organizational objective; it is also a highly valued political goal. The self­-produced, self-developed, and self­-managed network becomes a widespread cultural ideal, providing not only an effective model of political organizing but also a model for reorganizing society as a whole.

The dominant spirit behind this emerging political praxis can broadly be defined as anarchist, or what ac­tivists in Barcelona refer to as libertarian.35 Classic anarchist principles such as autonomy, self­ management, federation, direct action, and direct democracy are among the most important values for today’s radicals, who increasingly identify as anticapitalist, anti­authoritarian, or left ­libertarian.

 

These emerging political subjectivities are not necessarily identical to anar­chism in the strict ideological sense. Rather, they share specific cultural affini­ties revolving around the values associated with the network as an emerging political and cultural ideal: open access, the free circulation of information, self­-management, and coordination based on diversity and autonomy.

In a similar vein, Arturo Escobar (2004) has drawn on complexity theory to argue that anti–corporate globalization movements are emergent in that “the actions of multiple agents interacting dynamically and following local rules rather than top­ down commands result in visible macro­behavior or structures” (222).36 This is a compelling depiction of how anti–corporate globalization networks operate from a distance, but a slightly different perspective emerges when we engage in activist networking firsthand. Transnational networking requires a great deal of communicative work and struggle. Complexity theory provides a useful metaphor, but given its emphasis on abstract self -organizing systems, it tends to obscure micropolitical practices.

activists increasingly express their emerging utopian imaginaries di­rectly through concrete organizational and technological practice. As Geert Lovink (2002) suggests, “Ideas that matter are hardwired into software and network architectures” (34). This helps to explain why ideological debates are often coded as conflicts over organizational process and form.

Networks are not inherently demo­cratic or egalitarian, and they may be used for divergent ends. The network technologies and forms explored in this book were initially developed as a strategy for enhancing coordination, scale, and efficiency in the context of post-­Fordist capital accumulation. As we are reminded nearly every day, ter­ror and crime outfits increasingly operate through global networks as well.

while networks more generally are not necessarily democratic or egalitarian, their distributed structure does suggest a potential affinity with egalitarian values—including flat hierarchies, horizontal relations, and decen­ tralized coordination—which activists project back onto network technolo­ gies and forms.

What many activists now call “horizontalism” is best understood as a guiding vision, not an empirical depiction

Multiscalar ethnography

I specifically employ two tracking strategies: fol­ lowing activists to mobilizations and gatherings, and monitoring discourses and debates through electronic networks.

During my time in the field, I employed diverse ethnographic methods. First, I conducted participant observation among activists at mass mobili­zations, actions, and gatherings; meetings and organizing sessions; and in­ formal social settings. Second, I made extensive use of the Internet, which allowed me to participate in and follow planning, coordinating, and political discussions within Catalan, Spanish, and English­ language Listservs based in Europe, Latin America, and North America. Third, I conducted seventy qual­ itative interviews with Barcelona ­based activists from diverse backgrounds. Fourth, I collected and examined movement ­related documents produced for education, publicity, and outreach, including flyers, brochures, reports, and posters. Finally, I also collected articles and texts within mainstream and alternative media.

Practicing Militant ethnography

The ethnographic methodology developed here, which I call “militant eth­nography,” is meant to address what Wacquant (1992) calls the “intellectual bias”: how our position as outside observer “entices us to construe the world as a spectacle, as a set of significations to be interpreted rather than as concrete problems to be solved practically” (39). The tendency to position oneself at a distance and treat social life as an object to decode rather than entering the flow and rhythm of ongoing social interaction hinders our ability to understand social practice.45 To grasp the concrete logic generating specific practices, one has to become an active participant. With respect to social movements, this means organizing actions and workshops, facilitating meetings, weighing in during strategic and tactical debates, staking out political positions, and put­ ting one’s body on the line during direct actions. Simply taking on the role of “circumstantial activist” (Marcus 1995) is not sufficient; one has to build long­ term relationships of commitment and trust, become entangled with complex relations of power, and live the emotions associated with direct­action orga­nizing and transnational networking. Militant ethnography thus refers to ethnographic research that is not only politically engaged but also collaborative, thus breaking down the divide between researcher and object.46

Furthermore, militant ethnography also generates embodied and affec­tive understanding. As anyone who has participated in mass direct actions or demonstrations can attest, such events produce powerful emotions, involving alternating sensations of anticipation, tension, anxiety, fear, terror, solidar­ity, celebration, and joy. These affective dynamics are not incidental; they are central to sustained processes of movement building and activist networking. In this sense, I use my body as a research tool, particularly during moments of intense passion and excitement, to generate what Deidre Sklar (1994) calls “kinesthetic empathy.”47

militant ethnography can provide tools for activist (self­) reflection and decision making while remaining pertinent for broader aca­ demic audiences. I thus hope to contribute to strategic debates, but always from the partial and situated position of the militant ethnographer.

Practicing militant ethnography can thus help activists carry out their own ethnographic research.

For Burdick, this involves supporting movements in their efforts to reach out to a wider audience. But it might also mean helping activists analyze di­ verse movement sectors, understand how they operate, and learn how to most effectively work together.

Militant ethnography thus includes three interrelated modes: (1) collective reflection and visioning about movement practices, logics, and emerging cul­tural and political models; (2) collective analysis of broader social processes and power relations that affect strategic and tactical decision making; and (3) collective ethnographic reflection about diverse movement networks, how they interact, and how they might better relate to broader constituencies. Each of these levels involves engaged, practice­ based, and politically committed re­ search carried out in horizontal collaboration with social movements.

those of us within the academy can use writing and publishing as a form of resistance, working within the system to generate alternative politically en­gaged accounts.

The Book ahead

the genealogy of diverse processes that converged there, including grassroots struggles in the Global South, student­based anticorporate activism, campaigns against struc­tural adjustment and free trade, anarchist ­inspired direct action, and global Zapatista solidarity networks. I then go on to trace the growth and expansion of anti–corporate globalization movements after Seattle, before concluding with an analysis of their major defining characteristics.

The conflict between networking and traditional command logics forms part of a broader series of struggles involving competing visions, ideologies, and practices, leading to a complex pattern of shifting alliances driven by networking politics at local, regional, and global scales.

Notes from The War of All the People: The Nexus of Latin American Radicalism and Middle Eastern Terrorism

The War of All the People: The Nexus of Latin American Radicalism and Middle Eastern Terrorism

 

by Jon B. Perdue, Stephen Johnson

Jon B. Perdue is the author of The War of All the People: The Nexus of Latin American Radicalism and Middle Eastern Terrorism, published by Potomac Books in August 2012. Mr. Perdue was also the editor and wrote the foreword to the book Rethinking the Reset Button: Understanding Contemporary Russian Foreign Policy by former Soviet Central Committee member and defector Evgeni Novikov. He also contributed a chapter to the book Iran’s Strategic Penetration of Latin America (Lexington Books, 2014).

Perdue also serves as an instructor and lecturer on peripheral asymmetric warfare, strategic communication and counterterrorism strategy. He is credited with coining the term “preclusionary engagement,” a strategy of counterterrorism that focuses on combined, small-unit operations that can be conducted with a much smaller footprint prior to or in the early stages of conflict against a threatening enemy, in order to preclude the necessity of much larger operations, which are far more difficult in terms of costs and casualties, once the conflict has escalated due to the lack of a forceful resistance.

Mr. Perdue’s articles have been published in the Washington Times, Investor’s Business Daily, the Miami Herald, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution and a number of newspapers in Latin America. Perdue served as an international election observer in the historic elections in Honduras in 2009 and as an expert witness in a precedent-setting human rights trial in Miami-Dade Circuit Court in 2010. He has served as a security analyst for NTN24, a Latin America-based satellite news channel, and CCTV, a 24-hour English-language news channel based in China.

For most of the past decade Mr. Perdue has served as the Director of Latin America programs for the Fund for American Studies in Washington, DC, and as a Senior Fellow for the Center for a Secure Free Society. He also serves on the boards of the Americas Forum in Washington, DC and the Fundación Democracia y Mercado in Santiago, Chile. He has worked unofficially on three presidential campaigns, contributing foreign policy and counterterrorism policy advice.

Preface

As Edward Gibbon hypothesized despite its greatness and the quantum leap in human achievement and prosperity that it wrought, Rome fell after being pushed – but it requires little force to topple what had already been hollowed from within. Rome fell when Romans lost the desire and the ability to defend it.

The American republic has survived the buffeting winds of war and governmental caprice to stand as the sole remaining superpower. Its principal threat is no longer from rival nation-states but from a multitude of smaller subversions.

As the military strategist Bernard Brodie noted, “good strategy presumes good anthropology and sociology. Some of the greatest military blinders of all time have resulted from juvenile evaluations in this department.

What still challenges the United States today is the pervasive lack of seriousness that prevents those agencies tasked with defending the homeland from being able to even name the enemy that we face. It illustrates a failure of will to claim the legitimacy that we have sacrificed so much to attain and an infections self-consciousness that has no basis in realpolitik.

More than any failed strategy or improper foreign policy, it is this American self-consciousness that is the topsoil for the growth of anti-American terrorism worldwide.

It is foolhardy to allow our enemies to paralyze our will to fight by defining American foreign policy as some new form of imperialism or hegemony. The desire for human freedom, lamentably, is not an expansionist impulse.

Introduction

“The War of All the People” is the doctrine of asymmetrical and political warfare that has been declared against the United States, Western civilization, and most of the generally accepted tenants of modernity. At its helm today are Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran – two self-described “revolutionary” leaders hell-bent on the destruction of capitalism and what they call “U.S. hegemony” throughout the world.

In October 2007 the two announced the creation of a “global progressive front” in the first of a series of joint projects designed to showcase “the ideological kinship of the left and revolutionary Islam.” Ahmadinejad would promote the theme on state visits to Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, highlighting what he called “the divine aspect of revolutionary war”.

Declaring his own war against “imperialism,” Chavez aims to supplant U.S. dominance in the hemisphere with so-called 21st Century Socialism.

(2)

The Castro regime adopted the War of All the People doctrine from Viet Minh general Vo Nguyen Giap, who began publishing the military theories of Ho Chi Ming along with his own (much of it adapted from the theories of Mao Zedong) in the 1960s.

Giap’s most thorough examination of the tenets of a “people’s war” was put forth in his book To Arm the Revolutionary Masses: To Build the People’s Army, published in 1975.

(8)

What makes the current threat different is its stealthy, asymmetrical nature. The doctrine has been adapted to avoid the missteps made during the days of Soviet expansionism and has instead focused on the asymmetrical advantages that unfree states enjoy over free ones. While the United States enjoys a free press, it has no equivalent to the now-globalized state-run propaganda operations that unfree states utilize to attack the legitimacy of free ones.

…oil-rich states like Venezuela and Libya have been able to leverage their petrodollars to buy influence in those organizations and by corrupting weaker states to do their bidding on the world stage. These regimes have also formed new alliances around “revolutionary” and “anti-imperialist” ideology in order to coordinate their efforts against the ideals of the West.

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Peripheral warfare conducted by Chavez also includes the use of “ALBA houses,” ostensible medical offices for the poor that serve as recruitment and indoctrination centers for his supporters in neighboring countries… ALBA houses are modeled on Cuba’s Barrio Adentro program, which it has utilized for years to infiltrate spies and agitators into neighboring countries under the guise of doctors, coaches and advisers to help the poor… What is given up by ignoring a tyrant’s provocations is the ability to actively prevent the incremental destruction of democratic institutions that solidify his power.

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There exists a mistakenly view of the interactions between disparate extremist organizations and terrorist groups internationally. This “burqa-bikini paradox” – the premise that culturally or ideologically distinct actors couldn’t possibly be cooperating to any significant degree – has frequently been the default position of journalists, the diplomatic community, and even some in the intelligence community.

Douglas Farah, a former Latin America correspondent for the Washington Post and now a senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, challenged this premise at a December 2008 Capitol Hill briefing titled “Venezuela and the threat it Poses to U.S. and Hemispheric Security”:

These lines that we think exist where these groups like Iran – well they’re a theocracy, or Hezbollah, they’re religiously motivated, they won’t deal with anyone else – bullshit! They will deal with whoever they need to deal with at any given time to acquire what they want…. And the idea that someone won’t deal with Hezbollah because they don’t like their theology is essentially horseshit. You can document across numerous times and numerous continents where people of opposing views will do business together regardless of ideology or theology.

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It is no stretch of logic to surmise that terrorist groups are the natural allies of authoritarian regimes. But throughout the 1970s and ‘80s, there was a battle in Washington between those who believed that the Soviet Union was complicit in terrorism and those who maintained that the Soviets eschewed it as a tactic. The official policy of the Soviets during the Cold War was to declare its opposition to terrorism while unofficially supporting and supplying proxy terrorist groups. But in 1970 Moscow had grown bold enough to train terrorists to overthrow the Mexican government and set up a satellite totalitarian state just across the U.S. Border.

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Carlos (the Jackal) “was given a staff of 75 to plot further deaths and provided with guns, explosives and an archive of forged papers” by the East Germans. He was provided with safe houses and East German experts to ensure that his phones were not bugged, and even his cars were repaired by the Stasi.

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The recovery of Stasi files had proven that the extent of Soviet bloc involvement in terrorism was far greater than even the CIA and other security agencies had considered. Throughout the Cold War, much of the conventional media and the foreign policy establishment often dismissed reports that the Soviets were sponsoring international terrorism or that the Marxist terrorists of Europe might be intermingling with Maoists in Latin America.

Some analysts and scholars referred to the writing of Karl Marx and Lenin to shot that the, and hence the Soviets, were ideologically opposed to terrorism… This and other tenants of Marxist-Leninist theory were often used to claim an ideological aversion to Soviet terror sponsorship.

(22)

In 1916 Lenin wrote to Franz Koritschoner, one of the founders of Austria’s Communist Party, telling him that the Bolsheviks “are not at all opposed to political killing… but as revolutionary tactics individual attacks are inexpedient and harmful. Only the mass movement can be considered genuine political struggle. Only in direct immediate connection with the mass movement can and must individual terrorist acts be of value.

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Soviet Use of Communist Party Front Groups in the United Nations

The CPSU’s International Department was tasked with controlling the policy of the world communist movement. From 1955 to 1986, Boris Ponomarev was the chief of this department, which became the premier Soviet agency for fomenting and supporting international terrorism.

Under Ponomarev, the CPSU founded the Lenin Institute, which trained communist from Western and Third World countries in psychological warfare and propaganda and in guerilla warfare. Seeing the potential of “liberation movements” and “anti-imperialist” movements as proxy forces against the West, the CPSU also founded in 1960 the Peoples’ Friendship University (renamed Patrice Lumumba University in 1961) to train “freedom fighters” from the Third World who were no Communist Party members.

The International Department was also in charge of setting up front groups and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that could advocate by proxy for Soviet aims at the United Nations (UN) and other international governments. According to a U.S. House of Representative Subcommittee on Oversight report on February 6, 1980, Soviet subsidies to international front organizations exceeded $63 million in 1979 alone.

The report noted that the KGB and the Central Committee “actively promote” the UN imprimatur of the NGO front groups. The international Department controlled the NGOs and held coordinated meetings twice a year, and an official of the Soviet journal Problems of Peace and Socialism (also known as World Marxist Review) would always attend.

According to the report, Anatoly Mkrtchyan, the Soviet director of the External Relations Division of Public Information, was in charge of the NGO section.

Source: At the U.N., Soviet Fronts Pose as Nongovernmental Organizations Juliana Geran Pilon

https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/the-un-soviet-fronts-pose-nongovernmental-organizations

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After Arafat started the First Intifada in 1987, both the Soviet Union and Cuba increased military support to the Palestinians, often portraying U.S. and Israeli actions in the Middle East as hegemonic aggression against unarmed Palestinian victims.

In 1990 Havana sent assistance to Iran following an earthquake, and Iran started buying biotechnology products from Cuba. In the last 1990s Castro made a number of bilateral agreements with Iran, and several high-level delegations from Iran made trips to Cuba.

(33)

In 1962, the CPSU helped to establish the Paris-based Solidarite terrorist support network that was masterminded by Henri Curiel. Curial was an Egyptian communist born to an Italian Jewish family who ran a highly successful clandestine organization providing everything from arms to safe houses to actionable intelligence for terrorist group from Brazil to South Africa.

In 1982 a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate stated that Curiel’s Solidarite “has provided support to a wide variety of Third World leftist revolutionary organizations,” including “false documents, financial aid, and safehaven before and after operations, as well as some illegal training in France in weapons and explosives.”

Besides the direct support and training of terrorists, the Soviets made ample use of front groups that posed as religious organizations, academic institutions, or human rights advocates. A 1980 CIA report titled Soviet Covert Action and Propaganda stated:

At a meeting in February 1979 of World Peace Council (WPC) officials, a resolution was adopted to provide “uninterrupted support for the just struggle of the people of Chile, Guatemala, Uruguay, Haiti, Paraguay, El Salvador, Argentina and Brazil.” Without resort to classified information, from this one my logically conclude that the named countries are targets for Soviet subversion and national liberation struggles on a continuing basis. One might interpret “uninterrupted support for the just struggle” to mean continuing financial and logistic support to insurrection movements.

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A former senior GRU officer confirmed this when he made the following statement:

…” If I give you millions of dollars’ worth of weapons, or cash, I have a small right to expect you to help me. I won’t tell you where to place the next bomb, but I do expect to have a little influence on your spheres of action. And if someone later arrests an Irishman, he can honestly say that he never trained in the Soviet Union. And he still believes he is fighting for himself.”

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The point that Colby and Sterling were making was that the Soviets supported terrorist groups as proxy forces, specifically to retain the appearance of distance from their activities. The more important point was that international terrorist groups would have been far less prodigious, and far less deadly, without the support that they received from the Soviet Union and its satellite states…. The Soviet aspect could be seen as giving these groups a “do-it-yourself kit for terrorist warfare.”

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According to [Former Secretary of Defense Robert] Gates, “We would learn a decade later that [CIA analysis] had been too cautious. After the communist governments in Eastern Europe collapsed, we found out that the Easter Europeans (especially the East Germans) indeed not only had provided sanctuary for West European ‘nihilist’ terrorists, but had trained, armed and funded many of them.

(49)

She (Leila Khaled) has also been a regularly scheduled speaker at the World Social Forum.

On May 26, 1971, Khaled told the Turkish newspaper Hurryet that:

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) sends instructors to Turkey in order to train Turkish youth in urban guerrilla fighting, kidnapping, plan hijackings, and other matters… In view of the fact that it is more difficult than in the past for Turks to go and train in PFLP camps, the PFLP is instructing the Turks in the same way as it trains Ethiopians and revolutionaries from underdeveloped countries. The PFLP has trained most of the detained Turkish underground members.

Within ten years, terrorist attacks in Turkey would be killing an average of nine to ten people per day.

Source: Sterling, Terror Network

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The Baath Party’s founders were educated at the Sorbonne in Paris, where, incidentally, an inordinate number of the world’s former dictators were schooled. Commenting on this phenomenon, Egyptian journalist Issandr Elamsani said that Arab intellectuals still see the world through a 1960s lens: “They are all ex-Sorbonne, old Marxists, who look at everything through a postcolonial prism.”

The Sorbonne in the 1960s was one of the intellectual centers of radial political science. In the tradition of the Jacobins, it offered a pseudo-intellectual foundation for end-justifies-means terrorism, which many of its graduates – among them Cambodian dictator Pol Pot, Peruvian terrorist leader Abimeal Guzman, intellectual arbiter of the Iranian revolution Ali Shariati, and Syrian Baathist Michel Aflaq – would use to justify mass murder.

(60-61)

Aleida Guevara, the daughter of Che, made a trip to Lebanon in 2010 to lay a wreath on the tomb of former Hezbollah leader Abbas al-Musawi. At the ceremony, she echoed [Daniel] Ortega’s sentiments, saying, “I think that as long as [the martyr’s] memory remains within us, we will have more strength, and that strength will grow and develop, until we make great achievements and complete our journey to certain victory.”. Guevara later told supporters while visiting Baalbek, “If we do not conduct resistance, we will disappear from the face of the earth.” To make sure that the international press understood the subtext, Hezbollah’s official in the Bekaa Valley said, “We are conducting resistance for the sake of liberty and justice, and to liberate our land and people from Zionist occupation, which receives all the aid it needs from the U.S. administration.

Though Guevara was parroting what has become standard rhetoric among revolutionaries in all parts of the world, her visit had the potential to become controversial. Just three years earlier, in 2007, she and her brother Camilo had visited Tehran for a conference that was intended to emphasize the “common goals” of Marxism and Islamist radicalism.

Titled “Che Like Chamran,” the conference was a memorial to the fortieth anniversary of Che Guevara’s death, which happened to coincide with the twenty0sizzth anniversary of the death of Mostafa Chamran. Chamran, a radical Khomeinist who founded the Amal terrorist group in Lebanon, went to Iran in 1979 to help the mullahs take over and died in 1981 in the Iran-Iraq War (or, according to some, in a car accident.

Speaker Mortaza Firuzabadi, a Khomeinist radical, told the crowd that the mission of both leftist and Islamist revolutionaries was to fight America “everywhere and all of the time,” adding, “Our duty is to the whole of humanity. We seek unity with revolutionary movements everywhere. This is why we have invited the children of Che Guevara.”

…He ended his speech with an entreaty to all anti-American revolutionaries in the world to accept the leadership of Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his revolutionary regime.

Qassemi returned once again to the podium at this point. “The Soviet Union is gone,” Qassemi declared. “The leadership of the downtrodden has passed to our Islamic Republic. Those who wish to destroy America must understand the reality.

Though it has been treated as a rarity by much of the Western media, collaboration between radical groups that might appear to have little in common have included joint operations of far-right, fascist, and neo-Nazi groups with far-left, Marxist and Islamist groups. These collaborations go back well before World War II.

The widespread misconception that a philosophical or religious wall of separation exists between the extremist ideological movements of the world is not only demonstrable false, it is highly detrimental to a proper analysis of the terrorist threat and to the public’s understanding of counterterrorism efforts. This myth has served well the forces of subversion.

The small subset of the population that is drawn to extremist movements is not limited to those who process the same or a similar ideology but instead includes those who tend to seek personal fulfilment from extremism itself. Ideology can be quite malleable when militants see an opportunity to take advantage of the popularity of a more militant group, regardless of any ideological differences between them. In fact, these groups have often found common cause soon after seeing a rival group begin to dominate international headlines.

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One of the principal objectives of a terrorist attack that is often overlooked is the expected overreaction of the state in response to the threat.

Feltrinelli’s thesis, like those of many terrorist theorists before and after, was that this would bring “an advanced phase of the struggle” by forcing “an authoritarian turn to the right”.

Feltrinelli is emblematic of the ideologically itinerant radicals who wreaked havoc in the 1960s and 1970s in Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. He was a close friend of Fidel Castro’s, attended the Tricontinental Conference in 1966, and published its official magazine, Tricontinental, in Europe after the event… (he) began wearing a Tupamaros uniform on his return to Italy. There Feltrinelli built his own publishing empire, flying to Moscow to secure the publishing rights to Boris Pasternack’s Dr. Zhivago and publishing Giuseppe Tomasi de Lampedusa’s bestseller The Leopard, … The profit from these blockbusters allowed him to fill bookstores throughout Italy with radical manifestos and terrorist literature.

On March 15, 1972, the police found Feltrinelli’s body in pieces at the foot of a high-voltage power line pylon. He had been placing explosives on the pylon with a group of fellow terrorists when one of his own explosives detonated accidentally.

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According to the Aryan Nations’ website, the premise that could bridge the ideological gap between these ostensibly disparate worldviews that Muslims are of the same “Aryan” lineage. This view was not hard to concoct. Adolph Hitler’s minister of economics, Hjalmar Schacht, had professed a similar theory which was one promoted by King Darius the Great: the Persian bloodline was of Aryan lineage. This, Schacht argued it made the Persians – and therefor, somehow, all Muslims – the natural allies of Hitler’s vision of a superior Aryan race that should rule the world.

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The rise of the Third Reich became a rallying point for many Muslim leaders, who fostered a bit of Muslim mythmaking by claiming that both Hitler and Mussolini were closet Muslims. One rumor had it that Hitler had secretly converted to Islam and that his Muslim name was Hayder, translated as “the Brave One”.” Mussolini, the rumors told, was really an Egyptian Muslim name Musa Nili, which translated into “Moses of the Nile.”

As far back as 1933, Arab nationalists in Syria and Iraq were supporting Nazism.

Arab support for Hitler was widespread by the time he rose to power. And when the Nazis announced the Nuremburg Laws in 1935 to legalize the confiscation of Jewish property, “telegrams of congratulations were sent to the fuhrer from all over the Arab and Islamic world.”

It was Germany’s war against the British Empire that motivated much of the early support for the Nazi regime. Hitler was, after all, fighting the three shared enemies of Germany and the Arab world at the same time: Zionism, communism, and the British Empire.

After World War II, many German officers and Nazi Party officials were given asylum in the Middle East, mostly in Syria and Egypt, where they were utilized to help set up clandestine services throughout the region – this time in support of many of the anticolonialist forces fighting the British and French.

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Ronald Newton, a Canadian academic who wrote The Nazi Menace in Argentina, 1931-1947… thesis was that the tales of Nazi-fascist settlement in Argentina was the result of British disinformation, designed to thwart postwar market capture of Argentina by the United States. The theory was refuted in 1998 after Argentina president Carlos Menem put together a commission to study the issue.

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The stated aim of right-wing extremist groups had always been to bring down the leftist democratic state model and bring about a national socialist or fascist state. But that ideology began to devolve in the 1980s as neo-Nazi groups started to see the dame and legitimacy that was afforded to left-wing terrorist groups that were committing far more violent acts and seemed to be rewarded proportionately.

Two years after Palestinian terrorists killed eleven Israeli team members at the Munich Olympics in 1972, PLO chairman Yasser Arafat was invited by the United Nations to address its General Assembly, and the PLO was awarded UN observer status shortly after that. Moreover, by the 1980s the PLO had been accorded diplomatic relations with more countries than Israel had.

(91)

In 1969, Qaddafi became the chief financier of terrorism of every stripe throughout the world. And though he became known as the principal donor to worldwide leftist groups, he began his terrorist franchise with those of the extreme right.

(93)

In his book Revolutionary Islam, Carlos tried to join the two strongest currents of revolutionary terror, declaring that “only a coalition of Marxists and Islamists can destroy the United States.”

Carlos’s book would be little noticed until Hugo Chavez, speaking to a gathering of worldwide socialist politicians in November 2009, called him an important revolutionary fighter who supported the Palestinian cause. Chavez said during his televised speech that Carlos had been unfairly convicted and added, “They accuse him of being a terrorist, but Carlos really was a revolutionary fighter.”

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“There is a revolution going on in Venezuela, a revolution of an unusual kind – it is a slow-motion revolution.” Thus, declared Richard Gott in an interview with Socialist Worker on February 12, 2005. Gott, a British author and ubiquitous spokesman for all things Chavez and Castro, is not the first to note the nineteenth-century pedigree of Chavez’s 21stCentury Socialism.

The incremental implementation of socialism was the dream of the Fabian Society, a small but highly influential political organization founded in London in 1884… The logo of the Fabian Society, a tortoise, represented the group’s predilection for a slow, imperceptible transition to socialism, while its coat of arms, a “wolf in sheep’s clothing,” represented its preferred methodology for achieving its goal.

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In a 1947 article in Partisan Review, [Arthur] Schlesinger Jr. stated, “there seems to be no inherent obstacle to the gradual advance of socialism in the United States through a series of New Deals.”

Gradualism has always been considered “anti-revolutionary” in communist and socialist circles. But pragmatism has taken the place of idealism after the events of 9/11 increased international scrutiny on radical groups, forcing revolutionists like Chavez and Ahmadinejad to use the Fabian strategy as a “soft subversion” tactic with which to undermine their enemies. In the past decade, Chavez and his allies in Lain America have all embraced Ahmadinejad’s regime, and all have developed their strategic relationship based on mutual support for this incremental subversion.

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Castro has had a lot of practice in the art of subversion. Within a short time after he came to power in Cuba, he began trying to subvert other governments in Latin America and the Caribbean. On may 10, 1967 Castro sent an invasion force to Machurucuto, Venezuela, to link up with Venezuelan guerillas to try and overthrow the democratic and popular government of President Raul Leoni.

Led by Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, the invasion force was quickly vanished, and the Venezuelan armed forces, with the help of peasant farmers leery of the guerillas, pacified the remaining guerrilla elements before the end of the year. Then the Venezuelan government issues a general amnesty to try and quell any violence from the remaining guerrilla holdouts. But the PRV, Red Flag and the Socialist League continued to operate clandestinely. Douglas Bravo, the Venezuelan terrorist who inspired Carlos the Jackal, remained the intransigent leader of the PRV. One of Bravo’s lieutenants was Adan Chavez, Hugo’s older brother, who would serve as Hugo’s liaison to the radical elements throughout for years to come.

After suffering calamitous defeats at the hand of the Venezuelan armed forces, the PRV decided the best way to continue the revolution would be to infiltrate the “system” and subvert it from within. In 1970, they would first make a move to infiltrate the armed forces. Bravo first contacted Lt. William Izarra in 1920. A year later, Chavez entered military school and started to recruit leftist military members to what became a clandestine fifth-column groups, the Revolutionary Bolivarian Movements. The failed 1992 coup that launched Hugo Chavez’s political career would be planned and executed jointly by the MBR, PRV, Socialist League and Red Flag.

After his release in 1994, Chavez spent six months in Colombia receiving guerrilla training, establishing contacts with both the FARC and the ELN of Colombia, and even adopting a nom de Guerra, Comandante Centeno.

Once he was elected president four years later, he would repay the Colombian guerrillas with a $300 million “donation” and thank Castro with a subsidized oil deal.

Though Chavez would denounce Plan Avila often, it would be his own decision to order its activation in 2002 that would provoke his own military to remove him from power.

Chavez seemed to take the near-death experience as a sign from divine providence of his right to rule and began a purge of the military and the government of anyone who might later threaten his power. Chavez then began radicalizing the remainder of the Venezuelan military by replacing its historical training regimen with a doctrine of asymmetric warfare that involved all sectors of society. He would call his new doctrine la guerra de todo el pueblo – “the war of all the people”.

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The Revolutionary Brotherhood Plan

While Chavez calls his hemispheric governing plan “21st Century Socialism,” his critics have given it another name – democradura.

Democradura is a Spanish neologism that has come to define the budding autocracies in Lain America that have incrementally concentrated power in the executive branch under the guise of constitutional reform.

A Socialist think tank in Spain, the CEPTS foundation, part of the Center for Political and Social Studies, was founded in Valencia in 1993 by left-wing academics supporting Spain’s socialist Party as well as the FARC and ELN terrorist groups in Colombia. It put together a team of Marxist constitutional scholars to write the new constitutions of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, turning them into “socialist constitutions” but with variations applicable to each particular country.

(105)

Where Bolivia’s indigenous president Evo Morales used race to marginalize his opposition, Correa used the rhetoric of environmental radicalism to demonize the mining, oil and gas sectors in Ecuador. Anyone who opposed the anthropocentric environmental language in the (new) constitution was called a “lackey” or multinational corporations and oligarchs. This stance also allowed Correa to eventually break the contracts with these companies in order to demand higher government revenues from their operations, which was then used to support government-funded projects in government-friendly provinces.

The process of Marxist constitution making first caught the attention of the revolutionary left during Colombia’s constitutional change in 1991. The Colombian constitution had been in place since 1886, a long time for regional constitutions, and was only able to be changed with some political machination and legal subterfuge.

As M-19 guerrillas began demobilization talks with a weak Colombian government in the late 1980s, the group took advantage of its position to transition from an armed insurgency to a political party. By 1991 M-19 was able to get one of its leaders, Antonio Navarro, included as one of the three copresidents of the constituent assembly that drew up the new constitution.

Navarro was able to negotiate a prohibition against any attempts by the state to organize the population against the armed guerrilla groups. Not only would this provision end up escalating violence in Colombia, but it would inspire other terrorist groups throughout the America to seek both an armed and a “political wing” which would be utilized skillfully to prolong their longevity as insurgents.

After witnessing the ease with which the Colombian constitution was changed, “constitutional subversion” became standard operation procedure for those countries headed by Chavez’s allies.

The former Venezuelan ambassador to the United Kingdom, Jorge Olavarria, assessed the situation with a bit more apprehension and foresight: “The constituent assembly is nothing more than a camouflage to make the world think that the coming dictatorship is the product of a democratic process.

Where most Latin American constitutions contained between 100 and 200 articles, the new Venezuelan constitution had 350, or 98 more than its predecessor. According to Professor Carlos Sabino of Francisco Marroquin University in Guatemala, the essence of the new constitution was “too many rules, no system to enforce them.” (it) “would consolidate an authoritarian government with a legal disguise, necessary in today’s globalized world where the respect for democratic values is the key to good international relations.

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The Defense of Political Sovereignty and National Self-Determination Law would prohibit organizations, as well as individuals, that advocate for the political rights of Venezuelans from accepting funds from any foreign entity. It also prohibited them from having any representation from foreigners and even sponsoring or hosting any foreigner who expresses opinions that “offend the institution of the state.” This law was included with the International Cooperation Law, which would force all NGOs to reregister with the government and include a declared action plan on their future activities, along with a list of any financing that they expected to receive.

(109)

gNGOs are Governmental Non-Governmental Orgs. Fake NGO’s operated by the government.

(110)

The Sandinista government in Nicaragua has been even more aggressive against civil society groups, raiding the offices of long-established NGOs and launching what it called Operation No More lies, a crackdown against those that it accuses of money laundering, embezzlement and subversion.

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At the end of March 2011, former president Jimmy Carter made a trip to Cuba to meet with members of the regime. About the time he arrived, Cuban state television aired a series in which it portrayed independent NGOs as subversive organizations that sought to “erode the order of civil society” in Cuba. The report claimed that “via the visits to the country of some of its representatives and behind the backs of Cuban authorities, these NGOs have the mission of carrying out the evaluations of the Cuban political situation and instructing, organizing, and supplying the counter-revolution.” It accused the organizations of hiding “their subversive essence [behind] alleged humanitarian aid.” The series featured Dr. Jose Manuel Collera, who was revealed as “Agent Gerardo,” a Cuban spy who had infiltrated the NGOs in the United States “to monitor their work and representatives.”

Along with thwarting the oversight power of NGOs in Venezuela, Chavez also included a number of “economic” laws designed to put the stamp of legitimacy on his new “communal” economic system that had caused shortages throughout the country… These laws made communes the basis of the Venezuelan economy and established “People’s Power” as the basis of local governance. It is codified as being responsible to the “revolutionary Leadership,” which is Chavez himself. This effectively supplanted the municipalities and regional governments.

(117) 

Managing the Media

Speaking in September 2010 at a Washington event to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors Walter Issacson, warned, “We can’t allow ourselves to be out-communicated by our enemies. There’s that Freedom House report that reveals that today’s autocratic leaders are investing billions of dollars in media resources to influences the Global opinion… You’ve got Russia Today, Iran’s Press TV, Venezuela’s TeleSUR…”

Their techniques are similar: hire young, inexperienced correspondents who will toe the party line as TV reporters, and put strong sympathizers, especially Americans, as hosts of “debate” shows.

Where normal media outlets will film only the speakers at such an event, these state-sponsored media units will often turn the cameras toward the audience in order to capture on film those in the audience who may be government critics. Their purpose for this is twofold – to later screen the video to see who might be attending such a conference and to intimidate exiles from attending such events.

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TeleSUR’s president, Andres Izarra, is a professional journalist who formerly worked for CNN en Espanol. He also serves as Chavez’s minister of communications and information. Izarra said of TeleSUR’s launch: “TeleSUR is an initiative against cultural imperialism. We launch TeleSUR with a clear goal to break this communication regime.”

In a 1954 letter to a comrade, Fidel Castro wrote, “We cannot for a second abandon propaganda. Propaganda is vital – propaganda is the heart of our struggle.

“We have to win the war inside the United States, said Hector Oqueli, one of the Rebel leaders. And after the Sandinistas first took power in Nicaragua in the 1980s, the late Tomas Borge, who served as the interior minister and head of state security for the Sandinista regime, told Newsweek, “The battle for Nicaragua is not being waged in Nicaragua. It is being fought in the United States.

It had not been difficult for the revolutionary left in Latin America to find willing allies in the United States to help with its propaganda effort. An illustrative example is William Blum, the author of several anti-American books that have called U.S. foreign engagements “holocausts”. Blum has described his life’s mission as “slowing down the American Empire… injuring the Beast.” Blum’s treatment of U.S. involvement in Latin America is noteworthy, because it is emblematic of what often passes as scholarship on the subject and because it gets repeated in many universities where he is often invited to speak to students… In January 2006, Blum’s Rogue State got an endorsement by Osama bin Laden, who recommended the book in an audiotape and agreed with Blum’s idea that the way the United States could prevent terrorist attacks was to “apologize to the victims of American Imperialism.”

Examples of bad scholarship follow…

Blum’s book is typical of a genre that has long eschewed scholarship for sensationalized anti-Americanism. At the summit of the Americas in April 2009, Chavez handed President Obama a copy of Open Veins of Latin America by Eduardo Galeano, about which Michael Reid, the Americas editor at The Economist, wrote, [Galeano’s history is that of the propagandist, a potent mix of selective truths, exaggeration and falsehood, caricature and conspiracy. Called the “Idiots Bible” by Latin American scholars, Galeano’s 1971 tome was translated to English by Cedric Belfrage, a British journalist and expatriate to the United States who was also a Communist Party member and an agent for the KGB.

The Artillery of Ideas

Another Chavez propaganda effort designed to reach English-speaking audiences is the state funded newspaper Correo del Orinoco, named for a newspaper started by Simon Bolivar in 1818.

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Un April 2010 Chavez held a celebration on the eight anniversary of the coup that earlier had removed him from office for two days. He named the celebration “Day of the Bolivarian Militias, the Armed People and the April Revolution” and held a swearing in ceremony for 35,000 new members of his civilian militia. As part of the festivities, Chavez also had a swearing in ceremony for a hundred young community media activists, calling them “communicational guerrillas.” This was done, according to Chavez, to raise awareness among young people about the “media lies” and to combat the anti-revolution campaign of the opposition-controlled private media.

(122)

The most notorious propaganda and coverup operation to date has been that of the Puente Llaguno shooting in 2002, in which nineteen people were killed and sixty injured as Chavez’s henchmen were videotaped shooting into a crowd of marchers from a bridge overhead.

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According to Nelson (the author of The Silence and the Scorpion) the reason that Chavez felt the need to go after the Metropolitan Police was because they were the largest group in the country, aside from the army. This, feared Chavez, made them a potential threat for another coup against his regime. After he was briefly ousted from office in 2002, Chavez skillfully utilized the canard that the Metropolitan police had fired the first shots at the Bolivarian Circles as an excuse to take away much of their firepower and equipment, leaving them only with their .38 caliber pistols. And one a Chavez loyalist took over as mayor of Caracas, the Metropolitan Police were completely purged. According to Nelson, loyalty to Chavez’s political party became much more important than expertise or experience on the police force.

In January 2007, the President of TeleSUR, Andres Izarra, revealed the thinking behind Chavez’s campaign against the media: “We have to elaborate a new plan, and the one that we propose is the communication and informational hegemony of the state.”

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A report done for the United Nations by the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders said that verbal attacks against anyone “who dared to criticize the policies of President Ortega or his government… were systematically and continuously taken up by the official or pro-Government media.” The reports, issued in June 2009, stated:

President Ortega’s government tried to silence dissident voices and criticisms of Government policies through members of the government who verbally assaulted demonstrators and human rights defenders as well as the Citizens Council (Consejos de Poder Ciudadno – CPC) who hampered the NGOs’ activities and physically assaulted defenders. In this context, 2008 saw numerous attacks against human rights defenders and attempts to obstruct their activity…

These Citizens’ Councils were taken directly from the “Revolutionary Brotherhood” plan and are close facsimiles of groups like the Bolivarian Circles in Venezuela. Ortega claimed in July 2007 that “more than 6,000 [CPCs] has been formed,” and “around 500,000 people participated in CPCs.”

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Managing the Military

Daniel Patrick Moynihan: More and more the United Nations seems only to know of violations of human rights in countries where it is still possible to protest such violations… our suspicions are that there could be a design to use the issue of human rights to undermine the legitimacy of precisely those nations which still overserve human rights, imperfect as that observance may be.” (871)

The Department of State Bulletin. (1975). United States: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs.

The southern Connections was a coordinated effort by far-left supporters of the Castro regime and other leftist governments in Latin America to end the Monroe Doctrine or at least to deter Washington’s policy of intervention against communist expansion in the hemisphere.

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EL Salvador’s civil war, from 1979 until 1992, was emblematic of the Cuba-instigated wars in Latin America. It was Fidel Castro who convinced the various left-wing guerilla groups operating in El Salvador consolidate under the banner of the DRU, officially formed in May 1980. The DRU manifesto stated, “There will be only one leadership, only one military plan and only one command, only one political line.” Fidel Castro had facilitated a meeting in Havana in December 1979 that brought these groups together – a feat that has not been repeated since, as the historic tendency of most leftist terrorist groups in the region have been of splintering after fights over egos and ideological differences.

It was a Salvadoran of Palestinian descent, Schafik Handal, who helped found the Communist Party of El Salvador and who would serve as Castro’s partner in the Central American wars of the era.

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Stealth NGOs

One of the most effective asymmetrical tactics has been the use of dummy NGOs as front groups in Latin America. A number of nongovernmental organizations operating in the region that claim to advocate for human rights actually receive funding from radical leftist groups sympathetic to revolutionary movements in the hemisphere. Many of these groups derive much of their legitimacy from unwitting representative of the European Union, the United Nations and even the U.S. Department of State who often designate them as “special rapporteurs” for human rights reporting.

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Both Cristian Fernandez de Kirchner, the current president, and her husband the late President Nestor Kirchner, were far left radicals in the 1960s and 1970s and filled both of their administrations with ex-terrorists and radicals… Many have accused the Kirchner’s and their allies of blatant double standards on human rights issues – especially in the prosecution of former military members who served during Argentina’s Dirty War from 1976 to 1983.

Since 2003, when Nestor Kirchner took office, the successive Kirchner administrations have aggressively prosecuted hundreds of ex-soldiers, many of who served prior to the beginning of the Dirty War. The double standard arises because not one of the ex-terrorists, who started the Dirty War in the first place, has been prosecuted. The Kirchners, along with far-left judicial activists in the region, have relied on a blatantly unjust tenant of “international human rights law” that says crimes against humanity only apply to representatives of the state, a group that includes military and policy but excludes the terrorists who ignited the guerillas wars.

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Since the late 1990s, the NGO practice of dragging the military into court on allegations of human rights violations has destroyed the careers of some of [Colombia’s] finest officers, even though most of these men were found innocent after years of proceedings.”

According to O’Grady, the enabling legislation that makes this judicial warfare possible is what’s been termed the “Leahy Law,” after its sponsor, Sen Patrick Leahy (D-VT). Under this law, American Military aid can be withdrawn if military offenses are brought against them, even when the credibility of the charges is dubious. O’Grady noted, “The NGOs knew that they only had to point fingers to get rid of an effective leader and demoralize the ranks.”

The legislation that became the Leahy Law was first introduced in 1997 in the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, and similar language was inserted into the 2001 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. It has since been used repeatedly against Colombia, which has been a target ever since it became serious about taking on the FARC and took funding from the United States to Implement Plan Colombia, an anti-drug smuggling and counter-insurgency initiative.

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The publicity about Reyes’s death put the spotlight on the situation in Colombia and led researchers to uncover the fact that many of the so-called trade unionists in Colombia were moonlighting as FARC terrorists.

Raul Reyes was the prime example, having begun his career at age sixteen when he joined the Colombian Communist Youth (JUCO), which led him to become a trade unionist at a Nestle plant in his hometown of Caquetá. His position as a Nestle “trade unionist” was a front for his real job, which was influencing, recruiting, and radicalizing fellow workers at a plant for the Colombian Communist Party… Since the beginning of the FARC, and its collaboration and later split with the party, a number of Colombian trade unions have served as way stations for FARC members as they moved from union posts to the ranks of the FARC.

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Uribe was able to turn the tide…. By strategically transitioning from the largely fruitless supply-control methods of Plan Colombia to the population centric counterinsurgency (PC-COIN) methods of Plan Patriota, a later iteration of the original plan that put focus on counterinsurgency.

Where the previous policy had granted a vast demilitarized zone to the FARC in exchange for a proposed peace treaty, Plan Patriota utilized a counter-insurgency strategy that attacked terrorists with physical force. But more importantly, it attached their legitimacy by placing security personnel in remote areas where there had been no state presence before. What this accomplished, more successfully than any of the Colombian military’s previous operational tactics, was to change the populations’ perception of the forty-year insurgency. What had been seen as a conflict between rival political parties was now looked upon as the battle of a legitimate, elected government against illegitimate narco-terrorists.

Revolutionizing the Military

In 2001 the Venezuelan daily Tal Cual published a leaked document from the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DIM) which spelled out a plan to politicize the military. According to the document top military officers were to be divided into “revolutionists” who supported Chavez, “institutionalists” who were considered to be neutral, and “dissidents” who were opposed to the regime. It also advocated for catequesis (Spanish for catechism) to proselytize these officers to accept Chavez’s socialist governing program.

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During the Hungarian Uprising in 1956, Andropov “had watched in horror from the windows of his embassy as officers of the hated Hungarian security service were strung up from lampposts” It is said that Andropov was “haunted for the rest of his life by the speed with which an apparently all-powerful Communist one-party state had begun to topple” and was thereafter “obsessed with the need to stamp out ‘ideological sabotage’ where it reared its head within the Soviet bloc.” This obsession made the Soviets much more eager to send in troops whenever other communist regimes were in jeopardy.

…both Castro and Chavez, would develop a Hungarian complex as well, leading to a clampdown on ‘ideological sabotage’ within their respective countries. In 1988 Castro stated, when speaking of the Sandinistas’ use of civilian militias to defend their revolution in Nicaragua, that both Cuba and Nicaragua needed a “committed… people’s armed defense that is sufficient in size, training and readiness, “adding that Salvador Allende hadn’t had a big enough force to prevent the coup that drove him from power in Chile in 1973. It was a rare moment of candor, as the militia is usually touted as the last bastion against a U.S. invasion. But in reality, it is a tool designed to accomplish the prime objective of an aspiring autocrat – to ensure the longevity of the regime. Max Manwaring, writing on Chavez’s use of these civilian militias, stated:

All these institutions are outside the traditional control of the regular armed forced, and each organization is responsible directly to the leader (President Chavez). This institutional separation is intended to ensure the no military or paramilitary organization can control another, but the centralization of these institutions guarantees the leader absolute control of security and social harmony in Venezuela.

Perpetuating the Regime

Started as a jobless protest in 1996, the piquiteros have transformed into what are, according to The Economist, “government rent-a-mobs” consisting of “unemployed protestors receiving state welfare payments.” The piquiteros were co-opted by Nestor Kirchner’s government, through some have splintered since his wife succeeded him.

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In February 2011 the gravity of the effort to militarize Morales’s civilian supporters became far clearer. According to ABC, a Paraguayan daily, Iran was providing the financing for the militia training facility. Called the Military Academy of ALBA, it is located in Warnes, thirty miles north of Santa Cruz. ABC reported that the facility would train both military personnel and civilian militia members from all of the ALBA countries.

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Shortly after Castro’s guerrillas took power in Havana, Cuban embassies in Latin America became recruitment centers and incubators for radical groups and terrorist subversives throughout the hemisphere. Organizing subversive student movements became a priority for Cuban “diplomats,” and the autonomy of the campuses provided easy access and impunity.

A comparison of the student vote to that of the general population at the time provides an illustration of the radicalization of the student body. During the 1960s in Venezuela, students at the Central University typically voted 50 to 60 percent for candidates from the Communist Party of Venezuela and the radical Castroite MIR, while these candidates never broke 10 percent among the general population.

A Venezuela MIR guerrilla noted that their near total domination of the liceos (secondary schools) and the universities led them wrongly to believe that this level of acceptance could be extrapolated to the general population. But in reality, noted the guerrilla, “there was absolutely no mass solidarity with the idea of insurrection.” One MIR cofounder, Domingo Alberto Rangel, noted after renouncing the group’s support for terrorism that “the Left enjoys support among students, but it is unknown among working-class youth, or the youth of the barrios.”

In Colombia, the Industrial University of Santander in Bucaramanga was a haven for that country’s ELN terrorists. In 1965 in Peru, the ELN based itself in the San Cristobal of Huamange National University in Ayacucho, and at the National University in Lima a number of leftist political parties set up operations for MIR terrorists.

Just over twenty years later, after Shining Path and Tupac Amaru terrorists had gained control over a majority of the rural area of Peru and had begun to threaten the capital, the (first) government of President Alan Garcia reluctantly decided to raid the University of San Marcos, the National University of Engineering, and a teacher’s college – three schools that had long been known as terrorist havens.

This kind of autonomy without accountability is a policy that invited terrorist infiltration among impressionable young people.

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Like guerrilla groups in many countries in Latin America, Mexico’s also have a cadre of supporters in NGOs who purport to be human rights advocates. After the bombing of the FARC camp in Ecuador, instead of denouncing the FARC for hosting Mexican students in a war zone, one Mexican human rights NGO called the operation an “unjustified massacre” and announced that it was planning to sue the Colombian government.

(161)

According to The Miami Herald, [Tareck] El Aissami was born in Venezuela to Syrian parents, and his father, Carlos, was the president of the Venezuelan branch of the Baath Party and was an ardent supporter of Saddam Hussein. El Aissamni’s uncle, Shibili el-Aissami, whose whereabouts are unknown, was a top-ranking Baath Party official in Iraq.

(164)

The extent of Cuban subversion was investigated and reported to Congress as early as 1963, when the Senate Judiciary Committee released a report detailing the activities of Cuban operatives in the hemisphere. The report concluded: “A war of liberation” or ‘popular uprising’ is really hidden aggression: subversion… the design of Communist expansion finds in subversion the least costly way of acquiring peoples and territories without exaggerated risk.” The report elaborated on the goal of Cuban subversion:

Its aim is to replace the political, economic, and social order existing in a country by a new order, which presupposes the complete physical and moral control of the people… That control is achieved by progressively gaining possession of bodies and minds, using appropriate techniques of subversion that combine psychological, political, social, and economic actions, and even military operations, if this is necessary.

(166)

It was reported by a defector that all Sandinista military plans were sent first to Havana to be vetted by Raul Castro and a Soviet handler before any action was taken against the contras.

A State Department background paper also reported that besides the influx of thousands of Cuban “advisers,” nearly all of the members of the new state police organization, the General Directorate of Sandinista State Security, were trained by the Cubans.

Alfonso Robelo, one of the original members of Nicaragua’s five-man junta, told reporters, “this is something that you have to understand, Nicaragua is an occupied country. We have 8,000 Cubans plus several thousand East Bloc people, East Germans, PLO, Bulgarians, Libyans, North Koreans, etc. The national decisions, the crucial ones, are not in the hands of the Nicaraguans, but in the hands of the Cubans… And, really, in the end, it is not the Cubans, but the Soviets.”

While many foreign policy experts and officials in the Carter administration scoffed at the idea of either Soviet of Cuban steering of the Sandinistas, numerous defectors later confirmed it. Victor Tirado, one of the original Sandinistas, wrote in 1991 that “we allowed ourselves to be guided by the ideas of the Cubans and the Soviets.” Alvaro Baldizon, a chief investigator of the Sandinista Ministry of the Interior, said after defecting, “The ones who give the orders are the Cubans…. Every program, every operation is always under the supervision of Cuban advisors.”

Since the Barrio Adentro program began in Venezuela in October 2000, the number of Cubans in the country has grown to somewhere between forty thousand and sixty-five thousand, depending on the source.

(169)

One of the programs instituted by the Cubans that has driven out many of the professional officers is a new system that allows sergeants to be promoted to the rank of colonel simply by what they call “technical merit” – which most officers define as a high level of fealty to the Chavez political program.

(170)

Prior to the 2006 presidential election in Peru, Hugo Chavez set his sights on the country to try to bring it into the ALBA orbit. Besides sending letters of invitation to mayors near the border areas of his allies, Chavez underwrote a number of ALBA houses in rural areas of Peru. The Peruvian government became concerned enough about the ALBA houses that a congressional committee investigated them and issues a report in March 2009 recommending they be shut down. The committee report concluded that Chavez was trying to influence Peruvian politics via the ALBA houses, which had been established without any government-to-government agreement.

A June 2009 incident in the Amazon city of Badua ended the détente. The incident, called the Baguazo, ended in a bloodbath when members and supporters of a radicalized “indigenous rights” group slit the throats of police officers who had been sent to end the group’s roadblock that had closed the city’s only highway for over a month. Leaders of the Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Rainforest were revealed to have ties to Chavez and Morales and had previously traveled to Caracas to participate in a meeting of radical indigenous groups.

(171 – 172)

Like Soviet communism, Chavez’s 21st Century Socialism can only survive by spreading and enveloping its neighbors, lest too much of a distinction be shown in economic outcomes by its nonsocialist neighbors.

In a July 2008 hearing of the Western Hemispheric Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Dr. Norman Bailey, a former official of the National Security Council whose specialty was monitoring terrorism by tracking finances, testified that Chavez had spent “$33 billion on regional influence.” Bailey further stated that corruption in the Chavez regime was “nothing less than monumental, with literally billions of dollars having been stolen by government officials and their allies in the private sector over the past nine years.” Bailey also testified that a Chavez government official had his bank accounts closed by HSBC Bank in London, which had deposits of $1.5 billion.”

A large portion of the income derived from both the narco-trafficking and money laundering is funneled to Venezuelan entities and officials and “is facilitated by the Venezuelan financial system, including both public and private institutions.”

* Bailey testimony before the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee

(174)

A Wikileaks cable released in December 2010 revealed that Ortega had been given “suitcases full of cash” in Caracas. “We have firsthand reports that GON [Government of Venezuela] officials receive suitcases full of cash from Venezuelan officials during official trips to Caracas,” a 2008 diplomatic cable written by Ambassador Paul Trivelli stated. The embassy cables also said that Ortega was believed to have used drug money to underwrite a massive election fraud.

The accusations of suitcases of Venezuelan money going to Nicaragua match very closely with an August 2007 case in which a Venezuelan American businessman, Antonini Wilson, was cause at the Ezeiza Airport just outside Buenos Aires with a suitcase packed with $800,000 in cash. According to U.S. prosecutors who ended up in charge of the case, the money was intended for Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, who was campaigning for (and eventually won) the presidency of Argentina… when Wilson flew home to Key Biscayne immediately after he incident, he reported it to the FBI, fearing (rightly) being set up as the “fall guy,” according to his court testimony. Wilson agreed to wear a wire during his subsequent meetings with Venezuelan officials and to record his phone calls. Three of the officials involved were indicted in the United States and pleaded guilty. Another fled and is still at large.

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Nicaraguan defectors had long reported the drug-trafficking habits of the Sandinista government. Antonio Farach, a defector who had worked as a Sandinista minister in Nicaragua’s embassies in Honduras and Venezuela, told U.S. officials in 1983 that Humberto Ortega, brother of the president and then Nicaragua’s minister of defense, was “directly involved” in drug trafficking.

Farach repeated an oft-reported rationale used by Marxists who moonlight in the drug trade as a sideline to revolution. He states that Sandinista officials believed their trafficking in drugs was a “political weapon” that would help to destroy “the youth of our enemies.” According to Farach, the Sandinistas declared, “We want to provided food to our people with the suffering and death of the youth of the United States.”

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As of 2008, nineteen of the forty-three groups that are officially designated “foreign terrorist organizations” were all linked to the international drug trade, and as much as 60 percent of all terrorist organizations were believed to be linked to the drug trade.

From fiscal years 1999 through March 2010, 329 Iranian nationals have been caught by U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

In March 2005 FBI director Robert Mueller testified before the House Appropriations Committee that “there are individuals from countries with known Al Qaeda connection who are changing their Islamic surnames to Hispanic-sounding names and obtaining false Hispanic identities, learning to speak Spanish and pretending to be Hispanic.

In 2010 the Department of Homeland Security had thousands of what are called “OTMs” – Other Than Mexicans – incarcerated for illegally crossing the southern border. The OTMs consisted of individuals from Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and elsewhere.

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Hugo Chavez’s placement of individuals with known ties to terrorist groups in charge of his immigration and identification bureau have long been documented.

(204)

Influenced by Chavez and radical leftist groups in the region, Lopez Obrador staged a populist sit-in in the central square of Mexico City for nearly two months, claiming to be the “legitimate president”.

Rep Jim Kolbe (R-AZ) told several Mexican legislators at the time that he had received intelligence reports that Chavez had been funding AMLO’s Party of the Democratic Revolution. Had Lopez Obrador won, the nefarious influences of Chavez and Ahmadinejad would have moved to America’s doorstep, and the nexus of drug trafficking and terrorism that were already on the border would be an order of magnitude greater.

(207)

In September 2011, El Universal reported that a Spanish court had prosecuted five members of Askapena, the international wing of ETA. Court documents showed that Askapena had been instructed to set up an international relations network by organizing seminar and creating “solidarity committees” in Europe and North and South America.

(208)

The New York Times reported on January 28, 1996 that during the last two months that the Sandinistas were in power, they had granted Nicaraguan citizenship and documentation to over nine hundred foreigners, including terrorists from ETA and Italy’s Red Brigades, three dozen Arabs and Iranians from Islamic terrorist groups, and terrorists from “virtually every guerrilla organization in Lain America”.

(209)

As far back as May 2008, Jackson Diehl, deputy editorial page editor and foreign policy writer for the Washington Post, wrote that Chavez belonged on the State Department’s list of State Sponsors of Terror.

His reported actions are, first of all, a violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373, passed in September 2001, which prohibits all states from providing financing or havens to terrorist organizations. More directly, the Colombian evidence would be more than enough to justify a State Department decision to cite Venezuela as a state sponsor of terrorism. Once cited, Venezuela would be subject to a number of automatic sanctions, some of which would complicate its continuing export of oil to the United States…

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It is this irrational reluctance to properly describe the threat we face from declared enemies that validates those enemies contrived grievances. Almost inversely proportional to our increased prowess in kinetic warfare, we have continually ceded the ideological war that has become the only battlefield on which our enemies are able to make an impact. As Max Manwaring and others have stated, today’s battles are fights for legitimacy. To allow political correctness or misplaced deference to alter the terminology of war is to cede our most valuable territory. To our enemies, deference equals weakness, not civil accommodation.

Another tenet shared by political Islam in the Middle East and 21st Century Socialism in Latin America is that its adherents have declared war not only on the United States and the West in general but on capitalism and free societies as well. TO most of us in the West, this is equivalent to declaring war on gravity, as free exchange and free enterprise are the bases of life and the engines of progress throughout the world.

We enjoy the advantage that our enemies are not only fighting against us but are also fighting against the trajectory of human progress. Our duty is to decide whether we are going to continue to accommodate their superstitions or whether we will confront them before further carnage provides them with false validation.

 

Notes from Black Against Empire: The History and Politics of the Black Panther Party

Black Against Empire: The History and Politics of the Black Panther Party

While I highlighted far more from Black Against Empire: The History and Politics of the Black Panther Party than the below, I decided to limit myself to posting here issues related to changing perceptions of the Panthers following the dismantling of Jim Crow, issues linked to Marxism issues, and international relations.

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But by 1968, even in “Bloody Lowndes,” the political dynamic had changed. As the Civil Rights Movement dismantled Jim Crow through the mid-1960s, it ironically undercut its own viability as an insurgent movement. Whereas activists could sit in at lunch counters or sit black and white together on a bus or insist on registering to vote where they had traditionally been excluded, they were often uncertain how to nonviolently disrupt black unemployment, substandard housing, poor medical care, or police brutality. And when activists did succeed in disrupting these social processes nonviolently, they often found themselves facing very different enemies and lacking the broad allied support that civil rights activists had attained when challenging formal segregation. By 1968, the civil rights practice of nonviolent civil disobedience against racial exclusion had few obvious targets and could no longer generate massive and widespread participation.

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In this environment, Lil’ Bobby Hutton became a very different kind of martyr from King. He was virtually unknown and ignored by the establishment. Hutton had died standing up to the brutal Oakland police; he died for black self-determination; he died defying American empire like Lumumba and Che and hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese had before him. Unlike King in 1968, Lil’ Bobby Hutton represented a coherent insurgent alternative to political participation in the United States—armed self-defense against the police and commitment to the revolutionary politics of the Black Panther Party.

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A Panther press statement said that in addition to support for the “Free Huey!” campaign and the black plebiscite, the Panthers were calling upon “the member nations of the United Nations to authorize the stationing of UN Observer Teams throughout the cities of America wherein black people are cooped up and concentrated in wretched ghettos.” After meeting with several U.N. delegations and talking with the press, the Black Panthers filed for status as an official “nongoverning organization” of the United Nations. While the notion of the black plebiscite was intriguing to many, it failed to gain traction.

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At SNCC’s invitation, student antiwar activists came to see themselves as fighting for their own liberation from the American empire. The imperial machinery of war that was inflicting havoc abroad was forcing America’s young to kill and die for a cause many did not believe in. Young activists came to see the draft as an imposition of empire on themselves just as the war was an imposition of empire on the Vietnamese.59

SDS leader Greg Calvert encapsulated this emerging view in the idea of “revolutionary consciousness” in a widely influential speech at Princeton University that February. Arguing that students them- selves were revolutionary subjects, Calvert sought to distinguish radicals from liberals, and he advanced “revolutionary consciousness” as the basis for a distinct and superior morality: “Radical or revolutionary consciousness . . . is the perception of oneself as unfree, as oppressed— and finally it is the discovery of oneself as one of the oppressed who must unite to transform the objective conditions of their existence in order to resolve the contradiction between potentiality and actuality. Revolutionary consciousness leads to the struggle for one’s own freedom in unity with others who share the burden of oppression.”

The speech marked a watershed in the New Left’s self-conception. Coming to see itself as part of the global struggle of the Vietnamese against American imperialism and the black struggle against racist oppression, the New Left rejected the status quo as fundamentally immoral and embraced the morality of revolutionary challenge. From this vantage point, the Vietnam War was illegitimate, and draft resistance was an act of revolutionary heroism.

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In their move to take greater leadership in organizing a revolutionary movement across race, the Black Panthers sought to make their class and cross-race anti-imperialist politics more explicit. They began featuring nonblack liberation movements on the cover of their news- paper, starting with Ho Chi Minh and the North Vietnamese. They began widely using the word fascism to describe the policies of the U.S. government. Then in July 1969, two weeks before the United Front Against Fascism Conference, the Panthers changed point 3 of their Ten Point Program from “We want an end to the robbery by the white man of our Black Community” to “We want an end to the robbery by the CAPITALIST of our Black Community”

The Black Panther Party held the United Front Against Fascism Conference in Oakland from July 18 to 21.

At least four thousand young radicals from around the country attended the conference. The delegates included Latinos, Asian Americans, and other people of color, but the majority of delegates were white. More than three hundred organizations attended, representing a broad cross-section of the New Left. In addition to the Young Lords, Red Guard, Los Siete de la Raza, Young Patriots, and Third World Liberation Front, attendees included the Peace and Freedom Party, the International Socialist Club, Progressive Labor, Students for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance, and various groups within the Women’s Liberation Movement.

Bobby Seale set the tone for the conference, reiterating his oft-stated challenge against black separatism: “Black racism is just as bad and dangerous as White racism.” He more explicitly emphasized the importance of class to revolution, declaring simply, “It is a class struggle.” Seale spoke against the ideological divisiveness among leftist organizations, arguing that such divisiveness would go nowhere. What was needed, he said, was a shared practical program. He called for the creation of a united “American Liberation Front” in which all communities and organizations struggling for self-determination in America could unite across race and ideology, demand community control of police, and secure legal support for political prisoners.

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The main outcome of the conference was that the Panthers decided to organize National Committees to Combat Fascism (NCCFs) around the country. The NCCFs would operate under the Panther umbrella, but unlike official Black Panther Party chapters, they would allow membership of nonblacks. In this way, the Black Panther Party could maintain the integrity of its racial politics yet step into more formal

(311)

The Black Panther Party’s anti-imperialist politics were deeply inflected with Marxist thought.

The Party’s embrace of Marxism was never rigid, sectarian, or dogmatic. Motivated by a vision of a universal and radically democratic struggle against oppression, ideology seldom got in the way of the Party’s alliance building and practical politics.

he asserted that unemployed blacks were a legitimate revolution- ary group and that the Black Panther Party’s version of Marxism transcended the idea that an industrial working class was the sole agent of revolution.

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Nondogmatic throughout its history, the Black Panther Party worked with a range of leftist organizations with very different political ideologies—a highlight being its hosting of the United Front Against Fascism Conference in July 1969.10 The unchanging core of the Black Panther Party’s political ideology was black anti-imperialism. The Party always saw its core constituency as “the black community,” but it also made common cause between the struggle of the black community and the struggles of other peoples against oppression. Marxism and class analysis helped the Black Panthers understand the oppression of others and to make the analogy between the struggle for black liberation and other struggles for self-determination. While the Marxist content deepened and shifted over the Party’s history, this basic idea held constant.

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. One of the Panthers’ early sources of solidarity and support was the left-wing movements in Scandinavia. The lead organizer of this support was Connie Matthews, an energetic and articulate young Jamaican woman employed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization in Copenhagen, Den- mark. In early 1969, Matthews organized a tour for Bobby Seale and Masai Hewitt throughout Scandinavia to raise money and support for the “Free Huey!” campaign. She and Panther Skip Malone worked out the logistics of the trip with various left-wing Scandinavian organizations, enlisting their support by highlighting the class politics of the Black Panther Party.

 

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In noninsurgent organizations, established laws and customs are assumed and largely respected. Maintaining organizational coherence may be challenging, but transgressions of law and custom are generally outside of organizational responsibility. Within insurgent organizations like the Black Panther Party, law and custom are viewed as oppressive and illegitimate. Insurgents view their movement as above the law and custom, the embodiment of a greater morality. As a result, defining acceptable types of transgression of law and custom, and maintaining discipline within these constraints, often poses a serious challenge for insurgent organizations like the Black Panther Party. What sorts of violation of law and custom are consistent with the vision and aims of the insurgency?

 

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By the fall of 1968, as the Party became a national organization, it had to manage the political ramifications of actions taken by loosely organized affiliates across the country. The Central Committee in Oak- land codified ten Rules of the Black Panther Party and began publishing them in each issue of the Black Panther. These rules established basic disciplinary expectations, warning especially against haphazard violence that might be destabilizing or politically embarrassing. They prohibited the use of narcotics, alcohol, or marijuana while conducting Party activities or bearing arms. The Party insisted that Panthers use weapons only against “the enemy” and prohibited theft from other “Black people.” But they permitted disciplined revolutionary violence and specifically allowed participation in the underground insurrectionary “Black Liberation Army.”

 

(344)

 

The Black Panther Party derived its power largely from the insurgent threat it posed to the established order—its ability to attract members who were prepared to physically challenge the authority of the state. But this power also depended on the capacity to organize and discipline these members. When Panthers defied the authority of the Party, acted against its ideological position, or engaged in apolitical criminal activity, their actions undermined the Party, not least in the eyes of potential allies. The Panthers could not raise funds, garner legal aid, mobilize political support, or even sell newspapers to many of their allies if they were perceived as criminals, separatists, or aggressive and undisciplined incompetents. The survival of the Party depended on its political coherence and organizational discipline.

As the Party grew nationally and increasingly came into conflict with the state in 1969, maintaining discipline and a coherent political image became more challenging. The tension between the anti- authoritarianism of members in disparate chapters and the need for the Party to advance a coherent political vision grew. One of the principal tools for maintaining discipline—both of individual members and of local chapters expected to conform to directives from the Central Committee—was the threat of expulsion.

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Hilliard explained the importance of the purge for maintaining Party discipline: “We relate to what Lenin said, ‘that a party that purges itself grows to become stronger.’ The purging is very good. You recognize that there is a diffusion within the rank and file of the party, within the internal structure of the party.

As the Party continued to expand in 1969 and 1970, so did conflicts between the actions of members in local chapters across the country and the political identity of the Party—carefully groomed by the Central Committee.

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The resilience of the Black Panthers’ politics depended heavily on sup- port from three broad constituencies: blacks, opponents of the Vietnam War, and revolutionary governments internationally. Without the sup- port of these allies, the Black Panther Party could not withstand repressive actions against them by the state. But beginning in 1969, and steadily increasing through 1970, political transformations undercut the self-interests that motivated these constituencies to support the Panthers’ politics.

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Cuban support for the Black Panthers also shifted during the late 1960s. When Eldridge Cleaver fled to Cuba as a political exile in late

1968, Cuba not only provided safe passage and security but promised to create a military training facility for the Party on an abandoned farm out- side Havana. This promise was consistent with the more active role Cuba had played in supporting the Black Liberation Struggle in the United States in the early 1960s, when it sponsored the broadcast of Robert Williams’s insurrectionary radio program “Radio Free Dixie,” as well as publication of his newspaper, the Crusader, and his book Negroes with Guns. But, as the tide of revolution shifted globally toward the end of the decade, security concerns took on higher priority in Cuban policy. Eager to avoid provoking retaliation from the United States, Cuba distanced itself from the Black Liberation Struggle, continuing to allow exiles but refraining from active support of black insurrection. The government never opened a military training ground for the Panthers, instead placing constraints on the political activities of Panther exiles.34

As the United States scaled back the war in Vietnam; reduced the military draft; improved political, educational, and employment access for blacks; and improved relations with former revolutionary governments around the world, the Black Panthers had difficulty maintaining support for politics involving armed confrontation with the state.

More comfortable and secure with the ability of mainstream political institutions to redress their concerns—especially the draft—liberals went on the attack, challenging the revolutionary politics of the Black Panther Party.

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Many Panthers hoped that Huey would resolve the challenges the Party faced and lead them successfully to revolution. But his release had the opposite effect, exacerbating the tensions within the Party. Some rank-and-file Panthers took Huey’s long-awaited release as a pre- lude to victory and a license to violence, and their aggressive militarism became harder to contain. Organizationally, the Party had grown exponentially in Newton’s name but was actually under the direction of other leaders. His release forced a reconfiguration of power in the Party.

Paradoxically, Newton’s release also made it harder for the Party to maintain support from more moderate allies. It sent a strong message to many moderates that—contrary to Kingman Brewster’s famous statement three months earlier—a black revolutionary could receive a fair trial in the United States. The radical Left saw revolutionary progress in winning Huey’s freedom, but many moderate allies saw less cause for revolution.

(359)

 

The Panther 21 asserted that the Black Panther Party was not the true revolutionary vanguard in the United States and hailed the Weather Underground as one of, if not “the true vanguard.” In line with the vanguardist ideology of the Weather Underground, the Panther 21 argued that it was now time for all-out revolutionary violence that they believed would attract a broad following and eventually topple the capitalist economy and the state

(361)

 

 

Dhoruba Bin Wahad explained his decision to desert the Black Panther Party as a response to the increasing moderation of Newton, Hilliard, and the Central Committee and their efforts to appease wealthy donors. In a public statement in May 1971, Dhoruba wrote,

We were aware of the Plots emanating from the co-opted Fearful minds of Huey Newton and the Arch Revisionist, David Hilliard… . Obsession with fund raising leads to dependency upon the very class enemies of our People. . . . These internal contradictions have naturally developed to the Point where those within the Party found themselves in an organization fastly approaching the likes of the N.A.A.C.P.—dedicated to modified slavery instead of putting an end to all forms of slavery.67

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To this day, small cadres in the United States dedicate their lives to a revolutionary vision. Not unlike the tenets of a religion, a secular revolutionary vision provides these communities with purpose and a moral compass. Some of these revolutionary communities publish periodicals, maintain websites, collectively feed and school their children, and share housing. But none wields the power to disrupt the status quo on a national scale. None is viewed as a serious threat by the federal government. And none today compares in scope or political influence to the Black Panther Party during its heyday.

The power the Black Panthers achieved grew out of their politics of armed self-defense. While they had little economic capital or institutionalized political power, they were able to forcibly assert their politi- cal agenda through their armed confrontations with the state.

The Black Panther Party did not spring onto the historical stage fully formed; it grew in stages. Newton and Seale wove together their revolutionary vision from disparate strands.

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Nixon won the White House on his Law and Order platform, inaugurating the year of the most intense direct repression of the Panthers. But the Party continued to grow in scope and influence. By 1970, it had opened offices in sixty-eight cities. That year, the New York Times published 1,217 articles on the Party, more than twice as many as in any other year. The Party’s annual budget reached about $1.2 million (in 1970 dollars). And circulation of the Party’s newspaper, the Black Panther, reached 150,000.3

The resonance of Panther practices was specific to the times. Many blacks believed conventional methods were insufficient to redress persistent exclusion from municipal hiring, decent education, and political power.

(395)

The vast literature on the Black Liberation Struggle in the postwar decades concentrates largely on the southern Civil Rights Movement. Our analysis is indebted to that literature as well as to more recent historical scholarship that enlarges both the geographic and temporal scope of analysis.5 Thomas Sugrue in particular makes important advances, calling attention to the black insurgent mobilizations in the North and West, and to their longue durée.This work, however, fails to analyze these mobilizations on their own terms, instead seeking to assimilate these black insurgencies to a civil rights perspective by presenting the range of black insurgent mobilizations as claims for black citizenship, appeals to the state—for full and equal participation. This perspective obscures the revolutionary character and radical economic focus of the Black Panther Party.

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The broader question is why no revolutionary movement of any kind exists in the United States today. To untangle this question, we need to consider what makes a movement revolutionary. Here, the writings of the Italian theorist and revolutionary Antonio Gramsci are instructive: “A theory is ‘revolutionary’ precisely to the extent that it is an element of conscious separation and distinction into two camps and is a peak inaccessible to the enemy camp.”17 In other words, a revolutionary theory splits the world in two. It says that the people in power and the institutions they manage are the cause of oppression and injustice. A revolutionary theory purports to explain how to overcome those iniquities. It claims that oppression is inherent in the dominant social institutions. Further, it asserts that nothing can be done from within the dominant social institutions to rectify the problem—that the dominant social institutions must be overthrown. In this sense, any revolutionary theory consciously separates the world into two camps: those who seek to reproduce the existing social arrangements and those who seek to overthrow them.

In this first, ideational sense, many insurgent revolutionary movements do exist in the United States today, albeit on a very small scale. From sectarian socialist groups to nationalist separatists, these revolutionary minimovements have two things in common: a theory that calls for destroying the existing social world and advances an alternative trajectory; and cadres of members who have dedicated their lives to advance this alternative, see the revolutionary community as their moral reference point, and see themselves as categorically different from everyone who does not.

More broadly, in Gramsci’s view, a movement is revolutionary politically to the extent that it poses an effective challenge. He suggests that such a revolutionary movement must first be creative rather than arbitrary. It must seize the political imagination and offer credible proposals to address the grievances of large segments of the population, creating a “concrete phantasy which acts on a dispersed and shattered people to arouse and organize its collective will.”18 But when a movement succeeds in this task, the dominant political coalition usually defeats the challenge through the twin means of repression and con- cession. The ruling alliance does not simply crush political challenges directly through the coercive power of the state but makes concessions that reconsolidate its political power without undermining its basic interests.19 A revolutionary movement becomes significant politically only when it is able to win the loyalty of allies, articulating a broader insurgency.20

In this second, political sense, there are no revolutionary movements in the United States today. The country has seen moments of large-scale popular mobilization, and some of these recent movements, such as the mass mobilizations for immigrant rights in 2006, have been “creative,” seizing the imagination of large segments of the population. One would think that the 2008 housing collapse, economic recession, subsequent insolvency of local governments, and bailout of the wealthy institutions and individuals most responsible for creating the financial crisis at the expense of almost everyone else provide fertile conditions for a broad insurgent politics. But as of this writing, it is an open question whether a broad, let alone revolutionary, challenge will develop. Recent movements have not sustained insurgency, advanced a revolutionary vision, or articulated a broader alliance to challenge established political power.

In our assessment, for the years 1968 to 1970, the Black Panther Party was revolutionary in Gramsci’s sense, both ideationally and politically. Ideationally, young Panthers dedicated their lives to the revolution because—as part of a global revolution against empire—they believed that they could transform the world. The revolutionary vision of the Party became the moral center of the Panther community.

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While minimovements with revolutionary ideologies abound, there is no politically significant revolutionary movement in the United States today because no cadre of revolutionaries has developed ideas and practices that credibly advance the interests of a large segment of the people. Members of revolutionary sects can hawk their newspapers and proselytize on college campuses until they are blue in the face, but they remain politically irrelevant. Islamist insurgencies, with deep political roots abroad, are politically significant, but they lack potential constituencies in the United States.

No revolutionary movement of political significance will gain a foot-hold in the United States again until a group of revolutionaries develops insurgent practices that seize the political imagination of a large segment of the people and successively draw support from other constituencies, creating a broad insurgent alliance that is difficult to repress or appease. This has not happened in the United States since the heyday of the Black Panther Party and may not happen again for a very long time.

Notes from CastroChavism: Organized Crime in the Americas

CastroChavism: Organized Crime in the Americas by José Carlos Sánchez Berzaín, Bolivia’s former Minister of Defense and the author of XXI Century Dictatorship in Bolivia.

(16)

[Venezuela and Bolivia] are dictatorships that reach[ed] power through elections and through successive coups that liquate democracy.

(17)

The two Americas make up an axis of confrontation in which perpetual and arbitrary control of power, on the one handed, branded dictatorship with ideology as a pretext; versus democracy, with respect for human rights, alternation in power, accountability and free elections, declaratively protected by the inter-American system, enshrined – among others – in the inter-American democratic charter.

From 1959 to 1999, the Cuban dictatorship is “Castroism.” From 1999 onwards it is “Castrochavismo,” led by Hugo Chavez until his death.

(18-19)

It began as progressive leftist populism, and was successively called ALBA Movement (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America); the Bolivarian Movement; and after a few years Socialism of the 21st Century.

Castro receives a new source of financing for his conspiratorial and criminal actions with Chavez’s surrender not only of Venezuela’s money and oil but, as we have learned today, of the entire country. This allowed the dictator to reactivate genuine Castroism under the mantle of the Bolivarian Movement, or ALBA, and disguise it as democracy. With Venezuela’s money he started conspiracies, which led to the fall and overthrow of democratic leaders. The first one occurs in Argentina, with the fall of President De La Rua. The second happens in Ecuador and it is Jamil Mahuad who pays the proce. The Third one is the overthrow of President Gonzalo Sanches de Lozada in Bolivia. The fourth is in Ecuador, with the fall of President Lucio Gutierrez. They also overthrew the OAS Secretary General, Miguel Angel Rodriguez, who had just been elected. A false case of corruption was planted in Costa Rica, where Rodriguez ends up being illegally detained, making room for Insulsa to arrive.

The nascent CastroChavista organization expands with Lula da Silva taking power in Brazil with the Workers Party, whose government he used to strengthen the extraordinary flow of economic resources with transnational corruption .A sample of such crimes include the infamous case of “Lava Jato – Odebrecht”

The destruction of democracy becomes noticeable in the exiles, who had been purely Cuban and are now regional – waves of Venezuelans Bolivians, Nicaraguans, Ecuadorians, Argentines, and Central Americans.

(21)

An electoral dictatorship is a political regime that by force or violence concentrates all power in a person or in a group or organization that repressed human rights and fundamental freedoms and uses illegitimate elections, neither free no fair, with fraud and corruption, to perpetuate itself indefinitely in power.”

(23)

Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua… are criminal entities that must be separated from politics and must be treated as transnational organized crime from within the framework of the Palermo Convention and other norms, without the immunities or privileges inherent to the heads of State or government.

(24)

Castrochavista dictatorships are in crisis, but are not defeated. They are called out as regimes that violate human rights, that have no rule of law, where there is no division or independence of public powers, and that are narco States and creators of poverty. To remain in power, they apply the uniform strategy of “resisting at all costs, destabilizing democracies, politicizing their situation and negotiating.”

The first element of this strategy, of “retention of all power at all costs,” can be seen in Nicaragua, Venezuela and Cuba – where they imprison and torture political prisoners. The President of the Human Rights assembly in Bolivia has just reported that there are 131 deaths without investigation from killings that the government has committed, and there are more than 100 political prisoners.

(25)

The second element of their strategy is to “destabilize democracies,” for which they conspire against those who accuse them and against the governments that defend democracy. The destabilization range from false news and character assassination of leaders whom they designate as right wing, to criminal acts of terrorism, kidnappings and narco guerrillas.

The third element of their strategy is to “politicize their situation and their criminal acts.” When the dictatorships in Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua improperly imprison a citizen, when they torture them, when they evn kill them – they call it defense of the revolution.

These four dictatorships are narco states and, to justify themselves, they argue that “drug trafficking is an instrument of struggle for the liberation of the peoples”

Evo Morales in 2016 at the United Nations said that “the fight against drug trafficking is an instrument of imperialism to oppress the peoples”.

Jesus Santrich fled from Colombia to Venezuela, proclaiming that he had been persecuted by the right. The bosses of the ELN narco-guerrillas of Colombia are under protection in Cuba.

The third element of Castrochavismo, which consists in politicizing their crimes, serves to ensure that when they kill any person they say that they are defending the revolution. When they torture they say they defend the popular process of liberation of peoples and so on.

The fourth element of Castrochavista strategy is to “negotiate”. They negotiate in order to gain time, demoralize the adversary, collect bills from their allies or extort money from third states to gain their support or at least neutralize them.

From these four elements, they survive.

(27)

Political events are based on respect for the “rule of law,” which is simply that “no one is above the law,” on the temporality of public service, on accountability and public responsibility, where you can take on an adversary. But organized crime has no adversaries, it has enemies and the difference between an adversary and an enemy is that the former is defeated or convinced, whereas the latter is eliminated, and this explains the number of crimes that Castrochavismo commits in the Americas.

(30)

The peoples of Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia are fighting against the dictatorships that oppress them, but it is not a local or national oppressor, they take on a transnational enemy, united by the objective of retaining power indefiniately as the best mechanism for impunity.

Castrochavismo as a transnational organized crime structure is a very powerful usurper with a lot of money, a lot of criminal armed forces, control of many media and many mercenaries of various specialties at its service, which has put the peoples they oppress in a true and extreme “defenseless condition.”

As long as there are dictatorships there will be no peace or security in the Americas.

(33)

It is vital to differentiate and separate that which is “politics” meaning an activity of public service, from that which is “organized crime” and “delinquency.” Politics with its ideologies, pragmatisms, imperfections, errors, crises, even tainted by corruption is one thing, but another very different things is politics and power under the control of associated criminals who turn their politics into their main instrument for the commission of crimes, the setting up of criminal organizations, the seizure and indefinite control of power with criminal objectives and for the sake of their own impunity.

Politics is legal, meaning that it is conducted in pheres considered to be “just, allowed, according to justice and reason” because it is of order and public service….

(35)

Castro, Maduro, Ortega and Morales are not politicians, they are not corrupted government – they are organized delinquency that holds political power and plans to indefinitely keep holding it. They can no longer keep being treated as politicians, and least of all as State Dignitaries.

(42)

CastroChavist is the label for Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez’s undertaking that, using the subversive capabilities of the Cuban dictatorial regime and Venezuelan oil, has resurrected – commencing in 1999, the expansion of Castroist, antidemocratic communism with a heavy antiimperialist discourse.

(46-47)

What is happening in Venezuela today is the result of almost two decades of progressive and sustained abuses to freedom and democracy, violation of human rights, persecutions, electoral fraud, corruption, violation of the sovereignty of the country, theft of government and private resources, killing of the freedom of the press, elimination of the rule of law, disappearance of the separation and independence of the branches of government, control of the opposition, imprisonment and forced exile of political opponents, narcotics trafficking and all that may be necessary to make Venezuela a Castroist-model dictatorial “narco-state with a humanitarian crisis.”

The international democratic community has understood that for the sake of their own interests and security, it must preclude Venezuela from turning into the second consolidated dictatorship of the Americas, and prevent the dictatorships of Bolivia and Nicaragua from following that path. Liberating Venezuela is a strategic necessity.

(49)

In Bolivia, the top and perpetual leader of the coca leaf harvesters, Evo Morales, is the head of the Purinational State of Bolivia wherein “by decree of law” he has increated the lawful cultivation of coca by 83% from 12,000 hectares to 22,000 hectares and has increased the cultivation of unlawful coca from the existing 3,000 hectares in 2003 – the year they toppled President Sanchez de Lozada – to the current 50,000 hectares.

Evo Morales’ drug czar Colonel Rene Sanabria was arrested by the DEA for cocaine trafficking and has been sentenced by US judges to 15 years in jail.

(55)

In democracy, corruption is not the rule but the flaw, it is the violation of normalcy, “the misuse of government power to get illegitimate advantages, generally in a secret or private way”, it is “the consistent practice of utilizing the functions and means of the government for the benefit – whether this benefit be financial or otherwise – of those who are involved with it.” In a democracy, there are investigations, prosecution, and punishment with accountability, there is separation and independence of the branches of government, the Rule of Law exists, and there is freedom of the press. On the other hand, however, in dictatorships, corruption is the means, the cause, and the end objective of getting to, and indefinitely remaining in power.

(61)

The Venezuelan dictatorship is the Gordian knot the keeps the Venezuelan people from recovering their freedom and democracy, one that at the same time sustains dictatorships in the America, specifically in Cuba, Bolivia, and Nicaragua as a system of Transnational Organized Crime – they are a real danger not only for this region, but the whole world.

(62)

The hub of narcotics trafficking that Venezuela has been turned into, with the Colombian FARC’s cocaine and with Evo Morales’ coca growers’ unions from Bolivia, has penetrated the entire region and impacts the whole world with serious consequences in security and the wellbeing of people.

(65)

A well-orchastrated international system of public relations, lobbyists who work for the Cuba-Venezuela-Bolivia-Nicaragua group, the subjecting of PetroCaribe countries with bribes of Venezuelan oil, it’s penetration into international organizations, its control over the national news media and its creation and influence over international media, its collusion with important magnates and businessmen, and its repetitive anti-U.S. discourse along with its opening to Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, have all been factors – that have allowed the existence of the Ortega’s Crime Dictatorship in Nicaragua.

(67)

Cuba with the Castro’s, Venezuela with Chavez and Maduro, Bolivia with Evo Morales, Nicaragua with Daniel Ortega, and Ecuador with Rafael Correa, replaced freedom of the press with a system of control of the information with prior censorship, self-censorship, financial and judicial repression. They appropriated themselves – through transfers under duress, seizures, intervention, and violence – of private news media in order to place them at their service, they have supported and created state media, founded and funded regional media, they manage the official propaganda as a mechanism for extorsion, they use taxes as a means of pressure and retribution, they extort companies regarding the assignment of propaganda, they start and sustain “assassination of reputation” campaigns against journalists and owners of news media.

(74)

Crimes committed by the 21st Century Socialist Regimes range from persecution with the aim of physical torture and killing, judicial trials with false accusations heard by “despicable judges”, the application of the regime’s pseudo-laws violating human rights or of “despicable laws”, restricting freedom of speech or freedom to work, to be employed, or discharge a profession, assassinating the individuals reputation to convert the wrongly accused as an undesirable, subjecting the person into a condition of being defenseless, depriving him/her of a job and much more.

(75)

…they’ve replaced politics with criminal practices in order to totally and indefinitely control political power.

Extortion is a key feature of the Castrochavista methods that is further proof of the Transnational Organized Crime nature of these dictatorships.

Extortion is “the pressure exerted on someone – through threats – to compel them to act in a certain way and obtain a monetary or other type of benefit.” The legal definition of extortion includes “the intimidation or serious threat that restricts a person to do, tolerate the doing or not doing of something for the purpose of deriving a benefit or undue advantage for one’s self or someone else.”

The Castrochavista constitutions have established “the law’s retroactivity” and have suppressed or limited parliamentary immunities in order to keep extorting members of the opposition.

Judges, prosecutors and even attorneys are extorted. Several cases corroborate this, cases, such as Venezuela’s Judge Maria Lourdes Afiuni’s jailing, violations, and tortures; the fired prosecutors and judges who were afterwards prosecuted in the case of Magistrate Gualberto Cusi in Bolivia, as well as the jailing of defense attorneys; the persecution and exile of Magistrates from Venezuela’s Supreme Justice Tribunal “ the legitimate one in exile,” or that of Attorney General Ortega, the assassination of Prosecutor Alberto Nisman in Kirchner’s Argentina, and dozens more.

The imprisonment, torture, humiliations, assassinations, and exile started as extrortions and are dictatorial warning operations in order to ensure the submission of the system it manipulates “setting precedents” of its decision to use extortion to obtain benefits for the dictator and his Organized Crime group who is called government. Benefits range from financial gain, cover up, and impunity, to the indefinite tenure in government.

(78)

Cornered by crises, the dictatorships of Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia, have gone into an attack more and the meeting of the Sao Paulo Forum in Havana was the scenario to launch their new phase of destabilization.

Dictatorships attack with forced migration, the generation of internal violence, and destabilization.

(79)

All of the region’s democratic countries are under the pressure of forced migration caused by Venezuela’s dictatorship that has converted on of its shameful problems into a problem for the whole region. Democracies must now deal with problems in: their security, unemployment, provision of health care, their handling of massive numbers of people in transit, identification issues, budgets, and human rights, all because the Castrochavista criminal regime of Nicolas Maduro has transformed its crimes and its effects into a political weapon. Very similar to the so-called “Mariel’s exodus” promoted by Dictator Fidel Castro against the United States, but many folds greater and for an indefinite period.

(81)

The Sao Paulo Forum is 1990 was the dictatorial reaction to the crash of Soviet Communism and was gathered, for the first time, with the objective of addressing the international scenario following the fall of the Berlin Wall and to confront the “neo-liberal” policies. It is the tool with which the Castroist dictatorship formulated the “multiplication of the confrontation axis” strategy, going beyond class struggles to the fight against any elements that may be useful to destabilize democratic governments.

The 21st Century in the Americas is the history of the Castro-Chavista buildup…

The worn-out cliché of “liberation of the peoples” as an “anti-imperialist” argument and slogan for massive demonstrations, has remained to become “the people’s oppression” that is corroborated by the quantity of massacres, assassinations, torture, political prisoners, exiles, and the daily life the people must endure.

(83)

It has become necessary for Americas’ leaders and politicians to clearly differentiate themselves from the criminals who hold power in Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia. Not doing so implies the assumed risk of being accomplices and concealers.

(89)

The price for Pablo Iglesias and PODEMOS backing to the investiture of the PSOE would be the sustainment of the dictatorships for which Iglesias works and their funding, are now amply evident in Spain’s new foreign policy aiming to sustain the CastroChavista dictatorships of Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia.

(92)

Is the use of force the only options for the dictatorships to leave?

Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia are under regimes that after applying all possible simulations and misrepresentations in order to be a revolution, a democracy, populist, leftist, and socialist governments but are nothing by Organized Crime’s organizations that hold power by force.

Alleging self-determination of the nation state while oppressing the citizens and violating their human rights is but another flaw of the CastroChavista dictatorships.

(95)

The parameters to qualify a regime as a dictatorship, an Organized Crime dictatorship, and a criminal government, are set out but existing universal and regional standards, such as: the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Charter of Bogota, the Convenant of San Jose, the European Union Treaty, the Palermo Conventions, the Interamerican Democratic Charter, and many more.

(102)

The dictatorial nature of a regime is proven by its violation of all essential components of democracy through the supplanting of the democratic order, manipulation of constituent referendums, consults and elections, down to the imposition of a fraudulent legal framework, a “legal” scheme, that nowadays is the legal system in existence in Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Correa’s Ecuador.

(105)

Why Abstention?

To run as a candidate in a dictatorship is to dress up a tyrant as a democrat.

(106)

For elections to be free and fair, there must be “conditions of democracy” in existence, this is the minimum presence of the essential components of democracy that will enable all citizens to be wither voters or be elected, will guarantee an equity of options to the candidates, transparency in the process, impartiality in the electoral authorities, offer guarantees of resources with impartial judges, with freedom of association, freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and guarantees against electoral fraud, timeliness and more.

(109)

In 1961, Cuba’s dictatorship birthed; Nicaragua’s National Liberation Army (ELN) afterwards converted into the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), then later converted into the 13th of November Revolutionary Movement (MR13N), and the Revolutionary Armed Forced (FAR) in Guatemala. In 1962, it birthed Venezuela’s National Liberation Armed Forces (FALN), the Colombian Self-Defense Forces turned into the Southern Block Forces afterwards turned into the Colombian Armed Revolutionary Forces (FARC). In Peru, it birthed the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR), in Bolivia the National Liberation Army (ELN), in Uruguay the Tupamaros, as an urban guerrilla, in Argentina the Montoneros, and in the 70’s the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP), in Brazil the Revolutionary Movement 8 (MR*), and many more. The Castroist movement did no spare any country from staining it with the blood of guerrillas.

(120)

The OAS has two charters; the Charter of Bogota which birthed the organization and the Interamerican Democratic Charter, with which democracy was institutionalized.

Article 1 of the IDC mandates that “America’s people haec the right to democracy and their government has the obligation to promote and defend it.”

(123)

The Palermo Convention for Human Trafficking should be applied to the Cuban physicians.

(134)

What dictator Nicolas Maduro and his regime insist in presenting as “elections” is a chain of serious crimes to misrepresent the popular sovereignty, sustain the narco-state, and guarantee himself impunity. The “organized crime group” that hold power has committed, and is willing to commit, whatever crime may be necessary to continue receiving the criminal benefits that have taken Venezuela to the current state of its ongoing crisis.

(188)

Fear is an essential component of dictatorships, this is why they kill the “Rule of Law” and supplant it with the “Rule of the State” with despicable laws to enable them to persecute, imprison, dishonor and wrest the property of, citizens.

The foreign enemy is useful in order to blame the United States for all disastrous results from the organized crime that holds political power, such as what the Castros’ have done for so many years and now Maduro, Morales, and their thugs do.

Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Bolivia claim the “right” conspires, pays politicians, and wants them toppled, attributing to themselves the position of being “leftist”, socialist, and communist when in reality they are criminal “fascists” whose sole ideology and objective is the total and indefinite control of power along with their illicit enrichment.

(193)

Odebrecht is one of the Brazilian companies implicated in the Forum of Sao Paulo’s criminal network implemented by Lula de Silva with the dictators Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez with the payments of millions of dollars in bribes.

(202)

Hugo Chavez allied himself with Fidel Castro in 1999 when Cuba agonized during it’s “special period” as a parasite state that, since the breakdown of the Soveit Union, did not have a way to survive. With Venezuela’s oil, Chavez salvaged the only dictatorship there was at that time in the Americas and kick started the recreation of Castroist expansionism under the labels of the Bolivarian Movement, ALBA, and 21st Century Socialism and that is today known as “CastroChavismo”.

 

 

 

Notes from Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations

Notes from Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations.

  1. Scope

PREFACE

This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of information operations across the range of military operations.

Overview

The ability to share information in near real time, anonymously and/or securely, is a capability that is both an asset and a potential vulnerability to us, our allies, and our adversaries.

The nation’s state and non-state adversaries are equally aware of the significance of this new technology, and will use information-related capabilities (IRCs) to gain advantages in the information environment, just as they would use more traditional military technologies to gain advantages in other operational environments. As the strategic environment continues to change, so does information operations (IO). Based on these changes, the Secretary of Defense now characterizes IO as the integrated employment, during military operations, of IRCs in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.

 The Information Environment

The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. This environment consists of three interrelated dimensions, which continuously interact with individuals, organizations, and systems. These dimensions are known as physical, informational, and cognitive. The physical dimension is composed of command and control systems, key decision makers, and supporting infrastructure that enable individuals and organizations to create effects. The informational dimension specifies where and how information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, and protected. The cognitive dimension encompasses the minds of those who transmit, receive, and respond to or act on information.

Information Operations

Information Operations and the Information-Influence Relational Framework

The relational framework describes the application, integration, and synchronization of IRCs to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of TAs to create a desired effect to support achievement of an objective.

Relationships and Integration

IO is not about ownership of individual capabilities but rather the use of those capabilities as force multipliers to create a desired effect. There are many military capabilities that contribute to IO and should be taken into consideration during the planning process. These include: strategic communication, joint interagency coordination group, public affairs, civil-military operations, cyberspace operations (CO), information assurance, space operations, military information support operations (MISO), intelligence, military deception, operations security, special technical operations, joint electromagnetic spectrum operations, and key leader engagement.

Legal Considerations

IO planners deal with legal considerations of an extremely diverse and complex nature. For this reason, joint IO planners should consult their staff judge advocate or legal advisor for expert advice.

Multinational Information Operations

Other Nations and Information Operations

Multinational partners recognize a variety of information concepts and possess sophisticated doctrine, procedures, and capabilities. Given these potentially diverse perspectives regarding IO, it is essential for the multinational force commander (MNFC) to resolve potential conflicts as soon as possible. It is vital to integrate multinational partners into IO planning as early as possible to gain agreement on an integrated and achievable IO strategy.

Information Operations Assessment  

Information Operations assessment is iterative, continuously repeating rounds of analysis within the operations cycle in order to measure the progress of information related capabilities toward achieving objectives.  

The Information Operations Assessment Process

Assessment of IO is a key component of the commander’s decision cycle, helping to determine the results of tactical actions in the context of overall mission objectives and providing potential recommendations for refinement of future plans. Assessments also provide opportunities to identify IRC shortfalls, changes in parameters and/or conditions in the information environment, which may cause unintended effects in the employment of IRCs, and resource issues that may be impeding joint IO effectiveness.

A solution to these assessment requirements is the eight-step assessment process.

  • Focused characterization of the information environment
  • Integrate information operations assessment into plans and develop the assessment plan
  • Develop information operations assessment information requirements and collection plans
  • Build/modify information operations assessment baseline
  • Coordinate and execute information operations and collection activities
  • Monitor and collect focused information environment data for information operations assessment
  • Analyze information operations assessment data
  • Report information operations assessment results and recommendations

 

 

Measures and Indicators

Measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) help accomplish the assessment process by qualifying or quantifying the intangible attributes of the information environment. The MOP for any one action should be whether or not the TA was exposed to the IO action or activity. MOEs should be observable, to aid with collection; quantifiable, to increase objectivity; precise, to ensure accuracy; and correlated with the progress of the operation, to attain timeliness. Indicators are crucial because they aid the joint IO planner in informing MOEs and should be identifiable across the center of gravity critical factors.

CHAPTER I

OVERVIEW

“The most hateful human misfortune is for a wise man to have no influence.”

Greek Historian Herodotus, 484-425 BC

INTRODUCTION

  1. The growth of communication networks has decreased the number of isolated populations in the world. The emergence of advanced wired and wireless information technology facilitates global communication by corporations, violent extremist organizations, and individuals. The ability to share information in near real time, anonymously and/or securely, is a capability that is both an asset and a potential vulnerability to us, our allies, and our adversaries. Information is a powerful tool to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp an adversary’s ability to make and share decisions.
  2. The instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) provide leaders in the United States with the means and ways of dealing with crises around the world. Employing these means in the information environment requires the ability to securely transmit, receive, store, and process information in near real time. The nation’s state and non-state adversaries are equally aware of the significance of this new technology, and will use information-related capabilities (IRCs) to gain advantages in the information environment, just as they would use more traditional military technologies to gain advantages in other operational environments. These realities have transformed the information environment into a battlefield, which poses both a threat to the Department of Defense (DOD), combatant commands (CCMDs), and Service components and serves as a force multiplier when leveraged effectively.
  3. As the strategic environment continues to change, so does IO. Based on these changes, the Secretary of Defense now characterizes IO as the integrated employment, during military operations, of IRCs in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.

This revised characterization has led to a reassessment of how essential the information environment can be and how IRCs can be effectively integrated into joint operations to create effects and operationally exploitable conditions necessary for achieving the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) objectives.

  1. The Information Environment

The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. This environment consists of three interrelated dimensions which continuously interact with individuals, organizations, and systems. These dimensions are the physical, informational, and cognitive (see Figure I-1).

The Physical Dimension. The physical dimension is composed of command and control (C2) systems, key decision makers, and supporting infrastructure that enable individuals and organizations to create effects. It is the dimension where physical platforms and the communications networks that connect them reside. The physical dimension includes, but is not limited to, human beings, C2 facilities, newspapers, books, microwave towers, computer processing units, laptops, smart phones, tablet computers, or any other objects that are subject to empirical measurement. The physical dimension is not confined solely to military or even nation-based systems and processes; it is a defused network connected across national, economic, and geographical boundaries.

The Informational Dimension. The informational dimension encompasses where and how information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, and protected. It is the dimension where the C2 of military forces is exercised and where the commander’s intent is conveyed. Actions in this dimension affect the content and flow of information.

The Cognitive Dimension. The cognitive dimension encompasses the minds of those who transmit, receive, and respond to or act on information. It refers to individuals’ or groups’ information processing, perception, judgment, and decision making. These elements are influenced by many factors, to include individual and cultural beliefs, norms, vulnerabilities, motivations, emotions, experiences, morals, education, mental health, identities, and ideologies. Defining these influencing factors in a given environment is critical for understanding how to best influence the mind of the decision maker and create the desired effects. As such, this dimension constitutes the most important component of the information environment.

The Information and Influence Relational Framework and the Application of Information-Related Capabilities

IRCs are the tools, techniques, or activities that affect any of the three dimensions of the information environment. They affect the ability of the target audience (TA) to collect, process, or disseminate information before and after decisions are made. The TA is the individual or group selected for influence.

The change in the TA conditions, capabilities, situational awareness, and in some cases, the inability to make and share timely and informed decisions, contributes to the desired end state. Actions or inactions in the physical dimension can be assessed for future operations. The employment of IRCs is complemented by a set of capabilities such as operations security (OPSEC), information assurance (IA), counter-deception, physical security, electronic warfare (EW) support, and electronic protection. These capabilities are critical to enabling and protecting the JFC’s C2 of forces. Key components in this process are:

(1) Information. Data in context to inform or provide meaning for action.

(2) Data. Interpreted signals that can reduce uncertainty or equivocality.

(3) Knowledge. Information in context to enable direct action. Knowledge can be further broken down into the following:

(a) Explicit Knowledge. Knowledge that has been articulated through words, diagrams, formulas, computer programs, and like means.

(b) Tacit Knowledge. Knowledge that cannot be or has not been articulated through words, diagrams, formulas, computer programs, and like means.

(4) Influence. The act or power to produce a desired outcome or end on a TA.

(5) Means. The resources available to a national government, non-nation actor, or adversary in pursuit of its end(s). These resources include, but are not limited to, public- and private-sector enterprise assets or entities.

(6) Ways. How means can be applied, in order to achieve a desired end(s). They can be characterized as persuasive or coercive.

(7) Information-Related Capabilities. Tools, techniques, or activities using data, information, or knowledge to create effects and operationally desirable conditions within the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions of the information environment.

(8) Target Audience. An individual or group selected for influence. (9) Ends. A consequence of the way of applying IRCs.

(10) Using the framework, the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions of the information environment provide access points for influencing TAs (see Figure I-2).

  1. The purpose of integrating the employment of IRCs is to influence a TA. While the behavior of individuals and groups, as human social entities, are principally governed by rules, norms, and beliefs, the behaviors of systems principally reside within the physical and informational dimensions and are governed only by rules. Under this construct, rules, norms, and beliefs are:

(1) Rules. Explicit regulative processes such as policies, laws, inspection routines, or incentives. Rules function as a coercive regulator of behavior and are dependent upon the imposing entity’s ability to enforce them.

(2) Norms. Regulative mechanisms accepted by the social collective. Norms are enforced by normative mechanisms within the organization and are not strictly dependent upon law or regulation.

(3) Beliefs. The collective perception of fundamental truths governing behavior. The adherence to accepted and shared beliefs by members of a social system will likely persist and be difficult to change over time. Strong beliefs about determinant factors (i.e., security, survival, or honor) are likely to cause a social entity or group to accept rules and norms.

  1. The first step in achieving an end(s) through use of the information-influence relational framework is to identify the TA. Once the TA has been identified, it will be necessary to develop an understanding of how that TA perceives its environment, to include analysis of TA rules, norms, and beliefs. Once this analysis is complete, the application of means available to achieve the desired end(s) must be evaluated (see Figure I-3). Such means may include (but are not limited to) diplomatic, informational, military, or economic actions, as well as academic, commercial, religious, or ethnic pronouncements. When the specific means or combinations of means are determined, the next step is to identify the specific ways to create a desired effect.
  2. Influencing the behavior of TAs requires producing effects in ways that modify rules, norms, or beliefs. Effects can be created by means (e.g., governmental, academic, cultural, and private enterprise) using specific ways (i.e., IRCs) to affect how the TAs collect, process, perceive, disseminate, and act (or do not act) on information
  3. Upon deciding to persuade or coerce a TA, the commander must then determine what IRCs it can apply to individuals, organizations, or systems in order to produce a desired effect(s) (see Figure I-5). As stated, IRCs can be capabilities, techniques, or activities, but they do not necessarily have to be technology-based. Additionally, it is important to focus on the fact that IRCs may come from a wide variety of sources. Therefore, in IO, it is not the ownership of the capabilities and techniques that is important, but rather their integrated application in order to achieve a JFC’s end state.

(10) Using the framework, the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions of the information environment provide access points for influencing TAs

  1. The purpose of integrating the employment of IRCs is to influence a TA. While the behavior of individuals and groups, as human social entities, are principally governed by rules, norms, and beliefs, the behaviors of systems principally reside within the physical and informational dimensions and are governed only by rules. Under this construct, rules, norms, and beliefs are:

(1) Rules. Explicit regulative processes such as policies, laws, inspection routines, or incentives. Rules function as a coercive regulator of behavior and are dependent upon the imposing entity’s ability to enforce them.

(2) Norms. Regulative mechanisms accepted by the social collective. Norms are enforced by normative mechanisms within the organization and are not strictly dependent upon law or regulation.

(3) Beliefs. The collective perception of fundamental truths governing behavior. The adherence to accepted and shared beliefs by members of a social system will likely persist and be difficult to change over time. Strong beliefs about determinant factors (i.e., security, survival, or honor) are likely to cause a social entity or group to accept rules and norms.

  1. The first step in achieving an end(s) through use of the information-influence relational framework is to identify the TA. Once the TA has been identified, it will be necessary to develop an understanding of how that TA perceives its environment, to include analysis of TA rules, norms, and beliefs. Once this analysis is complete, the application of means available to achieve the desired end(s) must be evaluated.

Such means may include (but are not limited to) diplomatic, informational, military, or economic actions, as well as academic, commercial, religious, or ethnic pronouncements. When the specific means or combinations of means are determined, the next step is to identify the specific ways to create a desired effect.

  1. InfluencingthebehaviorofTAsrequiresproducingeffectsinwaysthatmodifyrules, norms, or beliefs. Effects can be created by means (e.g., governmental, academic, cultural, and private enterprise) using specific ways (i.e., IRCs) to affect how the TAs collect, process, perceive, disseminate, and act (or do not act) on information (see Figure I-4).
  2. Upon deciding to persuade or coerce a TA, the commander must then determine what IRCs it can apply to individuals, organizations, or systems in order to produce a desired effect(s) (see Figure I-5). As stated, IRCs can be capabilities, techniques, or activities, but they do not necessarily have to be technology-based. Additionally, it is important to focus on the fact that IRCs may come from a wide variety of sources. Therefore, in IO, it is not the ownership of the capabilities and techniques that is important, but rather their integrated application in order to achieve a JFC’s end state.

CHAPTER II

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

“There is a war out there, old friend- a World War. And it’s not about whose got the most bullets; it’s about who controls the information.”

Cosmo, in the 1992 Film “Sneakers”

  1. Introduction

This chapter addresses how the integrating and coordinating functions of IO help achieve a JFC’s objectives.

  1. Terminology
  2. Because IO takes place in all phases of military operations, in concert with other lines of operation and lines of effort, some clarification of the terms and their relationship to IO is in order.

(1) Military Operations. The US military participates in a wide range of military operations, as illustrated in Figure II-1. Phase 0 (Shape) and phase I (Deter) may include defense support of civil authorities, peace operations, noncombatant evacuation, foreign humanitarian assistance, and nation-building assistance, which fall outside the realm of major combat operations represented by phases II through V.

(2) Lines of Operation and Lines of Effort. IO should support multiple lines of operation and at times may be the supported line of operation. IO may also support numerous lines of effort when positional references to an enemy or adversary have little relevance, such as in counterinsurgency or stability operations.

  1. IO integrates IRCs (ways) with other lines of operation and lines of effort (means) to create a desired effect on an adversary or potential adversary to achieve an objective (ends).
  2. Information Operations and the Information-Influence Relational Framework

Influence is at the heart of diplomacy and military operations, with integration of IRCs providing a powerful means for influence. The relational framework describes the application, integration, and synchronization of IRCs to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of TAs to create a desired effect to support achievement of an objective.

  1. The Information Operations Staff and Information Operations Cell

Within the joint community, the integration of IRCs to achieve the commander’s objectives is managed through an IO staff or IO cell. JFCs may establish an IO staff to provide command-level oversight and collaborate with all staff directorates and supporting organizations on all aspects of IO.

APPLICATION OF INFORMATION-RELATED CAPABILITIES TO THE INFORMATION AND INFLUENCE RELATIONAL FRAMEWORK

This example provides insight as to how information-related capabilities (IRCs) can be used to create lethal and nonlethal effects to support achievement of the objectives to reach the desired end state. The integration and synchronization of these IRCs require participation from not just information operations planners, but also organizations across multiple lines of operation and lines of effort. They may also include input from or coordination with national ministries, provincial governments, local authorities, and cultural and religious leaders to create the desired effect.

Situation: An adversary is attempting to overthrow the government of Country X using both lethal and nonlethal means to demonstrate to the citizens that the government is not fit to support and protect its people.

Joint Force Commander’s Objective: Protect government of Country X from being overthrown.

Desired Effects:

  1. Citizens have confidence in ability of government to support and protect its people.
  2. Adversary is unable to overthrow government of Country X.

Potential Target Audience(s):

  1. Adversary leadership (adversary).
  2. Country X indigenous population (friendly, neutral, and potential adversary).

Potential Means available to achieve the commander’s objective:

  • Diplomatic action (e.g., demarche, public diplomacy)
  •  Informational assets (e.g., strategic communication, media)
  •  Military forces (e.g., security force assistance, combat operations, military information support operations, public affairs, military deception)
  •  Economic resources (e.g., sanctions against the adversary, infusion of capital to Country X for nation building)
  •  Commercial, cultural, or other private enterprise assets

Potential Ways (persuasive communications or coercive force):

  •  Targeted radio and television broadcasts
  •  Blockaded adversary ports
  •  Government/commercially operated Web sites
  •  Key leadership engagement

Regardless of the means and ways employed by the players within the information environment, the reality is that the strategic advantage rests with whoever applies their means and ways most efficiently.

  1. IO Staff

(1) In order to provide planning support, the IO staff includes IO planners and a complement of IRCs specialists to facilitate seamless integration of IRCs to support the JFC’s concept of operations (CONOPS).

(2) IRC specialists can include, but are not limited to, personnel from the EW, cyberspace operations (CO), military information support operations (MISO), civil-military operations (CMO), military deception (MILDEC), intelligence, and public affairs (PA) communities. They provide valuable linkage between the planners within an IO staff and those communities that provide IRCs to facilitate seamless integration with the JFC’s objectives.

  1. IO Cell

(1) The IO cell integrates and synchronizes IRCs, to achieve national or combatant commander (CCDR) level objectives.

  1. Relationships and Integration
  2. IO is not about ownership of individual capabilities but rather the use of those capabilities as force multipliers to create a desired effect.

(1) Strategic Communication (SC)

(a) The SC process consists of focused United States Government (USG) efforts to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of national interests, policies, and objectives by understanding and engaging key audiences through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.

(b) The elements and organizations that implement strategic guidance, both internal and external to the joint force, must not only understand and be aware of the joint force’s IO objectives; they must also work closely with members of the interagency community, in order to ensure full coordination and synchronization of USG efforts.

(2) Joint Interagency Coordination Group. Interagency coordination occurs between DOD and other USG departments and agencies, as well as with private-sector entities, nongovernmental organizations, and critical infrastructure activities, for the purpose of accomplishing national objectives. Many of these objectives require the combined and coordinated use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power.

(3) Public Affairs

(a) PA comprises public information, command information, and public engagement activities directed toward both the internal and external publics with interest in DOD. External publics include allies, neutrals, adversaries, and potential adversaries. When addressing external publics, opportunities for overlap exist between PA and IO.

(b) By maintaining situational awareness between IO and PA the potential for information conflict can be minimized. The IO cell provides an excellent place to coordinate IO and PA activities that may affect the adversary or potential adversary. Because there will be situations, such as counterpropaganda, in which the TA for both IO and PA converge, close cooperation and deconfliction are extremely important. …final coordination should occur within the joint planning group (JPG).

(4) Civil-Military Operations

(a) CMO is another area that can directly affect and be affected by IO. CMO activities establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to achieve US objectives. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military operations.

(b) Although CMO and IO have much in common, they are distinct disciplines.

The TA for much of IO is the adversary; however, the effects of IRCs often reach supporting friendly and neutral populations as well. In a similar vein, CMO seeks to affect friendly and neutral populations, although adversary and potential adversary audiences may also be affected. This being the case, effective integration of CMO with other IRCs is important, and a CMO representative on the IO staff is critical. The regular presence of a CMO representative in the IO cell will greatly promote this level of coordination.

(5) Cyberspace Operations

(a) Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.

(b) As a process that integrates the employment of IRCs across multiple lines of effort and lines of operation to affect an adversary or potential adversary decision maker, IO can target either the medium (a component within the physical dimension such as a microwave tower) or the message itself (e.g., an encrypted message in the informational dimension). CO is one of several IRCs available to the commander.

(6) Information Assurance. IA is necessary to gain and maintain information superiority. The JFC relies on IA to protect infrastructure to ensure its availability, to position information for influence, and for delivery of information to the adversary.

(7) Space Operations. Space capabilities are a significant force multiplier when integrated with joint operations. Space operations support IO through the space force enhancement functions of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; missile warning; environmental monitoring; satellite communications; and spacebased positioning, navigation, and timing.

(8) Military Information Support Operations. MISO are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. MISO focuses on the cognitive dimension of the information environment where its TA includes not just potential and actual adversaries, but also friendly and neutral populations.

MISO are applicable to a wide range of military operations such as stability operations, security cooperation, maritime interdiction, noncombatant evacuation, foreign humanitarian operations, counterdrug, force protection, and counter-trafficking.

(9) Intelligence

(a) Intelligence is a vital military capability that supports IO. The utilization of information operations intelligence integration (IOII) greatly facilitates understanding the interrelationship between the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions of the information environment.

(b) By providing population-centric socio-cultural intelligence and physical network lay downs, including the information transmitted via those networks, intelligence can greatly assist IRC planners and IO integrators in determining the proper effect to elicit the specific response desired. Intelligence is an integrated process, fusing collection, analysis, and dissemination to provide products that will expose a TA’s potential capabilities or vulnerabilities. Intelligence uses a variety of technical and nontechnical tools to assess the information environment, thereby providing insight into a TA.

(c) A joint intelligence support element (JISE) may establish an IO support office (see Figure II-5) to provide IOII. This is due to the long lead time needed to establish information baseline characterizations, provide timely intelligence during IO planning and execution efforts, and to properly assess effects in the information environment.

(10) Military Deception

(a) One of the oldest IRCs used to influence an adversary’s perceptions is MILDEC. MILDEC can be characterized as actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers, creating conditions that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. While MILDEC requires a thorough knowledge of an adversary or potential adversary’s decision-making processes, it is important to remember that it is focused on desired behavior. It is not enough to simply mislead the adversary or potential adversary; MILDEC is designed to cause them to behave in a manner advantageous to the friendly mission, such as misallocation of resources, attacking at a time and place advantageous to friendly forces, or avoid taking action at all.

(b) When integrated with other IRCs, MILDEC can be a particularly powerful way to affect the decision-making processes of an adversary or potential adversary.

(11) Operations Security

(a) OPSEC is a standardized process designed to meet operational needs by mitigating risks associated with specific vulnerabilities in order to deny adversaries critical information and observable indicators. OPSEC identifies critical information and actions attendant to friendly military operations to deny observables to adversary intelligence systems.

(b) The effective application, coordination, and synchronization of other IRCs are critical components in the execution of OPSEC. Because a specified IO task is “to protect our own” decision makers, OPSEC planners require complete situational awareness, regarding friendly activities to facilitate the safeguarding of critical information. This kind of situational awareness exists within the IO cell, where a wide range of planners work in concert to integrate and synchronize their actions to achieve a common IO objective.

(12) Special Technical Operations (STO). IO need to be deconflicted and synchronized with STO. Detailed information related to STO and its contribution to IO can be obtained from the STO planners at CCMD or Service component headquarters. IO and STO are separate, but have potential crossover, and for this reason an STO planner is a valuable member of the IO cell.

(14) Key Leader Engagement (KLE)

(a) KLEs are deliberate, planned engagements between US military leaders and the leaders of foreign audiences that have defined objectives, such as a change in policy or supporting the JFC’s objectives. These engagements can be used to shape and influence foreign leaders at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, and may also be directed toward specific groups such as religious leaders, academic leaders, and tribal leaders; e.g., to solidify trust and confidence in US forces.

(b) KLEs may be applicable to a wide range of operations such as stability operations, counterinsurgency operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, security cooperation activities, and humanitarian operations. When fully integrated with other IRCs into operations, KLEs can effectively shape and influence the leaders of foreign audiences.

  1. The capabilities discussed above do not constitute a comprehensive list of all possible capabilities that can contribute to IO. This means that individual capability ownership will be highly diversified. The ability to access these capabilities will be directly related to how well commanders understand and appreciate the importance of IO.

CHAPTER III

AUTHORITIES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

Introduction

This chapter describes the JFC’s authority for the conduct of IO; delineates various roles and responsibilities established in DODD 3600.01, Information Operations; and addresses legal considerations in the planning and execution of IO.

Authorities

The authority to employ IRCs is rooted foremost in Title 10, United States Code (USC). While Title 10, USC, does not specify IO separately, it does provide the legal basis for the roles, missions, and organization of DOD and the Services.

Responsibilities

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]). The USD(P) oversees and manages DOD-level IO programs and activities. In this capacity, USD(P) manages guidance publications (e.g., DODD 3600.01) and all IO policy on behalf of the Secretary of Defense. The office of the USD(P) coordinates IO for all DOD components in the interagency process.

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[I]). USD(I) develops, coordinates, and oversees the implementation of DOD intelligence policy, programs, and guidance for intelligence activities supporting IO.

Joint Staff. In accordance with the Secretary of Defense memorandum on Strategic Communication and Information Operations in the DOD, dated 25 January 2011, the Joint Staff is assigned the responsibility for joint IO proponency. CJCS responsibilities for IO are both general (such as establishing doctrine, as well as providing advice, and recommendations to the President and Secretary of Defense) and specific (e.g., joint IO policy).

Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC). The JIOWC is a CJCS- controlled activity reporting to the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) via J-39 DDGO.

JIOWC’s specific organizational responsibilities include:

(1) Provide IO subject matter experts and advice to the Joint Staff and the CCMDs.
(2) Develop and maintain a joint IO assessment framework.
(3) Assist the Joint IO Proponent in advocating for and integrating CCMD IO requirements.
(4) Upon the direction of the Joint IO Proponent, provide support in coordination and integration of DOD IRCs for JFCs, Service component commanders, and DOD agencies.

Combatant Commands. The Unified Command Plan provides guidance to CCDRs, assigning them missions and force structure, as well as geographic or functional areas of responsibility. In addition to these responsibilities, the Commander, United States Special Operations Command, is also responsible for integrating and coordinating MISO.

Functional Component Commands. Like Service component commands, functional component commands have authority over forces or in the case of IO, IRCs, as delegated by the establishing authority (normally a CCDR or JFC). Functional component commands may be tasked to plan and execute IO as an integrated part of joint operations.

Legal Considerations

Introduction. US military activities in the information environment, as with all military operations, are conducted as a matter of law and policy. Joint IO will always involve legal and policy questions, requiring not just local review, but often nationallevel coordination and approval. The US Constitution, laws, regulations, and policy, and international law set boundaries for all military activity, to include IO.

Legal Considerations. IO planners deal with legal considerations of an extremely diverse and complex nature. Legal interpretations can occasionally differ, given the complexity of technologies involved, the significance of legal interests potentially affected, and the challenges inherent for law and policy to keep pace with the technological changes and implementation of IRCs.

Implications Beyond the JFC. Bilateral agreements to which the US is a signatory may have provisions concerning the conduct of IO as well as IRCs when they are used in support of IO. IO planners at all levels should consider the following broad areas within each planning iteration in consultation with the appropriate legal advisor:

(1) Could the execution of a particular IRC be considered a hostile act by an adversary or potential adversary?

(2) Do any non-US laws concerning national security, privacy, or information exchange, criminal and/or civil issues apply?

(3) What are the international treaties, agreements, or customary laws recognized by an adversary or potential adversary that apply to IRCs?

(4) How is the joint force interacting with or being supported by US intelligence organizations and other interagency entities?

CHAPTER IV

INTEGRATING INFORMATION-RELATED CAPABILITIES INTO THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING PROCESS

“Support planning is conducted in parallel with other planning and encompasses such essential factors as IO [information operations], SC [strategic communication]…”

Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 201

Introduction

The IO cell chief is responsible to the JFC for integrating IRCs into the joint operation planning process (JOPP). Thus, the IO staff is responsible for coordinating and synchronizing IRCs to accomplish the JFC’s objectives. Coordinated IO are essential in employing the elements of operational design. Conversely, uncoordinated IO efforts can compromise, complicate, negate, and pose risks to the successful accomplishment of the JFC and USG objectives. Additionally, when uncoordinated, other USG and/or multinational information activities, may complicate, defeat, or render DOD IO ineffective. For this reason, the JFC’s objectives require early detailed IO staff planning, coordination, and deconfliction between the USG and partner nations’ efforts within the AOR, in order to effectively synchronize and integrate IRCs.

Information Operations Planning

The IO cell and the JPG. The IO cell chief ensures joint IO planners adequately represent the IO cell within the JPG and other JFC planning processes. Doing so will help ensure that IRCs are integrated with all planning efforts. Joint IO planners should be integrated with the joint force planning, directing, monitoring, and assessing process.

IO Planning Considerations

(1) IOplannersseektocreateanoperationaladvantagethatresultsincoordinated effects that directly support the JFC’s objectives. IRCs can be executed throughout the operational environment, but often directly impact the content and flow of information.

(2) IO planning begins at the earliest stage of JOPP and must be an integral part of, not an addition to, the overall planning effort. IRCs can be used in all phases of a campaign or operation, but their effective employment during the shape and deter phases can have a significant impact on remaining phases.

(3) The use of IO to achieve the JFC’s objectives requires the ability to integrate IRCs and interagency support into a comprehensive and coherent strategy that supports the JFC’s overall mission objectives. The GCC’s theater security cooperation guidance contained in the theater campaign plan (TCP) serves as an excellent platform to embed specific long-term information objectives during phase 0 operations.

(4) Many IRCs require long lead time for development of the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) and release authority. The intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) identifies intelligence and information gaps, shortfalls, and priorities as part of the JIPOE process in the early stages of the JOPP. Concurrently, the IO cell must identify similar intelligence gaps in its understanding of the information environment to determine if it has sufficient information to successfully plan IO. Where identified shortfalls exist, the IO cell may need to work with J-2 to submit requests for information (RFIs) to the J-2 to fill gaps that cannot be filled internally.

(5) There may be times where the JFC may lack sufficient detailed intelligence data and intelligence staff personnel to provide IOII. Similarly, a JFC’s staff may lack dedicated resources to provide support. For this reason, it is imperative the IO cell take a proactive approach to intelligence support. The IO cell must also review and provide input to the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs), especially priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and information requirements.

The joint intelligence staff, using PIRs as a basis, develops information requirements that are most critical. These are also known as essential elements of information (EEIs). In the course of mission analysis, the intelligence analyst identifies the intelligence required to CCIRs. Intelligence staffs develop more specific questions known as information requirements. EEIs pertinent to the IO staff may include target information specifics, such as messages and counter-messages, adversary propaganda, and responses of individuals, groups, and organizations to adversary propaganda.

IO and the Joint Operation Planning Process

Throughout JOPP, IRCs are integrated with the JFC’s overall CONOPS

(1) Planning Initiation. Integration of IRCs into joint operations should begin at step 1, planning initiation. Key IO staff actions during this step include the following:

(a) Review key strategic documents.

(b) Monitor the situation, receive initial planning guidance, and review staff estimates from applicable operation plans (OPLANs) and concept plans (CONPLANs).

(c) Alert subordinate and supporting commanders of potential tasking with regard to IO planning support.

(d) Gauge initial scope of IO required for the operation.

(e) Identify location, standard operating procedures, and battle rhythm of other staff organizations that require integration and divide coordination responsibilities among the IO staff.

(f) Identify and request appropriate authorities.

(g) Begin identifying information required for mission analysis and courseof action (COA) development.

(h) Identify IO planning support requirements (including staff augmentation, support products, and services) and issue requests for support according to procedures established locally and by various supporting organizations.

(i) Validate, initiate, and revise PIRs and RFIs, keeping in mind the long lead times associated with satisfying IO requirements.

(j) Provide IO input and recommendations to COAs, and provide resolutions to conflicts that exist with other plans or lines of operation.

(k) In coordination with the targeting cell, submit potential candidate targets to JFC or component joint targeting coordination board (JTCB). For vetting, validation, and deconfliction follow local targeting cell procedures because these three separate processes do not always occur at the JTCB.

(l) Ensure IO staff and IO cell members participate in all JFC or component planning and targeting sessions and JTCBs.

(2) Mission Analysis. The purpose of step 2, mission analysis, is to understand the problem and purpose of an operation and issue the appropriate guidance to drive the remaining steps of the planning process. The end state of mission analysis is a clearly defined mission and thorough staff assessment of the joint operation. Mission analysis orients the JFC and staff on the problem and develops a common understanding, before moving forward in the planning process.

As IO impacts each element of the operational environment, it is important for the IO staff and IO cell during mission analysis to remain focused on the information environment. Key IO staff actions during mission analysis are:

(a) Assist the J-3 and J-2 in the identification of friendly and adversary center(s) of gravity and critical factors (e.g., critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities).
(b) Identify relevant aspects of the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions (whether friendly, neutral, adversary, or potential adversary) of the information environment.
(c) Identify specified, implied, and essential tasks.
(d) Identify facts, assumptions, constraints, and restraints affecting IO planning.
(e) Analyze IRCs available to support IO and authorities required for their employment.
(f) Develop and refine proposed PIRs, RFIs, and CCIRs.
(g) Conduct initial IO-related risk assessment.
(h) Develop IO mission statement.
(i) Begin developing the initial IO staff estimate. This estimate forms the basis for the IO cell chief’s recommendation to the JFC, regarding which COA it can best support.
(j) Conduct initial force allocation review.
(k) Identify and develop potential targets and coordinate with the targeting cell no later than the end of target development. Compile and maintain target folders in the Modernized Integrated Database. Coordinate with the J-2 and targeting cell for participation and representation in vetting, validation, and targeting boards
(l) Develop mission success criteria.

(3) COA Development. Output from mission analysis, such as initial staff estimates, mission and tasks, and JFC planning guidance are used in step 3, COA development. Key IO staff actions during this step include the following:

(a) Identify desired and undesired effects that support or degrade JFC’s information objectives.

(b) Developmeasuresofeffectiveness(MOEs)andmeasuresofeffectiveness indicators (MOEIs).

(c) Develop tasks for recommendation to the J-3.

(d) RecommendIRCsthatmaybeusedtoaccomplishsupportinginformation tasks for each COA.

(e) Analyze required supplemental rules of engagement (ROE). (f) Identify additional operational risks and controls/mitigation. (g) Develop the IO CONOPS narrative/sketch.
(h) Synchronize IRCs in time, space, and purpose.

(i) Continue update/development of the IO staff estimate.

(j) Prepare inputs to the COA brief.

(k) Provide inputs to the target folder.

(4) COA Analysis and War Gaming. Based upon time available, the JFC staff should war game each tentative COA against adversary COAs identified through the JIPOE process. Key IO staff and IO cell actions during this step include the following:

(a) Analyze each COA from an IO functional perspective.

(b) Reveal key decision points.

(c) Recommend task adjustments to IRCs as appropriate.

(d) Provide IO-focused data for use in a synchronization matrix or other decision-making tool.

(e) Identify IO portions of branches and sequels.
(f) Identify possible high-value targets related to IO. (g) Submit PIRs and recommend CCIRs for IO.

(h) Revise staff estimate.

(i) Assess risk.

(5) COA Comparison. Step 5, COA comparison, starts with all staff elements analyzing and evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of each COA from their respective viewpoints. Key IO staff and IO cell actions during this step include the following:

(a) Compare each COA based on mission and tasks.

(b) Compare each COA in relation to IO requirements versus available IRCs.

(c) Prioritize COAs from an IO perspective.

(d) Revise the IO staff estimate. During execution, the IO cell should maintain an estimate and update as required.

(6) COA Approval. Just like other elements of the JFC’s staff, during step 6, COA approval, the IO staff provides the JFC with a clear recommendation of how IO can best contribute to mission accomplishment in the COA(s) being briefed. It is vital this recommendation is presented in a clear, concise manner that is not only able to be quickly grasped by the JFC, but can also be easily understood by peer, subordinate, and higher- headquarters command and staff elements. Failure to foster such an understanding of IO contribution to the approved COA can lead to poor execution and/or coordination of IRCs in subsequent operations.

(7) Plan or Order Development. Once a COA is selected and approved, the IO staff develops appendix 3 (Information Operations) to annex C (Operations) of the operation order (OPORD) or OPLAN. Because IRC integration is documented elsewhere in the OPORD or OPLAN, it is imperative that the IO staff conduct effective staff coordination within the JPG during step 7, plan or order development. Key staff actions during this step include the following:

(a) Refine tasks from the approved COA.

(b) Identify shortfalls of IRCs and recommend solutions.

(c) Facilitate development of supporting plans by keeping the responsible organizations informed of relevant details (as access restrictions allow) throughout the planning process.

(d) Advise the supported commander on IO issues and concerns during the supporting plan review and approval process.

(e) Participate in time-phased force and deployment data refinement to ensure IO supports the OPLAN or CONPLAN.

(f) Assist in the development of OPLAN or CONPLAN appendix 6 (IO Intelligence Integration) to annex B (Intelligence).

  1. Plan Refinement. The information environment is continuously changing and it is critical for IO planners to remain in constant interaction with the JPG to provide updates to OPLANs or CONPLANs.
  2. Assessment of IO. Assessment is integrated into all phases of the planning and execution cycle, and consists of assessment activities associated with tasks, events, or programs in support of joint military operations. Assessment seeks to analyze and inform on the performance and effectiveness of activities. The intent is to provide relevant feedback to decision makers in order to modify activities that achieve desired results. Assessment can also provide the programmatic community with relevant information that informs on return on investment and operational effectiveness of DOD IRCs. It is important to note that integration of assessment into planning is the first step of the assessment process. Planning for assessment is part of broader operational planning, rather than an afterthought. Iterative in nature, assessment supports the Adaptive Planning and Execution process, and provides feedback to operations and ultimately, IO enterprise programmatics.
  3. Relationship Between Measures of Performance (MOPs) and MOEs. Effectiveness assessment is one of the greatest challenges facing a staff. Despite the continuing evolution of joint and Service doctrine and the refinement of supporting tactics, techniques, and procedures, assessing the effectiveness of IRCs continues to be challenging.

(1) MOPs are criteria used to assess friendly accomplishment of tasks and mission execution.

Examples of Measures of Performance Feedback

  • Numbers of populace listening to military information support operations (MISO) broadcasts
  • Percentage of adversary command and control facilities attacked
  • Number of civil-military operations projects initiated/number of projects completed
  • Human intelligence reports number of MISO broadcasts during Commando Solo missions
  • Intelligence assessments (human intelligence, etc.)
  • Open source intelligence
  • Internet (newsgroups, etc.)
  • Military information support operations, and civil-military operations teams (face to face activities)
  • Contact with the public
  • Press inquiries and comments
  • Department of State polls, reports and surveys (reports)
  • Open Source Center
  • Nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, international organizations, and host nation organizations
  • Foreign policy advisor meetings
  • Commercial polls
  • Operational analysis cells

(2) In contrast to MOPs, MOEs are criteria used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that are tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. Ultimately, MOEs determine whether actions being executed are creating desired effects, thereby accomplishing the JFC’s information objectives and end state.

(3) MOEs and MOPs are both crafted and refined throughout JOPP. In developing MOEs and/or MOPs, the following general criteria should be considered:

(a) Ends Related. MOEs and/or MOPs should directly relate to the objectives and desired tasks required to accomplish effects and/or performance.

(b) Measurable. MOEs should be specific, measurable, and observable. Effectiveness or performance is measured either quantitatively (e.g., counting the number of attacks) or qualitatively (e.g., subjectively evaluating the level of confidence in the security forces). In the case of MOEs, a baseline measurement must be established prior to the execution, against which to measure system changes.

(c) Timely. A time for required feedback should be clearly stated for each MOE and/or MOP and a plan made to report within that specified time period.

(d) Properly Resourced. The collection, analysis, and reporting of MOE or MOP data requires personnel, financial, and materiel resources. The IO staff or IO cell

should ensure that these resource requirements are built into IO planning during COA development and closely coordinated with the J-2 collection manager to ensure the means to assess these measures are in place.

(4) Measure of Effectiveness Indicators. An MOEI is a unit, location, or event observed or measured, that can be used to assess an MOE. These are often used to add quantitative data points to qualitative MOEs and can assist an IO staff or IO cell in answering a question related to a qualitative MOE. The identification of MOEIs aids the IO staff or IO cell in determining an MOE and can be identified from across the information environment. MOEIs can be independently weighted for their contribution to an MOE and should be based on separate criteria. Hundreds of MOEIs may be needed for a large scale contingency. Examples of how effects can be translated into MOEIs include the following:

(a) Effect: Increase in the city populace’s participation in civil governance.

MOE: (Qualitative) Metropolitan citizens display increased support for the democratic leadership elected on 1 July. (What activity trends show progress toward or away from the desired behavior?)

MOEI:

  1. A decrease in the number of anti-government rallies/demonstrations in a city since 1 July (this indicator might be weighted heavily at 60 percent of this MOE’s total assessment based on rallies/demonstrations observed.)
  2. An increase in the percentage of positive new government media stories since 1 July (this indicator might be weighted less heavily at 20 percent of this MOE’s total assessment based on media monitoring.)
  3. An increase in the number of citizens participating in democratic functions since 1 July (this indicator might be weighted at 20 percent of this MOE’s total assessment based on government data/criteria like voter registration, city council meeting attendance, and business license registration.)

(b) Effect: Insurgent leadership does not orchestrate terrorist acts in the western region.

  1. MOE: (Qualitative) Decrease in popular support toward extremists and insurgents.
  2. MOEI:
  3. An increase in the number of insurgents turned in/identified since1 October.
  4. The percentage of blogs supportive of the local officials.
  5. Information Operations Phasing and Synchronization

Through its contributions to the GCC’s TCP, it is clear that joint IO is expected to play a major role in all phases of joint operations. This means that the GCC’s IO staff and IO cell must account for logical transitions from phase to phase, as joint IO moves from the main effort to a supporting effort. Regardless of what operational phase may be underway, it is always important for the IO staff and IO cell to determine what legal authorities the JFC requires to execute IRCs during the subsequent operations phase.

  1. Phase 0–Shape. Joint IO planning should focus on supporting the TCP to deter adversaries and potential adversaries from posing significant threats to US objectives. Joint IO planners should access the JIACG through the IO cell or staff. Joint IO planning during this phase will need to prioritize and integrate efforts and resources to support activities throughout the interagency. Due to competing resources and the potential lack of available IRCs, executing joint IO during phase 0 can be challenging. For this reason, the IO staff and IO cell will need to consider how their IO activities fit in as part of a whole-of-government approach to effectively shape the information environment to achieve the CCDR’s information objectives.
  2. Phase I–Deter. During this phase, joint IO is often the main effort for the CCMD. Planning will likely emphasize the JFC’s flexible deterrent options (FDOs), complementing US public diplomacy efforts, in order to influence a potential foreign adversary decision maker to make decisions favorable to US goals and objectives. Joint IO planning for this phase is especially complicated because the FDO typically must have a chance to work, while still allowing for a smooth transition to phase II and more intense levels of conflict, if it does not. Because the transition from phase I to phase II may not allow enough time for application of IRCs to create the desired effects on an adversary or potential adversary, the phase change may be abrupt.
  3. Phase II-Seize Initiative. In phase II, joint IO is supporting multiple lines of operation. Joint IO planning during phase II should focus on maximizing synchronized IRC effects to support the JFC’s objectives and the component missions while preparing the transition to the next phase.
  4. Phase III–Dominate. Joint IO can be a supporting and/or a supported line of operation during phase III. Joint IO planning during phase III will involve developing an information advantage across multiple lines of operation to execute the mission.
  5. Phase IV–Stabilize. CMO, or even IO, is likely the supported line of operation during phase IV. Joint IO planning during this phase will need to be flexible enough to simultaneously support CMO and combat operations. As the US military and interagency information activity capacity matures and eventually slows, the JFC should assist the host- nation security forces and government information capacity to resume and expand, as necessary. As host nation information capacity improves, the JFC should be able to refocus joint IO efforts to other mission areas. Expanding host-nation capacity through military and interagency efforts will help foster success in the next phase.
  6. Phase V-Enable Civil Authority. During phase V, joint IO planning focuses on supporting the redeployment of US forces, as well as providing continued support to stability operations. IO planning during phase V should account for interagency and country team efforts to resume the lead mission for information within the host nation territory. The IO staff and cell can anticipate the possibility of long-term US commercial and government support to the former adversary’s economic and political interests to continue through the completion of this phase.

CHAPTER V

MULTINATIONAL INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Introduction

Joint doctrine for multinational operations, including command and operations in a multinational environment, is described in JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight specific doctrinal components of IO in a multinational environment (see Figure V-1). In doing so, this chapter will build upon those aspects of IO addressed in JP 3-16.

Other Nations and Information Operations

Multinational partners recognize a variety of information concepts and possess sophisticated doctrine, procedures, and capabilities. Given these potentially diverse perspectives regarding IO, it is essential for the multinational force commander (MNFC) to resolve potential conflicts as soon as possible. It is vital to integrate multinational partners into IO planning as early as possible to gain agreement on an integrated and achievable IO strategy.

Initial requirements for coordinating, synchronizing, and when required integrating other nations into the US IO plan include:

(1) Clarifying all multinational partner information objectives.
(2) Understanding all multinational partner employment of IRCs.
(3) Establishing IO deconfliction procedures to avoid conflicting messages. (4) Identifying multinational force (MNF) vulnerabilities as soon as possible. (5) Developing a strategy to mitigate MNF IO vulnerabilities.
(6) Identifying MNF IRCs.

Regardless of the maturity of each partner’s IO strategy, doctrine, capabilities, tactics, techniques, or procedures, every multinational partner can contribute to MNF IO by providing regional expertise to assist in planning and conducting IO. Multinational partners have developed unique approaches to IO that are tailored for specific targets in ways that may not be employed by the US. Such contributions complement US IO expertise and IRCs, potentially enhancing the quality of both the planning and execution of multinational IO.

Multinational Information Operations Considerations

Military operation planning processes, particularly for IO, whether JOPP based or based on established or agreed to multinational planning processes, include an understanding of multinational partner(s):

(1) Cultural values and institutions.
(2) Interests and concerns.
(3) Moral and ethical values.
(4) ROE and legal constraints.

(5) Challenges in multilingual planning for the employment of IRCs.

(6) IO doctrine, techniques, and procedures.

Sharing of information with multinational partners.

(1) Each nation has various IRCs to provide, in support of multinational objectives. These nations are obliged to protect information that they cannot share across the MNF. However, to plan thoroughly, all nations must be willing to share appropriate information to accomplish the assigned mission.

(2) Information sharing arrangements in formal alliances, to include US participation in United Nations missions, are worked out as part of alliance protocols. Information sharing arrangements in ad hoc multinational operations where coalitions are working together on a short-notice mission must be created during the establishment of the coalition.

(3) Using National Disclosure Policy(NDP)1, National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations, and Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) O-3600.02, Information Operations (IO) Security Classification Guidance (U), as guidance, the senior US commander in a multinational operation must provide guidelines to the US-designated disclosure representative on information sharing and the release of classified information or capabilities to the MNF.

(4) Information concerning US persons may only be collected, retained, or disseminated in accordance with law and regulation. Applicable provisions include: the Privacy Act, Title 5, USC, Section 552a; DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense; Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities; and DOD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons.

  1. Planning, Integration, and Command and Control of Information Operations in Multinational Operations
  2. The role of IO in multinational operations is the prerogative of the MNFC. The mission of the MNF determines the role of IO in each specific operation.
  3. Representation of key multinational partners in the MNF IO cell allows their expertise and capabilities to be utilized, and the IO portion of the plan to be better coordinated and more timely.
  4. While some multinational partners may not have developed an IO concept or fielded IRCs, it is important that they fully appreciate the importance of the information in achieving the MNFC’s objectives. For this reason, every effort should be made to provide basic-level IO training to multinational partners serving on the MNF IO staff.
  5. MNF headquarters staff could be organized differently; however, as a general rule, an information operations coordination board (IOCB) or similar organization may exist (see Figure V-2).

A wide range of MNF headquarters staff organizations should participate in IOCB deliberations to ensure their input and subject matter expertise can be applied to satisfy a requirement in order to achieve MNFC’s objectives.

  1. Besides the coordination activities highlighted above, the IOCB should also participate in appropriate joint operations planning groups (JOPGs) and should take part in early discussions, including mission analysis. An IO presence on the JOPG is essential, as it is the IOCB which provides input to the overall estimate process in close coordination with other members of the MNF headquarters staff.
  2. Multinational Organization for Information Operations Planning
  3. When the JFC is also the MNFC, the joint force staff should be augmented by planners and subject matter experts from the MNF. MNF IO planners and IRC specialists should be trained on US and MNF doctrine, requirements, resources, and how the MNF is structured to integrate IRCs.
  4. Multinational Policy Coordination

The development of capabilities, tactics, techniques, procedures, plans, intelligence, and communications support applicable to IO requires coordination with the responsible DOD components and multinational partners. Coordination with partner nations above the JFC/MNFC level is normally effected within existing defense arrangements, including bilateral arrangements.

CHAPTER VI

INFORMATION OPERATIONS ASSESSMENT

 

“Not everything that can be counted, counts, and not everything that counts can be counted.”

Dr. William Cameron, Informal Sociology: A Casual Introduction to Sociological Thinking, 1963

  1. Introduction
  2. This chapter provides a framework to organize, develop, and execute assessment of IO, as conducted within the information environment. The term “assessment” has been used to describe everything from analysis (e.g., assessment of the enemy) to an estimate of the situation (pre-engagement assessment of blue and red forces).

Assessment considerations should be thoroughly integrated into IO planning.

  1. Assessment of IO is a key component of the commander’s decision cycle, helping to determine the results of tactical actions in the context of overall mission objectives and providing potential recommendations for refinement of future plans. The decision to adapt plans or shift resources is based upon the integration of intelligence in the operational environment and other staff estimates, as well as input from other mission partners, in pursuit of the desired end state.
  2. Assessments also provide opportunities to identify IRC shortfalls, changes in parameters and/or conditions in the information environment, which may cause unintended effects in the employment of IRCs, and resource issues that may be impeding joint IO effectiveness.
  3. Understanding Information Operations Assessment
  4. Assessment consists of activities associated with tasks, events, or programs in support of the commander’s desired end state. IO assessment is iterative, continuously repeating rounds of analysis within the operations cycle in order to measure the progress of IRCs toward achieving objectives. The assessment process begins with the earliest stages of the planning process and continues throughout the operation or campaign and may extend beyond the end of the operation to capture long-term effects of the IO effort.
  5. Analysis of the information environment should begin before operations start, in order to establish baselines from which to measure change. During operations, data is continuously collected, recharacterizing our understanding of the information environment and providing the ability to measure changes and determine whether desired effects are being created.
  6. Purpose of Assessment in Information Operations

Assessments help commanders better understand current conditions. The commander uses assessments to determine how the operation is progressing and whether the operation is creating the desired effects. Assessing the effectiveness of IO activities challenges both the staff and commander. There are numerous venues for informing and receiving information from the commander; they provide opportunities to identify IRC shortfalls and resource issues that may be impeding joint IO effectiveness.

  1. Impact of the Information Environment on Assessment
  2. Operation assessments in IO differ from assessments of other operations because the success of the operation mainly relies on nonlethal capabilities, often including reliance on measuring the cognitive dimension, or on nonmilitary factors outside the direct control of the JFC. This situation requires an assessment with a focused, organized approach that is developed in conjunction with the initial planning effort. It also requires a clear vision of the end state, an understanding of the commander’s objectives, and an articulated statement of the ways in which the planned activities achieve objectives.
  3. The information environment is a complex entity, an “open system” affected by variables that are not constrained by geography. The mingling of people, information, capabilities, organizations, religions, and cultures that exist inside and outside a commander’s operational area are examples of these variables. These variables can give commanders and their staffs the appreciation that the information environment is turbulent―constantly in motion and changing―which may make analysis seem like a daunting task, and make identifying an IRC (or IRCs) most likely to create a desired effect, feel nearly impossible. In a complex environment, seemingly minor events can produce enormous outcomes, far greater in effect than the initiating event, including secondary and tertiary effects that are difficult to anticipate and understand. This complexity is why assessment is required and why there may be specific capabilities required to conduct assessment and subsequent analysis.
  4. A detailed study and analysis of the information environment affords the planner the ability to identify which forces impact the information environment and find order in the apparent chaos. Often the complexity of the information environment relative to a specific operational area requires assets and capabilities that exceed the organic capability of the command, making the required exhaustive study an impossible task. The gaps in capability and information are identified by planners and are transformed into information requirements and requests, request for forces and/or augmentation, and requests for support from external agencies.

Examples of capabilities, forces, augmentation, and external support include specialized software, behavioral scientists, polling, social-science studies, operational research specialists, statisticians, demographic data held by commercial industry, reachback support to other mission partners, military information support personnel, access to external DOD databases, and support from academia.

But the presence of sensitive variables can be a catalyst for exponential changes in outcomes, as in the aforementioned secondary and tertiary effects. Joint IO planners should be cautious about making direct causal statements, since many nonlinear feedback loops can render direct causal statements inaccurate. Incorrect assumptions about causality in a complex system can have disastrous effects on the planning of future operations and open the assessment to potential discredit, because counterexamples may exist.

  1. The Information Operations Assessment Process
  2. Integrating the employment of IRCs with other lines of operation is a unique requirement for joint staffs and is a discipline that is comparatively new.

The broad range of information-related activities occurring across the three dimensions of the information environment (physical, informational, and cognitive) demand a specific, validated, and formal assessment process to determine whether these actions are contributing towards the fulfillment of an objective.

With the additional factor that some actions result in immediate effect and others may take years or generations to fully create, the assessment process must be able to report incremental effects in each dimension. In particular, when assessing the effect of an action or series of actions on behavior, the effects may need to be measured in terms such as cognitive, affective, and action or behavioral. Put another way, we may need to assess how a group thinks, feels, and acts, and whether those behaviors are a result of our deliberate actions intended to produce that effect, an unintended consequence of our actions, a result of another’s action or activity, or a combination of all of these.

  1. Step 1—Analyze the Information Environment

(1) As the entire staff conducts analysis of the operational environment, the IO staff focuses on the information environment. This analysis occurs when planning for an operation begins or, in some cases, prior to planning for an operation, e.g., during routine analysis in support of theater security cooperation plan activities.

It is a required step for viable planning and provides necessary data for, among other things, development of MOEs, determining potential target audiences and targets, baseline data from which change can be measured. Analysis is conducted by interdisciplinary teams and staff sections. The primary product of this step is a description of the information environment. This description should include categorization or delineation of the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions.

(2) Analysis of the information environment identifies key functions and systems within the operational environment. The analysis provides the initial information to identify decision makers (cognitive), factors that guide the decision-making process (informational), and infrastructure that supports and communicates decisions and decision making (physical).

(3) Gaps in the ability to analyze the information environment and gaps in required information are identified and transformed into information requirements and requests, requests for forces and/or augmentation, and requests for support from external agencies. The information environment is fluid. Technological, cultural, and infrastructure changes, regardless of their source or cause, can all impact each dimension of the information environment. Once the initial analysis is complete, periodic analyses must be conducted to capture changes and update the analysis for the commander, staff, other units, and unified action partners.

Much like a running estimate, the analysis of the information environment becomes a living document, continuously updated to provide a current, accurate picture.

  1. Step 2—Integrate Information Operations Assessment into Plans and Develop the Assessment Plan

(1) Early integration of assessments into plans is paramount, especially in the information environment. One of the first things that must happen during planning is to ensure that the objectives to be assessed are clear, understandable, and measureable. Equally important is to consider as part of the assessment baseline, a control set of conditions within the information environment from which to assess the performance of the tasks assigned to any given IRC, in order to determine their potential impact on IO.

Planners should also be aware that while each staff section participates in the planning process, quite often portions of individual staff sections are simultaneously working on the steps of the planning process in greater depth and detail, not quite keeping pace with the entire staff effort as they work on subordinate and supporting staff tasks.

(2) In order to achieve the objectives, specific effects need to be identified. It is during COA development, Step 3 of JOPP, that specific tasks are determined that will create the desired effects, based on the commander’s objectives. Effects should be clearly distinguishable from the objective they support as a condition for success or progress and not be misidentified as another objective. These effects ultimately support tasks to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of our adversaries, or to protect our own. Effects should provide a clear and common description of the desired change in the information environment.

UNDERSTANDING TASK AND OBJECTIVE, CAUSE AND EFFECT INTERRELATIONSHIPS

Understanding the interrelationships of the tasks and objectives, and the desired cause and effect, can be challenging for the planner. Mapping the expected change (a theory of change) provides the clear, logical connections between activities and desired outcomes by defining intermediate steps between current situation and desired outcome and establishing points of measurement. It should include clearly stated assumptions that can be challenged for correctness as activities are executed. The ability to challenge assumptions in light of executed activities allows the joint information operations planner to identify flawed connections between activity and outcome, incorrect assumptions, or the presence of spoilers. For example:

Training and arming local security guards increases their ability and willingness to resist insurgents, which will increase security in the locale. Increased security will lead to increased perceptions of security, which will promote participation in local government, which will lead to better governance. Improved security and better governance will lead to increased stability.

Logical connection between activities and outcomes

  • −  Activity: training and arming local security guards
  • −  Outcome: increased ability to resist insurgents
  • Clearly stated assumptions

−  Increased ability and willingness to resist increases security in the locale −  Increased security leads to increased perceptions of security

  • Intermediate steps and points of measurement
  • −  Measures of performance regarding training activities
  • −  Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) regarding willingness to resist
  • −  MOEs regarding increased local security

 

(3) This expected change shows a logical connection between activities (training and arming locals) and desired outcomes (increased stability). It makes some assumptions, but those assumptions are clearly stated, so they can be challenged if they are believed to be incorrect.

Further, those activities and assumptions suggest obvious things to measure, such as performance of the activities (the training and arming) and the outcome (change in stability). They also suggest measurement of more subtle elements of all the intermediate logical nodes such as capability and willingness of local security forces, change in security, change in perception of security, change in participation in local government, change in governance, and so on. Better still, if one of those measurements does not yield the desired result, the joint IO planner will be able to ascertain where in the chain the logic is breaking down (which hypotheses are not substantiated). They can then modify the expected change and the activities supporting it, reconnecting the logical pathway and continuing to push toward the objectives.

(4) Such an expected change might have begun as something quite simple: training and arming local security guards will lead to increased stability. While this gets at the kernel of the idea, it is not particularly helpful for building assessments. Stopping there would suggest only the need to measure the activity and the outcome. However, it leaves a huge assumptive gap. If training and arming security guards goes well, but stability does not increase, there will be no apparent reason why. To begin to expand on a simple expected change, the joint IO planner should ask the question, “Why? How might A lead to B?” (In this case, how would training and arming security guards lead to stability?) A thoughtful answer to this question usually leads to recognition of another node to the expected change. If needed, the question can be asked again relative to this new node, until the expected change is sufficiently articulated.

(5) Circumstances on the ground might also require the assumptions in an expected change to be more explicitly defined. For example, using the expected change articulated in the above example, the joint IO planner might observe that in successfully training and arming local security guards, they are better able to resist insurgents, leading to an increased perception of security, as reported in local polls. However, participation in local government, as measured through voting in local elections and attendance at local council meetings, has not increased. The existing expected change and associated measurements illustrate where the chain of logic is breaking down (somewhere between perceptions of security and participation in local governance), but it does not (yet) tell why that break is occurring. Adjusting the expected change by identifying the incorrect assumption or spoiling factor preventing the successful connection between security and local governance will also help improve achievement of the objective.

  1. Step 3—Develop Information Operations Assessment Information Requirements and Collection Plans

(1) Critical to this step is ensuring that attributes are chosen that are relevant and applicable during the planning processes, as these will drive the determination of measures that display behavioral characteristics, attitudes, perceptions, and motivations that can be examined externally. Measures are categorized as follows:

(a) Qualitative—a categorical measurement expressed by means of a natural language description rather than in terms of numbers. Methodologies consist of focus groups, in-depth interviews, ethnography, media content analysis, after-action reports, and anecdotes (individual responses sampled consistently over time).

(b) Quantitative—a numerical measurement expressed in terms of numbers rather than means of a natural language description. Methodologies consist of surveys, polls, observational data (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), media analytics, and official statistics.

(2) An integrated collection management plan ensures that assessment data gathered at the tactical level is incorporated into operational planning. This collection management plan needs to satisfy information requirements with the assigned tactical, theater, and national intelligence sources and other collection resources. Just as crucial is realizing that not every information requirement will be answered by the intelligence community and therefore planners must consider collaborating with other sources of information. Planners must discuss collection from other sources of information with the collection manager and unit legal personnel to ensure that the information is included in the overall assessment and the process is in accordance with intelligence oversight regulations and policy.

(3) Including considerations for assessment collection in the plan will facilitate the return of data needed to accomplish the assessment. Incorporating the assessment plan with the directions to conduct an activity will help ensure that resource requirements for assessment are acknowledged when the plan is approved. The assessment plan should, at a minimum, include timing and frequency of data collection, identify the party to conduct the collection, and provide reporting instructions.

(4) A well-designed assessment plan will:

(a) Develop the commander’s assessment questions.

(b) Document the expected change.

(c) Document the development of information requirements needed specifically for IO.

(d) Define key terms embedded within the end state with regard to the actors or TAs, operational activities, effects, acceptable conditions, rates of change, thresholds of success/failure, and technical/tactical triggers.

(e) Verify tactical objectives—support operational objectives.

(f) Identify strategic and operational considerations—in addition to tactical considerations, linking assessments to lines of operation and the associated desired conditions.

(g) Identify key nodes and connections in the expected change to be measured.

(h) Document collection and analysis methods.
(i) Establish a method to evaluate triggers to the commander’s decision points.

(j) Establish methods to determine progress towards the desired end state.

(k) Establish methods to estimate risk to the mission.

(l) Develop recommendations for plan adjustments.

(m) Establish the format for reporting assessment results.

  1. Step 4—Build/Modify Information Operations Assessment Baseline. A subset of JIPOE, the baseline is part of the overall characterization of the information environment that was accomplished in Step 1. It serves as a reference point for comparison, enabling an assessment of the way in which activities create desired effects. The baseline allows the commander and staff to set goals for desired rates of change within the information environment and establish thresholds for success and failure.
  2. Step 5—Coordinate and Execute Information Operations and Coordinate Intelligence Collection Activities

(1) With information gained in steps 1 and 4, the joint IO planner should be able to build an understanding of the TA. This awareness will yield a collection plan that enables the joint IO planner to determine whether or not the TA is “seeing” the activities/actions presented. The collection method must perceive the TA reaction. IO planners, assessors, and intelligence planners need to be able to communicate effectively to accurately capture the required intelligence needed to perform IO assessments.

(2) Information requirements and subsequent indicator collection must be tightly managed during employment of IRCs in order to validate execution and to monitor TA response. In the information environment, coordination and timing are crucial because some IRCs are time sensitive and require immediate indicator monitoring to develop valid assessment data.

  1. Step 6—Monitor and Collect Information Environment Data for Information Operations Assessment

(1) Monitoring is the continuous process of observing conditions relevant to current operations. Assessment data are collected, aggregated, consolidated and validated. Gaps in the assessment data are identified and highlighted in order to determine actions needed to alleviate shortfalls or make adjustments to the plan. As information and intelligence are collected during execution, assessments are used to validate or negate assumptions that define cause (action) and effect (conclusion) relationships between operational activities, objectives, and end states.

(2) If anticipated progress toward an end state does not occur, then the staff may conclude that the intended action does not have the intended effect. The uncertainty in the information environment makes the use of critical assumptions particularly important, as operation planning may need to be adjusted for elements that may not have initially been well understood when the plan was developed.

  1. Step 7—Analyze Information Operations Assessment Data

(1) If available, personnel trained or qualified in analysis techniques should conduct data analysis. Analysis can be done outside the operational area by leveraging reachback capabilities. One of the more important factors for analysis is that it is conducted in an unbiased manner. This is more easily accomplished if the personnel conducting analysis are not the same personnel who developed the execution plan. Assessment data are analyzed and the results are compared to the baseline measurements and updated continuously as the staff continues its analysis of the information environment.

(2) Deficiency analysis must also occur in this step. If no changes were observed in the information environment, then a breakdown may have occurred somewhere. The plan might be flawed, execution might not have been successful, collection may not have been accomplished as prescribed, or more time may be needed to observe any changes.

  1. Step 8—Report Assessment Results and Make Recommendations

As expressed earlier in this chapter, assessment results enable staffs to ensure that tasks stay linked to objectives and objectives remain relevant and linked to desired end states. They provide opportunities to identify IRC shortfalls and resource issues that may be impeding joint IO effectiveness. These results may also provide information to agencies outside of the command or chain of command.

The primary purpose of reporting the results is to inform the command and staff concerning the progress of objective achievement and the effects on the information environment, and to enable decision making. The published assessment plan, staff standard operating procedures, battle rhythm, and orders are documents in which commanders can dictate how often assessment results are provided and the format in which they are reported. I

  1. Barriers to Information Operations Assessment
  2. The preceding IO assessment methodology can support all operations, and most barriers to assessment can be overcome simply by considering assessment requirements as the plan is developed. But whatever the phase type of operation, the biggest barriers to assessment are generally self-generated.
  3. Some of the self-generated barriers to assessment include the failure to establish objectives that are actually measurable, the failure to collect baseline data against which “post-test” data can be compared, and the failure to plan adequately for the collection of assessment data, including the use of intelligence assets.
  4. There are other factors that complicate IO assessment. Foremost, it may be difficult or impossible to directly relate behavior change to an individual act or group of actions. Also, the logistics of data capture are not simple. Contingencies and operations in uncertain or hostile environments present unique challenges in terms of operational tempo and access to conduct assessments.
  5. Organizing for Operation Assessments
  6. Integrating assessment into the planning effort is normally the responsibility of the lead planner, with assistance across the staff. The lead planner understands the complexity of the plan and decision points established as the plan develops. The lead planner also understands potential indicators of success or failure.
  7. As a plan becomes operationalized, the overall assessment responsibility typically transitions from the lead planner to the J-3.
  8. When appropriate, the commander can establish an assessments cell or team to manage assessments activities. When utilized, this cell or team must have appropriate access to operational information, appropriate access to the planning process, and the representation of other staff elements, to include IRCs.
  9. Measures and Indicators
  10. As emphasized in Chapter IV, “Integrating Information-Related Capabilities into the Joint Operation Planning Process,” paragraph 2.f., “Relationship Between Measures of

Performance (MOPs) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs),” MOPs and MOEs help accomplish the assessment process by qualifying or quantifying the intangible attributes of the information environment. This is done to assess the effectiveness of activities conducted in the information environment and to establish a direct cause between the activity and the effect desired.

  1. MOPs should be developed during the operation planning process, should be tied directly to operation planning, and at a minimum, assess completion of the various phases of an activity or program.

Further, MOPs should assess any action, activity, or operation at which IO actions or activities interact with the TA. For certain tasks there are TA capabilities (voice, text, video, or face-to-face). For instance, during a leaflet-drop, the point of dissemination of the leaflets would be an action or activity. The MOP for any one action should be whether or not the TA was exposed to the IO action or activity.

(1) For each activity phase, task, or touch point, a set of MOPs based on the operational plan outlined in the program description should be developed. Task MOPs are measured via internal reporting within units and commands. Touch-point MOPs can be measured in one of several ways. Whether or not a TA is aware of, interested in, or responding to, an IRC product or activity, can be directly ascertained by conducting a survey or interview. This information can also be gathered by direct observational methods such as field reconnaissance, surveillance, or intelligence collection. Information can also be gathered via indirect observations such as media reports, online activity, or atmospherics.

(2) The end state of operation planning is a multi-phased plan or order, from which planners can directly derive a list of MOPs, assuming a higher echelon has not already designated the MOPs.

  1. MOEs need to be specific, clear, and observable to provide the commander effective feedback. In addition, there needs to be a direct link between the objectives, effects, and the TA. Most of the IRCs have their own doctrine and discuss MOEs with slightly different language, but with ultimately the same functions and roles.

(1) In line with JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, development of MOEs and their associated impact indicators (derived from measurable supporting objectives) must be done during the planning process.

(2) In developing IO MOEs, the following general guidelines should be considered. First, they should be related to the end state; that is, they should directly relate to the desired effects. They should also be measurable quantitatively or qualitatively. In order to measure effectiveness, a baseline measurement must exist or be established prior to execution, against which to measure system changes. They should be within a defined periodical or conditional assessment framework (i.e., the required feedback time, cyclical period, or conditions should be clearly stated for each MOE and a deadline made to report within a specified assessment period, which clearly delineates the beginning, progression, and termination of a cycle in which the effectiveness of the operations is to be assessed). Finally, they need to be properly resourced. The collection, collation, analysis and reporting of MOE data requires personnel, budgetary, and materiel resources. IO staffs, along with their counterparts at the component level, should ensure that these resource requirements are built into the plan during its development.

(3) The more specific the MOE, the more readily the intelligence collection manager can determine how best to collect against the requirements and provide valuable feedback pertaining to them. The ability to establish MOEs and conduct combat assessment for IO requires observation and collection of information from diverse, nebulous and often untimely sources. These sources may include: human intelligence; signals intelligence; air and ground-based intelligence; surveillance and reconnaissance; open-source intelligence, including the Internet; contact with the public; press inquiries and comments; Department of State polls; reports and surveys; nongovernmental organizations; international organizations; and commercial polls.

(4) One of the biggest challenges with MOE development is the difficulty of defining variables and establishing causality. Therefore, it is more advisable to approach this from a correlational, versus a causality perspective, where unrealistic “zero-defect” predictability gives way to more attainable correlational analysis, which provides insights to the likelihood of particular events and effects given a certain criteria in terms of conditions and actors in the information environment.

evidence seems to point out that correlation of indicators and events have proven more accurate than the evidence to support cause and effects relationships, particularly when it comes to behavior and intangible parameters of the cognitive elements of the information environment. IRCs, however, are directed at TAs and decision makers, and the systems that support them, making it much more difficult to establish concrete causal relationships, especially when assessing foreign public opinion or human behavior. Unforeseen factors can lead to erroneous interpretations, for example, a traffic accident in a foreign country involving a US service member or a local civilian’s bias against US policies can cause a decline in public support, irrespective of otherwise successful IO.

(5) If IO effects and supporting IO tasks are not linked to the commander’s objectives, or are not clearly written, measuring their effectiveness is difficult. Clearly written IO tasks must be linked to the commander’s objectives to justify resources to measure their contributing effects. If MOEs are difficult to write for a specific IO effect, the effect should be reevaluated and a rewrite considered. When attempting to describe desired effects, it is important to keep the effect impact in mind, as a guide to what must be observed, collected, and measured. In order to effectively identify the assessment methodology and to be able to recreate the process as part of the scientific method, MOE development must be written with a documented pathway for effect creation.

MOEs should be observable, to aid with collection; quantifiable, to increase objectivity; precise, to ensure accuracy; and correlated with the progress of the operation, to attain timeliness.

  1. Indicators are crucial because they aid the joint IO planner in informing MOEs and should be identifiable across the center of gravity critical factors. They can be independently weighted for their contribution to a MOE and should be based on separate criteria. A single indicator can inform multiple MOEs. Dozens of indicators will be required for a large-scale operation.
  2. Considerations
  3. In the information environment, it is unlikely that universal measures and indicators will exist because of varying perspectives. In addition, any data collected is likely to be incomplete. Assessments need to be periodically adjusted to the changing situation in order to avoid becoming obsolete.

In addition, assessments will usually need to be supplemented by subjective constructs that are a reflection of the joint IO planner’s scope and perspective (e.g., intuition, anecdotal evidence, or limited set of evidence).

  1. Assessment teams may not have direct access to a TA for a variety of reasons. The goal of measurement is not to achieve perfect accuracy or precision—given the ever present biases of theory and the limitations of tools that exist—but rather, to reduce uncertainty about the value being measured. Measurements of IO effects on TA can be accomplished in two ways: direct observation and indirect observation. Direct observation measures the attitudes or behaviors of the TA either by questioning the TA or observing behavior firsthand. Indirect observation measures otherwise inaccessible attitudes and behaviors by the effects that they have on more easily measurable phenomena. Direct observations are preferable for establishing baselines and measuring effectiveness, while indirect observations reduce uncertainty in measurements, to a lesser degree.
  2. Categories of Assessment
  3. Operation assessment of IO is an evaluation of the effectiveness of operational activities conducted in the information environment. Operation assessments primarily document mission success or failure for the commander and staff. However, operation assessments inform other types of assessment, such as programmatic and budgetary assessment. Programmatic assessment evaluates readiness and training, while budgetary assessment evaluates return on investment.
  4. When categorized by the levels of warfare, there exists tactical, operational and strategic-level assessment. Tactical-level assessment evaluates the effectiveness of a specific, localized activity. Operational-level assessment evaluates progress towards accomplishment of a plan or campaign. Strategic level assessment evaluates progress towards accomplishment of a theater or national objective. The skilled IO planner will link tactical actions to operational and strategic objectives.

APPENDIX A

REFERENCES

 

The development of JP 3-13 is based on the following primary references.

 General

National Security Strategy.

Unified Command Plan.

Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities.

The Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution.

The Privacy Act, Title 5, USC, Section 552a.

The Wiretap Act and the Pen/Trap Statute, Title 18, USC, Sections 2510-2522 and 3121-3127.

The Stored Communications Act, Title 18, USC, Sections 2701-2712.

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Title 50, USC.

 Department of State Publications

Department of State Publication 9434, Treaties In Force.

Department of Defense Publications

Secretary of Defense Memorandum dated 25 January2011, Strategic Communication and Information Operations in the DOD.

National Military Strategy. DODD S-3321.1, Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of Declared War.

DODD 3600.01, Information Operations (IO).

DODD5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense.

DOD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons.

DODI O-3600.02, Information Operation (IO) Security Classification Guidance.

 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

CJCSI 1800.01D, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP).
CJCSI 3141.01E, Management and Review of Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)-Tasked Plans.

CJCSI 3150.25E, Joint Lessons Learned Program.

CJCSI 3210.01B, Joint Information Operations Policy.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.01 A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures.

CJCSM 3122.02D, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)Volume III, Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution.

CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)Volume II, Planning Formats.

CJCSM 3500.03C, Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States. i. CJCSM 3500.04F, Universal Joint Task Manual.
j. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.
k. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations.
m. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.
n. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.
JP 3-0, Joint Operations.
JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations.
JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.
JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.
JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare.
JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations.

JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.
JP 3-13.4, Military Deception.
JP 3-14, Space Operations.
JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

JP 3-61, Public Affairs.
JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.
JP 6-01, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations. 

Multinational Publication

AJP 3-10, Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.