Transnational Networks of Insurgency and Crime: Explaining the Spread of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia beyond National Borders is the PhD thesis of Oscar Palma.
From what I can tell work, written during his association with the London School of Economics, is the basis for his recent book – Commercial Insurgencies in the Networked Era : The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.
It was a fascinating read. While my highlights from it are below, since you can freely download the whole work from the first link I’d recommend doing that if the topics interest you.
Notes
The rise of cyberspace as a theatre of social interaction and political debate, especially social networks as forums of coordinated action, is allowing insurgencies to act as dispersed horizontal entities with interconnected individuals, groups and cells placed in different countries and regions. They are challenging traditional hierarchical notions of organization. More than following Leninist/Castroist paradigms, as witnessed during the Cold War, they are arranged as networked actors.
the concept of complex insurgencies introduced by John Mackinlay describes agents that do not follow traditional hierarchical models of organization
it uses its description of insurgency processes to analyse FARC’s activities and structures, and to formulate possible new routes for the organization.
it is difficult to explain any war as purely national phenomena, and transnational networks have fueled conflict for decades, both in terms of the provision of materiel and the spread of ideas and discourses.
from an International Relations perspective, it contributes to the incorporation of Complexity to the discipline.
the approach requires observing the insurgency not as a single organization but as a system composed by individuals with diverse interests who perform different tasks. This requires observations in the lowest levels of analysis making it impossible to observe several case studies
it will be demonstrated that by 2010 networks and structures beyond borders constructed through the exploitation of environmental elements constituted a base for the insurgency to survive. This was the case even when the organization did not constitute a transnational insurgency per se, remaining only as a national insurgency with transnational operational networks.
According to the classification made by George and Bennett (2005), it is an Atheoretical/configurative idiographic case study providing descriptions that might be used in subsequent studies for theory building, but not configuring a theory by itself.
if FARC, as a commercial insurgency, is understood as one type of a hybrid entity, results can be compared with those of other type of organizations categorized as hybrid entities in order to raise more general conclusions. In other words, although the thesis is mainly interested in FARC, its conceptual developments and the elements of analysis introduced are instruments for the study of other cases, in the hope of raising wider generalizations.
it is possible to observe how I have managed to dodge a possible bias since the perspective from which I explain FARC actually opposes dominant narratives which are common through official circles.
observes organizations as composed by interacting individuals (nodes), emphasising their interrelatedness with the environment of operations.
Ideas of topology, network characteristics and failure are useful to think about the insurgency’s structural properties and processes.
develops the concept of commercial insurgencies with a particular proposition of its characteristics, structure and the interaction with its environment. The idea of the triadic character of commercial insurgencies is introduced along with the description of those dynamics through which the region contributes to its survival and re-emergence.
Insurgent and counterinsurgent are always in a kind of dialogue with actions, reactions and adaptations. They are mutually re-defining its practices.
FARC is a national insurgency with transnational operative functional networks which altogether constitute a base for the insurgency to survive. It uses elements introduced in the first and second chapters for such analysis, and it explores a networked-complex model of insurgencies to formulate a possible future scenario.
The emergence of complexity theory has opened the door to new visions in the explanation of physical, natural and social realities, exploring the interconnected character of agents and their construction of systems, the multidimensional nature of issues, the relevance of linkages among the smallest units, and the symbiotic relations between systems and their environments. In other words, this framework provides the ideal instruments to understand the characteristics of the type of insurgencies explored in this dissertation through FARC as a case study.
This linear paradigm emerged from the ideas of philosophers such as Rene Descartes, Isaac Newton, John Locke and Thomas Hobbes
This claim is based on two assumptions: that the chain of causes and consequences is discoverable in every circumstance, and that the universe is deterministic in its nature. The perspective implies an understanding of natural and human realities as systems where processes with specific inputs produce proportional and measurable outputs.
In synthesis, the linear paradigm can be explained through four basic principles:
Order: Given causes lead into known effects any moment and in any place.
Reductionism: The system can be understood through the sum of its parts.
Predictability: When behaviour of the system is defined the future course of events can be predicted.
Determinism: Processes flow along orderly and predictable paths with clear beginnings and rational ends
The Complexity paradigm
Further intellectual enquiry into other areas raised doubts about the capacity of the linear paradigm to explain all universal phenomena. Complexity appeared to reject the mechanistic view of society and the universe as predictable, ordered and determined.
Complexity deals with the nature of emergence, innovation, learning and adaptation.
Complexity then believes societies cannot be understood as predictable and ordered systems. Instead it proposes that social, political and economic processes are unpredictable, non-deterministic, and irreducible. It focuses on how interactions between individuals (the parts) generate changes in society itself (the system). The essence, the form, the character and the direction of the latter depends exclusively on how individuals interact in the lowest level; on their conditions, the information they transmit, and the actions they engage in according to specific circumstances in a given moment.
non-linearityappears as one of complexity’s main characteristics.
Outcomes are not determined by a single but by multiple causes according to the changes they generate through the system. This is known as ‘multiple causation’ (Byrne, 1998).
According to this explanation, systemic processes depend on the interactions of its units, that is, the system displays bottom-up dynamics instead of top-down coordination. This condition is known as emergence.
systems produce feedback that alters their internal dynamics according to its relation with the environment. Such feedback is classified as ‘negative’ when it is absorbed by the system, generating reactions for it to adapt and to return to its initial state. By contrast, positive feedback comes as information that is not internalized by the system but amplified by it, leading into systemic instability. The generation of new characteristics are ‘emergent phenomena’.
This is closely related to the principle of self-organization. “Self-organization refers to the process by which the autonomous interaction of individual entities results in the bottom-up emergence of complex systems. In the absence of centralized authority, the spontaneous appearance of patterned order results from the interaction of the parts of the system as they react to the flow of resources through the system.”
This means that units in the lower level will not act according to commands given by a centralized authority but following their own initiative. In that sense, the system will become organized according to unit interactions instead of depending on a determined process or a single source of power who directs it.
By logic, in this type of systems small changes in the initial conditions of its elements do not necessarily produce proportional variations throughout the system. Instead, a small change could generate bigger systemic transformations, but major changes in units may not end generating any variations at all. This is technically known as sensitive dependence on initial conditions: “the outcome of the generation of the explanatory variables is sensitive to very small differences in the initial conditions under which the analysis has begun.”
The property of adaptation, together with relations between the system and the environment, has opened the door to the study of a type of system that has been named Complex Adaptive System (CAS). These systems, according to Jon Norber and Graeme Cumming (2008), are made up of interacting components whose interrelations may be complex (non-linear) and display the capacity to learn, generating reactive or proactive adaptive behaviour. They display adaptation, a capacity of the system to change in response to prevailing conditions by means of self-organization, learning and reasoning.
Complex adaptive systems can be characterised as follows:
†“They have active internal elements that furnish sufficient local variety to enable the system to survive as it adapts to unforeseen circumstances.
†The systems elements are lightly but not sparsely connected.
†The elements interact locally according to simple rules to provide the energy needed to maintain stable global patterns, as opposed to rigid order or chaos.
†Variations in prevailing conditions result in many minor changes and a few large mutations, but it is not possible to predict the outcome in advance.”
these systems are basically characterised by a “huge amount of interacting particles that, together with energy intake from the environment, produce an overall pattern called ‘emergent properties’.
Walter Buckley (1998) proposed that complexity is an ideal theoretical framework for sociological studies given its vision of a system as sensitive to both its environment and its internal dynamics, where even slight stimuli may trigger large reactions.
Sociology, in his view, must be interested in a system described as “a complex of element components directly or indirectly related in a network of interrelationships of various kinds such that it constitutes a dynamic whole with emergent properties.”
“networks constitute the new social morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of networking logic substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of production, experience, power and culture.” (Castells, 1996)
Hyperconnectivitycreates the opportunity for criminals to increase their cooperation, their ties; their possibility to diversify their operations and their geographical scope; to reach new markets and hide their assets; to ease the difficulties and reduce the costs of their actions, to find escape valves when persecuted by a particular state.
the flexibility of the network allows it to shift its organizational structure, moving supply bases, altering transportation routes, and finding new places of residence for their bosses. Escaping police control through networking and globalization allows organized crime to keep its grip on national bases.
It is expressed, as it will be analysed through the dissertation, in the differentiated exploitation of particular elements such as sympathy from individuals, support from particular governments, alliances with armed organizations, connections with political and social movements, the exploitation of spaces with no strong institutional dominion of particular states, and the creation of conditions to place secretive nodes in other societies.
Christopher Coker (2012) summarizes this idea when he argues that “every era fights war differently, in every age war has its own distinctive characteristics.”
Our states and societies are changing from nationally-based to market-based. Power is increasingly determined by the flow of capitals with low barriers and through borderless spaces. Advances in finances and telecommunications create a disparity between the rapid movement of international capital and the territorially bounded actions of the nation-state. These market societies have their own way of fighting through varied sources of interconnection. However, it hasn’t been the state who has adapted more effectively to this reality; terrorist organizations have managed to adapt to network structures better.
The increase of all sorts of communication channels at societal levels including mobile technologies, online forums, blogs, online social networks such as Facebook, YouTube, and twitter, coupled with the increasing ease to travel and the global reach of powerful news stations, have in the practice created physical and virtual borderless spaces of social interaction.
the concept of network-centric warfare could be understood in a very wide sense as a form of war that brings together different units or agents which act in an interconnected manner towards the same objective
The information age, this era of hyperconnectivity in which communication technologies allow societies to be more interconnected and to learn and act in respect of events occurring all around the globe, has motivated the growth of networked political and social movements, including insurgencies, which are not strictly restrained to the territories of particular states. Rather, they are fed by the realities of different societies with shared political values and objectives.
netwar,which they define as:
“an emergent mode of conflict (and crime) at societal levels, short of traditional military warfare, in which the protagonist use network forms of organization and related doctrines, strategies, and technologies attuned to the information age. These protagonists are likely to consist of dispersed organizations, small groups and individuals who communicate, coordinate and conduct their campaigns in an internetted manner, often without a precise central command. Thus, netwar differs from modes of conflict and crime in which the protagonists prefer to develop formal stand-alone, hierarchical organizations, doctrines and strategies as in past efforts, for example, to build centralized movements along Leninist lines.” (Arquila & Ronfeldt, 2001, p.6)
In other words, far from the traditional hierarchical and centralized model of military structure, non-state actors (terrorists, insurgents and criminals) are increasingly becoming organized as a loose set of interconnected organizations, groups, cells and individuals which pursue the same end and coordinate their activities through a wide range of channels offered by modern communication technologies. If the model is taken to the extreme it would be possible to observe, for example, that an insurgency might not even be composed by a single organization but by a group of agents, both legal and in the margins of the law, which are bounded by the same visions, political principles, philosophical background or interests.
If the model is taken to the extreme it would be possible to observe, for example, that an insurgency might not even be composed by a single organization but by a group of agents, both legal and in the margins of the law, which are bounded by the same visions, political principles, philosophical background or interests. This explains the possibility of interoperability without centralized command and control.
“systems [that] are composed by many independent parts which are arranged in a non-linear fashion, making centralized control no longer desirable.”11 Metz (2000) describes it as “a web of strategic partnerships, and strategic flexibility based on project teams or group works rather than hierarchies or bureaucracies.”(p.viii). Bruce Berkowitz (2003) refers to it, in similar terms, as the fighting network, with the following characteristics:
– A structure developed around a series of interconnected autonomous cells of varied sizes.
– Each cell is armed with potential weapons that count on a high level of lethality.
– The cells are linked together by a network of communications, logistics, command and control. (p.16-17)
An interesting feature of the definition of netwar is that the authors describe it as a form of both conflict and crime. This means that the concept, in scope, is applicable to agents who pursue social/political ends or economic self-interests.
Using modern technologies as well as physical spaces and traditional communication channels, agents become organized, make decisions and act in order to achieve their objectives, spread their ideas, and incorporate more actors in the campaign. Their acts might be violent or might be purely political. As a matter of fact the authors described two types of netwar: civil-society activism and violent terrorism or insurgency.
Insurgencies in the information era find elements through the environment that make them increasingly transnational. Communication channels and technologies have the possibility to spread their messages globally, creating a capacity to reach a borderless global community which might act for or against its claims in very diverse ways.
insurgencies, and particularly commercial insurgencies, (the system) exploit elements within their regions and the international system (the environment) to place nodes of their military, political and criminal networks beyond the borders of a single state. This ultimately creates the possibility for the insurgency to survive if the state offensive is intense. Survival will always open the door to the possibility for the insurgency to return when conditions are appropriate.
Several of these elements have been gathered by John Mackinlay in a concept that, together with the idea of netwar, becomes useful to understand insurgencies in the information era and in the context of hyperconnectivity. This former British Army Officer and war scholar at Kings College London defines complex insurgencies as:
“A campaign by globally dispersed activists and insurgents who seek to confront the culture and political ideals of a nation or group of nations that are seen to challenge their interests and way of life”(Mackinlay, 2006, p.vii).
this description also implies a blurring between the system and its environment. Since dispersed activists and insurgents are part of the campaign, they might act in diverse forms and in different scenarios, making it difficult to recognize who is and who isn’t a member of the insurgency. This boundary will be constantly changing and evolving as individuals, groups or organizations join or leave the campaign. Since events and ideas exist in a borderless global society, those individuals are not necessarily placed in a single territory; they might be, as the definition states, ‘globally dispersed’.
the disappearance of the concept of military front. He argues that “everything and everyone is becoming part of the battle as insurgencies become blended with their societies, as they successfully embed within civilian communities, or even more, when the entire society becomes a potential insurgency.”
Robert Bunker and Matt Bergett (2005) describe networks on the offensive as free floating cells and nodes linked via information channels, forming a web-like pattern. They benefit from ease of connectivity, allowing them to be established and terminated as required with little or no effort.
On the defensive, well-constructed networks tend to be redundant and diverse given the relative ease to replace their nodes, making them robust and resilient to adversity. They are difficult to crack and defeat as a whole. They may be able to defy counter-leadership targeting since the elimination of specific nodes does not immediately lead into the collapse of the network. Attackers may be able to find and confront portions of the network, but the possibility of other nodes to survive provides the opportunity for the organization’s structure to heal and reconstitute
Anonymous, although having a core composed by its creators and most important nodes, works more as an idea, a brand or an umbrella, than as an organization. Several hacktivists which find the idea attractive could decide to act by themselves. In that sense leadership is symbolical more than operational: if the main nodes are disabled (captured), the idea and the brand of Anonymous remains, inviting other hackers, cells or groups to continue acting in the same direction.
In similar terms to Anonymous, Al Qaeda could also be understood as a brand more than as an organization; as a dispersed group of activists, insurgents, cells and organizations which decide to act in their name and in the name of Al Qaeda through different territories. Such agents have mastered the use of communication technologies as channels of coordination, indoctrination, recruitment, and networking for the purpose of attack. Online forums, blogs, websites, mobile phone chats, e-mails, online social networks, cafes, libraries and mosques have been of common use. Militants have perfectly blended with their environments.
The insurgency nurtures itself from ideas, claims and grievances than are not only deeply rooted within societies where they operate, but that have been exacerbated by the discourse to the point where it has become a system by itself without depending on its leaders. As such, leaders turn out to be more motivational symbols than organizational administrators and commanders. I
In many cases, violent actions are not the only form of support for the organization. ‘Political’ actions in the order of spreading the discourses and reaching wider audiences might also constitute group support.
The virtual dimension of war is thus vital. The war of ideas is as important as the war of force. It is the existence of a common set of ideas and a spreading discourse which allows individuals to be identified with the groups; which gives cohesion to the network as a whole. Symbols, figures, concepts and brands are very relevant to this end. Without a common understanding of the problem, of the legitimate means to achieve the objective, and perception of the enemy, the network is in risk of falling apart. The centrality of ideas and the spread of information are typical symptoms of the information age.
The Study of Social Networks
Through complexity, a particular understanding of networks has been disseminated. The definition of a network proposed by Pierre Musso offers an insight into this change: “an unstable structure of connections composed of interacting elements, whose variability follows certain functional rules”
This means that networks, instead of being stable and static structures are the result of continuous internal readjustments given the interactions among its elements and with the environment.
complexity is evident because there are no formalized procedures for a node to resolve conflicts arising from interaction; no single actor with formal authority to impose its will on other participants. There are no command and control structures making the forms of the network dependant on a continuous inter-definition of their participants.
He believes that social networks today should be understood as an enduring form of social organization, composed of asymmetrical, interacting elements held together by a shared set of values, standards, or functional rules. They are coordinated through an on-going negotiation in which elements re-define not only the network’s identity but also their positions within it; and this process of self-definition creates a permanent condition of flexibility. The transformations of the networks are not entirely random deriving into total chaos; they follow the network’s own internal logic according to its identity or its functional rules.
Randomness means irregularity: nodes in a network will have a different amount of connections. Very few elements will have either an extremely high or low amount of linkages, while most of the nodes will demonstrate an average number of them. In statistical terms this is known as the Poisson distribution
nodes could follow a power law distribution, in which very few nodes have an excessive amount of linkages, while others display fewer connections.
Since the power law distribution abandons the idea of a characteristic node and a peak of average of connections, the idea of ‘scale’ is discarded. This type of network then became known as a scale-free network.
an archetypical netwar actor would consist of a dispersed set of interconnected nodes, where the nodes can be individuals, groups or formal or informal organizations.
A node in a network could itself be a hierarchy. More than being structured as a single type of network, they are combinations of all of these forms. A typical case would be an all channel network as the core of the structure connecting starsand chains whose nodes are to conduct tactical operations. This is very important for the analysis of FARC. As it will be demonstrated, whereas military structures remain as hierarchies, criminal and political structures appear to be arranged more as networks, confirming this idea of combination.
the strength of a network is guaranteed by the high amount of connections among its elements. Interconnectivity leads into robustness. Following Barabasi, if a particular node fails, it is very likely that a specific fragment of the network will be isolated, but the network itself can be maintained. Removing only a few nodes will not have a significant impact on the integrity of the network.
Generalized node failures can break the network into a set of non-communicated fragments, but if this happens as part of a random attack, it is statistically more likely that the nodes destroyed or removed will be smaller since they are more abundant. But destroying hubs may pose a serious challenge.
defined two network properties: connection, which explains who the nodes are and how they are connected (structure); and contagion, the flows which run through the network, the information that is passed from node to node through all the existing linkages (function).
Failure cannot only emerge from the structure, as it was proved by Barabasi, but from the diffusion of information in the form of a cascading event, or through a domino effect, from node to node.
hyperconnected. Following their ideas, a superior level of connectivity has motivated a radical evolution of social networks in four ways: enormity, an increase in the scale of networks and the amount of people who might be reached; communality, broadening the scale in which we can share information and contribute to collective efforts; specificity, an increase in the particularity of the ties that are formed (interest groups); and virtuality, the ability to assume virtual identities
Insurgencies are, by definition, organizations which pursue particular political goals. But the opportunity found in the maximization of profits in a globalized economy may divert organizations from their original route and into the road of criminality.
insurgencies can become hybrids of criminality and political insurrection, making it difficult to recognize if the rebels are still following an original political cause or if such a purpose is only a facade to the real objective of profit.
Nodes and structures in other territories provide the opportunity for the insurgency to survive and to re-emerge as it will be explained ahead.
Insurgency is warfare; it is a form of achieving a political end through the force of arms. It is different to conventional warfare in that it is not waged by regular state military forces which follow determined standardized norms and procedures, but by groups of civilians, communities, and nations which take up arms against the established ruler. They fight for a cause they see as legitimate: a change in the nature of the political system, the creation of a new state, the separation of a portion of the territory, or the independence from a dominating power.
Walter Laqueur, a historian at Harvard, Johns Hopkins, Chicago and Georgetown, listed three elements to characterise this type of tactics: the exploitation of the environment in order to wear the enemy down; more than fighting it frontally, fighting it for a long period in order to wear it down instead of defeating it directly; and conducting actions through a sequence of attacks and retreats, using basic instruments instead of advanced technologies (Navias & Moreman, 1994). This tactics are known as guerrilla tactics.
the origin of insurgencies can be found in the national insurrections that flourished against established states only after a condition of regularity was achieved in terms of international law and politics, with the emergence of the state and European Public Law in the early modern era. (Schmitt, 2006) “The Ius Public Europaeum not only encompassed law, but the norms, philosophical texts, and power constellations that governed war and relations between states.”
insurgency as “a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the former consciously employs political resources (organizational skills, propaganda, and/or demonstrations) and instruments of violence to establish legitimacy for some aspect of the political system it considers illegitimate. Legitimacy and illegitimacy refer to whether or not existing aspects of politics are considered moral or immoral (or, to simplify, right or wrong) by the population or selected elements therein.”
The psychological dimension of war, then, becomes as important as the physical act of combat, and the reason why insurgencies are protracted, lasting not only years but maybe even decades.
In conceptual terms, insurgency (or politically motivated violence) and criminality can be clearly differentiated.
partisan warfare is rooted in the sphere of politics. It is his intense political commitment which sets the partisan apart from other combatants. It is politics which distinguishes him from the common thief and criminals whose motives are personal enrichment. The pirate is possessed of what jurisprudence knows as animal furandi (felonious intent). The partisan, by contrast, fights on a political front and it is precisely the political character of his actions that throws into stark relief the original sense of the word we apply to comprehend him” (Coker, 2008, p.46)
But whereas in conceptual terms the difference might be clear, in practice the dimensions tend to merge when specific cases are observed: “In theory, the distinction is crystal clear: to be classified as warfare, violence must be motivated by politics, not profit, as is the case with criminal behaviour. In practice, though, the political and the criminal tend to merge” (Gray, 2007, p.250) Criminal entities sometimes display political interests, for example, when they provide goods and services to a host community either because there are shared feelings of appreciation or as a means to make its job easier. Similarly, criminals might seek to control local political institutions in order to carry on with their activities more easily. As such, they could become a sort of parallel state performing political and social functions in a particular location. On the other hand criminals might challenge certain state acts, as the enactment of extradition laws, and might act to achieve their reversal.
Politically-guided organizations may also become permeated by criminal interests. Non-state organizations need to fund themselves in order to operate. Given their illegal nature, they are more likely to find funds in illicit economic activities. This fact creates the possibility of insurgents, or groups within the insurgency, to become more motivated by profit than by politics.
An economic circle emerges in which local populations find a source of income through commodities that are used by the armed organization to fund their war: “conflicts can create war economies, often in regions controlled by rebels or warlords and linked to international trading networks; members of armed gangs can benefit from looting; and regimes can use violence to deflect opposition, reward supporters or maintain their access to resources.”
more than understanding political or economic motivations for war separately, a political economy perspective linking agendas and explaining the interdependence of economic and political variables is more appropriate.
“Conceptualizing explanations of armed conflict in terms of greed and grievance has imposed an unnecessary limiting dichotomy on what is, in reality, a highly diverse, complex set of incentive and opportunity structures that vary across time and location.”
These authors proposed an examination of combatants’ behaviours without understanding rebel organizations as unitary groups. This is precisely the approach in this dissertation since FARC will not be explored as a monolithic entity but as a set of nodes (individuals) with different interests, objectives and functions.
narcotics and diamonds have a stronger influence on the duration of conflict than oil, gas, timber or minerals. Narcotics, particularly, tend to favour non-state actors disproportionately because of its illegality, allowing them to strengthen their operational capabilities and even to increase their legitimacy with communities connected to the business. Narco-trafficking is in fact the largest source of profit for both criminal groups and terrorism, accounting for 2% of the global economy according to the International Monetary Fund, and 7% of international trade following United Nations statistics
anda Felbab-Brown, a researcher at Brookings Institution, demonstrated that legitimacy is not only constructed from an ideological affinity between agents. In the case of narcotics, in those areas where the organization is the de facto authority and coca is grown, the insurgency provides the security and stability necessary for inhabitants to have an income. As such, it is the insurgent organization which actually provides some sense of organization, protection, authority and stability in locations where war economies develop. This circumstance guarantees freedom of action, popular support and legitimacy to the organization…the organization turns into a sort of parallel state becoming a political agent, transforming a criminally-based enterprise into a political phenomenon.
Terrorism and organized crime cannot be analysed separately in the contemporary international context, since evidence “suggests that they may be deeply intertwined in ways that go well beyond tactical alliances of convenience.” (Lal, 2005, p.293)
Given the continued need of these organizations to engage in activities that are not natural to their original purpose, they might build an alliance with an organization that would provide such services in order for the organization to focus on their key activities; a sort of outsourcing. Examples include FARC and Mexican Cartels, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Afghan Mafia, and Al Qaeda and Bosnian Criminals.
A subsequent stage referred to as ‘symbiosis’ implies a stronger interdependence between both organizations given their impossibility to conduct their operations without its ally.
A further stage in the interaction model speaks about the creation of a hybrid organization. This type of entity was also introduced by Williams (2008). In this case political motivations and criminal interests, and the execution of criminal and terrorist activities, have merged in a single organization, without the possibility to define it entirely in political or criminal terms. As examples of this type of entities Williams (2008) points towards FARC in Colombia
Shelley and Makarenko describe another element of this interaction that is relevant for the case of FARC. Shelley linked lawless physical spaces without the authority of state institutions to the processes of convergence between terror and crime. It is argued that “areas with little government control, weak enforcement, or opened borders” foster the collaboration between criminal and terrorist entities, making their activities easier
Makarenko introduced a similar idea through her concept of the black hole, which she described as a space where weak or failed states foster a convergence between transnational organized crime and terrorism; a sort of safe haven for convergent groups.
The concept of commercial insurgencies
Metz argued that although the United States lost strategic interest in insurgencies, the Post-Cold War era was about to observe the growth of evolved forms of insurgency. Among them he described ‘commercial insurgencies’ “driven less by the desire of justice than wealth” (Metz, 1993). In his words:
“Commercial insurgency will be a form of what is becoming known as “grey area phenomena”–powerful criminal organizations with a political veneer and the ability to threaten national security rather than just law and order. In fact, many commercial insurgencies may see an alliance of those for whom political objectives are preeminent and the criminal dimension simply a necessary evil, and those for whom the accumulation of wealth through crime is the primary objective and politics simply a rhetorical veneer to garner some support that they might not otherwise gain. It is this political component that distinguishes commercial insurgents from traditional organized crime. Most often, though, commercial insurgencies probably will not attempt to rule the state but will seek instead a compliant regime that allows them to pursue criminal activity unimpeded.” (Metz, 1995, p.31-37)
In this type of insurgencies, by similarity to Williams’s conception of hybrid organization, it would be impossible to determine if the commercial interest constitutes the purpose of the organization, or if the political motivation is still driving combatants’ desires.
Although the concept has been used as a base for empirical analysis through several cases, there haven’t been deeper developments on how a commercial insurgency is structured, how it operates, and especially how it interacts with its environment (the region). The present dissertation, then, takes forward this concept through the case of FARC to explain how this organization can be characterised, and how it exploits several elements of the environment which allow the spread of its structures and networks beyond borders. This vision challenges the idea of the state as the counterinsurgent given its impossibility to act in the territories where it is not sovereign.
If understood as a criminal entity, political elements are downplayed, and if pictured purely as an insurgency, profits are reduced as a problem of means and not as a motivation. The approach also allows constructing a vision of the organization not as a monolithic entity that can be understood through simplifying adjectives (narco-terrorist, criminal) but, as it was suggested by Ballentine and Sherman, as a system composed by different interacting individuals or sectors with diversified interests that range between the social and political to the selfish and criminal.
There is no scientific and analytical rigour in placing “a disparate group (of actors) with widely divergent motives and types of relationships with drugs” as part of the same category (Wardlaw, 1988, p.5).
The triadic character of commercial insurgencies
How then to think about such entities? Evidently a simplistic and generalizing view is insufficient to fully understand commercial insurgencies.
systems are composed by a series of units whose conditions at the lowest level determine the system as a whole. As such, and following the logic in Metz’s definition, it is necessary to ‘open the box’ and dig deeper within the insurgency to explore motivations and functions of individuals, groups, sectors or levels, instead of understanding them through the same lens. It is necessary to propose a comprehensive understanding of how these actors operate in the context of hyperconnectivity
Several factors ranging from prestige and unemployment to coercion explain such decision. But within the insurgency several processes are in place to create organizational cohesion, including political indoctrination. Through time, combatant’s motivation to remain in war could change. Some might continue to be interested only as means of income (criminal motivations) while others might be convinced by the political objective (political motivation).
In theory, the nature of an insurgency is political by definition. This means that all individuals, commanders and combatants are motivated by the achievement of a social/political goal. But this does not mean that everyone will be a combatant. As several classic theorists of insurgency such as Mao Tse Tung or Vo Nguyen Giap, have suggested, insurgencies develop political structures which remain independent to those units waging war, for they will spread the discourse to build popular support and to participate through political spaces.
In other words, all combatants -those who wage war- have a political motivation and are thus part of the political dimension in motivational terms, but in terms of functionality they only constitute the ‘military’ dimension since they do not develop specific political tasks. By contrast, those individuals that are only dedicated to the organization’s political tasks (i.e. members of the political party) can only be part of the political dimension both in motivational and functional terms.
Those who perform tasks related to the criminal activity are part of the criminal dimension in functional terms. For example, in the case of narcotics, the criminal dimension expresses interests in profiting from drug-dealing (motivational) and the performance of tasks related to the production and trade of drugs (functional).
It is then here proposed that this type of organization displays a triadic character composed of military, political and criminal dimensions, for which particular functional structures are developed, composed by individuals who conduct activities and tasks according to the nature of each of them. Such structures are not mutually exclusive; that is, the organization will not necessarily establish separate units (fronts, columns, companies, cells, blocs, platoons) for each of the dimensions. There is an overlapping; individuals can be part of several dimensions simultaneously.
functional structures extend beyond state borders, exploiting elements in its environment, and challenging the capacity of the state to respond to the threat.
The military dimension, as it can be observed, exists only in functional terms. Militants must have a motivation that can be classified either as political or criminal, but a military motivation by itself does not have a proper logic. There is no fighting for the sake of fighting. Combatants are not waging war because they want to wage war; they are fighting for a purpose.
A describes an individual who is politically motivated and develops political tasks without engaging in combat. For example, those militants of political parties or movements of the insurgency, without including urban militias. It is difficult to trace a defined border between this area and the rest of society.
– B refers to those individuals who are politically motivated and participate in armed actions, whether in rural spaces as traditional frontline combatants or in urban areas as militias. In classic theory this is the bulk of the insurgency, and it corresponds to those within the military dimension in figure 2.2.
– C describes those individuals who are motivated by the proceeds of criminal activities, and perform tasks related to them, but do not engage in combat. From a strict point of view they might be seen as associates of the organization, but they could be actual insurgency members specifically destined to such tasks. As with the political dimensions, it might also be difficult to trace a dividing line between society and this area.
– D refers to insurgents motivated by criminal wealth and performing specific tasks related to criminal activities, but participating in combat.
– E describes the point where all the dimensions come together. Combatants in this area are both politically and criminally motivated, and are understood to engage in political, criminal and political activities. It is possible to think about commanders as part of this category. But this space should not be thought as exclusive of commanders, we could probably find mid-ranking combatants also performing varied functions in all dimensions. As it was argued by William Reno, “economic benefit is not the motivation of all individuals in every internal war. Combatants might pursue diverse objectives simultaneously.” (Pizarro, 2004, p.16)
– F describes an odd condition. Individuals who are criminally motivated but for some reason end up performing only political functions. They shouldn’t be a general case within the organization but under strict conditions of command, it could be a possibility. For example, an individual who is part of the organizations because he is interested in wealth, but his commander has placed him in a position where he must indoctrinate communities or coordinate cells of the clandestine political party. Point G would explain a similar condition but adding the role of combat.
– H refers to the same situation in opposite terms. Individuals who are politically motivated but end up performing tasks related only to the criminal activity. I adds its participation in warfare.
But these dimensions are not static. As complexity explains, nodes can change and evolve over time, their motivations and the tasks they perform may vary. Nodes can ‘jump’ from dimension to dimension, expressing their interdependence. This has a relevant implication in terms of re-emergence, as it will be detailed ahead, since stimuli from the environment may trigger changes in nodes allowing them to engage with other dimensions. This ‘leap’ can be produced through a series of processes:
– Node politicization: In motivational terms this means convincing those who pursue a criminal objective to follow the political struggle (indoctrination). In functional terms it means the beginning of the conduction of political activities and tasks.
– Node militarization: It consists in transforming nodes that were developing exclusively political or criminal tasks into active combatants. This can be achieved through military training and the preparation of a reserve force with appropriate capabilities.
– Node criminalization: In motivational terms, this implies a loss of interest regarding the original political reason to fight. A lack of motivation produced by low perspectives on winning the war or the appearance of a stronger interest in profits. In functional terms, this implies that militants will begin to develop tasks related to the organization’s criminal activities.
Now, in theory, several organizations might find its military and political dimensions significantly overlapping, even in functional terms. That is, every member of the insurgency is both a political actor performing political tasks and a participant in military actions. Such might be the case not of classic Marxist or Maoist insurgencies, but of a decentralized, networked and loose structure of individuals, very much as described in the last chapter: Individuals who decide to act by themselves without receiving a formal order, who look for support in cells or groups, or come together with others to form their own.
Which are the tasks that define the dimensions in functional terms? In the military dimension, the tasks resemble those of a proper military institution: recruiting and finding the adequate personnel for each of the tactical demands; developing training routines to guarantee success in operations and, if necessary, the required specialization; executing operations, either offensive or defensive according to the dynamics of conflict; building logistical chains to keep the organization running (e.g. food, weaponry and clothing); securing communication channels to allow the necessary coordination among its command and control structures; establishing routines and practices of internal control and discipline to keep internal cohesion with adequate punishment procedures when necessary; obtaining intelligence information; and organizing urban militias for the conduction of operations, intelligence and logistical support in the cities.
The activities related to the political dimension of an insurgency may be derived from the creation of a political party or movement as the cornerstone of its participation at the national and local levels. In the case of Marxist-Leninist and Maoist insurgencies during the Cold War, communist parties became the political wing of armed rebellions. But according to the political and strategic contexts, the case for a political body acting at the national level might not always be the ideal mechanism. Political structures might be developed in a clandestine manner, and the tasks performed informally within specific local contexts.
In general terms, such tasks are related to spreading the discourse, ideals, philosophy and arguments of the insurgency in search of the sympathy of individuals for their active or passive support. These include popular assemblies, smaller local meetings, indoctrination of specific individuals, dissemination of ideas by word of mouth, and the spread of propaganda through methods such as pamphlets or radio stations. Today, these tasks extend to the cyberspace and include online social networks. If the organization has somehow become the local authority in particular areas, either directly or through third parties, their acts of government are also duties of political nature.
The environment of operations
As complexity explains, systems are part of the environment and they constantly interact with it. Insurgency adapts to the circumstances it imposes, while elements of the environment might change as a result of the acts of insurgents.
it is difficult to make a difference between members of the insurgency and supporting elements in Latin America. Members of the FARC-created Movimiento Continental Bolivariano, a Latin American movement bringing together Bolivarian and Communist parties, groups and individuals, could well be considered active part of the insurgency.
the environment is constituted as a grand continuum connecting the local, national, regional and global theatres of operations where the insurgency finds elements that allow for its nodes to be embedded through different social and geographical spaces. It is through these elements or variables that the interaction between the system and the environment is possible; through these variables the insurgency is able to embed nodes in geographical and social spaces beyond borders. They include:
– Sympathy of non-organized individuals (individuals not formally enrolled in any organization)
– Connections with political and social movements
– Alliances with armed actors
– Support from national governments
– Exploitation of empty spaces
– Accommodation of secretive nodes
these elements are exploited by the insurgency to expand, to place nodes of all its dimensions through different social and geographical spaces.
Support from national government in the primary environment lacks sense since insurgencies by definition exist as opposed to the government. On the local level it could be understood as support from the local authority. But this is usually a result of the process of insurgency growth. As the movement grows and individuals, organizations and political figures are incorporated into the effort, local power is achieved to be administered directly or through third parties.
when support spreads considerably to incorporate an increased amount of individuals, support is likely to be channelled through different instruments, such as a social movement, or it can be understood as part of the progressive territorial expansion of the insurgency itself. As such, this support can be understood not through this particular variable but, for example, through social movements.
Empty spaces are here understood as those areas or zones of the territory of any country where there is virtually no authority or presence of the security forces, allowing its relative occupation by the insurgency.
It is possible to observe three different scenarios of insurgency involvement in regional/global processes.
Transnational networks of a national insurgency
Insurgency as part of a regional revolution
Transnational insurgency
In the first case, the organization counts with militants in several countries but they exist in function of an internal conflict. Even when certain operative functions extend beyond borders, the objective is still revolution in a particular state.
In the second situation, the insurgency is part of a wider regional or even global uprising in which several actors, movements, organizations and rebel groups pursue the same objective.
There is no single theatre of operations since they extend through regions.
In the third case, the insurgency constitutes a regional revolutionary army by itself. There are connections and alliances with other actors but they are either local, operating in national scenarios, or constitute different regional actors pursuing a particular regional agenda.
this understanding of insurgencies challenges the traditional model of competition between a national insurgency and a single counterinsurgent state. The survival of militants beyond borders creates the possibility for the insurgency to re-emerge in case of being reduced to a point of near destruction in the primary theatre.
An insurgency that is part of a regional revolution will find elements of support within the secondary environment more easily than a national insurgency.
Although the primary environment is vital to understand the configuration of the structures of the three dimensions, this dissertation prioritizes events in the secondary environment for survival and re-emergence.
survival might be expressed by scattered and diffused nodes, without any major organizational logic, and without the possibility to interact and to coordinate actions. But they might continue performing their functions in different scenarios, through other organizations or in smaller groups. As explained through network theory, structures can survive unless 5 to 15% of hubs are disabled simultaneously.
There are specific environmental (regional) processes that contribute not only to the embedment and survival of insurgency nodes beyond borders, but to the re-emergence of the organization via the possibility of nodes to re-engage with other dimensions. These processes are the preservation of the ideology and the discourse, and the mobility of elements of the criminal economy. They guarantee node redundancy, and the flexibility, adaptability, and resilience of the networks.
The globalization, or regionalization, of particular ideologies, doctrines and discourses that speak about societies in certain political/geographical contexts, contribute to the embeddedness of operatives beyond borders and provides instruments for nodes to re- engage with the political dimension. Trans-nationality generates local expressions of support channelled or materialized through specific political parties, social groups or other armed organizations. Examples are Political Islam or Islamism in the case of Al Qaeda and affiliated organizations, and Bolivarianism-Communism throughout the Andes and South America.19
Node politicization: remnants of the insurgency may become criminals in the strict sense of the concept. However, through the preservation of the ideology and discourse through the region, and probably through contacts with other regional actors, they might be pushed back into fighting for a political cause (indoctrination).
Node militarization: when there is an offensive against an insurgency, evidently the military dimensions is severely hit. Remaining nodes may either become tempted to turn entirely into criminals, or to escape to cities and towns to proselytise without actually waging war. The militarization of nodes means the return of such nodes into combat.
Node criminalization: If military and political nodes continue to exist beyond borders, but eradication policies in Colombia became successful in eliminating war economies, the existence of spaces for cultivation, production and traffic in other areas of the region will invite not only those remaining nodes to engage on activities related to drug production and trafficking, but also new nodes to participate.
given the right environmental conditions, the insurgency may be reconstituted from nodes dedicated to any of the dimensions.
The traditional model of insurgency, socially and geographically marginalized rural guerrillas dressed in combat fatigues progressively conquering human and territorial spaces, such as Castro’s Cuban Revolution, is declining in favour of interconnected horizontal and decentralized structures, as Arquila and Ronfeldt have explained. As worldwide political events during 2010-2011 demonstrate, there is considerable power on social mobilizations and popular movements, for which online social networks have become highly instrumental. The youth, the students, marginalized social sectors, the unemployed, and political activists are an ideal niche for insurgency growth.
variables the insurgency is able to embed nodes in geographical and social spaces beyond borders. They include:
– Sympathy of non-organized individuals (individuals not formally enrolled in any organization)
– Connections with political and social movements
– Alliances with armed actors
– Support from national governments
– Exploitation of empty spaces
Chapter 3. The evolution of counterinsurgency warfare
The emergence of Maoism
Mao Tse Tung proposed a model for a conservative and parochial vast rural population, and a semi-feudal and semi-colonial society (Beckett, 2001). He developed a theory for a small weaker actor to override a more powerful enemy by the means of will, time, space and propaganda, in the absence of initial fire power capacity.
From local support of specific communities the insurgency will grow to become a mass movement challenging established powers. His theory of insurgency is generally known as Popular Protracted Warfare.
In a first stage known as strategic defensive the insurgency is still a small armed force which attacks and makes a gradual retreat before a strong retaliation of the enemy’s army. Insurgents do not recur to positional warfare; the objective is survival through time.
In a second stage known as stalemate, guerrilla tactics of quick strike and retreat are the mode of military operations. The sense of futility among army troops and its home front continues to grow while its morale decreases. The war reaches a state of equilibrium with insurgents controlling little land but maintaining positions of tactical initiative.
The third stage, known as strategic offensive begins when these regular armies grow in size, and positional warfare dominates the mode of conflict.
Maoism became the main paradigm of insurgency warfare throughout the developing world, and COIN would evolve to respond to such paradigm.
In Malaya, Harold Briggs, a British Officer with experience on the Burma revolts during the Second World War, was appointed as director of operations. He formulated a plan, known as the ‘Briggs Plan’, which aimed at protecting and isolating the populace from insurgents, while identifying the Malayan Communist Party’s (MCP) political body, not the fighters in the jungles, as the priority in confrontation.
An organizational structure was created with the Federal War Council on the national level, and district and village level committees. These collegiate bodies constituted assemblies where diverse institutions came together to discuss insurgency matters and to make decisions on the appropriate actions to be taken. Not only security institutions such as the Army and the Police were included, also civil agencies, and representatives of ethnic communities.
a‘comprehensive approach’to counterinsurgency: the idea that the responsibility to fight an insurgency is not exclusive of security institutions, but of a wider range of state and even societal organizations; and that actions must be conducted in issues beyond security. These principles would later constitute a central tenet of modern COIN, as it has been experienced not only in Colombia but also in Afghanistan and Iraq.
These cases have demonstrated that addressing the grievances of the communities that fuel the insurgency’s motivations or discourse is not necessarily a sign of state weakness, as extremist in national contexts may tend to describe it, but actually a vital part of an effective counterinsurgency strategy.
As summarised by Ian Beckett, the experience against Maoists demonstrated the importance of six factors:
- Political action designed to prevent insurgents from gaining popular support should have priority over pure military action.
- Civil-military cooperation is necessary.
- Intelligence should be coordinated
- Insurgents must be separated from the populations through winning their hearts and minds
- Pacification should be supported with the appropriate use of military force
- Lasting political reform should be implemented to prevent the recurrence ofinsurgency
Theorisation of counterinsurgency during the Maoist era
counterinsurgency must follow several principles:
– The objective of the struggle is political and not military. Since insurgency was finally understood as a political construction, military means are insufficient to confront the rebels. Given the precedence of the organization’s political objectives and
structures, the response must be understood as political and not only as military.
- – COIN is not only a responsibility of the military forces. As a consequence of the last point, the campaign against insurgents is a matter of all state institutions and not only of the security and defence sector. The leadership must be civilian/political, and
the military command must be subordinated to it.
- – There must be a plan of action. State policy should guide the conduct of the
campaign, including of course the role of the military and other security institutions, but also the participation of other organizations and sectors. This implies the existence of a degree of coordination between interacting agencies under a single direction and command.
- – Government’s actions must comply with the law: the heart of the campaign, as it has been argued, is winning the support of the population and achieving its rejection of the insurgent movement. As such, legitimacy expresses the centre of gravity. The government cannot recur to excesses or actions beyond the law which could be used by the insurgent to present it as an illegitimate actor. Its conducts must follow all norms and rules, guaranteeing the integrity, security and rights of the population.
The five principles announced by Robert Thomson, several of which were just discussed, summarize the essence of counterinsurgency thought from the perspective of the classic authors:
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- “The government must have a clear political aim
- The government must function within the law
- The government must have an overall plan
- The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas.
- In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency it must secure its base first”
Convincing the population of why the state is a better option, or persuading insurgents to demobilize, becomes more important than killing rebels in mass.
For such a purpose the government must respect the feelings and aspirations of the nation, provide a firm and fair government, build up public confidence, and establish a campaign of civic action and propaganda to counter the discourse and propositions of the insurgency.
Counterinsurgency failure during the Cold War
As stated before, it is highly relevant for civilians and military to adapt to the efforts required by COIN campaigning; the lack of adaptation is likely to lead into failure.
actions by other US Agencies such as the US Information Agency, the CIA, and USAID were conducted independently without any coordination.
whereas the theorisation of COIN gained momentum during the Cold War, military cultures impeded its proper application in the field. The United States who was traditionally sceptical to such type of warfare, decided to act in Vietnam through conventional instruments. As a consequence, mistakes allowed for the growth of the insurgency and the spread of hatred towards the counterinsurgent.
Hearts and Minds and the Comprehensive Approach.
Human Terrain System (HTS) are composed of individuals with social science and operational backgrounds that are deployed with tactical and operational military units to assist in bringing knowledge about the local population into a coherent analytic framework and build relationships with the local power-brokers in order to provide advice and opportunities to Commanders and staffs in the field.
On the other hand, the ‘build’ component of the clear-hold-build approach makes this practice very similar to nation-building. Once the insurgency has been expelled and the presence of security institutions have been guaranteed, the campaign turns into development. Building capabilities for communities to achieve social and economic sustainability within the law, and building the permanent presence of all state institutions is the objective.
This is a step beyond civic action campaigns aimed at winning hearts and minds. Whereas medical, educational or other types of civic campaigns might be temporary, providing some benefits for the population in a specific moment, the aim of local development is sustainability through time, reducing dependence on particular state actions and empowering local communities. This is why this type of COIN approach can also be referred to as develop-centred counterinsurgency. It is this particular component of current COIN theorization that makes to the elimination of criminal war economies part of an overall strategy to defeat insurgents. As it will be seen in the case of Colombia, this approach was valuable for the fight against FARC during the administration of Alvaro Uribe.
Counterinsurgency beyond the state: looking to the future
History demonstrates that the practice of counterinsurgency has been almost defined in state-centric parameters. Insurgents have traditionally challenged the government, the regimes and institutional structures of particular states.
the state-centric paradigm in terms of insurgency is crumbling. Globalization and the spread of communication technologies have created opportunities for insurgencies to extend beyond the boundaries of a single state, as it was described in the last chapter.
Chapter 4. The configuration of FARC as a commercial insurgency and the evolution of state responses
In the beginning, FARC’s capacity to challenge the state militarily was marginal, and its political dimension was expressed through the motivations of its members. Rebels fought because of real concerns of the peasant communities, especially regarding land possession and income distribution. As they evolved into a guerrilla movement, they created clusters of support in specific regions taking advantage of the sympathy demonstrated by local peasants.
The lack of development in marginal areas of the country, the inexistence of state institutions, and the peasant colonization of areas motivated by the coca boom created a perfect combination for the growth of a commercial insurgency.
At first COIN strategy lacked any doctrinal and systematic order. The state basically reacted with all available means and with excessive force not only against insurgents but also against the communities which hosted them. A tactic of depopulation was implemented in areas of strong insurgency presence: Settlers were expelled, houses were burnt down and the areas were bombarded (Pardo, 2004). In many occasions, anti-guerrilla units fought dressed as civilians or pretending to be guerrilla members.
Following global tendencies, as explained by the classic COIN authors, during the 1960’s information gained a central position in COIN. Intelligence and psychological operations were becoming as relevant as military actions. Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1966-1970) created a national intelligence and regional intelligence boards to coordinate actions at the national and local levels.
From self-defence to guerrilla resistance
During the early 1960’s, communists organized enclaves of peasant colonization with support of the PCC, after spreading their influence through the population with civic-military actions and propaganda (Matta, 1999). These were agrarian zones which rejected national authority and opted for a socialist order, with their own organizational and self-defence institutions. These zones were known as republicas independientes (See Map 2).
In Marquetalia, Tirofijoorganized its guerrilla group with strong support from the families in the region (Rizo, 2002). He launched an ‘agrarian guerrilla programme’ demanding the redistribution of lands allowing peasants to own properties. Guerrillas ceased to exist as self- defence movements to become groups of armed resistance. Through the 1960’s a different type of insurgency had flourished. It was not based on partisan identities as it was the case during the 1950’s but motivated by the ideals of social vindication, subversion against injustice, class struggle, and anti-imperialism
By 1965, 48 men had reconvened in Southern Tolima to celebrate the First Guerrilla Conference, a collegiate meeting in which FARC is officially founded, although it was initially named ‘Southern Block’. Basic plans of political, military, organizational, and propaganda actions were sketched, mainly with the objective of guaranteeing survival of the group. Since then, the ideals and discourse have followed an orthodox Marxist-Leninist doctrine
The emergence of a commercial insurgency
It was in the Seventh Conference in that FARC adopted a comprehensive strategy as a base to become a powerful commercial insurgency during the 80s and 90s. The organization is projected as a broader popular-based insurgency, promoting ideals such as mass struggle, open democracy with opposition, and popular participation in state decisions. Thus its new name FARC-EP (Ejercito del Pueblo or People’s Army) (Pizarro, 2004). The objective was to constitute a proper conventional-like revolutionary army with popular support.
A Strategic Plan was sketched during this conference to be further elaborated during the next 17 months. It was later approved by the Plenum of the Central General Staff (the second hierarchical assembly of the organization). It was a flexible eight year plan for taking power: if insurrection was not successful in the first eight-year cycle, strategic withdrawal would be followed by a second attempt. It blended a Maoist three step approach with the Vietnamese concept of Dau tranh (political warfare among enemy forces, enemy society and a group’s own civilian support base (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011). The plan required advancing towards major cities to isolate them. The most important was Bogota, the capital, for which the Eastern Bloc was strengthened, deploying troops through the Eastern mountain chain in order to surround it.
A plan of expansion was also established. It consisted in increasing recruitment and to ‘unfold’ existing fronts in order to create new ones, covering every single province. For this purpose FARC implemented systematic plans for recruitment, indoctrination and training of operatives; the indoctrination and control of civilian population; and the use of propaganda
Urban units would radicalize urban population intending to aggravate the contradictions of a capitalist society, and would gather intelligence and resources (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011). After the adaptations, FARC managed to advance from guerrilla warfare to the conduction of semi-conventional attacks.
But more interestingly, through the Seventh conference, the criminal dimension of FARC finally emerged, joining the political and military dimensions to complete the tripartite character of the commercial insurgency. The organization formalized its participation in the drug business with the establishment of a tax known as gramaje. It was initially a percentage of 10 to 15% from the quantity of the drug produced
by 1978 FARC opposed the Medellin Cartel and forbade peasants to cultivate coca. But such position eroded its support among peasants, given their increase dependence on coca leaf, so two years later cultivation was authorized only if they also cropped licit products. The tax was agreed in negotiations with the drug barons, and it generated a peaceful coexistence between the insurgency and the cartels, especially in the South.
The tax became ideal for FARC’s growth and expansion plans, and indeed provided the necessary resources for its strongest period during the 80s and 90s. The expansion derived from the Strategic Plan was only possible given such resources. The insurgency’s participation in the drug business became evident with the discovery of production complexes such as Tranquilandia in the jungles of the province of Caquetá, where the bulk of Medellin Cartel’s drugs were produced with protection from the insurgency. The joint operation which destroyed the camp in 1984 accounted for 16 labs, 7 airstrips, 7 airplanes and 7000 tanks with chemicals (Lizarazo, 2008, p.50).
From 1996 to 1998 they had gained total control of the local drug trade in Putumayo and Caquetá. They eliminated local drug dealers and introduced fixed prices for the coca paste. They forced farmers to sell only to the local Front of the organization, and began to store and trade large amounts of cocaine with envoys of multiple new micro-cartels (International Crisis Group, 2005). This is how interests in profiting from drug-dealing permeated the organization to create a commercial insurgency. Whereas some individuals continued to be motivated by the political goals of the organization, others became more interested in their own profits. Some could actually display both types of motivations simultaneously
The fight against narcotics and the insurgency had been understood as separate efforts. There was never a comprehensive strategy to eliminate insurgencies, disrupt criminal economies, and generate new sustainable legal economies with presence of state institutions. Programmes were not articulated with social, economic and political processes of the national level, being mere isolated and unsustainable efforts to eradicate coca leaf cultivation.
Years later, Carlos Lleras (1966-1970) implemented the Plan Andes incorporating university and school students as soldiers in groups with lawyers, doctors, dentists, engineers, vets, sociologists and economist to spread education in the regions, in a figure that resembled human terrain teams. 1000 soldiers and 328 professionals were incorporated in 10 Brigades for this purpose. Each soldier needed to teach 25 individuals (Torres del Rio, 2000, p.180). The plan was part of a military strategy to isolate insurgent groups, destroy the irreducible groups, and engage on consolidation operations.
Negotiations as a strategic base for growth
The period of rapid growth of the insurgency was possible not only because of the increase of its revenues via drug-dealing, but because of their strategic use of the spaces conceded by governments in times of negotiation. Such spaces have been useful to break the offensive of the Military Forces, to rest and re-group, to gain territorial control, to increase their political profile, and to reach international audiences.
Peace was seen by FARC as another strategic instrument for its objectives; an opportunity to grow and to gain political recognition at the national and international levels. Peace itself never seemed to be an ultimate objective, only an instrument for the real strategic objective of winning the war. “In short, despite their public discourse of reformist peacemaking, FARC leaders would remain uncompromisingly maximalist, stating that a truce ‘is a form of war and not a form of peace’”
With a stronger force, FARC proceeded with its strategic plan, occupying the Eastern mountain chain surrounding Bogota. Control wasn’t only expressed in terms of military presence, but also municipal control, the expulsion of state forces, the assassination of social leaders or opposing figures, and the dominion over public budgets (Pizarro, 2004). Overall, insurgencies grew 414% from 1981 to 1988
theTeofilo Forero counted on more combatants that any of the fronts in the South and with 250 of the most specialized combatants in irregular warfare, explosives, rural and urban intelligence. They were trained in the zona de distension (to be explained ahead), and sometimes even outside Colombia, by foreign experts, including members of the IRA and ETA
FARC emerged from support of the Communist Party, so the guerrillas were understood as its military wing (dimension). FARC depended on the doctrinal orientations of the PCC, while it determined their priorities of action according to the political context. In fact, as it was recognized by the Secretary of the Party, all militants of FARC were considered members of the PCC (Pizarro, 2011). The presence of Jacobo Arenas, a Party intellectual, as a leader of the insurgency evidenced the linkage.
At the Eight Guerrilla Conference in 1993, they opted for the creation of a clandestine political party, the Partido Colombiano Comunista Clandestino (PC3), to avoid the elimination of its members. The Party became a relevant structure for networked individuals to promote FARC’s political platform.
Both the PC3 and the Movimiento Bolivariano were political structures under command of the National Secretariat, a move that analysts have qualified as the organization’s abandonment of politics, or the subjugation of politics to the military.29Guerrilla leaders became both the military and the political commanders of the organization, and as such, they became part of both dimensions. As explained by Eduardo Pizarro, “FARC, after its break-up with the PCC and the creation of the MB, do not divide the political direction from the military direction, they are integrated in a single team: the National Secretariat”
In operational terms, FARC recurred to large columns in order to engage military units which had spread out, thinking they were facing small groups (Ospina, 2006). It would make about twenty simultaneous attacks, eroding the ability of the military to discern the dimension of each of them, and in the end only one would have the battalion-strength that ultimately overwhelmed the camp.30 It was a people’s war technique observed in Vietnam and El Salvador. This became known by FARC as the ‘new form of operations’ which included stages of siege, hit, occupy and retreat.
As former Minister of Defence, Rafael Pardo, explained “the combination produced by resources from coca crops, the training and the close relation with tens of thousands of coca cultivators, gave a territorial, financial, military and social base to this insurgency, which took its political capability to a level never witnessed before.” (Pardo, 2004, p.540) This is a clear expression of the triadic character of FARC, and an example of how the dimensions coexist to make the organization stronger.
Julio Cesar Turbay (1978-1982) enacted the Security Statute, which conceded wider powers to the military to investigate and judge civilians, and more autonomy for the Forces to operate. It was designed to confront insurgencies but also to control popular sectors of society and trade unions. This obeyed to the widening of the conception of enmity into that of an ‘undefined and non- localized’ enemy, meaning that not only fighters in mountains and jungles were to be considered as such, but also civilians in cities or in certain social or political organizations (Torres del Rio, 2000). In other words the counterinsurgent included a wide number of elements of the environment, not necessarily members of the insurgency, as part of the political or the military dimensions, which needed to be fought accordingly.
A total of 82000 individuals were arrested (Galindo, 1999, p.170-171). Abuses committed by the military without any rejection from the administration generated a sense of illegitimacy (Torres del Rio, 2000). The Statute was thus widely rejected because of its violations of Human Rights, and especially because of the control and judgement of civilians by the Military. As a result, Turbay revoked the Statute not only because of its criticisms but because results of its application were not positive
Pastrana’s approach consisted more on negotiations than confrontation. He granted an area in South-eastern Colombia, roughly the size of Switzerland, without military or state control for the insurgency to convene in safe conditions. The area became known as the zona de distension. (See map 4) The idea was strongly opposed by certain political figures and sectors. The Military supported establishing a zone for negotiations, but rejected the removal of all military and police forces in the area.
Negotiations, once again, failed. No ceasefire was contemplated during the process so terrorist attacks, kidnapping, and cocaine production were constant. Furthermore, FARC practically transformed the zona de distencion into a sort of parallel state: They enacted decrees imposing taxation, served as judicial authority for disputes between civilians, and built roads and airstrips for cocaine trade. In fact, coca cultivation areas increased
They changed military operations: “instead of running around chasing guerrillas, [the Army] and [the Military Forces] got inside FARC’s strategic decision-making loop.”31 They realized FARC had two centres of gravity, its finances and its units; the latter since they did not count with a mass base of support.
After the operation in Mitu, and from 1999 to 2001, a series of operations would prove that the Military Forces were gaining the advantage while FARC was losing its initiative. General Ospina has explained such a dynamic with a graph that became known as the ‘Ospina Curve’, in which he observed the number of casualties of the military forces through time to determine how strong FARC’s operations where (See figure 4.1). It is evident that from 1999 the insurgency’s capacity decreased progressively.
Democratic Security Policy and widening COIN
As it was argued before, Alvaro Uribe added a very valuable element to the fight against the insurgency: an understanding that such a fight is not an exclusive responsibility of the Military but of all state institutions, and that strong political authority was necessary to conduct a real comprehensive strategy to defeat the insurgency. The strategy was based on a very basic principle: that authority and state institutions should extend to all of the Colombian territory. It became known as the ‘Democratic Security Policy’ (DSP).
The DSP intended to eliminate the insurgency from all of territory by fighting it in their strongest areas, extending the coverage of the National Police to every municipality, destroying illicit war economies, building state institutions, and guaranteeing processes of sustainable development for the population in remote areas. In COIN terms, it meant the application of a clear-hold-build model in which Military Forces would act to clear areas of insurgents, and many other institutions would contribute with the second and third stages. The Policy set five objectives:
- 1- Consolidate state control of the territory
- 2- Protect the population
- 3- Eliminate illicit drug trafficking
- 4- Build and maintain a credible deterring capability
- 5- Efficient and clear accountability
With a clear comprehensive strategy, political will, sources, and knowledgeable commanders, the state was ready to severely damage FARC.
The Department of Special Joint Operations (JOEC) was created as an instrument to share information between Military Forces, Police and DAS, specifically on high value targets: the members of FARC’s Secretariat. Each of the targets was assigned to one of the institutions which would gather all the intelligence provided. The JOEC did not produce intelligence; it worked as a coordination centre to process intelligence provided by the Forces, and to count on the logistical, human and technical resources necessary to act against such targets in due moment. On the other hand, former guerrilla members who demobilized and decided to cooperate with the government to obtain benefits provided specific detailed information about their units and commanders, generating valuable intelligence for the planning and execution of key operations.
Changes in the intelligence structure along with increased operational capabilities guaranteed military success against the insurgents. According to Santos, it was “the perfect union of joint intelligence, capacity of immediate action and political decision.”
From 2002 to 2009 there were 12,294 demobilizations of which 1128 were middle rank commanders with over 10 years of experience; an increase from 1 in 27 in 2002, to 1 in 3 in 2008.
The demoralization of FARC’s combatants became evident through the testimonies of those who defected. It was shocking for guerrilla fighters to see the abysmal differences between commanders, who live in relative luxury, and common troopers whose living conditions were appalling, opposing the ideals of a Marxist organization. Demotivation was also created by the inexistence of a viable project guiding the insurgency, by a sense of nostalgia for family and friends, and by the impossibility of having a family while enrolled.
Applying development-centred COIN
the Presidency created the Centro de Coordinación de Acción Integral (CCAI) to coordinate more than 20 governmental entities involved. Before the CCAI, state entities acted by themselves, with no coordination or without following any strategic central guidelines. But with the agency, once an area was stabilized and ready for consolidation, a task force with of institutions coordinated by CCAI would evaluate regional needs to design an inter-institutional plan for its development.
FARC’s conditions by the end of the Uribe era
FARC’s response to the strongest offensive in history, in military terms, consisted on a strategic withdrawal and re-concentration in areas of the South, more specifically in the provinces of Putumayo, Caquetá, South of Tolima, North of Cauca and Huila, and taking over the control of specific corridors.
Main activities were displaced to border regions, especially with Venezuela, Ecuador and Panama, to provinces such as Arauca, Norte de Santander and Chocó.
Vertical coordination between the Secretariat and the fronts, and horizontal between similar units (inter-blocs or inter-fronts) was significantly eroded given the interception of communication systems and the obstruction of strategic corridors. (Fundación de Ideas para la Paz, 2009). In Maoist terms, FARC was forced to return to the strategic defensive stage when it had almost advanced towards strategic stalemate, at least in several regions.
In 2008, Alfonso Cano, a former student of Anthropology at the National University in Bogota, launched a strategy known as the Plan Renacer Revolucionario de las Masas in order to adapt to the context imposed by the counterinsurgent. The new commander had always emphasised Gramscian ideas about conceding maximum importance to the political elements of the struggle, the work through masses, urban action and the international front (Mendoza, 2008, October 30). More than remaining as an isolated war-prone army-like guerrilla located in marginalized areas of the country, he believed the insurgency should be an expression emerging from communities and even from society as a whole, fighting for the grievances of specific social sectors. Correctly interpreting social realities such as the increasing urbanization and the construction of new spaces of political action, he intended to build a more politically-focused insurgency, diffused among Colombians and blending with society, in order to conquer new social and political spaces of participation.
It was evident that the conquest of political and social power could not be achieved in rural areas anymore, and it couldn’t be done exclusively through military means. Political and social action became necessary in order to build support of the masses and of specific social sectors; FARC needed to have individuals (nodes) in the cities, spreading its discourse, and acting in their favour. It became necessary to work through all types of social organizations, political movements, NGO’s, and local communal boards.
As it will be explained in the next chapter, several of FARC’s adaptations under Cano can be better explained through the paradigm of networked insurgency than from the traditional model of insurgency: flexibilization and urbanization of military structures, engaging on swarming more than in frontal combat; increasing the invisibility of forces; and strengthening political networks, especially in major cities.
In military terms, FARC was recurring to guerrilla tactics, harassing Police or Military units in isolated regions. It prioritized the use of landmines as a defensive tenet and as a mechanism to guarantee territorial control. Mined camps of hundreds of squared meters had appeared in the South, East and Southwest, more specifically in Meta, Cauca and the lower valley of the Cauca River in Antioquia (Avila, 2009, p.26). In the offensive, the insurgency decided to avoid frontal confrontations and resort to the use of snipers. Sniper attacks nearly doubled from 87 in 2007 to 177 in 2009
At the zona de despeje Cano launched an ambitious political project, a movement known as Movimiento Bolivariano por una Nueva Colombia (MB), which was to become a political platform for the expansion of Bolivarianism as a popular movement of mass support. Since the foundation of this organization, political networks became increasingly relevant for FARC as it will be detailed in the next chapter
FARC was also recurring to the ‘invisibility of its forces’. It opted for blending more strongly with civilian communities by having its combatants wearing civilian clothes and living in towns and municipalities. It was also transforming its strategic rear-guard from jungle areas to social spaces.
The level of support at the national level was practically non-existent. The organization was perceived as lacking direction and a political motivation, being moved only for economic benefits. Its discourse was observed as incoherent with its actions. While proselytising about being warriors fighting for people’s needs, they turned against the people, attacking civilians and communities.37 Indiscriminate violence, kidnapping, assaulting municipalities, and using landmines were common actions of which most victims are civilians. It had practically lost its international support, while its lack of legitimacy was considerable even among students, unions and NGO’s (Baron, 2006).
Chapter 5. Networks and structures through the primary environment
The objective of this chapter is to explain FARC’s political, military and criminal structures in what has been denominated the ‘primary environment’ (Colombian nation and territory), observing the relation of the system with its environment through several variables: exploitation of empty spaces, connections with social and political organizations, sympathy from of non-organized individuals, and the accommodation of secretive non-public nodes.
One of FARC’s features has been its historical observance of Marxist-Leninist principles of organization, command and control. The processes and flows of orders and information have followed strict hierarchical patterns. In other words, FARC had functioned as a traditional guerrilla, with its combatants wearing uniforms, organized as platoons and battalions in jungles, mountains or zones where state presence had been weak. This has been clear for the military dimension, but when structures of the political or criminal order are observed, networks more than hierarchies seem to explain their form and logic more appropriately. As it was explained in the first chapter, structures and networks are not static through time, they are evolving and nodes are in constant change. The offensive of the Uribe administration pushed rebels into a series of adaptations that could be explained from a networked model of insurgency.
Such adaptations include the flexibilization and decentralization of military structures, recurring to smaller, more flexible and mobile groups, applying ‘swarming’ tactics instead of concentrating big masses to fight ‘conventionally’; the increased diffusion of nodes through Colombian societies in order to conquer political and social spaces, mainly expressed through the urbanization and the invisibility of its forces; and the strengthening of political networks through interconnected nodes acting both openly and covertly in specific social and professional spaces in order to create favourable environments for the insurgency.
For these explanations, the present chapter addresses first the transformations of military structures, followed by the analysis of political networks including the Partido Comunista Colombiano Clandestino and the Movimiento Bolivariano.
In similar terms, they have occupied specific geo-strategic areas of great value, in many occasions related to drug traffic routes, such as the Perija region in the Northeast, not only relevant in terms of coca leaf plantations but also neighbouring Venezuela. With the strong offensive of the Uribe period, communications between members of the Secretariat, but especially between FARC Commanders and Blocs and Fronts, were disrupted. The possibility to move freely through the territory was truncated, generating a command and control crisis within the organization.
Commander Alfonso Cano implemented new measures following the principles announced in 2008 under his Plan Renacer. The Plan comprising 14 points proposes dispositions on operations, politics, and its international strategy. Those regarding operational adaptations include:
- – Using guerrilla warfare as a response to the Democratic Security Policy
- – Increasing mined camps as a means to stop the advance of the Military Forces
- – The use of snipers with high precision rifles type VD or Dragunov
- – The obligation of new insurgents to carry on terrorist attacks in urban and rural areas.
From these ideas, three specific military strategies were developed:
- Increasing the process of organizational decentralization, with the creation of new sub-structures, the creation of new commands and new operational forms.
- Prioritizing mobile guerrilla warfare instead of massive operations.
- Differentiation and specialization of military units either in combat or for supplies.
This included the professionalization of insurgents.
This is how structures such as Unidades Tacticas de Combate (Tactical Combat Units -UTC) and Comandos Conjuntos de Area (Area Joint Commands-CCA) also known as interfrentes orminibloques,were implemented (Pizarro, 2011). CCAs are smaller that blocs but bigger than fronts, and thus more efficient in tactical withdrawal to maintain communications and preserve the line of command with fronts
The implementation of the Plan changed the strategic scenario for FARC, its operations in smaller, more flexible, capable and professional units led to positive results. Their objective of conducting surprise attacks against stationed units or small military and police patrols had caused an increased number of deaths since 2008.
this transformation allowed the insurgency to overcome communication problems between bloc commanders, and to absorb the impact of the elimination of FARC’s leaders. Command, control and communications worked in these circumstances because instead of having closed and continued procedures, which are typical of military organizations, they were flexible, and discontinued, giving relative operational autonomy to units.
In a personal interview with the Deputy Minister of Defence for the Uribe government, Sergio Jaramillo, he noted that by 2010 the risk of FARC’s atomization was considerable. The lack of internal cohesion would push the organization into a process of node criminalization in which smaller autonomous groups would focus mainly on profiting from the drug trade. Several fronts would disappear, others would merge and those strongly focused on drug trafficking would survive purely as drug cartels.
according to reports by the Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris, FARC has implemented a strategy to prevent atomization. In essence, it consists on having its structures specialized so that they generate relations of co-dependency. For example, the Compañia Movil Alfredo Gonzalez in Tolima specializes in explosives and landmines. This unit, composed by about 50 insurgents, gets its food from the 21st Front and its weapons from the 50thFront. The 16thFront in Vichada patrols and protects coca plantations, while the 39th Front goes to combat and the 1stFront makes the contacts for weapons smuggling
Military structures: urbanization and militia networks
FARC had seen the urbanization of war as a strategic goal for several decades. The insurgency would see social spaces as a new kind of strategic rear-guard; as a space to be conquered. For this purpose FARC counted on two instruments of particular importance, urban militias, which are set at the crossroads of the military and political dimensions, and political structures which obviously express the political dimension. Under this logic, FARC needed to exploit two particular variables to embed nodes through the primary environment: connections with social and political organizations and raising its acceptance by non- organized individuals and communities in the cities.
Although FARC had been a rural-based organization since its inception, it was in the cities where social and economic structural contradictions would become evident. It was logical then for the insurgency to exploit marginalized sectors to mobilize them in their favour and against the capitalist society. This is a clear reference to the need to gain the support from individuals and communities from specific social sectors, and to incorporate social and political organizations in their struggle (NGO’s, unions, student organizations, communal boards, etc.) As it was clearly stated after a plenary meeting of the High Command in 1989:
“That’s why our strategy has to go in the correct direction, where the contradictions of society are being noted. And these contradictions are not given in the same way or with the same intensity everywhere, but in the big cities and urban centres with the highest population density. (…) There the contradictions are not only given in terms of work-capital but at the same time, all contradictions, and if this is so FARC has to give a fight in the area of stronger social- political conflict”
Militias are defined as a “mechanism of political and military work; they have their own structure and are directed by the Central High Command and the High Commands of the fronts and blocs. They are armed by FARC but constituted by civilians. [Militia members] have a political and a partisan life, they live from their jobs, in their houses and with their families, and they are not committed to remain in the organization as FARC members do.” (Ferro & Uribe, 2002, p.55) They have also been defined as an “armed body with civilian camouflage, who are ruled by the same guerrilla statutes, and as such, every militia member is a potential guerrilla member”44FARC officially defines them as “a military organization that welcomes all persons whose physical integrity and interests are threatened by the reactionary repression, the dirty war and its disastrous consequences.”
It must be understood that the structure, although similar to a proper military organization, does not imply operations through a conventional distribution of forces in the field. The levels of command and flow of information may be consistent with a typical military structure, but in tactical terms, they resemble more a set of interconnected nodes approaching targets in different manners. In that sense, swarming explains their tactical behaviour better than conventional operations through battalions and squadrons. Urban militia networks are usually developed in marginalized areas of the cities, and once they gain control, they impose order engaging in murder, extortion and terrorism.
The dual military/political character of the militias can be demonstrated through their types of meetings: one to study, discuss, and agree on activities and tasks related to the political, economic, cultural and social situation of their area; and another for proper military purposes
The importance of militias and urban networks became so evident that Admiral Cely placed them at the heart of FARC’s strategic action: “FARC’s new strategy is based on its militias, and there we find the popular and Bolivarian militias, the PC3, the MB, the Juventudes Bolivarianas, which is that invisible enemy that hurts the youth, and that is looking at schools and universities.”
Political networks
A more urban and networked model of insurgency would be insufficient if only militias were to conquer the cities. Military structures may perform relevant functions, but in order to gather support of the population much more was necessary. As it was said, FARC needed to increase its sympathy through communities and individuals, and to establish connections with existing social and political organizations in order to become a real mass movement according to its objectives; this, especially, taking into account specific social sectors observed as its potential base for growth… But not all political structures were determined to serve as the instrument to build a mass social movement of support for the insurgency. One of the organizations, the Movimiento Bolivariano por la Nueva Colombia (MB) was in charge of this mission, thus exploiting the variables that have been mentioned. But the Partido Comunista Colombiano Clandestino (PC3) was a clandestine closed organization of infiltrated nodes, spreading across the primary environment not through the support from other actors, but by accommodating secretive nodes in specific scenarios.
Files found on Raul Reyes’s computer demonstrate that the MB and the PC3 were not the only institutions through which FARC was trying to build support from the masses to become a nation-wide political movement. Particularly, with students, FARC organized the Federacion de Estudiantes Universitarios FEU, an association of university students, and Federacion de Estudiantes Secundarios FES, for school students.51 But the former two were the widest and the most relevant.
The Partido Comunista Colombiano Clandestino (PC3)
There is a significant difference between the PC3 and the MB. Whereas the former is a clandestine organization of networked individuals who infiltrate diverse institutions, the latter is a semi-clandestine wide mass movement that incorporates diverse sorts of individuals, groups, and organizations. For that reason they display a different form of organization and command procedures, and they exploit different elements in the primary environment. Their implementation was ratified in the Plenary of the Central High Command in 1997
Three principles –secrecy, compartmentality and verticality– rule PC3 networks. Secrecy guarantees the existence of its members, giving them “protection towards the outside, making its location unknown to the enemy, but allowing their ideas and claims to be known” (FARC-EP, n.d.d, p.18). Compartmentality is an internal measure that contributes to the secrecy of the organization. “It is the fractioned truth, known to individuals only according to their participation in the conduction of their tasks.” (FARC-EP, n.d.d, p.18) Verticality explains the direction of the organization, its hierarchy. Processes follow a top-down logic, not a bottom-up initiative. “Different organisms are directed from the top to the bottom. They work separately from others, and only those responsible establish contacts with staff under their command and with their superiors.” (FARC-EP, n.d.d., p.19) In that sense PC3 networks are directed and do not follow an emergence logic that is typical of complexity.
The PC3 is defined by the insurgents as the “most elevated expression of ideological, political and organizational unity of the working class and of all Colombian workers. It is the superior form of organization and its part of the vanguard of the revolutionary and insurrectional struggle for political power and the construction of socialism. (…) It is inspired by the revolutionary thought of El Libertador Simon Bolivar, [and his principles of] anti-imperialism, Latin American unity and people’s welfare.” (FARC-EP, n.d.e) It has also been defined as an “orthodox communist party, of clandestine and compartmented character. It is a pillar for FARC’s strategic plan and the urbanization of conflict.”52
The purpose of its members is to infiltrate diverse organizations in government, security institutions, private companies, media, universities, NGO’s, international organizations, unions, social organizations, and to comply with specific requirements in order to contribute with FARC’s objectives. They carry on with their normal lives, in their offices and their homes, without other individuals, not even their closest family members, noticing they role. This is why, by contrast to militias, members of the PC3 are “mostly professionals or qualified political leaders.”
The member of the PC3 who was interviewed explained that there are three Party types or branches in order to reach the intended audiences. These are the Agricultural PC3, which spreads through the countryside penetrating peasant organizations and unions to direct them in favour of FARC’s causes; the Industrial PC3, determined to ‘capture’ the labour unions in companies, corporations and enterprises in order to have them acting in favour of the organization; and the University PC3 to recruit students, promote FARC’s ideas through younger generations, create cells and penetrate student groups.
The structure of the organization allows for the principles of secrecy, compartmentality and verticality to be strictly followed. Members ignore who other nodes beyond their cells are, even if they are placed in the same organization. They might actually know each other and constantly interact among themselves without knowing they are part of the same clandestine organization. They ignore what other cells are doing.
Cells follow a General Plan for action in order to infiltrate different institutions according to the profiles and contexts of its members. Ideal targets of infiltration are state security institutions, the Military Forces, National Police and intelligence agencies; communication media; international cooperation NGO’s; and financial institutions. Ideal scenarios of political intervention are schools, universities, labour unions, social organizations and local communal boards.
Orders and directions from FARC commanders will flow down to the cells through the organisms, while proposals and concerns from the militants will flow up to commanders. Through the structure it is possible to coordinate the execution and assessment of plans and tasks
Explaining how the militias and the PC3 interact in their own spaces, the PC3 member compared the militias as being the Police, controlling spaces and providing security, and the PC3 being the social-political power, controlling the Communal Boards of Action, and its Committees for Education, Health, Public Works, Sports, and most importantly the Conciliation Committee, which deals with the resolution of conflicts and conciliations between members of the community. He admits sometimes there are tensions between the militia and PC3 members, especially with the Bolivarian Militias given its political character, but given its nature it is always the PC3 who has precedence.
If network theory is brought into analysis, it is possible to argue that this is a directed network given the flow of information (commands) from the top to the bottom of the chain, and the centralized control by the High Commands. Evidently nodes in the lowest level are not acting freely with other nodes, except for the members of their own cells. In that sense, it relatively follows the logic of Christakis and Fowler’s telephone tree model but without the tree spreading arithmetically by two nodes from every node. Rather the spread is limited according to the structural parameters which have been described. Command procedures explain the flow of information through the structure in the form of the tre
Although not very flexible, given the difficulty to join the network and the lack of linkages at the lowest levels, the network is very resilient in the sense that random attacks will not destroy the network itself, both because of its structure and the principle of compartmentality.
Movimiento Bolivariano por la Nueva Colombia (MB)
As already explained, by contrast to the PC3, the MB was created as a wide movement, opened to all individuals and groups of diverse tendencies and beliefs, which share the ideals of FARC. It is though as a movement for the masses to create viable political spaces. The idea of this type of movement is not new, and it can be traced back to the Seventh Guerrilla Conference in 1982:
“We will begin the construction of the BOLIVARIAN GATHERING OF THE PEOPLE, (caps in original text) a wide organization, without statutes or regulations, opened to the participation of those patriots who want to fight for a new Colombia, and in Bolivarian countries, those who share the objectives of liberty for which Bolivar fought.”
In the Zona de Despeje in San Vicente del Caguan, in April 29, 2000, it was officially launched. It is described as a “wide movement without statutes, regulations or discriminations, with the exception of the declared enemies of the people. It does not have offices and its headquarters are in any place of Colombia where the unsatisfied live”
Determining the structure of the MB is not as easy as with the PC3 given its character as an opened movement. According to FARC’s documents, the base of the MB should be constituted by “millions of Colombians members of clandestine groups, of multiple and varied forms such as circles, boards, workshops, malokas, families, unions, combos, brotherhoods, lanzas, groups, clubs, associations, councils, galladas, parches, barras, working groups, mingas, guilds, committees, and all the forms that their members want to adopt in order to guarantee their secrecy and compartmentality.”60 This groups, formally referred to as nucleos bolivarianos are the equivalent to the PC3’s cells, the basic structure of operation in the lowest levels.
These cells are supposed to spread through the nation, but especially through the social sectors listed above in the declaration. These sectors constitute the potential space for MB network growth. These individuals, members of diverse organizations and part of specific social sectors, are potential nodes of the organization. This is how the variables of sympathy from non-organized individuals and connections with social and political organizations can be observed as a mechanism for the placement of nodes of the insurgency through Colombian societies, or for the growth of insurgency itself. Through these mechanisms the border between the insurgency and the primary environment becomes blurry.
Each nucleus selects ten candidates and those with the highest results are asked if they want to assume their position (FARC-EP, n.d.g.).
In that sense the network, following Arquila and Ronfeldt’s idea, might look as a combination of different types of networks. A general structure could look as a power-law or scale-free network with hubs displaying a higher amount of connections and random linkages among its nodes. Nodes can be individuals, but also, groups, cells, and small organizations. Clusters might be formed around dense organizations and given the secrecy of particular groups or cells, cliques are likely to be common through the network.
The emerging bottom-up logic contrasts the directed flows of the PC3 networks. There is, of course, leadership, but the type of leadership is different.
Alfonso Cano used to send opened messages in the form of videos through opened channels such as YouTube or Google videos, and posting them in the Movement’s websites.61 However, the organization is not entirely ‘command-free’ and there seemed to be some planning and coordination. According to official documents “the MB is being constructed under the direct orientation of each Front in coordination with the Command through the planning and assessments of working plans with each of the clandestine structures”.
As explained by MB militant ‘Julian Rincon’ from the Nucleo Francisco Miranda “we made ourselves known through culture, art, academia, labour unions, gangs, parches, groups; in infinity of expressions aimed at the development of an objective, and that is the unity of popular sectors to fight for the points of our platform.”
As it can be evidenced from the videos uploaded to their websites, the militants of nucleos bolivarianos are always active and present in events of student mobilizations; they repetitively appear in public universities through the country, and they make special activities to commemorate special dates, such as the anniversaries of the foundation of the MB.
According to this data, and if calculations made in the regions of the Omega Force are extended to the country as a whole, then 8000 to 10,000 active combatants being 30% of the organization would speak about 26,666 to 33.333 members of the organization including Bolivarian and popular militias, members of the PC3 and the MB.
Criminal Networks
In the case of FARC’s criminal dimension, its nodes have a wide participation in the lower levels of the cocaine production-trade chain, and this is possible given the development of a war economy in particular marginalized regions of Colombia.
There are several types of nodes through the chain according to their functions, explaining the process itself and the participation of FARC in the business:
- Coca growers and collectors. They include raspachines (scratchers) which are generally poor individuals from other regions that move to producing areas in search of some economic stability and who scratch the coca leaf in order to process it.
- Extraction of crude coca paste from the coca leaf, performed by peasants with very basic instruments in makeshift laboratories, usually known as ‘paste laboratories.’
- Purification of coca paste to coca base in a different type of laboratory, still very basic in technical terms, referred to as ‘base laboratories ́ or ‘kitchens’. It has been learned, however, that in certain cases the ‘paste’ and ‘base’ stages are done in leaf- to-base laboratories (Casale, 1993). FARC taxes peasants that produce coca base.
- During the first years of FARC’s participation in the business, coca base was sold to intermediaries (commission agents) in the regions where the base was produced. FARC also taxed commission agents.
- Such intermediaries sold the coca base to agents who would travel to remote areas to take it to ‘crystal’ laboratories owned by drug-dealers. However, by the end of the 1990s, FARC had eliminated intermediaries assuming sales themselves.
- Coca base is transformed into cocaine hydrochloride, in a technically sophisticated laboratory that requires a certain level of chemical expertise and materials. Usually owned by drug-dealers, laboratories are usually known as cristalizaderosor ‘crystal’ laboratories.
- Once the process is done, cocaine is taken via air, land or river, to consumption centres, where micro-traffic begins or to shipment points for its exportation.68 FARC taxes not only the coca base producers and agents, but also the traffickers which used land strips in their areas of control. When towns and small municipalities developed around the cocaine economy, FARC also used to tax companies of the services sector (Vargas, 2005).
- Exporters send products to international transhipment points in Mexico, Central America or the Caribbean and West Africa, from Colombia or Venezuela. There, they are distributed to grand consumer markets.
- Distribution groups or cells in overseas markets receive shipments and distribute the product to wholesalers.
- Wholesalers distribute to retailers
- Brokers provide critical linkages between the nodes by introducing participants from different groups (Kenney, 2007).
- Money launderers receive illicit proceeds from wholesale or retail transactions and clear them through the system (Kenney, 2007).
As it can be seen, FARC’s involvement had always been restricted to the lowest stages of the chain, but its level of participation differs from region to region
It has been argued that they operate as an armed monopoly imposing the price of coca base on peasants and growers; controlling routes of precursors, coca, cocaine, guns and ammo; and exchanging drugs for weapons.
“Narcs, terrorists and counterterrorists form distinctive social systems characterized by complexity, adaptability and hostility. Trafficking and terrorist systems are complex because they contain large numbers of actors who interact with each other (…) the Colombian trafficking system contains hundreds of smuggling enterprises and law enforcement agencies in the US, Colombia and other countries.” (Kenney, 2007, p.15)
There are several advantages that drug dealers find in this type of structures. Their workers are segmented, meaning that they don’t have to learn about the entire operations system but only about their specific tasks. If several of them are eliminated, then it is possible to recover the lost segments easily.
A very important feature is the decentralization of decision-making, providing a degree of resiliency from targeted attacks. If a particular head of an organization is captured or killed, activities will continue since there will be more heads who will be in capability of making decisions
FARC as a networked insurgency
It is not appropriate to argue that FARC constituted a networked or complex insurgency in a strict sense by the end of the Uribe administration. Evidence is not sufficient to support such a claim; by 2010 the organization was still marginal within Colombian society, and its hierarchical character still determined patterns of organization. However, under Cano, FARC did incorporate several elements more typical of a proper networked-complex insurgency than of a traditional rural isolated guerrilla, further exploiting connections with political and social organizations and elevating the sympathy towards the insurgency by communities and individuals, especially through specific social vulnerable or marginalized sectors as described in the MB’s manifest.
Through evidence collected it is not possible to confirm that Cano intended to turn the organization into a more decentralized and loose organization. But he evidently understood the importance of conquering spaces of social and political participation, exploiting all sorts of instruments to build mass support, in order for FARC to become a real popular movement. In that sense, although the organization is not a networked insurgency in strict terms, several of its components can be explained under such a model.
Militias and political structures were intended to clearly blend with society, making the borders between the system and its primary environment blurry. They allowed the embedment of FARC’s nodes through communities, in several cases without individuals noticing their affiliation. From within, they could spread FARC’s ideas and recruit more militants to be added to the networks. In the end, insurgents had the appearance of normal civilians, but acting against the state and in favour of the insurgency.
Peña described this evolution as “the creation of a new type of combatant, a civilian combatant with sufficient training and cohesion to develop military operations and to return to its daily activities, making recognition by the Military Forces much more complex.”(Peña, 2011, p.229) This description is very close to the idea of a combatant in a networked or complex insurgency, as it was explained in the first chapter.
This organization, given its wide, opened and inclusive character, gives the insurgency all the potential to become an interconnected insurgency, or at least to increase the number of FARC’s interconnected members and supporters –nodes–. Their members can be anywhere, in many organizations, in marginalized communities or they can be part of specific social sectors as described in FARC ́s open invitation to join its movement.
The Military Forces began facing a significant challenge because of their impossibility to make an objective difference between combatants and non-combatants. When they patrol a town or municipality, and they were attacked from civilian’s houses, they could not respond with fire without breaking principles of international humanitarian law and without being widely criticized.
in practical terms, it is difficult to define to which dimension nodes belong to. It was earlier explained that although Bolivarian Militias belong to both dimensions, PC3 and MB nodes are part of the political dimension. But through time, they may end up involved in military tasks, proving the interdependence between the dimensions. Since members of the MB also go through military training, it is possible to think about them as a sort of military reserve, which could become active according to the decline of regular combatants.
If we put together the military training received by members of the MB, their possibility to join war, and the wide and opened character of the organization, then we have to at least consider the possibility, or the potential, of individuals from marginalized social sectors to become combatants. In such case, an image of interconnected nodes acting in their spaces, in their cities, through small groups, resembles the model of complex or networked insurgency.
Marginal entities might still represent a considerable threat, generating instability, putting people and assets at risk, and causing real havoc in the countries where they operate. Given the right conditions and depending on their actions, they might even grow to incorporate more elements in its environment. It must not be forgotten that, in theory, insurgencies begin as marginal entities and they gain support and legitimacy through the process.
Chapter 6. Node embeddedness and structures through the secondary environment.
Nodes placed beyond Colombian borders become central to the analysis in the interest of determining to what extent they could offer the opportunity for FARC to survive or to re- emerge when national counterinsurgency operations are offering positive results.
Government support, although very favourable for node placement, is not a necessary variable, and through alliances with armed actors, connections with social and political organizations, exploitation of ‘empty spaces’, and the accommodation of secretive nodes, insurgents can be safely embedded. On the other hand, it explains that the combination of all the variables, especially through the exploitation of empty spaces, create the right conditions for the placement of hubs and clusters.
The International Commission and a first configuration of networks
Initial entry to a foreign country was explained through the accommodation of secretive nodes in specific social spaces. But as they began to act politically, interactions with other actors increased. Their permanence in those countries, then, began to be explained through other variables such as their connections with social and political organizations.
In this construction three variables interact: An individual, or several individuals, are embedded as secretive nodes in other societies. In their host country, they identify a number of individuals which display sympathy for the insurgency. Together they create a group, cell, or organization, probably affiliated to others with similar ideological views. They will promote FARC’s ideals and struggle to incorporate more militants to their organization.
It was only with the Eight Guerrilla Conference in 1993 that the idea of an International Commission took form as a “linkage between FARC and leftist political parties, social organizations, labour unions, human rights organizations and non-profit foundations”, mainly in South America and Europe
The International Commission (COMINTER) was an idea of Raul Reyes. Together with Rodrigo Granda and Liliana Lopez Palacio (alias Olga Lucia Marin), who joined Reyes at the top level
of the Command structure, he defined the mission and objectives of these networks:
- Contacting government officials, parliamentarians and NGO leaders, to obtain their support and to achieve recognition by relevant political sectors.
- Interacting, in FARC’s name, with national governments such as Venezuela, Cuba, Brazil, Mexico, Nicaragua and Costa Rica.
- Participating in conferences, forums, gatherings, meetings, political, social and student workshops, on hemispheric and global levels.
- Establishing support groups in each of the countries where FARC is present according to the political context and the assigned tasks.
- Creating and managing instruments for the diffusion of information in other countries such as websites, magazines and radio stations.
- Establishing contacts with leftist movements, radical anarchist parties, insurgent groups, and networks of weapons trade.
- Administration of FARC’s goods in other countries.
- Contacting associations of political refugees and solidarity groups.
- Engaging in university studies and postgraduate degrees in universities in Europe and the United States in order to achieve their infiltration.
- Designing ideological campaigns of recruitment and disinformation about the Colombian conflict and the illegality of Colombian institutions
Reyes set as essential objectives to reach “the European Parliament, the US Congress, the Latin-American Parliament, the Central American Parliament, the Amazonian Parliament, the UN, the Sao Paulo Forum, the Bolivarian People’s Congress, the Bolivarian Continental Coordinator Committee, the World Social Forum, Universities, Churches, media, journalists, workers associations, agrarian and popular movements, cooperatives, Indians, black communities, women’s and youth organizations, and to participate directly and indirectly in gatherings, seminars, meetings and all type of activity where they could promote their project.”
It could initially be thought that given the description of Comintern’s role, the networks were developed in function of the political dimension. But that is not the only case. Insurgents were not only conducting political tasks, in practice they also performed military and even criminal duties. They wouldn’t participate directly in violent actions, but in general sense they “established contacts with weapons and explosives traffickers and forged links for narcotics trade, infiltrated social organizations or universities to gather support, through NGO’s they created linkages for intelligence cooperation, and in the end, they spread insurgency propaganda.”
This structure of ‘embassies’ was supported by a network of media and communications linkages which included online agencies to spread FARC’s news and communiqués. Examples are Anncol, the most important source of propaganda, based in Sweden; Kaosenlared; farc-ep.org; resistencia.org; the Bolivarian Press Agency; and even a radio station, Cafe stereo, also based in Sweden.
even without government approval of an office, FARC’s militants in Costa Rica where able to develop different types of contacts, making this country one of the first hubs for international action.
They managed to reach labour unions and human rights and student organizations such as CODEHUR, FEUCR, FEUNA, ANEP and CUT (Rojas, 2008). According to Berrocal, there were two key groups of FARC’s nodes, the Asociacion Centro de Integracion Cultural Colombia- Costa Rica, established in 1997, and the GAIF established between 1994 and 1998
it has also been argued that Costa Rica served as a space where Colombian, Mexican and Dominican mafias met, proving that the networks are also relevant for the criminal dimension
A second and more important theatre for international action was developed in Mexico. An office was created with government’s authorisation and it was led by Olga Lucia Marin and Marco Calarca. They established linkages with organizations such as the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), the Mexican Communist Party, the Ejército Popular Revolucionario (EPR), and several media companies. This country became a new hub for FARC’s international action. According to research conducted by Jorge Fernandez, the office was not only useful for political purposes, but also to forge ties with drug cartels. He explains that since 1997 there was communication with the Tijuana Cartel, with which a weapons- drugs exchange agreement was reached
Raul Reyes and other five guerrilla leaders had the opportunity to visit several countries in Europe for 33 days in 2000, including Spain, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Italy and the Vatican. They were able to establish contacts with leftist leaders and to gain sympathy from different political and social sectors through the continent (Perez, 2008).
After this period, FARC’s networks extended to Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, Paraguay, Costa Rica, Canada, France, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway and Portugal (Perez, 2008). Its operatives were actively establishing contacts with radical and leftist movements, political parties, and human rights organizations. They were participating in academic spaces, and in general terms they were promoting FARC’s vision of the Colombian conflict, gaining support through different social sectors. Media and communication channels became highly instrumental, with the special role of FARC’s journal, Resistencia, created in 1999, which included articles of leftist Latin American thinkers
Appendix 4 describes FARC networks developed by the Comintern, but it must be clear that representing it as a static structure might not be rigorous, since they had been in constant evolution through time. Nodes change from place to place, they disappear, they are replaced, and new ones are added to the structure. Delegates are changed from country to country depending on the political conditions, and in other cases they are captured and replaced by others.
The rigid hierarchical structure tightly controlled by Reyes, however, gave way to a more loose set interconnected cells and NGO’s spread through diverse countries and mainly composed by Europeans. They were more effective than Colombian expatriates given their knowledge of the environment (International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2011). Although Colombians continued establishing contacts for military and criminal purposes, NGO’s became the front for political actions. Through those NGO’s it was possible to reach several social and political spaces and to spread FARC’s views more easily. But this structural arrangement does not necessarily mean that the command was unaware of cells’ actions. When Reyes moved to the Colombian-Ecuadorian border, he was able to establish direct links with most of these supporters
In Spain, Leyla Yolima (alias Manuela) was in charge of the creation of a support group and the recruitment of young activists
nodes in each of the countries would develop specific tasks. In Spain, it was through Remedios Garcia Olmert (alias Irene) that cells become functional. She was relevant for logistics, obtaining visas for guerrilla members, moving funds, but also for political duties as establishing contacts and the diffusion of journal articles (Arrazola, 2008). She had a direct communication with Raul Reyes and other members of the Comintern such as Gualdron, Orlando Higuita (alias Orlando), Ovidio Salinas (alias Juan Antonio) and Rodrigo Granda (Arrazola, 2008).
Several arrest warrants have been issued for European citizens because of their connections with FARC: four Spaniards, two Italians, one Dane, and one Australian (Europa Press, 2008, August 3). It is believed that between 2000 and 2008, the Spaniards acted as coordinators for the Comintern in the Iberian Peninsula and Central Europe, and participated in events in Germany, Switzerland and Spain. The Dane citizen was identified as ‘Carlos Mono’ who was arguably one of the most effective agents of FARC’s networks in Europe, moving around Copenhagen, Oslo and Stockholm. Information indicates he established contacts with at least 10 labour unions in Denmark and others in the United Kingdom.
According to Europol, Colombian expats would be in charge of information, training and the creation of clandestine cells to trade weapons and drugs more easily. The Organization believed FARC could have been planning the creation of a delegation office in Brussels, Amsterdam or Paris.
Although most of the linkages for criminal and military purposes were established by Comintern delegates or Colombian expats, Europeans organized in cells, NGO’s, or organizations, contributed with the political activities. In the end, the pattern through which three variables allow for the construction of these networks becomes evident: members of the Comintern who were secretly placed in each of the countries identify individuals who are able to contribute in the host country, and through the creation of support groups and NGO’s political action is maximized.
Through the creation of the Movimiento Continental Bolivariano, the insurgency’s networks beyond borders were reinforced, especially, but not uniquely in terms of the political dimension.
Strengthening networks: the Movimiento Continental Bolivariano
From 2003 FARC’s transnational networks grew, not necessarily extending through more countries but increasing the number of nodes and connections in the Americas and Europe. It is clear that networks developed by Comintern delegates, and their support groups, were political, military, and even criminal in their functions. But the multiplication of connections experienced since 2003 would be mainly, but not uniquely, political.
It was through the emergence of the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela in 1999, and the subsequent rise of other leftist governments, that FARC found a favourable environment for a regional projection. The creation of an international organization, the Movimiento Continental Bolivariano (MCB) became a platform to spread its discourse, gather support, and strengthen links with different types of actors through Latin America.
The dynamics created by MCB networks ratify the idea previously introduced: governments might play a key role in the placement of nodes within their territories but they are not vital. Other variables, which were listed before, can actually contribute more to the placement and preservation of nodes beyond borders.
The MCB emerged initially as a mechanism to coordinate efforts between Bolivarian and communist organizations, known as the Coordinadora Continental Bolivariana CCB. The advantage of this construction was that ‘Bolivarianism’ as such is not a carefully defined doctrine but a series of basic principles related to South American political reality, so wide that they can be observed by movements or organizations with diverse philosophical backgrounds. Bolivarianism had married Marxism-Leninism, creating a tent for leftist organizations and movements to meet in a similar, yet not identical, doctrinal ground.
In a personal interview with Commander Wilmer Castro Soteldo, Governor of the State of Portuguesa in Venezuela and one of the leaders of the 1992 military coup with Hugo Chavez, he defined Bolivarianism as a broad set of ideas extracted from the discourses and works of Simon Bolivar, from which particular principles can be deduced. These include:
- Anti-imperialism, directed against Spain during Bolivar’s campaigns, but applied now to Western world powers and their capitalist system which exploit the Latin American nations and its resources.
- Latin American Union, as it was Bolivar’s great dream to constitute a single nation out of all of the provinces that were liberated from the Spanish empire, and today even as counterweight to the United States.
- Equality and welfare, which is interpreted as the justification of socialist ideas.74
Rather than being an objective and strictly defined political doctrine, Bolivarianism is more a common background for political action of diverse agents. Hence its famous motto ‘in Bolivar we all meet’. This explains why movements, organizations and individuals from varied doctrinal backgrounds on the Left of the political spectrum find a powerful symbol in Bolivar’s image.
“The CCB is work of FARC and the Movimiento Bolivariano, Bloques Jose Maria Cordova and Caribe. Comrade Alfonso, as head of the movement, has been informed of these steps, as had been the Secretariat. As I informed in a past email, the first plenary of the executive committee was made in one of our camps, which defined specific tasks that are being developed today. Among other tasks we have the creation of the Movimiento Bolivariano, organization of the CCB, in each country. This organization has already led protests in Ecuador and Panama.”
By December 2009 the CCB had evolved into the MCB, becoming a transnational Latin American political movement which brought together several organizations and individuals from the hemisphere which agreed with the ideals and propositions of Bolivarianism. With its headquarters in Caracas it already included “1200 delegates, counting with the representation of 30 countries and a diversity of political, social and cultural organizations.” (Agencia Bolivariana de Prensa, 2010)
It had a clear structure: The Executive Committee, later renamed General Secretariat, composed by fifteen Honorary Presidents listed in figure 6.2 who became notable speakers in favour of the insurgency through the hemisphere, most especially Narciso Isa Conde and Carlos Casanueva. A foreign legion named officially the ‘International Region’ in which individuals from the Basque Country, France, Spain, United States and Canada participated. A Continental Regional Direction composed by five members of the Regional Directions:
- – Brazil
- – Great Colombia: Colombia, Panama, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia
- – Caribbean: Cuba, Puerto Rico, Dominican Republic, Haiti
- – Mexico: Twenty social and political organizations and two FARC support cells.
- – South: Argentina, Uruguay and Chile.
According to the MCB’s website, each of these countries is a national chapter by itself.
In principle, the idea of NBAFs was to reach social and political movements to have them working in favour of FARC’s objectives; almost like a job of infiltration and manipulation. Member organizations of the MCB are not in principle FARC’s allies working in the insurgency’s favour. They might have joined the Movement in order to pursue their own particular interests. As such, the insurgency needs to have them acting according to their plans.
In order to articulate FARC cells in different countries with the MCB, Raul Reyes set a common model of organization in 2007 for all groups. It included specific defined positions for individuals to be in charge of specific areas:
- Political Secretary
- Education, Security and Documentation Centre
- Finances
- Organization and Bolivarian Press Agency
- Coordinadora Continental Bolivariana (Perez, 2009)
Marquez was involved on MCB’s activities since the beginning, given his permanent location in Venezuela. So after Reyes’s death, it could be said that he became the head of FARC’s international actions.
It is now necessary to turn into the analysis of the elements that have allowed for the establishment of nodes beyond borders. These variables are government support or permissiveness, linkages with social and political organizations, connections or alliances with armed actors and the exploitation of empty spaces. As it has already been analysed the accommodation of secretive nodes was relevant in an initial stage for the construction of support groups in each of the countries.
Government support or permissiveness
Government support is not only the first variable that comes into mind when we think about foreign elements that contribute to the safe placement of insurgents beyond borders. It is also the most valuable source in order for militants to be protected in the medium or long term. In the case of FARC, this was evident in Mexico. Through their public office they were able to establish contacts and spread their discourse more easily.
But this was obviously not the only government FARC intended to contact. Antecedents were positive with Nicaraguan President, Ariel Ortega, after he visited Manuel Marulanda at the Zona de Despeje to decorate him in name of the Sandinista party.
In an email signed by Granda, Bermudez and Rojas, they explained that the Cuban Ambassador believed “[President] Daniel Ortega is in full disposition to help [the insurgency] with whatever possible” (El Tiempo, 2008, August 27). Ortega was even considered as an intermediate with the Libyan government for the purchase of weapons (El Tiempo, 2008, August 27).
Nicaragua became one of the main spaces for the preservation of nodes. Even when it is not possible to empirically demonstrate FARC and the Sandinistas are allies, it is impossible to deny that this type of actions contributes to the flexibility of its networks.
But the most significant cases of government support, or permissiveness, by 2010, were Venezuela and Ecuador, with Hugo Chavez and Rafael Correa. Their relations became evident when files of the computers of Raul Reyes, which were retrieved in the attack to his campsite, were made public. In the case of Chavez, contacts began in 1992 and increased after he was released from prison in 1994, time when he received 100 million Colombian pesos (US$ 150,000) from the insurgents (International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2011, p.47). By 1996, contacts were revived, and by 1998 Chavez reportedly participated in several meetings of FARC’s 10thFront, while several of his aides met with Marco Calarca in Caracas (International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2011).
Chavez appointed a high official, Ramon Rodriguez Cachin, later to be Minister of Interior and Justice, to be his personal representative to FARC, dealing personally, directly and in secret with the insurgents in all matters. In August 1999, Chacin negotiated a memorandum of understanding with the insurgents, approved by Chavez, which went beyond a clause of non-aggression. It appeared to give FARC and advisory role within the Venezuelan administration; it facilitated the security and development of Venezuelan Border regions; and it opened communication channels between the Secretariat and Venezuela’s government and Armed Forces (International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2011). FARC agreed to
“provide intelligence on other criminal groups, violently oppose this groups in Colombia, abstain from violent operations in Venezuela, seek authorisation for training of any armed groups. In return, the Venezuelan government would provide help with health care, safety for operatives on Venezuela soil, unspecified ‘special support’, and various arrangements to trade energy resources with FARC and to launder money through investments in agriculture, housing and finance.“ (International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2011, p.60).
But from 2002 to 2004, there was a period of tensions with Chavez given their ideological differences and marked by the lack of progress in their relations. Secretariat member Mono Jojoy called Chavez “a deceitful and divisive president who lacked the resolve to organize himself politically and militarily, he scorned the corruption of Chavez’s political associates and dismissed [Chacin] as the worst kind of bandit” (International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2011, p.83). During this period FARC was even attacked by the Venezuelan Military forces (International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2011, p.89). In 2004 FARC made two mistakes which cause a more permanent rupture: On one hand, an attack in the State of Apure killing five Venezuelan soldiers; on the other, when Colombian operatives abducted Rodrigo Granda in Caracas, FARC reacted badly arguing that elements of the government had contributed.
From 2006, however, relations seemed to have improved given Chavez insistence on the reconstitution of the historical linkages and the appointment of a new envoy, Julio Chirino. Comprehensive agreements seemed to have been reached with Generals Cliver Alcala and Hugo Carvajal, and although during that year Chavez was still ambivalent towards FARC (camps were still being attacked) by 2007 the relationship had been restored. According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), it was during this period that Chavez began to perceive the insurgency as a strategic ally in his geopolitical agenda, conceding immense territorial benefits, and agreeing to provide the insurgency with US $300millon (International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2011).
Meetings with Comintern members, including Marquez and Granda, began to happen in Caracas. A stronger commitment from Venezuela was demonstrated by several initiatives: Chavez’s attempt to reconcile FARC and the ELN, full support for FARC’s quest on the status of belligerence, and the creation of special rest areas in the border. All of these were supposed to be given in return for the training of Venezuelan Military Forces in asymmetric warfare, which became the paradigm of Venezuelan security doctrine (International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2011). By the time of the attack of Reyes’s camp in Ecuador, relations between the insurgency and Chavez seemed to be booming, but there is no information of the relation between both actors after the attack.
In the case of Ecuador, evidence demonstrates that officials from Correa’s government established contacts with insurgents. During Correa’s political campaign, FARC established communications with one of his aides, Jorge Brito, to whom they provided US$ 100,000. In return, Brito offered “and ideologically appealing programme of government, high level diplomatic relations, ‘means of reciprocal assistance’, Ecuadorian neutrality in the Colombian conflict, and a reduced armed-forces presence on the border” (International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2011, p.29). According to James Lockhard-Smith, a researcher at the IISS, Correa received the funds and most likely knew about their precedence. He cites a demobilized guerrilla member who was in Ecuador and held conversations with Correa who was apparently aware of negotiations (El Tiempo, September 21, 2011).
Although there were genuine signs of permissiveness towards FARC, which allowed the insurgency to place nodes in its country, “the relationship between FARC and Correa had not been consolidated and indeed could be seen as embryonic. Each party sought to manipulate the behaviour of the other to its own advantage, but without displaying the commitment or compromise typical of a real strategic alliance.”
The closure of the Mexico office in 2002, fifteen years after its creation, was a setback for their international strategy, but also a condition for the demonstration of how resilient, flexible and adaptable the networks were. Reyes ordered Comintern operative Marco Calarca to create two support groups in the region of Mexico City, in order to maintain their relations with parties, organizations, universities and movements. As a consequence, the Ricardo Florez Magon andLucio Cabañas cells were created, continuing the tasks of the Comintern
openly, they operated through student groups at the Universidad Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM) where there were at least 30 cells, mainly from the Simon Bolivar Lecture at the Department of Philosophy and Literature, one of which was led by Lucia Morett, a survivor of the attack on Raul Reyes’s camp (El Pais, 2008, May 10). These groups are said to be close to the Movimiento Francisco Villa linked to the Partido de la Revolucion Democratica (PRD).
Connections with Social and Political Organizations
As opposed to linkages with governments, which may vary according to the political context, more permanent relations were established with social and political movements. FARC had made contact with about 400 organizations, including NGO’s, revolutionary leftist movements and legally established political parties (Martinez, 2011). Comintern operatives began setting contacts, but through the MCB interactions increased considerably.
Organizations which nurtured the existence of militants in other countries were existing ones, but also those constructed by loose individuals who came together in order to work in favour of FARC’s agenda. In that sense it is possible to observe how sympathy from non- organized individuals is in fact useful to embed nodes beyond borders. As it has been explained, there are individuals in several social contexts which, for some reason, agree with FARC’s agenda. If they want to take action they can either join an existing organization or create a cell affiliated to the movement. That’s how their contribution is more solidly expressed.
In Chile, Manuel Olate (alias Roque), a former member of the Frente Politico Manuel Rodriguez FPMR and coordinator of the MCB in Chile, visited Raul Reyes at his camp in Ecuador several times. According to intelligence information, in July 2004 Reyes demanded from ‘Roque’ the creation of “two clandestine cells to allow the administration of resources for FARC’s activities.”(Infobae, 2011, March 17). He was captured by Chilean authorities and was requested by Colombian justice in extradition.
According to emails, the insurgency even trained several PCV operatives during 2006 and 2007 (International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2011). But these were not the only organizations which established links with the insurgency. There was also communication with Patria Para Todos, Movimiento Quinta Republica and the Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo(International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2011).
The favourable atmosphere created by Chavez and other political organizations was enough for FARC to set the MBC’s headquarters in Caracas. After Mexico and Costa Rica, Venezuela became the new hub for FARC clusters to develop. The office in Caracas was coordinated by Ivan Marquez, Rodrigo Granda and his daughter Monica, as members of the Cominter. But these were not the only elements that favoured the embeddedness of FARC nodes in this country as it will be explained ahead.
In a similar case, FARC nurtured strong connections with the Ejercito del Pueblo Paraguayo EPP for over a decade (El Tiempo, 2010, April 27). After an investigation by Paraguayan officials it was evident that FARC had trained EPP units and supported the organization in the kidnapping and assassination of Cecilia Cubas, daughter of former President Raul Cubas. One of her assassins, Osmar Martinez confessed to have links to Bolivarian organizations through the Congreso Bolivariano de los Pueblos. According to Villamarin, FARCs support also led into the creation of mobile guerrilla units in the municipality of Juan Caballero and mobile militias in the outskirts of the capital, Asuncion. He describes the organization of networks in the location of La Marquetalia, district named after the municipality were Tirofijo created his first communist enclave, and where Police is said to have no access. He describes 16 bases, each of which is led by a political and a security leader.
Empty Spaces
Empty spaces allow for the expansion of the networks of the three dimensions, political, military and criminal. Embedding political nodes is of course important for the insurgency, but the possibility to place combating military nodes in spaces where they are safe, is almost priceless. Empty spaces also have the potential to serve as the theatre for connections and alliances with other agents, governments, social and political organizations and armed actors on the long term, because given the lack of strong presence of state’s institutions, the insurgency engages in processes which gradually and increasingly make it an authority in the area. This attracts the attention of other agents or individuals in the region that will feel attracted to the insurgency (sympathy), legitimizing its actions. In these spaces they create the conditions for hubs to be embedded and to build insurgency clusters. B
More than being a safe haven, Venezuela had become FARCs new hub and a territory for the development of insurgent clusters. According to the information provided by the Government with full evidence, there were 1500 insurgents organized in 28 camps
Luis Fernando Hoyos, former Colombian Ambassador to the Organization of American States, stated that “Venezuela had become a place for the meetings of international criminals, from where they plan attacks, trade with drugs and weapons, and perform kidnappings.”(El Tiempo, 2010, July 22). The empty space was favourable for FARC to interact with armed groups, to provide training to the FBL and to strengthen links with organizations like ETA.
It was learned that FARC met members of ETA at Ivan Marquez’s camp in 2003. They taught Colombian insurgents on the use of explosives in return for training on combat techniques and shooting.
A Colombian intelligence report also indicates that Grannobles, Marquez and Timochenko had direct linkages with several individuals in powerful positions, businessmen and social and education organizations (El Espectador, 2010, July 15). The mayor of the Municipality of Libertador, one of the districts of Caracas, Freddy Bernal, was very close to FARC, and was even appointed by Chavez to serve as his representative
The Brazilian government recognized in 2003 that there were three FARC camps in the states of Parana, Matto Grosso do Sul and Boavista. (Villamarin, 2007) They served the purposes of training, trafficking and even projecting force through the Amazon (Villamarin, 2007). A report from Correio Braziliense points at the existence of a second level commander in Brazil identified by Colombian counterintelligence as Ocyuber Sanchez (alias Hugo Mal Ojo), with the mission of acquiring weapons, uniforms, and supplies. He was in contact with Brazilian drug dealer Fernandinho Beira Mar (Sequeira, July 25, 2006).
As it can be seen from the examples, empty spaces might happen because of the unwillingness of a state to fight armed actors in the region, or because of its incapacity to build a stronger institutional presence. It might be difficult to evaluate which is more significant for every case, but the consequences are clear. The insurgency finds opportunities for its military, political and criminal nodes to create connections with different sorts of agents. Given the relative lack of opposition, the scenario is ideal for the configuration of new insurgency clusters, and the embedment of hubs (insurgents with a higher amount of connections). The important question, once again, is what does this mean in terms of insurgency survival or reconfiguration?
Node embeddedness and network characteristics
The alleged support from Chavez to FARC is not the only reason why this country had become, by 2010, the main territory for the development of guerrilla clusters. It is the combination of all the variables, government approval or support, connections with political and social organizations, linkages with armed groups and the existence of empty spaces, which allow for the insurgency’s political, military and criminal nodes to be embedded in their territories on the long term, with a relative level of security.
Governments constitute the ultimate source of support for insurgencies. It is with their acknowledgment, channelled as protection, material support or lack of confrontation, that insurgents find it easier to survive. However, this support is not a necessary condition, and even when governments oppose guerrilla presence in its territory, networks can be developed. Now, when this is the case, when the central government is not an ally, political networks, more than military, are likely to be developed, through contacts with particular social and political organizations. This can be evidenced through actions of all MCB chapters in different countries, which speak favourably about FARC.
But networks are also flexible and adaptable in the sense that militants can move from place to place without altering their flows, especially in the case of hubs (senior members of the Comintern which have the higher amount of connections).
Flexibility can also be observed from the mobility of hub scenarios, from Costa Rica to Mexico and later to Venezuela. The internal flexibility that nodes enjoy in each of their countries can be exemplified with the re-accommodation of Mexico’s nodes after the closure of FARC’s office.
Chapter 7. FARC as a regional actor and the survival of its structures.
Conditions in the environment contributed not only to the preservation of such nodes, but to give the networks a degree of flexibility, resilience, redundancy and adaptability. These conditions include the preservation of the ideology and political discourse, and the mobility of elements of the criminal economy.
These processes create the possibility for militants to engage with any of the dimensions, through node politicisation, criminalization and militarization as defined in the second chapter. As such, in order to avoid the survival and re-emergence of the organization, the counterinsurgent needs to develop a strategy to address elements of the three dimensions simultaneously, while acting in regards to elements placed beyond borders.
Complexity tells us that systems are opened; that the system (the insurgency) is in constant interaction with its environment (Latin America), in a process of co-evolution: the insurgency is changed by the environment, while the former contributes to variations in the latter. In that sense, the extent to which environmental conditions allow the survival of the insurgency depend on how deeply intertwined the system and its environment are, and how blurry the boundary between the primary and secondary environments is.
There are three scenarios:
- Transnational networks of a national insurgency
- Insurgency as part of a regional revolution
- Transnational insurgency
In the first case, FARC would count with militants in several countries but they would exist in function of the Colombian internal conflict. Even when certain operative functions extend to other countries, the objective would still be action in Colombia. There would be no regional common agenda, and alliances with other organizations would express solidarity but not a shared objective.
In the second situation, FARC would be part of a wider continental uprising in which several actors, movements, organizations and rebel groups pursue the same objective. FARC would not be alone in its struggle neither would Colombia be the only theatre of confrontation. Bolivarian governments, extremist parties, movements, and armed rebels would come together in a single borderless effort to implement political systems according to their ideals. This hypothesis has been considered within official and academic circles. It is popular through the Latin American right, and it was common in Colombia during the Uribe administration. The Sao Paulo Forum is seen as the space where such efforts are coordinated
In the third case, FARC would constitute a transnational or regional revolutionary army by itself. There would be connections and alliances with other actors but they would be either local agents, operating in a national scenario, or actors pursuing a different regional agenda. In a similar way to the second scenario, the objective of the organization would not be explained exclusively through the logic of the Colombian conflict, but through wider dynamics in the region. This means that FARC would also target other governments opposed to its revolutionary cause.
It is here demonstrated that by the end of the Uribe administration, FARC remained as a national insurgency with transnational structures. Although its objectives remained purely national in terms of fighting the Colombian state and not others in the region, their operations have expanded according to the spread of its military, criminal and political networks. This expansion has given FARC the opportunity to survive and re-emerge, even when its objectives remain primarily national.
the paths for survival and re-emergence of the insurgency would be evident since the environment would provide all of the necessary elements for this to happen. FARC would be waging the same war with other regional actors; and Colombia, the main US ally in the region, would be the common enemy and the strongest obstacle for the FSP regional agenda. The relation between the system (FARC) and its environment (the region) would be stronger, meaning that as an opened system the line that separates them would be very diffuse. Given the strong interaction and cooperation with all sorts of regional actors, it would be difficult to determine which elements actually belong to the insurgency.
If counterinsurgency operations in Colombia destroyed FARC, or reduced it to its minimum expression, it would be coherent to believe that such actors would provide all possible support for militants in their countries to re-engage with the struggle against the Colombian state.
The real scenario: node preservation
Evidence demonstrates that the ‘regional revolution’ scenario was not real, and in that sense the preservation of nodes depended on each of the variables introduced in the last chapter, for each of the types of nodes (political, military or criminal).
Secretive nodes, given their obvious lack of open interaction with the environment would be unaffected by the type of scenario. They would continue performing their functions, mainly criminal and logistical, in each of the countries where they were embedded. Finally, as it has already been stated, sympathy from individuals was an insufficient variable for the insurgency to place operatives through the secondary environment. As such, it was only valuable when it was expressed through other variables like the existence of empty spaces or the formation of social or political organizations.
Government support
Observing all leftist Latin American governments through the FSP lens is inaccurate. There are notorious differences, interest and priorities among them. To make just a basic distinction, which is not sufficient to explore differences in depth, there were at least two main tendencies: centre-left or social democracies and radicals and Bolivarianists.
Incompatibility between them was so evident that it was necessary for more radical governments to recur to smaller and more ideologically-sound coordination spaces. This is how the Alternativa Bolivariana para las Americas-ALBA emerged. It brought together the governments of Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua. In similar terms, it could also be argued that FARC’s creation of the MCB served as an alternative to a very wide and inclusive FSP. Furthermore, spaces such as the South American Union of Nations (UNASUR) which emerged as an idea of leftist governments, proved to be more effective in advancing regional agendas than the FSP itself.
Radical governments, as it was observed in the last chapter, were more instrumental for the placement of militants. Other leaders as Lula, Bachelet or Vasquez lacked an authentic ideological connection with FARC.
As Commander Castro Soteldo explained “we all have different interpretations of what Bolivarianism is. We have different interpretations of Bolivar, different visions, and different ways to drive our struggle. Not everyone wages war.”86 This is evident from the ambivalence that both Chavez and Correa demonstrated in its relation with FARC. During some periods they seemed to be more collaborative with the insurgency, while in others they were more confrontational, depending on what they were gaining from the relation. In the end, personal interests more than a common political or ideological vision of the region defined their relations:
“Chavez’s commitment to FARC has proved fragile for two reasons. Firstly, despite the overall strategic convergence, there is no firm ideological bond between FARC and Chavez, whose idosincratic and pragmatic approach to political problems has been perceived as incoherent and even alien to FARC. Secondly, the balance of power between Chavez and FARC has always been markedly unequal, with Chavez the stronger party. As a result, the president has not hesitated over the years to go back on promises made to the group, to distance himself from it, or even to harm its interests in Venezuela in pursuit of economic or political expediency.” (International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2011, p.56).
There are situations in which an alliance with FARC could be seen as counterproductive to Venezuela’s interests.
What becomes relevant for the present analysis is that under Chavez’s government the insurgency found the appropriate conditions for the expansion of its networks, transforming Venezuela into a space for the development of insurgency clusters and for the protection of hubs.
Two security analysts interviewed in Caracas were very clear in their coinciding opinion: ‘Venezuela had become FARC’s country’.
Political and Social Movements
Connections with political and social movements also demonstrate how the idea of a regional revolution scenario is unreal, but also how they are more meaningful for the preservation of FARC’s operatives. Field research conducted in Chile and Peru demonstrates that such connections do not constitute general strategic alliances on the long term given the disparity in their objectives. However, this does not imply that they do not contribute to the preservation of nodes in their countries.
In a personal interview with Manuel Castillo, Secretary of the Partido Comunista Peruano, he explained that the struggle of Communists and Bolivarians in Latin America was more a series of unbound national or local struggles with coincidences through the nations, than a single fight through the entire continent. In his words, “it is not a process where we are constantly agreeing on our actions; it obeys to each of our realities (…) the vision of Socialism is not necessarily common.”92
They were focused on the next elections and on political negotiations to retain local and national-level seats. Objectives beyond this panorama, he believed, are simply too idealistic.
Dialogues could have been produced in several countries, in order to listen to insurgency representatives. But this does not imply the establishment of long-term alliances or even processes of cooperation between agents. On the other hand, sectors or individuals within the organization, as opposed to the organization as a whole, could actually feel a stronger sympathy for the insurgents and they could have engaged on a more permanent interaction.
In sum, FARC’s political nodes were present, active and performing their tasks through connections with specific members of diverse political and social movements, and through the MCB. Although mainstream communist parties were affiliated to this Movement, smaller and more radical social and political groups were more likely to be closer to FARC’s operatives. They provided spaces such as academic forums, public conferences, political meetings, or street demonstrations, where FARC’s discourse could be spread in order to gather support and increase its legitimacy. Through these actions FARC could have won the sympathy of other individuals who would, in return, join the MCB or organize more support groups.
Alliances with Armed Actors
The idea of a unified South American grand people’s army, a ‘Bolivarian Liberation Front’, is also remote. Tirofijo set as an objective of the international campaign to “create a grand revolutionary army in the Americas with mass support to overthrow the capitalist system and implement socialism.”106 But by the end of 2010 this objective was farfetched. Although there were connections with several rebel groups through the continent, such as the EPP in Paraguay, MRTA and SL in Peru, FBL in Venezuela or Mapuche groups in Chile, the idea of a single transnational insurgent movement was still unthinkable. Most of the connections are explained more as operational alliances for the transfer of know-how than as a symbiosis of objectives and aims.
Most importantly, such alliances did not imply a long term placement of FARC’s combatants in other territories, since schemes of cooperation consisted on the temporary location of either the other group’s insurgents in Colombia, or FARC rebels in their territories.
In general terms, Chilean actors know that recurring to violence is not a positive strategy. As explained by Ivan Witker, for sociological and cultural reasons, rejection of the use of force in Chile is very high, and actors who recur to it are deemed to find more opposition than support.112 In that sense, political and social organizations would find connections to radical groups, such as FARC, more counterproductive than useful. If there were connections between members of the CAM and FARC, they were temporary and with the specific purpose of training.
Communists themselves believe that “Sendero is not a revolutionary group. If they had a programme, it was abandoned few months afterwards (…) it was dismembered into several groups which appeared to represent Sendero but were more the armed branches of drug dealers.”114Business alliances of mutual benefit between FARC and Sendero could help both groups if there are sufficient sources for the parties to make a profit, otherwise competition more than cooperation, could be the rule, as it happens in the West of Venezuela.
In general terms, then, marginality expresses the condition of FARC’s nodes both in other societies and through the region. Communists and other radical movements are not precisely the most popular tendencies in each of the countries (except for Venezuela). But insurgency nodes exist in conditions of even more marginality since their supporters are members or sectors within these parties, and at best, smaller and more marginal social organizations. In that sense, the emergence of a mass movement through the Americas was farfetched. But marginality, as it has been said, is not equivalent to non-existence, and threats to security could come from a marginal organization. Insurgencies, by definition, begin as a marginal phenomenon. FARC within Colombia is a fringe organization in terms of national popular support, and yet it was the most pressing issue in the national security agenda.
Empty Spaces
What we observe in an empty space is a process of co-evolution between the system and its environment.
She explained how units of the Venezuelan Military Forces “used its entire operative arsenal, including the suspension of border operations, to help FARC avoid Army action through a command chain that went all the way up to Miraflores.”
It is important to note that FARC’s presence and actions in Venezuela were extending further beyond the border with Colombia to inner states like Barinas, Guanare and Carabobo, and even to main cities where they built political networks and engaged in businesses.123 “There were cells in Barquisimeto, the Centre-West, and Barinas”124. The Venezuelan journalist who was interviewed mentioned the case of a shelter of FARC in the mountains of Yaracui, in Central-North Venezuela. She mentioned the training of militias, mainly for extortion and kidnapping, in an area extending from Carabobo to Central Venezuela.
The militias were yet another actor through which FARC could extend its influence in the country. In the opinion of Indira de Peña, militias are the “people in arms”. She calculates about 80,000 to 120,000 militia members who would supposedly be under FARC command in the event of an attack.126 It was learned that a high military commander ordered a governor of the state of Amazonas to organize a group of peasants and militants to be trained by the Army, FARC and the ELN.
As described by Roberto Giusti, “many NGO’s, cooperative social organizations, and criminal structures, emerged associated to FARC.”
Strong connections with political parties, businessman, social organizations and political figures is why, it has been argued, that even in the absence of a single regional revolution, the Venezuelan space had become not only the most important element for the clustering of combatants beyond borders, but the base for the reconstitution of insurgency networks. As Indira de Peña explains, “If FARC needs to be re-organized here they can find all they need.”
The re-emergence of a commercial insurgency
As it was demonstrated, by the end of 2010 FARC continued to be a national insurgency in terms of its position within the region. It was still fighting against the Colombian state and not to implement a revolutionary system through South America. However, in terms of its operations (military, political and criminal), it was becoming more transnational. The expansion of its networks created a window of opportunity for the insurgency to survive creating a serious challenge to the Colombian counterinsurgent.
Network theory, introduced in the first chapter, explains that networks do not collapse when a considerable number of nodes are disabled, or even when several of its hubs are destroyed. It was mathematically proven that about 5% to 15% of its hubs would have to be de-activated simultaneously for its destruction, but this is precisely what protection of nodes and hubs beyond borders prevents.
re-emergence occurs when dispersed nodes come together with some sort of organizational logic to re-engage with the three dimensions and to return to the primary theatre of operations.
As network theory suggests, networks are not static structures but evolving entities in constant change according to the conditions of its nodes and the influx of elements from the environment. Complexity tells us that systems are in a co-evolution process with the environment, meaning that the latter creates conditions that affect the system, stimulating change. In the case of FARC, the environment does not only create opportunities for the organization to place insurgents in other countries, it also allows a series of conditions that permit the flexibility, redundancy and adaptability of its networks.
Whereas Colombia was the base for aerial transportation of cocaine for decades, Venezuela became the new space from where almost all cocaine was flown into other destinations. The air traces presented in Appendix 8 describe the evolution of trafficking routes. The state of Apure in Venezuela, more than any location in Colombia, became the point of origin for almost all air traffic.
In specific terms of re-emergence, there are many possible paths depending on how the organization is being attack in Colombia, and on which elements manage to survive. It would depend on economic, political, social and strategic circumstances in the country. It can occur in one single moment, or it may happen gradually by dimensions. As in complexity, the direction of the system is undetermined and unpredictable, and presents no single path for the re-appearance of the insurgency in Colombia.
But the possibilities of re-emergence are also related to the processes of node militarization, politicization and criminalization, explained in the second chapter, through which all the dimensions of the commercial insurgency can be reconstructed. Militants focused on political activities in Colombia and other countries could suddenly become combatants. As it was observed in the fifth chapter, members of the PC3 and the MB were receiving military training, and according to an interview with a member of the PC3, they were ready to take up arms if the conditions justified it. On the other hand, a number of foreigners within the ranks demonstrate the will of non-nationals to join the organization.
Pressure was also pushing combatants towards the borders and especially to Venezuela. So the counterinsurgent did not only face the challenge of addressing the three dimensions altogether, but to confront the nodes of the three dimensions beyond Colombian borders. The state could potentially reduce FARC to the point of near-destruction within its borders, but to guarantee that the insurgency will not re-emerge it needs to implement control measures to mitigate the effects of those elements remaining in other spaces.
A potential future
It is important to consider a potential transnational scenario based on changes motivated by the implementation of Cano’s model.
It was explained in the fifth chapter that this model intended to turn the insurgency into a more urban political organization, more connected with the communities, and embedded within its society, exploiting the real grievances of marginalized or specific social sectors. International networks could become the extension of this model through other societies, allowing the organization to become a more transnational networked-complex insurgency with legitimacy and support within specific social and political sectors through the region. Such sectors would include marginalized communities, students, peasants, indigenous peoples, labour unions, political radicals, progressive organizations, communists, Marxists and extremists, possibly unified under the umbrella of Bolivarianism.
From this perspective there would be a connection between the internal and external dimensions. The line that divides internal and external institutions would become blurred; external cells and networks would be understood as extensions of national ones. The insurgency would be a grand single movement with the same kind of cells in Colombia and beyond borders; a massive set of interconnected groups performing similar functions through different social and geographical spaces. Political internal structures, the PC3 and the MB, would be articulated with support groups created by the Comintern and NBAF’s within the MCB. Furthermore, they could be understood as a single institution but with different labels. They would all be embedded through the region exploiting elements that have been discussed, in the hope of building a real mass movement.
A graphic vision of this model would be, very much as in the case of Al Qaeda, an interconnected group of individuals in a specific country motivated by the ideals of Bolivarianism and sympathetic towards FARC. They would engage in all sorts of activities in favour of the insurgency: blogging; spreading the discourse; recruiting more militants; organizing demonstrations; and using virtual spaces, such as the internet and social networks. Once again, Cano’s model is closer to the idea of a netwar, in which the political and military dimensions would overlap significantly, as combatants would be members of cells embedded within the population instead of isolated guerrillas in the jungle.
f commanders would observe and understand the current global social and political contexts, they would appreciate the potential that an insurgency could find in this type of models as a source of power.
The rise of the internet, the interest in social networks, the Arab Spring, the proliferation of student protests, and in general terms, the emergence of a wide global people’s movement with local expressions, constitute an enormous opportunity for the insurgency to become a mass political movement.Cano seemed to have recognized such importance:
“[We need to talk] to Senator Piedad [Córdoba] about the need to create a Party of the people and to look for its alliance with the Movimiento Bolivariano”
ARC is not the same now as it was before.”132 It exploits communication technologies and social networks. Its discourse spreads through different websites; political structures like the MCB and the MB are active in Facebook and YouTube; and FARC and commanders such as Hermes have twitter accounts.
Conclusion
To appropriately understand commercial insurgencies this dissertation introduced a particular narrative explaining the organization not as a monolithic entity with a single body, direction and aim, but as a system composed by individuals (nodes, in terms of network theory), which display differentiated interests and functions according to three dimensions of the organization: political, military and criminal. For this reason it was argued that commercial insurgencies display a triadic character of complementing dimensions. It is necessary to go beyond simplistic and reductionist perspectives to ‘open the box’ and discover competing and contrasting interests and functions of groups or individuals within the organization. An understanding of these entities through simplifying concepts such as ‘narcoterrorism’, terrorism, or criminality is insufficient to include all the elements at play in this type of situations.
Complexity teaches us that the system (the insurgency) and the environment are in constant interaction.
For analytical purposes the environment was studied through a categorization in which a ‘primary environment’ included the local and national levels, whereas a ‘secondary environment’ expressed the regional and global levels.
It was explained that through these elements combatants or militants who perform political, military or criminal tasks, can be embedded in the environment, through societies and territories beyond the borders of a single state. Their embedment in other social and geographical spaces depends on the type of functions they perform. In other words, not all variables are equally useful for the conduction of the three types of tasks. Some of them allow militants who perform political duties to act, but are not useful for the development of military or criminal activities. By contrast, other elements allow insurgents to conduct political, military and/or criminal duties.
Doctrines like Bolivarianism and Communism served more as a platform for the formulation of common principles for action within each state, than as the ideology of a single movement with a transnational agenda and coordinated agents throughout the region.
Traditional observations of FARC’s international dimension either underestimated the role of external elements, in the belief that they were irrelevant for the future of the organization, or overestimated them on the understanding that every agent in the Left of the Latin American political spectrum was part of a conspiracy to undermine the Colombian government.
It is interesting to observe, by contrast, that FARC had developed a political organization with secretive militants through the primary environment. The PC3, more than being an opened organization, is a political party composed of individuals performing clandestine activities where they operate. The MB is a semi-clandestine organization, so although its activities are public the identity of most of its militants is unknown. This is one of the differences between the primary and secondary environments.
whereas political organizations in host countries do not necessarily contribute directly to the embeddedness of militants who perform criminal or military tasks, their constant support and direct participation with FARC in political events, contributes to the stability of the cell. Individuals in the cell could well be establishing contacts for drug-dealing and weapons acquisition, without the knowledge or approval of members of other organizations
in terms of structure FARC was not necessarily a network, but it increasingly incorporated networked elements. As explained by netwar theorists, insurgencies are likely to be composed of a combination of hierarchies and networks; with different types of networks coexisting within the same organization. A hierarchy is strictly preserved through its military structure with centralized command and control. But increased flexibility was evident as conventional-like structures gave way to smaller, more mobile and adaptable formations. Swarming, more than frontal confrontation became a routine.
the evolution of counterinsurgency theory introduced in the third chapter explains the emphasis that should be placed on state actions. It is clear that military action alone is not effective itself. A focus on the population, more than on the destruction of the rebels, is more successful.
In the end, the solution is to build state institutions in those areas where their historical absence has allowed a parallel authority to appear.
Political networks had been the most difficult to confront. Their actions fluctuated between the liberty of expressing ideas in free-speech democratic societies, and the illegality of cooperating with violent armed agents. In judicial terms it will always be difficult to prosecute individuals based on their political beliefs or their association with a political organization, if there is no proven connection with an armed actor.
As counterinsurgency history demonstrates, repression of political thoughts is not only inconsistent with the principles of a democratic state; it has also been counterproductive, generally providing more justifications for the insurgency. Intelligence, more than force, becomes strategic when it comes to discovering and dismantling clandestine networks. Infiltration, penetration, and information operations are more valuable in this sense.
Targeting the general population through psychological operations aimed to delegitimize the insurgency is practically unnecessary. The lack of support of FARC at the national level makes it difficult to believe that Colombians are willing to join the insurgency en masse. But on the local level, and through marginalized social sectors which the insurgency is expected to exploit, information operations could be used in order to avoid an increase in recruiting for the insurgent’s political networks. This should not be done through indoctrination, but by raising awareness about the risks of becoming part of organizations associated with the insurgency, and the importance of acting through institutions which act fully within the law.
But political structures have a particular value. In democracies, insurgencies are illegal because they recur to violence, not because they display certain type of ideals or pursue particular political goals. The counterinsurgent could then stimulate process to strengthen the insurgency’s political dimension if that derives into the weakening of its military dimension. In other words, it could motivate insurgents to leave their weapons and to conduct their struggle through political parties. Counterinsurgency, once again, is not necessarily about physically destroying the enemy, but about finding a balance between different sorts of measures that will produce the end of violence.
The idea that ‘it takes a network to defeat a network’ could be understood as the need to include a wider range of actors.