From Peace and Conflict Review · Volume 6 Issue 1 · Year 2011 · Page 22
Written by Ethan Frisch holds an Msc in Violence, Conflict and Development, University of London.
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In April of 1965, Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, hero of the Cuban revolution, traveled with a group of Cuban fighters to eastern Congo to support the rebellion against the American- and Belgian-backed government. He intended to share his experiences from the success of the Cuban revolution with Congolese fighters by deploying experienced Cuban fighters alongside inexperienced Congolese recruits. He hoped the Congolese would learn by example, through a process he called ‘Cubanization’, and take on the Cuban fighters’ technical skills and revolutionary mentality. The Preface to his account of his time there, however, begins, ‘This is the history of a failure.’ Guevara very quickly realized that the context of the Congolese revolution was dramatically different from the one he had known in Cuba. The lessons he had learned in the mountains of the Sierra Madre were not always relevant to the Congolese context, and instead of the ‘Cubanization’ of the Congolese soldiers he had hoped for, he observed a ‘Congolization’ of the Cubans, as they adapted to the new environment and began to emulate their Congolese colleagues (Guevara, 2001).
First, I argue that insurgent organizational structure and subsequent strategic decision-making evolve organically, as a natural result of the organization’s short- and long-term goals, economic and social resources, observations and responses to the enemy’s behaviour, and other contextual factors. Second, I argue that the relationship between structure and organizational effectiveness is a product of context, and that in a post-9/11 global context of weak borders, wide-reaching media, centralized counter-terror networks and easy transportation and communication, a decentralized, international network is the most effective structure for an insurgent organization.
five key dilemmas of insurgent organizing: (1) action versus secrecy; (2) growth versus control; (3) recruitment versus retention; (4) success versus longevity; and (5) resources versus constituencies. Dilemmas are a widely used tool in organizational economics and psychology to understand the complexities of decisions that organizations face. They emphasize that choices are not binary and highlight the organization’s agency in negotiating the various challenges they face.
Insurgent organizations exist along a spectrum, from hierarchical to network structures. I introduce a second spectrum along which networked insurgencies can be classified, from local to international structures.
Definitions
For the most part, the use of the term insurgency implies an organized, armed resistance movement, and so for the purposes of this paper will be defined as:
A non-governmental organization working to affect social and/or political change through violent means against existing power structures and in a way that deliberately challenges the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.
It is also important to differentiate insurgencies from organized criminal groups, whose orientation is primarily towards profit-making.
Dilemma One: Action versus Secrecy
Simply put, any insurgency has two complementary operational goals: to carry out attacks, and to avoid getting caught. The inherent paradox of implementing those goals, however, is that the more attacks an organization carries out, the less secret the organization will be and thus the higher the likelihood they will be defeated.
Heightened secrecy can also have a detrimental impact on an organization’s ability to carry out attacks, as higher levels of secrecy can weaken internal communication and make it harder to coordinate operations.
as organizations emphasize easier internal communication, they become less secure and open themselves up to infiltration and leaks
Dilemma Two: Growth versus Control
As an organization grows in membership, geographical area and diversity and number of activities, the leadership must decide when and how to relinquish the high degree of control they exercised when the organization was smaller. Insurgent organizations, like business corporations, need more people if they want to engage in more activities.
As organizations grow, their structures also become formalized and fixed.
when centralized or decentralized organizations are attacked, each organizational form tends to become more extreme. In a centralized organization, further centralization can make it more vulnerable as the decision-making capacity become concentrated in fewer individuals. In decentralized organizations, a greater degree of decentralization allows the organization to spread to avoid irreparable organizational damage, continue to operate as smaller sub-groups, and to regroup after the attack has ended (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006).
Johnston argues that the key determinants of insurgent organizational structure are technology and geography. He describes a causal chain in which their interaction influences the type of organization that develops, which has an impact on the organization’s effectiveness.
The role of charismatic leadership is also important in understanding how insurgent organizations grow and change. Jordan, writing about leadership by analysing the assassination of insurgent leaders, finds that although charismatic leadership is key to the creation of a strong insurgent group, it does not determine the group’s ultimate survival and can actually be a hindrance as the group develops over time
two points relevant to the debate on insurgent organizational structure. First, they find that groups with charismatic leaders may resist bureaucratization and growth, and may even resist, at least implicitly, achieving organizational goals. If the leader feels that victory will force the organization to grow beyond his/her control or will remove the organization’s raison d’être, s/he may actually work to ensure that victory is not achieved. Second, they draw a distinction between groups that resemble armies and those that with semi-autonomous squads. They say that in the army-style groups, a loss of leadership always results in the group either being strengthened or collapsing, the group never stays the same or weakens
Groups are founded when charismatic leaders have a set of goals, and when the benefits of membership outweigh the costs for potential recruits. He also agrees that a major function of a terrorist organization is maintaining its own existence, and illustrates that an organization’s leadership needs to sustain the organization overall in order to sustain its privileged position.
Dilemma Three: Recruitment versus Retention
The recruitment-retention dilemma is a particularly pressing one for insurgent organizations
Recruitment is described as an extremely difficult endeavour, and retention is treated mostly as a form of what organizational economics calls ‘contract enforcement,’ focused on convincing members to fulfil their commitments. Actually, the challenge of recruitment is often more related to a lack of quality rather than quantity of recruits
Recruitment
There are three main, overlapping reasons that an individual chooses to join an insurgency: (a) because family members, friends, or other members of the recruit’s social network are involved; (b) because of personal trauma, including violence against the individual and/or his or her family members; and (c) because of deep religious and/or political conviction that inspires a willingness to fight and for a cause
Kuznar, in a wide-ranging psychological and sociological analysis of the reasons people engage in terrorist activities, highlights the significance of a sense of material inequality and lack of fairness as important motivators. He links those sentiments to deeper psychological feelings of resentment and humiliation, which both fuel the motivation to act violently, and create important social bonds with others who share those feelings.
Kuznar also emphasizes the importance of social networks as an important factor in an individual’s decision to participate in terrorism. He highlights the social isolation from mainstream society often felt by migrants… participation in terrorist activities may stem from a psychological impetus to be a part of a supportive group after migrating to an unfamiliar and alienating environment. His conclusions about the role of social networks in recruitment to commit violence is widely supported across the literature, and provide some insight into the non-economic reasons that people choose to participate in terrorist activities
Retention
The factors that contribute to recruitment, like strong social networks, grievance, and incentives also contribute to retention, and do not diminish with membership.
More importantly, access to recruits is a resource in itself, and one that is finite.
Another particularly difficult aspect of retaining group members is that the highest value recruits are also hardest to retain, both because of opportunities outside the insurgency…
The onus is also on the organization to build loyalty.
Dilemma Four: Success versus Longevity
insurgent organizations are primarily rational actors, and that the use of violence, including against civilians, is an effective political tool.
Abrahms disagrees with this conventional wisdom and criticizes the assumptions that underpin it, particularly that terrorist organizations engage in violence with the primarily political goals. He points out seven ways that terrorist organizations contradict the widely held assumption of strategic rationality. He argues that organizational survival and social connections, rather than the achievement of political goals, are the most important factors in the decision-making of terrorist organizations.
Resources versus Constituencies
Olson, writing about bandits in ancient China, presented one of the key choices facing all armed actors with an interest in resource extraction. He presents the ‘roving bandit’ as an armed group that attacks a village, steals as much as they can, and then leaves to do the same to the next village, and the ‘stationary bandit’, a group that establishes itself in a specific area and extracts a smaller, regular tithe from its residents. The stationary bandit will make less money in the short term, but ensures a steady flow of income over the long-term
Modern insurgent organizations often face a very similar dilemma. Weinstein outlines the link between resources, recruitment and organizational structure and behaviour. He argues that insurgencies are dependent on both social and economic endowments, the nature of which influence the organization’s recruitment, structure, goals, and leadership. The crux of his argument rests on the idea that an organization’s methods of resource extraction influence the individuals who choose to join and the way the organization behaves. An organization that depends on the local population for support will employ a ‘stationary bandit’ approach, and attract high-commitment recruits who believe in the organization’s ideology and will employ violence selectively. An organization with access to natural resources or external funding will attract low-commitment recruits who are primarily interested in profit and who have little regard for the lives or livelihoods of civilians, or in establishing a stable system of long-term tax collection. He also argues that the relationship between endowments and an organization’s leadership is mutually reinforcing: endowments shape the leadership’s behaviour, but the leadership can shape endowments as well (Weinstein, 2006).
Context and the Resolution of Dilemmas
It is clear from the dilemmas discussed above that insurgencies need to be dynamic and malleable organizations. They are influenced by a host of contextual factors, which determine the way they negotiate the five dilemmas discussed here.
The distinction between organic and explicit organizational structure and decision-making is important for two reasons. From a policy and particularly counter-insurgency perspective, the conclusion that context is key to the evolution of insurgencies would imply that lessons learned in one context should only be very carefully applied to another. The challenges represented by the dilemmas can be used to frame how an insurgency deals with its context. It also implies, therefore, that if the context in which an insurgency is forming can be changed, so too can the formation of the insurgency. It may be possible to track, or even predict, how those changes will take place if we know how the organization has resolved these dilemmas over time. As such, they can be a useful framework to guide counter-insurgency strategy towards an understanding of the importance of context and the ways it can influence organizational behaviour.
Section 2: A New Spectrum of Insurgent Network Organization
In a modern, post-September 11th context, the strict hierarchical structure has become a liability rather than an asset to an insurgent organization. A number of factors have contributed to this shift, stemming both from the policies and practices related to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and broader trends of the globalization of travel and trade.
Finally, the wide reach of the media, both in sourcing stories and in reporting them, has created clear incentives for a strategy based on perpetrating a small number of high-profile incidents. Older, hierarchical models of insurgent organization tend to emphasize a long-term strategy based on guerrilla tactics and attrition, whereas modern, networked insurgencies can capitalize on the international media echo to project power and presence through fewer, very public attacks.
Consequently, to be able to accurately analyze the organizational structure of modern insurgencies, it is important to introduce another measure in addition to the hierarchy-network spectrum. As discussed above, hierarchies are becoming less viable as insurgent organizational structures, so the new measure will focus on those organizations closer to the network pole of the spectrum.
Methodology
As we compare the effectiveness of local and international networks by looking at two fairly ideal cases, it’s important to establish a definition of effectiveness as it pertains to the strategies and tactics of insurgent organizations
Based on the Global Terrorism Database’s parameters, effectiveness will be defined by: (1) the frequency of attacks, (2) the sophistication of weapons used, (3) the number of casualties, including injuries and fatalities, caused by individual attacks, (4) the percentage of successful attacks, which are those where law enforcement officials were unable to prevent the attack as it occurred or immediately prior, (5) the defensive capabilities of the target, as the choice and ability to attack military and police targets implies a higher level of organizational effectiveness than attacking civilian or commercial targets, (6) the average number of attackers per incident, because the ability to coordinate more people implies greater organizational effectiveness (7) achievement of their stated goals, and (8) ultimate survival of the organization today.
Conclusion
None of the dilemmas is binary, and each represents a range of choices an organization can make. However, in a modern context of weak borders and easy international transportation, wide-reaching and hyperactive international media outlets, centralized counter-insurgency operations, and inexpensive, reliable means of communication, it would appear that the most effective insurgencies will resolve the dilemmas by evolving an internationally-networked and decentralized organization built of semi-autonomous units with shared goals, ideologies and tactics.
My recommendations to counter-insurgency strategists in government in the United States and Europe are these: harness the energy of insurgency into non-violent political activism, and support and protect the people who choose that route. Development projects aimed at addressing grievances, and at creating economic and social opportunities for potential recruits, could fundamentally change the nature of an insurgent organization before it grows large enough to pose a threat.
In the framework of the five dilemmas, that would entail: encouraging non-violent action over violent secrecy; supporting the growth of movements working to bring about productive social change; recruiting new members and retaining veterans by strengthening social networks and encouraging the use of new means of communication; prioritizing constituencies over resources. In a non-violent and inclusive organization, success and longevity are not mutually exclusive – one success can be the foundation for the next, to construct an organization that is strong enough to resist defeat and flexible enough to recognize and exploit weaknesses in its enemy.
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