Month: November 2020

 

Introduction

URBAN AREAS AND MODERN OPERATIONS

With the continuing growth in the world’s urban areas and increasing population concentrations in urban areas, the probability that Army forces will conduct operations in urban environments is ever more likely. As urbanization has changed the demographic landscape, potential enemies recognize the inherent danger and complexity of this environment to the attacker. Some may view it as their best chance to negate the technological and firepower advantages of modernized opponents. Given the global population trends and the likely strategies and tactics of future threats, Army forces will likely conduct operations in, around, and over urban areas—not as a matter of fate, but as a deliberate choice linked to national security objectives and strategy. Stability operations––where keeping the social structure, economic structure, and political support institutions intact and functioning or having to almost simultaneously provide the services associated with those structures and institutions is the primary mission––may dominate urban operations. This requires specific and timely intelligence support, placing a tremendous demand on the intelligence warfighting functions for operations, short-term planning, and long-term planning.

Providing intelligence support to operations in the complex urban environment can be quite challenging. It may at first seem overwhelming. The amount of detail required for operations in urban environments, along with the large amounts of varied information required to provide intelligence support to these operations, can be daunting. Intelligence professionals must be flexible and adaptive in applying doctrine (including tactics, techniques, and procedures) based on the mission variables: mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC).

As with operations in any environment, a key to providing good intelligence support in the urban environment lies in identifying and focusing on the critical information required for each specific mission. The complexity of the urban environment requires focused intelligence. A comprehensive framework must be established to support the commander’s requirements while managing the vast amount of information and intelligence required for urban operations. By addressing the issues and considerations listed in this manual, the commander, G-2 or S-2, and intelligence analyst will be able to address most of the critical aspects of the urban environment and identify both the gaps in the intelligence collection effort and those systems and procedures that may answer them. This will assist the commander in correctly identifying enemy actions so that Army forces can focus on the enemy and seize the initiative while maintaining an understanding of the overall situation.

 

 

Chapter 1
Intelligence and the Urban Environment

OVERVIEW

1-1. The special considerations that must be taken into account in any operation in an urban environment go well beyond the uniqueness of the urban terrain.

JP 3-06 identifies three distinguishing characteristics of the urban environment: physical terrain, population, and infrastructure. Also, FM 3-06 identifies three key overlapping and interdependent components of the urban environment: terrain (natural and manmade), society, and the supporting infrastructure.

CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS (ASCOPE)

1-2. Normally the factors used in the planning and execution of tactical military missions are evaluated in terms of the mission variables: METT-TC. Due to the importance of civil considerations (the letter “C” in METT-TC) in urban operations, those factors are discussed first in this manual. Civil considerations are the influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations (ADRP 5- 0).

1-3. An appreciation of civil considerations and the ability to analyze their impact on operations enhances several aspects of urban operations––among them, the selection of objectives; location, movement, and control of forces; use of weapons; and force protection measures. Civil considerations comprise six characteristics, expressed in the acronym ASCOPE:

• A
• S
• C
• O
• P
• E

1-4. Civil considerations, in conjunction with the components of the urban environment, provide a useful structure for intelligence personnel to begin to focus their intelligence preparation of the battlefield and organize the huge undertaking of providing intelligence to operations in the urban environment. They should not be considered as separate entities but rather as interdependent. Understanding this interrelationship of systems provides focus for the intelligence analyst and allows the commander a greater understanding of the urban area in question

TERRAIN

1-5. Terrain in the urban environment is complex and challenging. It possesses all the characteristics of the natural landscape, coupled with manmade construction, resulting in a complicated and fluid environment that influences the conduct of military operations in unique ways. Urban areas, the populace within them, their expectations and perceptions, and the activities performed within their boundaries form the economic, political, and cultural focus for the surrounding areas. What military planners must consider for urban areas may range from a few dozen dwellings surrounded by farmland to major metropolitan cities.

1-14. Urban areas are usually regional centers of finance, politics, transportation, industry, and culture. They have population concentrations ranging from several thousand up to millions of people. The larger the city, the greater its regional influence. Because of their psychological, political, or logistic value, control of regionally important cities has often led to pitched battle scenes. In the last 40 years, many cities have expanded dramatically, losing their well-defined boundaries as they extend into the countryside.

URBAN AREAS

1-16. As defined in FM 3-06, urban areas are generally classified as––

• l Megalopolis (population over 10million).
• Metropolis (population between 1 to 10 million).
• City (population 100,000 to 1million).
• Town or small city (population 3,000 to 100,000).
• Village (population less than 3,000).

URBAN PATTERNS

1-17. Manmade terrain in the urban environment is overlaid on the natural terrain of the area, and manmade patterns are affected by the underlying natural terrain. It can be useful to keep the underlying natural terrain in mind when analyzing the manmade patterns of the urban environment.

URBAN FUNCTIONAL ZONES

1-24. To provide an accurate depiction of an urban area, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of its numerous physical subdivisions or zones. These zones are functional in nature and reflect “where” something routinely occurs within the urban area.

SOCIETY (SOCIO-CULTURAL)

1-70. When local support is necessary for success, as is often the case in operations in the urban environment, the population is central to accomplishing the mission. The center of gravity for operations in urban environments is often human. To effectively operate among an urban population and maintain their goodwill, it is important to develop a thorough understanding of the society and its culture, to include values, needs, history, religion, customs, and social structure.

1-71. U.S. forces can avoid losing local support for the mission and anticipate local reaction to friendly courses of action by understanding, respecting, and following local customs when possible. The history of a people often explains why the urban population behaves the way it does. For example, U.S. forces might forestall a violent demonstration by understanding the significance of the anniversary of a local hero’s death.

1-72. Accommodating the social norms of a population is potentially the most influential factor in the conduct of urban operations. Unfortunately, this is often neglected. Social factors have greater impact in urban operations than in any other environment. The density of the local populations and the constant interaction between them and U.S. forces greatly increase the importance of social considerations. The fastest way to damage the legitimacy of an operation is to ignore or violate social mores or precepts of a particular population. Groups develop norms and adamantly believe in them all of their lives. The step most often neglected is understanding and respecting these differences.

1-73. The interaction of different cultures during operations in the urban environment may demand greater recognition than in other environments. This greater need for understanding comes from the increased interaction with the civilian populace. Norms and values could involve such diverse areas as food, sleep patterns, casual and close relationships, manners, and cleanliness. Understanding these differences is only a start in developing cultural awareness.

1-74. Religious beliefs and practices are among the most important, yet least understood, aspects of the cultures of other peoples. In many parts of the world, religious norms are a matter of life and death. In many religious wars, it is not uncommon to find suicidal acts in the name of their god. In those situations, religious beliefs are considered more important than life itself.

1-75. Failure to recognize, respect, understand, and incorporate an understanding of the cultural and religious aspects of the society with which U.S. forces are interacting could rapidly lead to an erosion of the legitimacy of the U.S. or multinational force mission. When assessing events, intelligence professionals must consider the norms of the local culture or society. For example, while bribery is not an accepted norm in our society, it may be a totally acceptable practice in another society. If U.S. intelligence professionals assess an incidence of this nature using our own societal norms and values as a reference, it is highly likely that the significance of the event will be misinterpreted.

1-77. Many developing country governments are characterized by nepotism, favor trading, sabotage, and indifference. Corruption is pervasive and institutionalized as a practical way to manage excess demand for city services. The power of officials is often primarily based on family and personal connections, economic, political or military power bases and age, and only after that on education, training, and competence.

1-78. A local government’s breakdown from its previous level of effectiveness will quickly exacerbate problems of public health and mobility. Attempts to get the local-level bureaucracy to function along U.S. lines will produce further breakdown or passive indifference. Any unintentional or intentional threat to the privileges of ranking local officials or to members of their families will be stubbornly resisted. Avoiding such threats and assessing the importance of particular officials requires knowledge of family ties.

1-79. U.S. military planners must also recognize that the urban populace will behave according to their own self-interest. The urban populace will focus on the different interests at work: those of U.S. or multinational forces, those of elements hostile to U.S. or multinational forces, those of international or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that may be present; those of local national opportunities and those of the general population. Friendly forces must be constantly aware of these interests and how the local national population perceives them.

1-80. Another significant cultural problem is the presence of displaced persons within an urban area. Rural immigrants, who may have different cultural norms, when combined with city residents displaced by urban conflict, can create a significant strategic problem. Noncombatants and refugees without hostile intent can stop an advancing unit or inadvertently complicate an operation. Additionally, there may be enemy troops, criminal gangs, vigilantes, paramilitary factions, and factions within those groups hiding in the waves of the displaced.

1-81. The enemy knows that it will be hard to identify the threat among neutral or disinterested parties.

Chechen rebels and the Hezbollah effectively used the cover of refugees to attack occupying forces and counted on heavy civilian casualties in the counterattack to gain support with the local population. The goal is to place incalculable stresses on the Soldiers in order to break down discipline and operational integrity.

1-82. Defining the structure of the social hierarchy is often critical to understanding the population. Identifying those in positions of authority is important as well. These city officials, village elders, or tribal chieftains are often the critical nodes of the society and influence the actions of the population at large. In many societies, nominal titles do not equal power––influence does. Many apparent leaders are figureheads, and the true authority lies elsewhere.

1-83. Some areas around the world are not governed by the rule of law, but instead rely upon tradition. Often, ethnic loyalty, religious affiliation, and tribal membership provide societal cohesion and the sense of proper behavior and ethics in dealing with outsiders, such as the U.S. or multinational partners. It is important to understand the complicated inner workings of a society rife with internal conflict, although to do so is difficult and requires a thorough examination of a society’s culture and history.

1-85. While certain patterns do exist, most urban centers are normally composed of a multitude of different peoples, each with their own standards of conduct. Individuals act independently and in their own best interest, which will not always coincide with friendly objectives.

Treating the urban population as a homogenous entity can lead to false assumptions, cultural misunderstandings, and poor situational understanding.

POPULATION

1-86. A population of significant size and density inhabits, works in, and uses the manmade and natural terrain in the urban environment. Civilians remaining in an urban environment may be significant as a threat, an obstacle, a logistics support problem (to include medical support), or a source of support and information.

1-89. Another issue is the local population’s requirement for logistic or medical support. U.S. troops deployed to Somalia and the Balkans immediately had to deal with providing logistic support to starving populations until local and international organizations could take over those functions.

1-90. From an intelligence standpoint, the local population can be a valuable information source.

1-92. Although the population is not a part of the terrain, the populace can impact the mission in both positive and negative ways. Individuals or groups in the population can be coopted by one side or another to perform a surveillance and reconnaissance function, performing as moving reconnaissance to collect information. City residents have intimate knowledge of the city. Their observations can provide information and insights about intelligence gaps and other activities that help reach an understanding of the environment. For instance, residents often know about shortcuts through town. They might also be able to observe and report on a demonstration or meeting that occurs in their area.

1-93. Unarmed combatants operating within the populace or noncombatants might provide intelligence to armed combatants engaged in a confrontation.

1-94. The presence of noncombatants in a combat zone can lead to restrictive rules of engagement, which may impact the way in which a unit accomplishes its mission. The population, groups or individuals or sectors within an urban area can be the target audience of influence activities (such as MISO or threat psychological operations).

1-95. Populations present during urban operations can physically restrict movement and maneuver by limiting or changing the width of routes. People may assist movement if a group can be used as human barrier between one combatant group and another. Refugee flows, for example, can provide covert infiltration or exfiltration routes for members of a force. There may also be unintended restrictions to routes due to normal urban activities which can impact military operations.

1-96. One of the largest challenges to friendly operations is the portion of the population that supports the adversary. Even people conducting their daily activities may inadvertently “get in the way” of any type of operation. For example, curiosity-driven crowds in Haiti often affected patrols by inadvertently forcing units into the middle of the street or pushing them into a single file.

INFRASTRUCTURE

1-101. The infrastructure of an urban environment consists of the basic resources, support systems, communications, and industries upon which the population depends. The key elements that allow an urban area to function are also significant to operations, especially stability operations. The force that controls the water, electricity, telecommunications, natural gas, food production and distribution, and medical facilities will virtually control the urban area. These facilities may not be located within the city’s boundaries. The infrastructure upon which an urban area depends may also provide human services and cultural and political structures that are critical beyond that urban area, perhaps for the entire nation.

1-102. A city’s infrastructure is its foundation. It includes buildings, bridges, roads, airfields, ports, subways, sewers, power plants, industrial sectors, communications, and similar physical structures. Infrastructure varies from city to city. In developed countries, the infrastructure and service sectors are highly sophisticated and well integrated. In developing cities, even basic infrastructure may be lacking. To understand how the infrastructure of a city supports the population, it needs to be viewed as a system of systems. Each component affects the population, the normal operation of the city, and the potential long- term success of military operations conducted there.

1-103. Military planners must understand the functions and interrelationships of these components to assess how disruption or restoration of the infrastructure affects the population and ultimately the mission. By determining the critical nodes and vulnerabilities of a city, allied forces can delineate specific locations within the urban area that are vital to overall operations. Additionally, military planners must initially regard these structures as civilian places or objects, and plan accordingly, until reliable information indicates they are being used for a military purpose.

1-104. Much of the analysis conducted for terrain and society can apply when assessing the urban infrastructure. For example, commanders, staffs, and analysts could not effectively assess the urban economic and commercial infrastructure without simultaneously considering labor. All aspects of the society relate and can be used to further analyze the urban work force since they are a sub-element of the urban society.

TRANSPORTATION

1-106. The transportation network is a critical component of a city’s day-to-day activity. It facilitates the movement of material and personnel around the city. This network includes roads, railways, subways, bus systems, airports, and harbors.

COMMUNICATIONS

1-108. Communication facilities in modern cities are expansive and highly developed. Complicated networks of landlines, radio relay stations, fiber optics, cellular service, and the Internet provide a vast web of communication capabilities. This communication redundancy allows for the constant flow of information.

1-109. National and local engineers and architects may have developed a communication infrastructure more effective and robust than it might first appear.

1-110. Developing countries may have little in the way of communication infrastructure. Information flow can depend on less sophisticated means—couriers, graffiti, rumors/gossiping and local printed media. Even in countries with little communication infrastructure, radios, cell phones, and satellite communications may be readily available to pass information. Understanding communication infrastructure of a city is important because it ultimately controls the flow of information to the population and the enemy.

ENERGY

1-111. All societies require energy (such as wood, coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear, and solar) for basic heating, cooking, and electricity. Energy is needed for industrial production and is therefore vital to the economy. In fact, every sector of a city’s infrastructure relies on energy to some degree. Violence may result from energy scarcity. From a tactical and operational perspective, protecting an urban area’s energy supplies prevents unnecessary hardship to the civilian population and, therefore, facilitates mission accomplishment. Power plants, refineries, and pipelines that provide energy resources for the urban area may not be located within the urban area. Energy facilities are potential targets in an urban conflict. Combatant forces may target these facilities to erode support for the local authorities or to deny these facilities to their enemies.

1-112. Electricity is vital to city populations. Electric companies provide a basic service that provides heat, power, and lighting. Because electricity cannot be stored in any sizable amount, damage to any portion of this utility will immediately affect the population. Electrical services are not always available or reliable in the developing world.

1-113. Interruptions in service are common occurrences in many cities due to a variety of factors. Decayed infrastructure, sabotage, riots, military operations, and other forms of conflict can disrupt electrical service. As a critical node of the overall city service sector, the electrical facilities are potential targets in an urban conflict. Enemy forces may target these facilities to erode support for the local authorities or friendly forces.

WATER AND WASTE DISPOSAL

1-115. Deliberate acts of poisoning cannot be overlooked where access to the water supply is not controlled. U.S. forces may gain no marked tactical advantage by controlling this system, but its protection minimizes the population’s hardship and thus contributes to overall mission success. A buildup of garbage on city streets poses many hazards to include health threats and obstacles. Maintenance or restoration of urban garbage removal to landfills can minimize this threat and improve the confidence of the civilian population in the U.S. friendly mission.

RESOURCES AND MATERIAL PRODUCTION

1-116. Understanding the origination and storage sites of resources that maintain an urban population can be especially critical in stability operations. These sites may need to be secured against looting or attack by threat forces in order to maintain urban services and thereby retain or regain the confidence of the local population in the U.S. mission. Additionally, military production sites may need to be secured to prevent the population from gaining uncontrolled access to quantities of military equipment.

FOOD DISTRIBUTION

1-117. A basic humanitarian need of the local populace is food. During periods of conflict, food supplies in urban areas often become scarce. Maintaining and restoring normal food distribution channels in urban areas will help prevent a humanitarian disaster and greatly assist in maintaining or regaining the good will of the local population for U.S. forces. It may be impossible to immediately restore food distribution channels following a conflict, and U.S. forces may have to work with NGOs that specialize in providing these types of services. This may require friendly forces to provide protection for NGO convoys and personnel in areas where conflict may occur.

MEDICAL FACILITIES

1-118. While the health services infrastructure of most developed cities is advanced, medical facilities are deficient in many countries. International humanitarian organizations may represent the only viable medical care available.

LOCAL POLICE, MILITARY UNITS WITH POLICE AUTHORITY OR MISSIONS, AND FIREFIGHTING UNITS

1-119. These elements can be critical in maintaining public order. Their operations must be integrated with friendly forces in friendly forces controlled areas to ensure that stability and security are restored or maintained. As discussed in chapter 3, the precinct structure of these organizations can also provide a good model for the delineation of unit boundaries with the urban area. It may be necessary for friendly forces to provide training for these elements.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND CIVIL DEFENSE

1-120. Local crisis management procedures and civil defense structures can aid U.S. forces in helping to care for noncombatants in areas of ongoing or recent military operations. Additionally, the crisis management and civil defense leadership will often be local officials that may be able to provide structure to help restore or maintain security and local services in urban areas under friendly control. Many larger urban areas have significant response teams and assets to deal with crises. The loss of these key urban “maintainers” may severely impact not only military operations within the urban environment but also threaten the health or mobility of those living there. During periods of combat this may also affect the ability of Soldiers to fight as fires or chemical spills remain unchecked or sewer systems back up. This is especially true when automatic pumping stations that normally handle rising water levels are deprived of power. It may be necessary for friendly forces to provide training for these elements.

SUBTERRANEAN FEATURES

1-121. Subterranean features can be extremely important in identifying underground military structures, concealed avenues of approach, and maintaining public services

Chapter 2
The Threat in the Urban Environment

OVERVIEW

2-1. The obligation of intelligence professionals includes providing adequate information to enable leaders to distinguish threats from nonthreats and combatants from noncombatants. This legal requirement of distinction is the initial obligation of decision makers who rely primarily on the intelligence they are provided.

2-2. Threats in the urban environment can be difficult to identify due to the often complex nature of the forces and the environment. In urban terrain, friendly forces will encounter a variety of potential threats, such as, conventional military forces, paramilitary forces, insurgents or guerillas, terrorists, common criminals, drug traffickers, warlords, and street gangs. These threats may operate independently or some may operate together. Individuals may be active members of one or more groups. Many urban threats lack uniforms or obvious logistic trains and use networks rather than hierarchical structures.

2-3. Little information may be available concerning threat tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) so intelligence staffs must collect against these TTP and build threat models. The enemy situation is often extremely fluid––locals friendly to us today may be tomorrow’s belligerents. Adversaries seek to blend in with the local population to avoid being captured or killed. Enemy forces who are familiar with the city layout have an inherently superior awareness of the current situation. Finally, U.S. forces often fail to understand the motives of the urban threat due to difficulties of building cultural awareness and situational understanding for a complex environment and operation. Intelligence personnel must assist the commander in correctly identifying enemy actions so that U.S. forces can focus on the enemy and seize the initiative while maintaining an understanding of the overall situation.

2-4. Potential urban enemies share some characteristics. The broken and compartmented terrain is best suited to the use of small unit operations. Typical urban fighters are organized in squad size elements and employ guerrilla tactics, terrorist tactics, or a combination of the two. They normally choose to attack (often using ambushes) on terrain which canalizes U.S. forces and limits our ability to maneuver or mass while allowing the threat forces to inflict casualties on U.S. forces and then withdraw. Small arms, sniper rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, mines, improvised explosive devices, Molotov cocktails, and booby traps are often the preferred weapons. These weapons range from high tech to low tech and may be 30 to 40 years old or built from hardware supplies, but at close range in the urban environment many of their limitations can be negated.

CONVENTIONAL MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

2-6. Conventional military and paramilitary forces are the most overt threats to U.S. and multinational forces. Identifying the capabilities and intent of these threat forces is standard for intelligence professionals for any type of operation in any type of environment. In the urban environment, however, more attention must be paid to threat capabilities that support operations in the urban environment and understanding of what, if any, specialized training these forces have received in conducting urban warfare.

INSURGENTS OR GUERRILLAS

2-7. Several factors are important in analyzing any particular insurgency. Commanders and staffs must perform this analysis within an insurgency’s operational environment. (See FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 for doctrine on analyzing insurgencies. See table 2-2 for examples of information requirements associated with analyzing insurgencies.) Under the conditions of insurgency within the urban environment, the analyst must place more emphasis on—

• Developing population status overlays showing potential hostile neighborhoods.
• Developing an understanding of “how” the insurgent or guerrilla organization operates and is organized with a focus toward potential strengths and weaknesses.
• Determining primary operating or staging areas.
• Determining mobility corridors and escape routes.
• Determining most likely targets.
• Determining where the threat’s logistic facilities are located and how their support organizations operate.
• Determining the level of popular support (active and passive).
• Determining the recruiting, command and control, reconnaissance and surveillance, logistics (to include money), and operations techniques and methods of the insurgent or guerrilla organization.
• Locating neutrals and those actively opposing these organizations.
• Using pattern analysis and other tools to establish links between the insurgent or guerilla organization and other organizations (to include family links).
• Determining the underlying social, political, and economic issues that caused the insurgency in the first place and which are continuing to cause the members of the organization as well as elements of the population to support it.

TERRORISTS

2-8. The terrorism threat of is a growing concern for the U.S. military. The opportunities for terrorism are greater in cities due to the presence of large numbers of potential victims, the likelihood of media attention, and the presence of vulnerable infrastructure. Many terrorist cells operate in cities because they can blend with the surrounding population, find recruits, and obtain logistic support. Terrorist cells are not confined to the slum areas of the developing world. In fact, many of the intelligence collection, logistic support, and planning cells for terrorist groups exist in the cities of Western Europe and even the United States.

CRIME AND CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

2-10. These organizations can threaten the successful completion of U.S. operations both directly and indirectly. Criminals and criminal organizations may directly target U.S. forces, stealing supplies or extorting money or contracts. Likewise, increased criminal activity can undermine the U.S. efforts to establish a sense of security among the local populace. Additionally, guerillas, insurgents, and terrorists may take advantage of criminal organizations in many ways, ranging from using them to collect information on U.S. and multinational forces to obtaining supplies, munitions, or services or using their LOCs as logistic support channels. Terrorist organizations may even have their own separate criminal element or be inseparable from a criminal group. An enterprise like narcoterrorism is an example of this.

2-11. Criminal activities will usually continue and may even increase during operations in the urban environment. Criminal organizations often run black markets and illegal smuggling operations in and around urban areas. These types of activities are often established prior to the arrival of U.S. and multinational forces and may proliferate prior to or once U.S. and multinational forces arrive, especially if normal urban services are disrupted by the events that resulted in the U.S. force deployment. For the local population, these activities may be the only reliable source of jobs which allow workers to provide for their families.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

2-12. Adversary information operations pose a threat to friendly forces. These threats can consist of propaganda, denial and deception, electronic warfare, computer network attack, and (although not a direct threat), the use of the media to achieve an objective. In general, the purposes of these attacks are to––

• Erode domestic and international support for the mission.
• Deny friendly forces information on enemy disposition and strength.
• Disrupt or eavesdrop on friendly communications.
• Disrupt the U.S. and multinational information flow.

2-13. Through the use of propaganda, adversaries try to undermine the U.S. and multinational mission by eroding popular support among the local population, the American people, and the international community. This is accomplished through savvy public relations campaigns, dissemination of falsehoods or half-truths, staging attacks on civilian sites and then passing the blame onto allied forces, and conducting other operations that make public statements by U.S. leaders appear to be lies and half-truths.

2-14. Urban terrain facilitates adversary denial and deception. The urban population provides a natural screen in which enemy forces can hide their identities, numbers, and equipment. There are other opportunities for denial and deception in cities. Threat forces can hide military equipment in culturally sensitive places—caching weapons in houses of worship or medical facilities. Threat forces can use decoys in urban terrain to cause erroneous assessments of its combat capability, strength, and disposition of assets. Decoys can be employed to absorb expensive and limited precision-guided munitions as well as cause misallocation of limited resources.

2-15. The enemy electronic warfare threat focuses on denying friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum to disrupt communications and radar emissions. Commercially available tactical jamming equipment is proliferating throughout the world and threatens allied communication and receiving equipment. Ensuring rapid and secure communications is one of the greatest challenges of urban operations.

2-16. The media can alter the course of urban operations and military operations in general. While not a direct threat, the increasing presence of media personnel during military operations can create special challenges. Media products seen in real time without perspective can erode U.S. military support both internationally and domestically. Enemy forces will attempt to shape media coverage to suit their own needs. For example, by escorting media personnel to “civilian casualty sites,” they attempt to sway international opinion against friendly operations. The media may also highlight errors committed by U.S. and multinational forces. In this age of 24-hour media coverage, the death of even a single noncombatant can negatively affect a military campaign.

HEALTH ISSUES

2-17. Urban centers provide favorable conditions for the spread of debilitating or deadly diseases. Sanitation is often poor in urban areas. Local water and food may contain dangerous contaminants. During military operations in the urban environment, sewage systems, power generating plants, water treatment plants, city sanitation, and other services and utilities are vulnerable. When disabled or destroyed, the risk of disease and epidemics increases, which could lead to unrest, further disease, riots, and casualties.

2-22. The typical urban environment includes potential biological or chemical hazards that fall outside the realm of weapons of mass destruction. Operations within confined urban spaces may see fighting in sewers and medical facilities and the subsequent health problems that exposure to contaminants may cause. There may also be deliberate actions to contaminate an enemy’s food or water or infect an enemy. Today’s biological threats include ebola, smallpox, and anthrax.

OTHER URBAN CONCERNS

2-23. There are additional concerns regarding the conduct of military operations within the urban environment. The analyst should, to some extent, also focus on the aviation and fire hazards discussed below.

AVIATION HAZARDS

FIRE HAZARDS

 

Chapter 3
Information Sources in the Urban Environment

OVERVIEW

3-1. In the urban environment, every Soldier is an information collector. Soldiers conducting patrols, manning observation posts, manning checkpoints, or even convoying supplies along a main supply route serve as the commander’s eyes and ears.

3-2. This chapter briefly discusses some of the types of information that Soldiers on the battlefield with different specialties can provide to the intelligence staff. It is essential to properly brief these assets so that they are aware of the intelligence requirements prior to their missions and to debrief them immediately upon completion of their missions; this is to ensure the information is still current in their minds and any timely intelligence they may provide is available for further action.

SCOUTS, SNIPERS, AND RECONNAISSANCE

3-3. Scouts, snipers, and other surveillance and reconnaissance assets can provide valuable information on people and places in the urban environment. Traditionally, scouts, snipers, and reconnaissance assets are often used in surveillance roles (passive collection) from a standoff position. Operations in the urban environment, especially stability operations, may require a more active role (reconnaissance) such as patrolling for some of these assets. When employed in a reconnaissance role (active collection), these assets tend to be most useful when accompanied by an interpreter who allows them to interact with people that they encounter, which allows them to better assess the situation.

ENGINEERS

3-9. Engineers can provide significant amounts of information to the intelligence staff. They support mobility, countermobility and survivability by providing maneuver and engineer commanders with information about the terrain, threat engineer activity, obstacles, and weather effects within the AO. During the planning process engineers can provide specific information on the urban environment such as information on the effects that structures within the urban area may have on the operation, bridge weight class and conditions, and information on most likely obstacle locations and composition. Engineers can assist in assessing potential collateral damage by analyzing risks of damage caused by the release of dangerous forces, power grid and water source stability, and the viability of sewage networks. Engineers provide a range of capabilities that enhance collection efforts. Each of the engineer functions may provide varying degrees of technical expertise in support of any given assigned mission and task. These capabilities are generated from and organized by both combat and general engineer units with overarching support from geospatial means

CIVIL AFFAIRS

3-23. Civil affairs personnel are a key asset in any operation undertaken in the urban environment. The missions of civil affairs personnel keep them constantly interacting with the indigenous populations and institutions (also called IPI). Civil affairs personnel develop area studies, conduct a variety of assessments, and maintain running estimates. These studies, assessments, and running estimates focus on the civil component of an area or operation.

3-24. The basic evaluation of an area is the civil affairs area study. An area study is produced in advance of the need. It establishes baseline information relating to the civil components of the area in question in a format corresponding to the civil affairs functional areas and functional specialties. Civil affairs assessments provide a precise means to fill identified information gaps in order to inform decisionmaking. Civil affairs Soldiers perform three types of assessments: the initial assessment, the deliberate assessment, and the survey. (See FM 3-57 and ATP 3-57.60 for doctrine on civil affairs area studies and assessments.)

3-25. The civil affairs operations running estimate feeds directly into the military decisionmaking process, whether conducted during civil-affairs-only operations or integrated into the supported unit’s planning and development of the common operational picture. During course of action development and wargaming, the civil affairs operations staff ensures each course of action effectively integrates civil considerations.

3-26. Civil affairs units conduct civil information management as a core competency. Civil information management is the process whereby data relating to the civil component of the operational environment is gathered, collated, processed, analyzed, produced into information products, and disseminated (JP 3-57). Effectively executing this process results in civil information being shared with the supported organization, higher headquarters, and other U.S. Government and Department of Defense agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs.

3-27. While civil affairs forces should never be used as information collection assets, the fact that civil affairs teams constantly travel throughout the AO to conduct their missions make them good providers of combat information, if they are properly debriefed by intelligence staffs. Intelligence personnel should ask their local civil affairs team for their area studies and assessments.

MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS

3-28. MISO units are made up primarily of Soldiers holding the psychological operations military occupational specialty. These Soldiers must have a thorough understanding of the local populace, including the effects of the information environment, and must fully understand the effects that U.S. operations are having on the populace.

Psychological operations Soldiers routinely interact with local populations in their native languages, directly influence specified targets, collect information, and deliver persuasive, informative, and directive messages. Intelligence personnel can leverage attached MISO units’ capabilities and the information they provide to gain key insights into the current sentiments and behavior of local nationals and other important groups. MISO units can be a tremendous resource to the intelligence staff; however, they rely heavily on the intelligence warfighting function.

MILITARY POLICE

3-32. Whether they are conducting area security operations, maneuver and support operations, internment and resettlement, or law and order operations, military police personnel normally have a presence across large parts of the battlefield.

In some cases, they may temporarily assume Customs duties, as they did at the main airport outside Panama City during Operation Just Cause. Generally, military police are better trained in the art of observation than regular Soldiers; with their presence at critical locations on the battlefield, they can provide a wealth of battlefield information provided that they are properly briefed on current intelligence requirements.

3-34. Military police also maintain a detainee information database which can also track detainees in stability operations. Information from this database can be useful to intelligence personnel, especially when constructing link diagrams and association matrixes.

JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

3-39. Most Army operations in urban environments are likely to be joint operations. This requires Army intelligence staffs at all levels to make sure that they are familiar with the intelligence collection capabilities and methods of Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps units operating in and around their AO. Joint operations generally bring more robust intelligence capabilities to the AO; however joint operations also require significantly more coordination to ensure resources are being used to their fullest extent.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT PACKAGES

3-40. The Defense Intelligence Agency produces intelligence support packages in response to the theater or joint task force target list or a request for information. A target summary provides data on target significance, description, imagery annotations, node functions, air defenses, and critical nodal analysis. These packages support targeting of specific military and civilian installations. Intelligence support packages include—

• Land satellite (also called LANDSAT) imagery.
• Land satellite digital terrain elevation data-merge (also called DTED-merge) imagery.
• Target line drawings.
• Photography (when available).
• Multiscale electro-optical (also called EO) imagery.

NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PRODUCTS

3-44. NGA produces a range of products that can be useful in the urban environment. These products include city graphics, urban features databases, gridded installation imagery (Secret-level products), the geographic names database, terrain analysis products, imagery intelligence briefs, and annotated graphics

MULTINATIONAL

3-47. Due to classification issues, sharing intelligence during multinational operations can be challenging. It may be the case that U.S. forces are working in a multinational force that contains both member countries with whom the United States has close intelligence ties and others with whom the United States has few or no intelligence ties. In many cases intelligence personnel from other countries have unique skills that can significantly contribute to the friendly intelligence effort.

3-48. Establishing methods of exchanging battlefield information and critical intelligence as well as coordinating intelligence collection efforts can be crucial to the overall success of the mission. Reports from multinational force members can fill intelligence gaps for the U.S. forces and the multinational force as a whole.

3-49. The unique perspective of some of the multinational partners may provide U.S. intelligence analysts with key insights. (For example, during the Vietnam War, Korean forces used to living in environments similar to Vietnamese villages often noticed anomalies that Americans missed such as too much rice cooking in the pots for the number of people visible in the village.) Likewise, few countries have the sophisticated intelligence collection assets available to U.S. forces, and information that the U.S. may provide could be critical both to their mission success and to their force protection.

INTERNATIONAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

3-50. International organizations (not NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations will often have a presence in areas in which U.S. forces may conduct operations, especially if those areas experience some type of unrest or upheaval prior to U.S. operations. International organizations and intergovernmental organizations include such agencies as the International Criminal Police Organization (also called Interpol), the United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. When providing support or considering offering support to the local populace, international organizations and intergovernmental organizations usually conduct assessments of the local areas that focus on understanding the needs of the local populace, the ability of the infrastructure to enable their support or aid to be effectively provided, and the general security situation and stability of the area.

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

3-53. As with international organizations and intergovernmental organizations, NGOs will often have a presence in areas in which U.S. forces may conduct operations. Since most of these organizations are concerned with providing support to the local populace, their presence tends to be especially prominent in areas experiencing or that recently experienced some type of unrest or upheaval prior to U.S. operations, during U.S. operations, or following U.S. operations.

3-54. NGOs strive to protect their shield of neutrality in all situations and do not generally offer copies of their assessments to government organizations. Nonetheless, it is often in their interest to make U.S. forces aware of their operations in areas under U.S. control. Representatives of individual NGOs operating in areas under U.S. control may provide U.S. forces with their detailed assessments of those areas in order to gain U.S. support either in the form of additional material aid for the local populace or for security considerations. (See JP 3-08 and FM 3-07.)

3-55. Individual NGO members are often highly willing to discuss what they have seen during their operations with U.S. forces personnel. Some NGOs have been used in the past as fronts for threat organizations seeking to operate against U.S. forces. Intelligence analysts must therefore carefully evaluate information provided by NGO personnel.

LOCAL NATIONAL AUTHORITIES

3-56. Local national authorities and former local national authorities know their populations and local infrastructure best. Key information can be gained from cooperative local national authorities or former authorities. Analysts must always be careful to consider that these authorities may be biased for any number of reasons.

3-57. Politicians usually know their populations very well or they would not be able to remain in office. They can provide detailed socio-cultural information on the populace within their region of control (for example, economic strengths and weaknesses or religious, ethnic, and tribal breakdowns). They are also usually aware of the infrastructure. Obviously, intelligence analysts must be aware that information provided by these personnel generally will be biased and almost certainly slanted in the long-term favor of that individual.

Chapter 4
Operations in the Urban Environment

OVERVIEW

4-1. In the urban environment, different types of operations (offense, defense, and stability) often occur simultaneously in adjacent portions of a unit’s AO. Intelligence support to operations in this extremely complex environment often requires a higher degree of specificity and fidelity in intelligence products than required in operations conducted in other environments. Intelligence staffs have finite resources and time available to accomplish their tasks. Realistically, intelligence staffs cannot expect to always be able to initially provide the level of specificity and number of products needed to support commanders.

4-2. Using the mission variables (METT-TC), intelligence staffs start prioritizing by focusing on the commander’s and operational requirements to create critical initial products. Requests for information to higher echelons can assist lower level intelligence sections in providing critical detail for these products. As lower level intelligence staffs create products or update products from higher, they must provide those products to higher so that higher can maintain an awareness of the current situation.

Once initial critical products have been built, intelligence staffs must continue building any additional support products required. Just as Soldiers continue to improve their foxholes and battle positions the longer they remain in place, intelligence staffs continue to improve and refine products that have already been built.

4-3. When preparing for operations in the urban environment, intelligence analysts consider the three primary characteristics of the urban environment as well as the threat.

Commanders and staffs require a good understanding of the civil considerations for the urban area as well as the situation in the surrounding region. This includes the governmental leaders and political organizations and structures, military and paramilitary forces, economic situation, sociological background, demographics, history, criminal organizations and activity, and any nongovernmental ruling elite (for example, factions, families, tribes). All are key factors although some are more important than others, depending on the situation in the target country. Intelligence personnel must assist the commander in correctly identifying enemy actions so U.S. forces can focus on the enemy and seize the initiative while maintaining an understanding of the overall situation.

4-7. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55). This activity integrates the intelligence and operations staff functions focused on answering the commander’s critical information requirements. At the tactical level, intelligence operations, reconnaissance, security operations, and surveillance are the four primary tasks conducted as part of information collection. (See FM 3-55.) The intelligence warfighting function contributes to information collection through intelligence operations and the plan requirements and assess collection task.

4-8. Plan requirements and assess collection is the task of analyzing requirements, evaluating available assets (internal and external), recommending to the operations staff taskings for information collection assets, submitting requests for information for adjacent and higher collection support, and assessing the effectiveness of the information collection plan (ATP 2-01). It is a commander-driven, coordinated staff effort led by the G-2 or S-2. The continuous functions of planning requirements and assessing collection identify the best way to satisfy the requirements of the supported commander and staff. These functions are not necessarily sequential.

4-9. Intelligence operations are the tasks undertaken by military intelligence units and Soldiers to obtain information to satisfy validated requirements (ADRP 2-0). Intelligence operations collect information about the activities and resources of the threat or information concerning the characteristics of the operational environment. (See FM 2-0 for doctrine on intelligence operations.)

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

4-15. When planning for intelligence support to operations in the urban environment, the following must be accomplished:

• Define priorities for information collection.
• Coordinate for movement of information collection assets.
• Coordinate for information and intelligence flow with all military intelligence units, non- military-intelligence units, other Service components and multinational organizations.
• Establish liaison with all elements, organizations, and local nationals necessary for mission accomplishment and force protection.

4-16. One of the major factors when planning for most operations in urban environments is the local population and their potential effect on U.S. operations. Intelligence personnel must be cognizant of local national perceptions of U.S. forces, their environment, and the nature of the conflict. To engage successfully in this dynamic, U.S. forces must avoid mirror imaging, that is, imposing their own values on the threat courses of action. Careful study of the threat country, collaboration with country experts, and through the use of people with pertinent ethnic backgrounds in the wargaming process all contribute to avoiding mirror imaging.

4-18. The information collection plan must be as detailed as possible and must be regularly reviewed for changes during operations in constantly changing urban environments. The finite information collection resources available to any command must be feasibly allocated and reallocated as often as necessary in order to keep up with the fluid urban environment. Employing these assets within their capabilities, taking into consideration their limitations within the urban environment, is critical to ensuring that a focused intelligence effort is successful.

PREPARE

4-19. During the preparation for operations, intelligence staffs and collection assets must refine their products, collection plans, and reporting procedures. Establishing and testing the intelligence architecture (to include joint and multinational elements) is a critical activity during this phase. Intelligence staffs must ensure that all intelligence personnel are aware of the current situation and intelligence priorities are fully trained on both individual and collective tasks, and are aware of any limitations within the intelligence architecture that are relevant to them.

4-20. Additionally, intelligence staffs must ensure that targeting procedures are well-defined and executed. In urban environments, nonlethal targeting may be more prevalent than lethal targeting and must be fully integrated into the process.

EXECUTE

4-21. Execution of operations in urban environments requires continuous updating and refining of intelligence priorities and information collection plan as the situation changes in order to provide the necessary intelligence to the commander in a timely manner. (See ATP 2-01.) Timely reporting, processing, fusion, analysis, production, and dissemination of critical intelligence often must be done within a more compressed timeline in the fluid and complex urban environment than in other environments.

4-22. Large amounts of information are generally available for collection within the urban environment. Procedures must be set in place to sort the information to determine which information is relevant and which is not.

4-23. Reported information must always be carefully assessed and verified with other sources of intelligence and information to avoid acting on single-source reporting. In stability operations, where human intelligence is the primary source of intelligence, acting on single-source reporting is a constant pitfall. Situations may occur, however, where the consequences of not acting on unverified, single-source intelligence may be worse than any potential negative consequences resulting from acting on that unverified information.

ASSESS

4-24. As previously stated, operations in the urban environment, especially stability operations, can be extremely fluid. The intelligence staff must constantly reevaluate the TTP of U.S. forces due to the rapid changes in the situation and the threat’s adaptation to our TTP. New threat TTP or potential changes to threat TTP identified by intelligence analysts must be quickly provided to the commander and operations staff so that U.S. forces TTP can be adjusted accordingly.

4-29. Debriefing must occur as soon as possible after the completion of a mission to ensure that the information is obtained while it is still fresh in the Soldiers’ minds and to ensure that time-sensitive information is reported to intelligence channels immediately.

Appendix A
Urban Intelligence Tools and Products

OVERVIEW

A-1. The urban environment offers the analyst many challenges normally not found in other environments. The concentration of multiple environmental factors (high rises, demographic concerns, tunnels, waterways, and others) requires the intelligence analyst to prepare a detailed plan for collecting information within the urban environment.

A-2. There are numerous products and tools that may be employed in assessing the urban environment. Due to the complex nature of the urban environment, these tools and products normally will be used to assist in providing an awareness of the current situation and situational understanding.

A-3. The tools and products listed in this appendix are only some of the tools and products that may be used during operations in an urban environment. For purposes of this appendix items listed as tools are ones generally assumed to be used primarily within intelligence sections for analytical purposes. Products are generally assumed to be items developed at least in part by intelligence sections that are used primarily by personnel outside intelligence sections.

TOOLS

A-4. Intelligence analysis is the process by which collected information is evaluated and integrated with existing information to facilitate intelligence production (ADRP 2-0). There are numerous software applications available to the Army that can be used as tools to do analysis as well as to create relevant intelligence products for the urban environment. These software applications range from such programs as Analyst Notebook and Crimelink which have link analysis, association matrix, and pattern analysis software tools to the Urban Tactical Planner, which was developed by the Topographic Engineering Center as an operational planning tool and is available on the Digital Topographic Support System. The focus of this section, however, is on the types of tool that could be used in the urban environment rather than on the software or hardware that may be used to create or manipulate them. (See ATP 2-33.4 for doctrine on intelligence analysis.)

LINK ANALYSIS TOOLS

A-6. Link analysis is used to depict contacts, associations, and relationships between persons, events, activities, and organizations. Five types of link analysis tools are––

• Link diagrams.
• Association matrices.
• Relationship matrices.
• Activities matrices.
• Time event charts.

Link Diagrams

A-7. This tool seeks to graphically depict relationships between people, events, locations, or other factors deemed significant in any given situation. Link diagrams help analysts better understand how people and factors are interrelated in order to determine key links. (See figure A-2.)

Relationship Matries

A-9. Relationship matrices are intended to depict the nature of relationships between elements of the operational area. The elements can include members from the noncombatant population, the friendly force, international organizations, and an adversary group. Utility infrastructure, significant buildings, media, and activities might also be included. The nature of the relationship between two or more components includes measures of contention, collusion, or dependency. The purpose of this tool is to demonstrate graphically how each component of the city interacts with the others and whether these interactions promote or degrade the likelihood of mission success. The relationships represented in the matrix can also begin to help the analysts in deciphering how to best use the relationship to help shape the environment.

A-10. The example relationship matrix shown in figure A-4, while not complete, is intended to show how the relationships among a representative compilation of population groups can be depicted. This example is an extremely simple version of what might be used during an operation in which many actors and other population elements are present.

A-12. Using figure A-4, there is a relationship of possible collusion that exists between the government and political group 3, and a friendly relationship between the government and the media. Some questions the intelligence analyst might ask when reviewing this information include—

• How can the government use the media to its advantage?
• Will the government seek to discredit political group3 using the media?
• Will the population view the media’s reporting as credible?
• Does the population see the government as willfully using the media to suit its own ends?

Activities Matrixes

A-13. Activities matrices help analysts connect individuals (such as those in association matrices) to organizations, events, entities, addresses, and activities—anything other than people. Information from this matrix, combined with information from association matrices, assists analysts in linking personalities as well.

LISTS AND TIMELINES OF KEY DATES

A-15. In many operations, including most stability operations, key local national holidays, historic events, and significant cultural and political events can be extremely important. Soldiers are often provided with a list of these key dates in order to identify potential dates of increased or unusual activity. These lists, however, rarely include a description of why these dates are significant and what can be expected to happen on the holiday. In some cases, days of the week themselves are significant. For example, in Bosnia weddings were often held on Fridays and celebratory fire was a common occurrence on Friday afternoons and late into the night.

As analytic tools, timelines might help the intelligence analyst predict how key sectors of the population might react to given circumstances.

CULTURE DESCRIPTION OR CULTURE COMPARISON CHART OR MATRIX

A-16. In order for the intelligence analyst to avoid the common mistake of assuming that only one perspective exists, it may be helpful to clearly point out the differences between local ideology, politics, predominant religion, acceptable standards of living, norms and mores, and U.S. norms. A culture comparison chart can be a stand-alone tool, listing just the different characteristics of the culture in question, or it can be comparative—assessing the host-nation population relative to known and familiar conditions.

PERCEPTION ASSESSMENT MATRIX

A-17. Perception assessment matrices are often used by psychological operations personnel and can be a valuable tool for intelligence analysts. Friendly force activities intended to be benign or benevolent might have negative results if a population’s perceptions are not considered, then assessed or measured. This is true because perceptions––more than reality––drive decision making and in turn could influence the reactions of entire populations. The perception assessment matrix seeks to provide some measure of effectiveness for the unit’s ability to reach an effect (for example, maintain legitimacy) during an operation. In this sense, the matrix can also be used to directly measure the effectiveness of the unit’s civil affairs, public affairs, and MISO efforts.

A-20. Perception can work counter to operational objectives. Perceptions should therefore be assessed both before and throughout an operation. Although it is not possible to read the minds of the local national population, there are several means to measure its perceptions:

• Demographic analysis and cultural intelligence are key components of perception analysis.
• Understanding a population’s history can help predict expectations and reactions.
• Human intelligence can provide information on population perceptions.
• Reactions and key activities can be observed in order to decipher whether people act based on real conditions or perceived conditions.
• Editorial and opinion pieces of relevant newspapers can be monitored for changes in tone or opinion shifts that can steer or may be reacting to the opinions of a population group.

A-21. Perception assessment matrices aim to measure the disparities between friendly force actions and what population groups perceive.

PRODUCTS

A-23. When conducting operations in the urban environment, many products may be required. These products may be used individually or combined, as the mission requires. Many of the products listed in this appendix will be created in conjunction with multiple staff elements.