Category: History

Mansel Blackford’s monograph Making Seafood Sustainable: American Experiences in Global Perspective is primarily a history of the development of the American regulatory regimes in the fisheries of the Pacific Northwest. That such a development occurred while the truck transportation, airline, rail industries were being deregulated by may seem unusual, but is explained by different set of conditions composing their industry. For one, the increased capacity of new, technologically advanced boats following World War II to bring in and even process ever larger catches with greater efficiency was a new force. To speak to the novelty of such an occurrence Blackford quotes a marine biologist who says that “the twentieth century heralded an escalation in fishing intensity that is unprecedented in the history of the oceans, and modern fishing technologies leave fish no place to hide” (15). Secondarily, domestic fishers appealed to government for greater-sized regions to exclusively exploit; thus regulations emerged to progressively force out foreign capital from extracting the limited resources. Following the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, regulations increased barriers to foreign exploitation of fisheries from 12 to 200 miles off the coast of U.S. borders and helped formulate limits to the amount of specific types of fish could be taken. With these factors, at wide variance from the other industries mentioned, regulation became conservatory rather than seeking to facilitate the rapid extraction of maximum profits. These are not, however, the only two factors affecting the form of subsequent regulation and Blackford opens the book by illustrating the historical milieu of the Northeast and California fisheries that helped inform policy makers how to proceed once a regulator body was formed.

Since the inception of the industry in the northeast Atlantic, fishers extracted from the commons of the ocean in their region in a largely unsupervised manner. In California, the fisheries had the resources involved in their catches take a second place to other industries such as electricity and construction. The result for both was a tragedy of the commons, wherein fish were no longer able to reproduce themselves fast enough and stocks were depleted to the point of near extinction. Despite late attempts at curbing catches to a sustainable level, damage to the stocks had been done so that that fishing had to be banned outright for a period of time so stocks could restore themselves. With this knowledge in mind, the northwestern fishers nor various environmental groups wished to see this replicated, so a disciplinary regime based upon scientific analysis of available stock and industry leaders requirements for profitability was formed. As Blackford then shows, this wasn’t a large enough constituency and they had to include other groups that had traditionally fished in that region such as native communities and particular Alaskan villages. Following the creation of a maximum catch allowable, a quota system with percentages of the potential catch had to be distributed amongst those groups. These portions were highly contested and led to conflict amongst various historical stakeholders with the new, big-capital corporations investing in processing and distribution.

At several point throughout the work Blackford relies upon novels in order to depict the life of fishers and the changes occurring as a result of these regulatory and technological changes that made Alaskan fisheries into the most regulated industry in the United States. In addition to this, it provides an aesthetic element that shows the terrifying and sublime aspects of the job that seems to readily appeal to intellectuals looking for a break from their work in the form of strenuous manual labor. Additionally, Blackford includes numerous descriptions of the daily operations of the processing industry that shows how seemingly banal technological developments and hygienic standards could have huge impacts on the industry.

I believe Mansel was a little too soft-handed when writing on the entrepreneurial ideology anathemic to government intervention held by so many of the fishers. While he need not go deeply into the content of an ideology that doesn’t recognize the fact that the federal government purchased Alaska for 7.2 million dollars in 1868, invested in the infrastructure that allowed the fisheries to transport their goods to southern markets, provided for the search and rescue operations which their lives depended in event of capsizing, or acted as police to keep foreign resource extractors out of the fisheries, it certainly speaks volumes to their incredibility as a legitimate institutional guides in helping determining maximum optimal catches in councils. As this is one of the factors Blackford’s conclusion focuses on, in the context of his endorsement of Elinor Ostrom’s cooperative, natural resource management framework, I think it’s worth more than just letting pass, especially having mentioned that the European attempt at a similar regime has ended so poorly.

Mark Rose, Bruce Seely and Paul Barret’s book The Best Transportation System in the World: Railroads, Trucks, Airlines & American Public Policy in the Twentieth Century limns the development of these three modes of transportation in America, and to a lesser extent waterways, to illustrate the federal government’s role in the formation, regulation, maintenance and segregation of these industries.

As transportation of goods for trade is one of primary importance for capitalist development, these four industries were of highlighted as of particular concern to American politicians seeking to increase the country’s wealth. Stoppages or bankruptcy would lead to negative effects rippling throughout the economy, as primary and manufactured goods would cease to circulate and capital would stop flowing. To prevent such economic vicissitudes from occurring, railroads increasingly had their capacity for free action limited by government. Committees such as the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Department of Transportation were formed to contend with these market forces and encourage the development of the nation’s industry through capital outlays, loan co-signing and regulatory oversight. These oversight and advisory boards, however, had limited capacity to influence business or enforce the policies stemming from their research.

One such example of this that I found particularly interesting was the manner in which national or regional planning was a solution continuously developed and promoted by every single professional studying the situation in an advisory capacity. Railroad consolidation was first promoted by transportation economists such as William Z. Ripley as a panacea to railroads competitive waste and fluctuations. Though it was not until the 1970s that this was able to gain political traction, and even then not in the manner envisioned by these professionals the authors make it clear why this is so: the various transport regimes desired to limit competition to increase profits and provide a modicum of stability in fluctuating, artificially isolated markets.

When one additionally factors in the high entry costs of these industries and the pressures to upgrade machinery following post-war technological developments, it becomes more understandable why the government would wish to partially subsidize them. One of the best examples the authors give to illustrate the governments overarching concern with stability and the manner in which government subsidized transport regime is in the airline industry and the variations they tried to create a efficient system. In this industry, the authors are concerned with illustrating that in the decision making process that to lead specific public policies political considerations was the driving force and not the promotion of capitalist rights. Regions with small populations that might not be profitable for companies could not be abandoned according to the regulatory regime but instead had to be included and the costs deferred amongst passengers taking other routes. This of course had pricing effects which the authors illustrate via reference to promotional, student and business fares.

With its tight focus on business history, public policies and the development of the “presidential state” to regulate and later deregulate these industries for increased capital efficiency through a vast number of primary sources, there are few things with which one can find fault. The only thing I believe could strengthen it the book, recognizing my own biases behind such a statement, would be a short narrative of the railroad conditions prior to the 1920s as the political actors from that time to the 1980s repeatedly use that epoch as a rhetorical device, much like the phrase, “the best transportation system in the world,” to mobilize political actors. Doing so would provide greater clarity as to why it was that such restrictive and at times seemingly counter-intuitive policies were implemented.

The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times by Orne Westad takes together a dauntingly large number of documents released or unclassified by governments to provide a narrative of what happened when the post World War II global powers, the USSR and USA, intervened in the third world, “the former colonial or semi-colonial countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America that were subject to European… economic or political domination” (3).

Westad opens by contextualizing Soviet Socialism and American Capitalism as ideological conceptions of socio-economic relations that represent different variations of modernism. Both powers saw themselves as embodying the natural trends of development and subsequently sought to obtain security from the other via weapons development and alliances. Additionally, he is keen to point out how in this post-colonial period: “Moscow’s and Washington’s objective were not exploitation or subjectification, but control and improvement. While this distinction may be rather ethereal seen from the receiving end, it is crucial for understanding the Cold War discourse itself: while imperialism got its social consciousness almost as an afterthought, in the Cold War it was inherent from the very beginning” (5). In this regard Westad writes to correct post-Soviet collapse revisionists who see the struggle between the two as emanating primarily from the machinations of the Evil Empire. Quite often, Soviet influence sought to counterbalance the relationship of “guide” and “ward” that the U.S. had imposed. Towards this end he provides a short but compelling account of American’s continuous aggression towards collectivists domestically and international and points to it’s intervention immediately following the Russian revolution in October as a sticking point for the newly self-proclaimed Socialist government.

The first chapters the book limns this account in detail while the second delves into the evolution of a United States ideology that increasingly viewed itself in a paternalistic mold. The Native American, Philippines, Mexico and many other countries felt the hard hand of America as they attempted to express faith in something other than market rationality. This form of emancipation at gun barrel point lead to agendas of “nation building” and “development” that would later be seen if not the models that at least the precedents for subsequent third-world intervention. Following this outline of American ideology and how it played out the third chapter begins by providing an account of the Soviet model for development and intervention.

Westad outlines the variations found in Marxism’s relation to anti-colonial practices within the third world. Significant factors, such as level of economic and bureaucratic development are analyzed and how it was that the United States sought to develop it’s own form of scientific modernization theory in an effort to combat the Marxian model gaining traction in these countries eager for development but seeking to avoid the pitfalls of exploitation by their newly empowered countrymen. Insistent on the post-Enlightenment connections of these two forms of historical experience that laud science, education and technological development and seek to shape the world in it’s own image, Westad presents them in an almost evangelical sense.

From here the last two hundred and fifty pages give account of the many “hot” conflicts in the Cold War. Westad gives background on the major players within the conflict and details the fighting and diplomacy involved in the struggles in Cuba, Vietnam, Iran, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and the Horn, Southern Africa. There are of course monographs on each of these conflicts however, to my knowledge, they do not limn the links between all of them in the manner in which both governments did.

The Soviets vacillating enthusiasm for their intentional projects at the cost of domestic growth is a recurring theme, as it the inability for the United States diplomatic core and intelligence services to provide an accurate telling of events to the policy makers. This latter point also obscured the manner in which the U.S. helped create the situation that would later be classified as under-development in world-systems theory. While this might be construed as a particularly academic concern, when considering that such theory influenced the U.S. decision to mobilize against democratic movements in Latin America it’s significance shines through. Also worth mentioning is that this should not be seen as a specifically American flaw, as similar modes of wishful thinking was occurring on the Soviet side as well. Westad develops this particular theme most forcefully in the various responses to the Afghan revolution and their calls for assistance. In the tension between these two super-powers Westad is also keep to illustrate how their policies helped facilitate the growth of radical Islam as a counter-balance to their attempts at extending into the Muslim world. Westad ends with a general call to non-violence in the political process in the understanding that as long as capitalism continues to cause the crises that lead to calls for revolution, Marxism will be a viable option for the dispossessed. The wars that he just described will continue, but need not.

Anti-Intellectualism in American Life by Richard Hofstadter was the 1964 winner of the Pulitzer Prize in non-fiction and illuminates American historical responses to issues of intellectualism. Rather than being a sustained examination of a particular period, Hofstadter instead writes on issues that have particular significance in a time after Joseph McCarthy has died but his legacy still had legs.

Intellectualism does not have a specific ideological composition but is determined by specific habits and attitudes, most typically defined as a mindset that takes joy in depth analysis. Genteel, ante-bellum southern intellectuals lamenting an advancing industrialism’s degenerative social effects on a once agrarian economy are thus as much intellectuals as the socialist writers at The Masses in the Lower East Side. Intellectualism (and intellectuals) are defined in contradistinction to intelligence which is viewed as inherited, traditional manners of analysis that only concerns itself with the practical. Hofstadter’s distinctions between those that are in the professional, white-collar classes and intellectuals is also noteworthy. He points out that an advanced education, say leading one to be a member of a legal profession, doesn’t necessarily make one an intellectual as this is just technical training. Intellectuals devote their free time to personal edification and wrestling with problems however they are not, according to Hofstadter, allowed to become devotees to any particular idea. I am somewhat ambivalent about this aspect of intellectualism as it seems to give the credence to the idea that – using Hofstader example – that anyone staking a solid position aren’t intellectuals but fanatics. I think that capriciousness is definitely an aspect of intellectualism, but I think to disregard those that stake out a position (that may be informed by contrasting views!) continues some of the anti-intellectualist McCarthite legacy that he seeks to throw in disrepute.

One of the first and most oft recurring themes Hofstadter identifies in American consideration of intellectualism is this conflict between conservative and religious groups to liberal political philosophy. For the former, intellectualism is dangerous as it’s quest, to paraphrase Marx, for a ruthless criticism of all things existing without fear as to where the conclusion will lead is disruptive to existing social fabrics. Their overriding antagonism stems from what they perceive as a lack of moral foundations in intellectualism. Such a sentiment does not, however, come ex nihilo and Hofstadter shows how this is closely tied to the early settler conditions, low levels of formative education, foreign immigration, revivalist preachers and resistance to foreign religious institutions like the Catholic diocese and Anglican church. One Georgia pastor states that there are only three books that should be read by people, the Bible, the hymn book and an almanac, as anything else will turn people “bad”.

For the politically conservative, intellectuals were weak-willed, effeminate intellectuals. They had book knowledge, but not knowledge of “how people are.” They were good at thinking, but not at doing. They were too quick to experiment with new solutions to social problems and not let the time honored traditional way of dealing with things work. As a force in electoral politics, Hofstadter shows how this first manifested in the Federalist and anti-Federalist debates with Jefferson playing the role of an intellectual devil inspired by too much French philosophy. Connected to the myriad slurs both sides produced about each other are concerns about the increasingly depersonalized nature of government that are still voiced today. The growth of a professional governmental bureaucracy and their role in establishing and perpetuating norms played on the anxieties of a recently “free” people that were afraid of a return to despotism. Most interesting in this period of anti-intellectualism is that as mass consumer culture increased, the native intellectuals – the “gentleman of good breeding” – soon left politics as they were yelled down by a new group who had no qualms about making barker-like appeals to emotions.

The political classes were not alone in their fear of intellectual, the small-holdings farmer often contributed his own perspective to the situation. At a time when America was largely agricultural, the small-farmers resisted the knowledge attempted to be brought to them by the universities. This was both as they resented the expert who had, at least in their mind, not put in the same sort of manual labour dues as to be called a farmer and as the large amount of cheap land made speculation on prices more profitable than working on it. This mistrust of the outside “intellectual” makes it’s way over into the labor unions as well. Samuel Gompers was notorious in his disdain for “idea men” and actively sought to emulate the values of the possessing classes. He actively fought against and decried the large number of socialists, communists and syndicalists which sought to turn the union into a larger instrument of social regeneration and instead propounded the bread and butter policies that would eventually become business unionism.

All of these social pressures could not, however, counter the power given to intellectuals during the period leading up to the New Deal. As the status quo become an untenable one, it had a tremendously revivifying effect for those intellectual specialists previously marginalized into small academic spheres. Now their proclamations were, at least in part, being seriously considering as being “the gospel” of how to proceed. The political and social institutions that were set up according to their outlines was not without nay-sayers, and often times the final result was a shell of the original plan, however once university professors and scientists came to play a role in the hall of power it was impossible to take them back. Hofstadter shows how one of the major driving sources of antagonism stemmed from businessmen combating the intellectualist attempts to insulate people form the vicissitudes of the market economy by supporting workers movements for greater on the job safety and general economic planning.

In the section on schooling, the anti-intellectualist animosity takes on the flavor of “life adjustment.” Here classes on how to master mundane tasks and how to develop one’s emotional intelligence are seen as preferable to classics and modern novels. While there is not the sort of depth into the reforms of Horace Mann and the conditions of teachers as I expect Dana Goldstein will be going into in when her book is published, the brief history of schools at the beginning of the 20th century shows the many deficiencies that would make today’s nay-sayer on the state of public education go into shock. For instance, it was an almost common practice for school masters to be Shang-Hai’d into the position and teachers to frequently leave without warning. This is understandable as their pay was so low and social regard for teachers differed drastically from the traditional Europeans recognition of them as having an important role. One of the aspects that I found to be somewhat surprising was Hofstadder’s silence in regards to the Modern School movement’s origin from libertarian, not liberal, traditions. The Modern School Movement: Anarchism and Education in the United States by Paul Avrich is clear in illustrating how much of the educational concept and theories which later came to form discourses on teacher-child relations and pedagogy in fact originated from Spain. The later philosophical contributions of John Dewey, while politically at odds with the Spanish anarchists, has several significant overlaps including their similar views that schools are society inchoate, that book learning isn’t as valuable as being well-rounded, that a spirit of social service ought to be instilled within the co-operative structure of the classroom. I would attribute these as stemming from Dewey’s debt to Hegel, especially as Hofstadter states that Dewey’s writing is so vague that it caused his supporters to form into different camps based upon their interpretation and that the high level of abstraction which he wrote often made it problematic to turn his pronouncements into policy.

The closing considerations on the then current place of the American intellectual is primarily on the relationship between intellectuals and political power. Using a series of articles published in The Parisian Review as a point from which to discuss the changes in alienation felt by those on the social-democratic left, intellectuals are here shown as splitting between those that are able to accommodate themselves to the needs of power and those that resist it. Hofstadter doesn’t claim that these are the only two roles possible, but sees them as existing on a continuum tending to the extremes. While not tarrying with it here, I think it would have been worthwhile to then analyze the claims of the Left intellectuals more. As a social democrat he seems to be sympathetic to them, and it makes me wonder what he would now think of human terrain teams, but like stakes a positions that is the very self-same definition of intellectualism he gave earlier – ambivalence.

While I don’t think that some of the trends which Hofstadter comments on, such as the business world’s ambivalence to math and science continue per se, it does take on a different form. Rather than supporting community schools, the current trend towards supporting privatization is anti-intellectual in that it is part of a broader movement to undo the welfare state. The increased availability to use foreign-born specialists in this post-industrial atmosphere allow for an intellectual environment that is increasingly without defender. Intelligence, yes, but even then only with limits.