The below is my translation into English of Javier Echeverría’s book La Revolución Tecnocientífica.
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Prologue
The scientific revolution began in the last decades of the sixteenth century and developed throughout the seventeenth century. Its impellers (Copernicus, Galileo, Harvey, Descartes, Huygens, Leibniz, Newton and many others) radically changed the European conception of the world, breaking with the Aristotelian-scholastic molds that had predominated during the Middle Ages. The change was slow and took place in some European countries (Italy, Holland, Great Britain, France, Germany), spreading little by little to the rest of Europe and North America. It affected only some disciplines (astronomy, mathematics, physics, medicine), which were the vanguard of philosophical and methodological change. Subsequently, the mathematization of knowledge and experimental methodology were reaching other sciences, with the consequent irruption of new theories in chemistry, biology, geology and, finally, in the field of social sciences.
To promote the new natural philosophy, inspired by the Baconian program, new institutions were created (scientific societies, astronomical observatories, laboratories, etc.), around which the emerging scientific communities came together. The Universities opposed the change, except for rare exceptions, originating famous processes and disputes between the defenders of the new scientific methodology and the maintainers of the Aristotelian method and the medieval structure of knowledge. As a result of this long process, modern science was gradually institutionalized, with notable differences according to the countries and disciplines.
Throughout the eighteenth century, scientists found important allies in the drivers of the Industrial Revolution, especially in Britain, where Newtonian science had a wide social diffusion. With the French Revolution and the introduction of compulsory education, the social dissemination of scientific knowledge was progressively guaranteed, while creating a system of reproduction of emerging scientific communities. During the nineteenth century other European countries followed the French example, with which science was inserted into the European educational system, culminating the scientific revolution. The Humboldt University in Germany and the French Polytechnique became role models throughout the continent.
The first industrial revolution occurred in Britain. Its social, economic and political impact was enormous in Europe. One of its main motors was technology. Science only had an indirect influence on industrial development. Both revolutions, scientific and industrial, have been constitutive of the Modern Era, together with the profound political changes that led to the establishment of democratic forms of government in some European countries, as well as in the United States of America. During the Second Industrial Revolution, the alliance between industry, technology and science was consolidated in some countries (Great Britain, Germany, to a lesser extent France), generating two new professions, that of scientist and that of engineer. Throughout the nineteenth century science and technology interacted closely, with mutual benefits, even forming part of clearly differentiated professional sectors. Scientists began to show that their knowledge could be very useful for industry and for war. The countries that promoted the collaboration between science, technology and industry, became great powers throughout the nineteenth century, to the detriment of ancient powers (Spain, Portugal, Turkey) that did not give way to the new scientific-industrial society.
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Taking as reference these two great revolutions of the Modern Era 1, in this book we are going to analyze a change no less important, the techno-scientific revolution, which implies a new way of doing science. It began in the USA at the time of the Second World War, was consolidated with the Cold War and, subsequently, it has been extended to other countries, particularly in Europe, Japan and Canada. We will focus on the US, since, just as modern science was a European creation, contemporary technoscience has a strong North American imprint. We will distinguish three stages. In the first (1940-1965), macro science (Big Science) emerges, which we will consider as the first technoscience modality. Basic research played a fundamental role as an engine of macro science, especially in the field of physics, but also in chemistry and mathematics. After a decade of crisis and stagnation (1966-1976), caused by the American failure in the Vietnam War and by the broad social response that arose in the US and Europe against the militarized macro-science (May 1968), in the The last quarter of the century saw the emergence of technoscience proper, driven by some large companies, rather than by the States, and focused on the development of new technologies. Technoscience also comes from the USA, although it has expanded rapidly in other countries. The Soviet Union was not able to make the new leap, due to lack of financial capacity and business network. If we consider macro-science and technoscience as the first and second techno-scientific revolution, respectively, it can be said that the current military, economic, political, diplomatic and commercial predominance of the US comes, among other reasons, from its techno-scientific leadership.
Science has not disappeared. Scientific societies and academic science continue to exist. However, its two new offshoots, the macroscience and the technoscience, manifest an enormous push, to the point that some authors tend to think that, nowadays, everything is technoscience. We will try to show that this is not the case, specifying the differences between science and macro science, first (chapter 1), and science and technoscience (chapter 2). The techno-scientific revolution differs in fundamental aspects from the scientific revolutions of which Kuhn spoke, which is why we will dedicate chapter 3 to clarify those differences. More than knowledge, it transforms the scientific-technological practice, generating a new structure, the national system elucidate two basic concepts: techno-scientific systems and techno-scientific actions. Faced with the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, which modified the structure of knowledge, the techno-scientific revolution of the twentieth century has transformed, above all, the structure of scientific-technological practice. In particular, the value systems that guide scientific activity have changed, which is why we will devote chapter 5 to the axiology of technoscience. It is not the only possible philosophical approach, but to our knowledge it is one of the clearest and most promising. The values of technoscience are much broader and more complex than those of modern science. Conflicts of values are a structural component of technoscience.
The techno-scientific revolution has not only changed the sciences and technologies. In addition, it has contributed to generate a great economic and social change, the information revolution, which began in the last decades of the twentieth century and which, predictably, will continue to develop during the twenty-first century. The link between technoscience and the emerging information society is very close, so that this alliance can be compared with that which modern science and technology maintained with the industrial revolution. These two new revolutions do not originate in Europe, but in the US of America, which has become a hegemonic power all over the world, in part because of its strong support for technoscience. Just as modern science was European, technoscience is American, just like the information revolution. At the moment both revolutions are expanding in other countries. In doing so, different versions of technoscience arise, depending on the diverse cultures in which it is inserted. It must be said that the First World is formed by those countries where these two new revolutions have been consolidated, or are in an advanced stage of development. To the modern concept of industrial, scientific and technological development, we must add the contemporary notion of techno-scientific and informational development. A country can be a scientific and industrial power, and yet be underdeveloped from the techno-scientific and informational point of view. That is why we understand that technoscience is one of the great challenges of the 21st century.
The new modes of production of wealth and knowledge have radically modified power relations and the distribution of wealth in countries, regions and companies. Military power, for example, requires a high techno-scientific and informational development. It is worth bearing in mind that technoscience not only serves to create, discover, invent and build, but also to annihilate and destroy. The links between technoscience and military institutions have been and continue to be very close, and this from the origin of macro-science. Human beings have developed countless war conflicts throughout history, but the Second World War and the subsequent contests in which the US has participated (Korea, Cold War, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, Kosovo, Afghanistan …) they represent a radical novelty: technoscience is a necessary condition for military victory. For many soldiers and a lot of bravery that is possessed, the defeat of war is guaranteed if you do not have adequate techno-scientific development. The same applies to the business sector, especially in the era of globalization. In summary, technoscience is a condition of possibility of economic and military power, which is why the most powerful countries are those with a high level of techno-scientific and informational development. Curiosity and the search for knowledge could be at the base of the emergence of modern science. Instead, the struggle for power is the engine of contemporary technoscience. Therefore we will finish this work with a reflection on technoscience and power.s of science and technology (SCyT), of which we will deal briefly in chapter 4, focusing on the North American system, which is still the canonical . Although the development of technoscience has generated new scientific theories and great discoveries, the basic paradigms continue to subsist in physics, chemistry, biology and mathematics. We are not facing an epistemological or methodological revolution, although there have been great changes in knowledge and scientific methods, but before a praxeological revolution. Therefore, we will try to analyze the new structure of scientific-technological practice, which is the most marked feature of the techno-scientific revolution. For this we will try The revolution of modern science has been widely studied by historians, sociologists and philosophers. The history, philosophy and sociology of science were established in the early twentieth century and focused on the study of modern science, including the scientific revolutions of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: chemistry (periodic table, organic chemistry), mathematics (Analysis, non-Euclidean geometries, set theory), biology (Darwin, Mendel), Geology (Lyell) and Physics (Einstein, quantum theory). The philosophy of science, which is the starting point of this work, has been primarily logic, epistemology and methodology of science. For this reason he has dealt with the analysis and reconstruction of scientific knowledge, focusing on the concepts, laws, facts and theories, establishing the theoretical / observational distinction, highlighting the logical-linguistic aspects of knowledge and developing enunciative conceptions of the scientific method, both logical- deductive as logical-inductive and statistics. Without underestimating this meta-theory of science, which has made great contributions to the study of science, we think it is insufficient to address technoscience. Since science has changed, becoming technoscience, the philosophy of science has to modify its approaches considerably, becoming the philosophy of technoscience. For that, it has to focus more on scientific activity than on knowledge, developing a theory of scientific action and paying much more attention to technology. The main purpose of this book is to take steps in that direction, without forgetting the starting point, but addressing a new object of reflection, technoscience, which differs in many and very relevant aspects of modern science and technology. What we say about the philosophy of science is also valid for other studies in science and technology, that is to say for history, sociology, glue, psychology, anthropology, politics or economics of science and technology, although here let’s not deal with those issues. If science has changed, as we will keep in these pages, science and technology studies will also have to change, paying more attention to the science of the 20th century, which is already history, although largely unmade. For this reason we will limit ourselves to a period of time, the post-Second World War, and to a country, the USA, which is where technoscience arose. It is certain that the investigation of the development of macro-science and technoscience in the USSR, in Europe, in Japan and in other countries will provide important clarifications to the theses that we are going to affirm here. Even so, we hope that this first foray into the philosophy of technoscience of the 20th century can contribute something to the studies of science, technology and society, not only to the philosophy of science. Together, it is about developing technoscience, philosophical, sociological, historical, pedagogical or other studies, including scientific studies on technoscience (scientometrics, technoscientific development indicators, etc.). The CTS studies (Science, Technology and Society) constitute the scope where all these perspectives can converge and interact.
We will stick first of all to the axiological questions, because they complete the classical epistemological and methodological studies, and because the Axiology of Science and Technology is much less developed. In summary, in this book we will expose the following theses:
1.- Throughout the twentieth century, and especially since the Second World War, has appeared and has consolidated a new form of science, technoscience or megaciencia (Big Science) 2. Initially we will use both expressions as synonymous, although later we will establish differential nuances between both.
2.- This change is important enough so that we can compare it with the modern scientific revolution. That is why we will talk about a techno-scientific revolution, or rather, techno-scientific revolutions, since they occur in almost all scientific disciplines, although in different ways in each.
3.- The techno-scientific revolution is one of the main engines, although not the only one, of a deeper social and economic change, the informational revolution, which due to its relevance can be compared to the industrial revolution. Put succinctly: just as science was vital for the development of industrial society, so technoscience is a basic component of the information society.
4.- The various studies on science and technology (historical, philosophical, sociological, political, cultural, anthropological, economic, etc.) have to face the challenge raised by the techno-scientific revolution, giving rise to the studies of technoscience. This trend is already evident in the last years of the twentieth century, characterized by a profound transformation of transdisciplinary studies of science and technology.
5.- In the case of the philosophy of science and technology, the perspective from which this book is written, it is necessary to deal primarily with the philosophical analysis of techno-scientific activity, instead of focusing on scientific knowledge or technological artifacts, as philosophy of science and the philosophy of technology have traditionally done. Accordingly, we will make some first proposals to analyze the structure of the techno-scientific activity. For this we will study the moment that, generally, is considered foundational of the macrociencia, that is to say the report of Vannevar Bush (1945), in which the technological scientific system was designed that allowed the consolidation of the technoscience in the USA, and later in other industrially, technologically and scientifically developed countries.
6 .- The philosophy of science of the twentieth century devoted many efforts to justify scientific knowledge, its objectivity and rationality. One of the ways that followed for this was the search for the foundations of science. It was understood that, since science was knowledge, these foundations (principles, laws, logical structure of the theories, empirical basis, facts) should also be knowledge, or at most a methodology to obtain valid knowledge. In our opinion, this way is inadequate to investigate the foundations of technoscience. The traditional philosophical problem of the justification of scientific knowledge is superimposed on another question, perhaps more important: the validation of scientific practice.
7.- Finally, and continuing the line followed in recent publications 3, we will first of all deal with the values of technoscience (chapter 5), as it is one of the areas where the techno-scientific revolution has the greatest impact. Faced with the axiological neutrality of the positivist tradition and the restriction of epistemic values or values internal to science (Laudan), we will affirm and develop the thesis of the axiological pluralism of technoscience, which includes the assumption of continued axiological conflicts in technoscientific activity . To analyze the values of technoscience in its various contexts and situations, we will use two formal instruments, the evaluation matrices and the evaluation thresholds or thresholds. In chapter 5 we will show that the Science and technology indicators that are commonly used in science policy are modalities of such matrices, as well as the various evaluation protocols that are used in daily techno-scientific practice. Axiology provides a powerful analytical tool that brings together and integrates in the same conceptual framework the various tools used today to assess techno-scientific actions and their results. This will be the most significant practical contribution of this work.
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The ideas developed in this book are the result of various seminars, courses, conferences and debates in which the author has participated in recent years. The facilities received from the Institute of Philosophy of the CSIC, and in particular from its Director, José María González, allowed me to find some time to clean up multiple drafts and organize this set of ideas, suggestions and proposals. The financial support of the Ministry of Science and Technology (Projects PB 98-0495-C08-01 and BFF2002- 04454-C10-01) made possible the organization of several of these seminars and conferences, in which I had the opportunity to contrast the initial theses and to improve them, thanks to the multiple criticisms received, which I deeply appreciate. Francisco Alvarez and Armando Menéndez were the ones who most closely collaborated with me, although many other people made contributions of great interest: Adelaida Ambrogi, Roberto R. Aramayo, Fernando Broncano, José Antonio Díez Calzada, Anna Estany, José Luis Falguera, José Ferreirós, Amparo Gómez, Marta González, José Luis González Quirós, Mercedes Iglesias, Carlos López Beltrán, José Antonio López Cerezo, José Luis Luján, Sergio Martínez, Javier Moscoso, Emilio Muñoz, León Olivé, Javier Ordóñez, Francisco Pérez, Ana Rosa Pérez Ransanz, Eulalia Pérez Sedeño, Miguel Angel Quintanilla, Ana Rioja, Concha Roldán, Frenando Sáez Vacas, Jesús Sánchez, José Manuel Sánchez Ron, María Jesús Santesmases, Juan Vázquez, Jesús Vega, Ambrosio Velasco and Jesús Zamora Bonilla, among others. The Associated Unit between the University of the Basque Country and the CSIC, which co-directed with Andoni Ibarra, was another of the forums where these proposals were discussed, as well as the Associated Unit between the University of Seville and the CSIC, co-directed by Ramón Queraltó. This book would not have been possible without the strong support given to its publication by María Luisa Capela and Héctor Subirats as the former heads of the FCE team in Spain, as well as its successors, Ricardo Navarro and Juan Guillermo López, who had to suffer some delay in the delivery of the original. But those who had more patience with me were Belén and Irene, already in the domestic sphere, where the computer was on for too long in recent months.
To all of them my sincere thanks.
J.E. January 2003
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Chapter I
Sciences, macro-sciences and technosciences
I.1: Microscience and macroscience.
Derek J. de Solla Price, physicist and historian of science, gave Pegram conferences in 1962 at the Brookhaven National Laboratory, one of the most important in the US for the peaceful application of nuclear energy. In them, it was proposed to introduce a quantitative methodology for the study of science. “Why not apply the resources of science to science itself? Why not measure and generalize, hypothesize and draw conclusions? “- he asked at the beginning 4. According to his physics training, Solla Price was interested in the size and shape of science, instead of focusing on the contents , theories and discoveries, as philosophers and historians of science had done since the beginning of the 20th century. “Considering science as a measurable entity,” he said, “I will try to calculate scientific personnel, literature, talent and expenditures on a national and international scale.” 5 These magnitudes are nowadays called indicators of scientific development and are of great importance to guide scientific policies. This line of inquiry generated a new discipline, Scientometrics (Scientometrics), which has had great development in the second half of the twentieth century and is part of the quantitative studies on science and technology.
The data presented by Solla Price, all of them referred to the USA, allowed him to affirm that science had grown exponentially in size during the 20th century. This increase affected the number of scientists, publications, novelties and discoveries achieved and also the financing of scientific activity. To give an example, in the 60s lived 80-90% of the scientists that had never been in history. This vertiginous growth led him to propose the hypothesis that science had entered a new phase, the Great Science or macro science (Big Science). He characterized it by means of two mathematical laws, both conjectural and subject to empirical testing: the law of exponential growth and the law of saturation. The first stated that “science grows at compound interest, multiplying by a certain amount in equal periods of time” 6. The period of doubling the size of science fixed it at 15 years. The second law qualified exponentiality and proposed as a growth model the logistic curve, according to which exponential growth with duplication every 15 years is only the beginning of a logistics curve, which subsequently reaches a ceiling or line of saturation. From this height growth can stagnate, in which case science will enter a phase of senility, or it can recover the exponential rhythm, entering a new phase of accelerated growth 7. Forty years later, there is no doubt that the Second hypothesis has been the right one.
The data and the mathematical models proposed by Solla Price have been corrected and further refined by the experts in Scientometrics, but to a large extent they are still valid. From a philosophical perspective, what matters is that the law of exponential growth led him to propose a conceptual distinction that has had great acceptance among scientists: on the one hand there would be Small Science (XVII, XVIII and XIX centuries) and on the other the Great Science (twentieth century). Both are distinguished by their rate of growth, very slow in the first case, very fast in the second. It is appropriate to consider whether this distinction between two types of science is justified philosophically and, above all, whether the differences in size and rate of growth are sufficient reason to introduce such an important conceptual distinction and whether this is purely quantitative, or qualitative as well.
The notion of macroscience (Big Science) had been suggested the previous year by Alvin Weinberg, who had suggested an economic criterion to define it: for a project to be considered as macro-scientific it is necessary that its realization requires a significant part of the gross domestic product (GDP ) of a country 8. According to Weinberg’s criterion, the distinction between science and macroscience is primarily budgetary 9. Solla Price accepted this economic criterion, but wanted to clarify and formalize it. For this he proposed a mathematical model that justified the need to significantly increase the financing of science. The conceptual distinction that he introduced affirmed that scientific research had entered a new historical stage, reason for which the problem of its financing had to be reconsidered: “the science of today overflows so widely the previous one, that it is evident that we have entered into a new era that has swept everything away, except for the basic scientific traditions “10. Finally, Solla Price suggested that his research was only a first step:” if we are to characterize the current phase as something new, different from the bourgeois science common to Maxwell, Franklin and Newton, we can not base ourselves solely on a growth rate “11. It left open the way to distinguish the macro-science from science not only by its size, but also by qualitative and cultural criteria.
The question was taken up in a Symposium organized by Stanford University in 1988, whose Minutes have been edited by two historians of science, Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly. For Hevly, “macro science is not science made with large or expensive instruments” 12. High budgets and large instruments are indicators of change, but according to Hevly, macro-science was characterized from the beginning by 13:
a): The concentration of resources in a very limited number of research centers.
b): The specialization of the work force in the laboratories.
c): The development of relevant projects from the social and political point of view, which contribute to increase the military power, industrial potential, health or prestige of a country.
In this Symposium, the problem of the origin of the macroscience, as well as its subsequent evolution, was also discussed. Hevly himself pointed out other peculiarities of macro-science, which have been manifesting throughout his later evolution 14:
d): The relationship between science and technology has taken new forms, which have influenced the nature of both.
e): Macro-science requires interaction between scientists, engineers and the military. Galison confirmed this point, stating bluntly that “it is manifestly impossible to examine the great science without taking into account the science of war” 15.
Other authors also presented other proposals to characterize macroscience. Robert W. Smith, for example, recalled that “among the characteristics that have been identified in the great science are politicization, bureaucratization, high risk and loss of autonomy.” 16 Galison said that mega-science has many faces, what his inquiry is difficult and complex. All the analysts pointed out that the discontinuity between small and large science is partly fictitious, which does not prevent the convenience of maintaining that distinction. Panofsky, one of the great promoters of the Great Science at Stanford University (MARK III project), said that “there is no conflict between the small and the great science, and in fact there is a continuum of scale between the different activities” 17 With this, I went back to the initial theses of Solla Price, insisting that the transition from science to megacience was evolutionary, not revolutionary.
There were no shortage of authors who investigated the emergence of mega-science in Europe (CERN) or in Japan (Tsukuba Science City), showing that there are important cultural differences in their development according to countries and disciplines. In summary, both participants in the Stanford Symposium and other authors who have addressed this issue, agree when using the term “macro-science” to refer to a new stage of the development of science, but differ from each other to the time to try to specify it and define it. Most scholars would subscribe to the statement of Sánchez Ron, according to which “the Great Science is a research procedure characteristic of our century” 18, referring to the twentieth century. But on the notes that define the Great Science, the positions are very diverse. We infer from all of this that it is worth specifying conceptually the differences between science and megaciencia and we opt for a philosophical perspective for it. Not in vain philosophy has strived to elucidate the concepts throughout its history.
Throughout this work we will maintain that throughout the twentieth century not only the size and rate of growth of science have changed, but something much deeper, namely: the structure of techno-scientific activity. The economic characterization of Weinberg and the quantitative models of Solla Price are indicators of this change, but they are not its cause. The emergence of megaciencia implied a deep change in the scientific practice, from which many other changes are derived, some of great magnitude. Therefore, we will also maintain the thesis that throughout of the twentieth century there has been a profound revolution in science and technology: a techno-scientific revolution. Since, when talking about scientific revolutions, the work of Thomas Kuhn is an obligatory reference, we will not only deal with distinguishing science from macro-science and technoscience (chapter 1), but we will also analyze the notion of “techno-scientific revolution”, distinguishing it from the Kuhnian scientific revolutions (chapter 2). Put succinctly, the scientific revolutions that Kuhn studied (Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Lyell, Lavoisier, Einstein, quantum mechanics, etc.) transformed the structure of scientific knowledge first of all. The techno-scientific revolution of the twentieth century, on the other hand, is based on a radical change in the structure of scientific activity, and therefore has many facets to analyze, including the changes in theory that derived from it. This change in structure brought with it an increase in the size of science, but it also modified the objectives of science, the scientific communities, the modes of organization of research and the criteria for assessing results. In particular, it produced a profound symbiosis between science and technology. We will also maintain that, after the emergence of the macro-science, the progressive entrepreneurization and computerization of the research activity generated in turn a new qualitative change, which has manifested itself especially in the last quarter of the 20th century. Therefore we will say that the macroscience was a prelude to technoscience, or if you want a phase of transition. Philosophically speaking, the great change experienced by science in the 20th century is better analyzed if we speak of technoscience than of macroscience. For this reason, we will consider macroscience as the first technoscience modality.
I.2: The origin of macro-science.
By hypothesis, Solla Price accepted that “the cataclysmic changes associated with the Second World War were the ones that initiated the new era and caused all the important differences (between the Small and the Great Science)” 19. Thus, it placed the beginning of macro-science at the time of the Second World War, even accepting that the transition from the Small to the Great Science was gradual 20.
Galison, Sánchez Ron and Seidel, among others, have pointed out the historical importance of the design and construction in Berkeley of the first cyclotron by Lawrence (1932) 21. Consequently, they tend to date the beginning of the Great Science in the previous decade. to World War II 22. Indeed, Lawrence’s project is a good example of a macro-scientific proposal, although it should not be forgotten that large cyclotrons and particle accelerators were built after 1940. But, from our point of view, the debate about the specific moment in which the megacience arose is vain. We are not facing a discovery that could be attributed to a specific person, nor dated and located at a specific time and place, 23 but rather to a change in the structure of scientific activity, which required a broad lapse of time to emerge, consolidate and develop. The techno-scientific revolution was not made by a person or a Research Center. Nor was it an epistemological, methodological or theoretical change, in the manner of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. It was a radical transformation of the research activity that took place in several research centers at the same time, although in some it crystallized with greater speed and clarity of ideas. What is more, not only occurred in laboratories and research centers, but also in other scenarios (scientific policy offices, companies, foundations, strategic study centers, etc.). On the other hand, the emergence of technoscience not only affected research, but also the management, application, evaluation, development and dissemination of science, that is, scientific activity as a whole. The techno-scientific revolution was a protracted and complex process, which is still happening now, as technoscience continues to expand in different countries. In each of them adopted different modalities, as in the various disciplines. But even so, there are a series of common features that allow us to characterize the new structure of scientific-technological practice, as we will see below.
Let’s go by steps, going back to the first technoscience modality, that is, to Big Science. The megaciencia brought with it a new scientific-technological system and for that reason the changes in the scientific practice were numerous and important. Some North American universities and research centers (MIT, Berkeley, etc.) had pointed in that direction in the 1930s. That is why we can speak of several examples of mega-science prior to the Second World War, such as the Radiation Laboratory of MIT, the Klystron Stanford Laboratory or the Radiation Laboratory of Berkeley. However, the greatest rise of these research centers occurred during the war and in the years immediately after. What these pioneering centers pointed out in the 1930s showed its enormous effectiveness during the World War. The report by Vannevar Bush, Science, the Endless Frontier (1945) provided a theory for this change, enabling the establishment of a new system of science and technology in the US after World War II. This CyT system (SCyT) was consolidated in the postwar period and became widespread in the 50s, first in the US, and later in other countries, with the corresponding variants and specificities.
Therefore, we will place the beginning of the megaciencia at the time of the Second World War, underlining that it occurred in the US of America and in the field of militarized physical-mathematics, as shown by the four great projects that we consider as initial canons of the Great Science: the Radiation Laboratory of Berkeley, the Radiation Laboratory of MIT, the ENIAC project of the Moore School of Pennsylvania and, above all, the Manhattan Project (Los Alamos), an authentic paradigm of macro science, which led to the manufacture of the first atomic bombs 24. Other countries (Germany, Great Britain) developed similar projects in World War II, and even before 25. But during the postwar period they lacked economic resources and enough political support to boost technoscience. These countries prioritized reconstruction, rather than creating a national science and technology system that would lead them to world leadership in the postwar era, as the USA did. In the American case, emerging technoscience contributed decisively to its military victory. But the key decision was to promote the new organizational structure of megaciencia during the postwar period, using important public funds for it. After the war, the only country that was in economic, political and military conditions to develop the Great Science was the USA. Therefore, megaciencia arises in the four aforementioned centers (and in others that could be mentioned), but the new structuring of scientific activity only takes place after 1945, more specifically with the approval of the Bush report and its progressive implementation. functioning.
Some years later the USSR became a nuclear power, developed its own SCyT system and, for example, took the initiative in space exploration with the launch of the first artificial satellite, Sputnik (1957). Therefore, Big Science also developed in the Soviet Union, but later. The scientific-technological competition between the two great military powers was one of the most significant characteristics of the Cold War and was closely linked to its military, political, industrial and ideological rivalry. The competition for the dominance of space between the US and the USSR in the 50s and 60s is an excellent example of megaciencia, as well as the hard emulation between the National Laboratory of Brookhaven and the European CERN (1952) in the field of physics of small particles. After 50, examples of mega-science abound, and since the 1980s are multiplied by economically developed countries, although with significant differences with respect to the first era of mega-science. The greater presence of private companies and the computerization of techno-scientific activity characterize, among other things, this second era of mega-science, in which what is properly called technoscience is configured. Therefore, we will say that megacience was the precursor of technoscience and that both differ from modern science (Small Science) based on qualitative criteria, not just quantitative ones. The objective of this chapter is to delimit these differential features, which in many cases are a matter of degree or scale, but in general they are deeper.
We will start from the Solla Price hypothesis: the new form of scientific activity was first configured in the USA in the 40s. Apart from the four major projects we have mentioned, a key moment is the Vannevar Bush Report on politics (Science, the Endless Frontier, 1945), which will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4. The report stated that basic research is the engine of technological innovation and that this, with the help of industry and State agencies, is a necessary condition for the economic and social progress of a country, as well as for national security. Scientific research was no longer justified by the search for truth or by the domination of nature. These objectives, which characterized the emergence of modern science and technology, continued to exist, but new ones emerged, much more specific to technoscience. In particular, it was about guaranteeing the military, political, economic and commercial predominance of a country. Throughout this work we will maintain the thesis that technoscience is characterized above all by the emergence, consolidation and stable development of a scientific-technological system that gives a place to a new mode of knowledge production. Unlike the First World War, after its conclusion it turned to normal scientific and technological activity, the Bush report designed a new scientific-technological system that could be worth as much for peace as for war 26. Among other aspects, Technoscience is characterized by the instrumentalization of scientific-technological knowledge. The advance in knowledge ceases to be an end in itself to become a means for other purposes.
I.3: Macro-science and technoscience.
The distinction between Small Science and Great Science can be improved if the term “technoscience” is used and Big Science is considered to be the first historical modality of technoscience, followed by others, for whose identification it is necessary to resort to other criteria, apart from those of size and growth proposed by Solla Price.
We will accept the proposals of Weinberg, Hevly, Galison and Smith, but we will try to better organize the system of distinctive features between science and technoscience. Technoscience, for example, not only modifies science: it also transforms technological, industrial and military activity, thanks to the development of a national system of science and technology that transcends the limits of scientific communities and generates techno-scientific companies, superimposed on communities pre-existing scientific The indicators proposed by Weinberg and Solla Price, as well as the criteria used by Heavy, Galison, Smith and others, are not enough to fully explore the concept of “technoscience”. For our part, we will characterize it through a set of distinctive features, in order to introduce a minimum of philosophical rigor, which we miss in a large part of the historical studies on macro-science. It is necessary to carry out a detailed conceptual analysis and from various perspectives to properly distinguish between science, macroscience and technoscience. The economic, scientometric and sociological criteria establish some differences, but they are not enough.
We will start with the first technoscience modality, that is, with the macroscience. This is characterized by the following distinctive features:
(a): Government financing.
The Federal Government of the USA decided to promote basic research, actively involved in the promotion of science, all in order to significantly increase the military and commercial power of the US. Thus broke a tradition of federal non-intervention in scientific affairs, which had been maintained during the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. Scientific research was the exclusive responsibility of academic institutions, although it was usually financed by patrons, foundations, some States of the Union and some companies very companies. In general, the interest of the companies was oriented almost exclusively to applied research, in accordance with the traditions of North American industrialization. At the time of the Second World War there was a great change in the USA and military agencies, political committees and government offices appeared, such as the Office of Scientific and Technological Mobilization, which began to strongly boost research. This brought about the entry of new and powerful agents in the field of knowledge, until then practically monopolized by the scientific communities. For this, large equipment and research macroprojects were financed, something that was beyond the reach of the economic means of the universities and research centers, with rare exceptions. Macro-science emerged around a few centers and projects (Berkeley, MIT, Moore School, Los Alamos, etc.), all of them with strong military or political support. The great military needs aroused by the Second World War were decisive at the time of increase the size of the projects and the means of financing. As far as basic research is concerned, the US lagged behind Germany and other European countries. The aim was to correct this delay in a few years, signing up for it the best European scientists, many of them with difficulties in their countries of origin due to the rise of Nazism and fascism. Faced with the traditional patronage of the Foundations or the States, the Federal Government and the Military Agencies decided to invest heavily in basic research, provided that it was closely linked to the lines that the new agents considered strategic.
(b): Integration of scientists and technologists.
For the development of these macroprojects, large equipment and investments were required, as well as large and multidisciplinary research teams. This required the collaboration (not free of internal conflicts) among scientists, engineers, technicians and research funders. A scientific macroproject not only pursues objectives linked to the search for scientific knowledge. It also aims to generate advances and improvements in the available technologies, so that these would be useful to the financing institutions, and in particular the Army, Navy and Aviation. Therefore, macro science requires that engineers and scientists collaborate closely if they want to achieve their respective objectives, breaking the previous disciplinary separation.
(c): Social contract of science.
The USA reorganized its Agencies and research centers, hiring scientists, engineers and technicians of great prestige for it. At the same time, they subcontracted with some academic institutions and with large industrial companies the realization of a good part of these macroprojects, provided that scientists, institutions and companies offered a high degree of confidence, reliability, scientific competence and industrial efficiency. Scientific research became part of an R & D industry. Each scientist and engineer had to contribute their knowledge and skills to a joint project that was developed by previously designed and planned stages. The management of these projects had a fundamental role, because they knew the final objectives, fixed the development phases and the intermediate objectives, maintained the relationships with the financing agents and potential clients, managed the available human and material resources and signed new contracts with experts and specialized companies when it was necessary for the proper development of certain phases of the project. In summary, the macroscience was not developed solely by laboratories, but by a complex of scientific industries managed and directed according to models of business and military organization. Academic science was superimposed on an industrial, political and military framework that radically modified the organization of research. While maintaining its traditional autonomy in laboratories, part of science was industrialized, that is, it became an auxiliary company of the great scientific-technological projects. As a result of this strategy, what was later called the social contract of science among scientists, engineers, politicians, military and industrial corporations. The report of Vannevar Bush (1945) is usually considered the founding text of said contract. We will analyze its content in greater detail in chapter 4.
(d): Industrialized macro-science.
These changes had direct consequences in the scientific practice, because the laboratories that collaborated in a macroproject of investigation happened to comprise of authentic factories scientists, as it happened in the laboratories that investigated on radars and in the project Manhattan 27. The investigation macrocientífica it requires large laboratories, whose construction has to be carried out by the industries, and whose use is shared by several research teams. It broke with the tradition of academic science, in which institution or scientist had its own laboratory, arising shared equipment. This allowed to optimize the resources, but it forced to coordinate the investigations of different teams and to keep in mind the criteria of people external to the scientific communities. The emergence of the macroscience brought internal conflicts in the scientific communities: some were integrated into the macro-projects of research, but there were many criticisms and resistances. The hard core of the macrociencia concentrated in the offices of direction, where the main decisions were taken. Over time, this led to a bureaucratization of scientific activity, hitherto unknown. The romantic era of scientific research (Darwin, Mendel, Einstein, the Curie spouses, etc.) had ended, entering the stage of industrialized macro-science. Obvious is to say that this transition did not occur everywhere. The Small Science continued to exist, but before it emerged a new mode of knowledge production, which was considered by the political authorities as a priority. Between the academic science that continued practicing in most of the Universities and the industrialized macroscience for which some chose, a border was gradually opened.
(e): Militarized macro-science.
Many of the scientific macroprojects had military support and funding, especially in the early stages of development. Therefore, they were secret, contrary to the tradition of modern science, based on the publication of research results. Faced with the traditional autonomy of scientists when determining what needs to be published, military R & D agencies introduced new values into scientific practice (secrecy, discipline, loyalty, patriotism, etc.). During the world war, a significant number of scientists and engineers was militarized. This phenomenon had occurred in previous armed conflicts. The novelty was to maintain the partial militarization of science during the postwar period. Many of the scientific macroprojects continued to have military funding, both in the Korean War (1950) and, especially, during the Cold War. Although the results of some secret projects (for example, ENIAC-type computers, or radar) were transferred to civil society, the military agencies designed new macro-projects (defense systems, space exploration, nuclear energy, cryptology, etc.) that followed remaining within the scope of militarized macro-science. In this way, some military institutions became stable agents for research scientific and technological 28. Macro-science was not only militarized in its emergency phase, but also, albeit partially, in the later stages of consolidation and development. The science and technology systems of developed countries always include military R & D agencies, serving a significant part of the scientific communities 29.
(f): The scientific policy.
The emergence of macro-science is concomitant with the emergence of scientific-technological policies, public or private. Some prestigious scientists left the laboratories and moved into management and advisory cabinets, becoming experts in the negotiation and design of scientific-technological policies. A new type of scientific-technological action emerged: the design of policies for macro-science. Its main action consisted of organizing the System of Science and Technology (SCyT) and for this they had to access the highest levels of political and military power, also maintaining close ties with large industrial corporations. A macro-scientific company was obliged to join lobbies formed by scientists, technologists, businessmen, the military and politicians. As President Eisenhower pointed out, lobbies formed by scientists, engineers, military men and businessmen had acquired great political power in the US in the 1950s. Macro-scientific companies competed with each other for large projects, which is why their Linkages with the spheres of power was imperative. In summary, the macroscience involved the full connection of science with power (political, military, economic). In particular, some scientists became direct advisers to the White House, acquiring considerable influence.
(g): The macro-scientific agency.
In front of the great “men of science” that made modern science, the macroscience was made by large coordinated teams that integrated their respective knowledge and skills into a common project that had mixed objectives. In philosophical terms it can be said that the subject of macrociencia became plural, breaking with the traditional methodological individualism. Leading the research teams were always people of great scientific prestige, but their role was that of project managers and macro-scientific agencies, rather than researchers in the classical sense of the word. The macroscience is done by legal persons, not by natural persons. Here lies another of the great changes in the structure of scientific activity.
We will return later on this last difference and we will add others, but the six distinctive features that we have just presented can serve for a first characterization of the macroscience. As the new scientific-technological system was consolidated, additional specific features emerged. The macro-science of the 50s ended up becoming technoscience at the end of the 20th century. Public investments in R & D grew continuously until 1966, the date on which there was a major crisis, coinciding with the arrival of the Nixon Administration. With the Presidency of Reagan the social contract of science was renewed and funding grew again, but based on criteria very different from those of the 50s and 60s. In the last quarter of a century we can properly speak of technoscience, not only of macroscience. The a huge increase in private financing will be one of its distinctive features, 30 as we will see in chapter 2.
The previous characterization of the macroscience can be criticized from different perspectives. For example, it can be argued that there are other distinctive features of macroscience that have not been mentioned. Some of the proposed specificities may also be questionable: there are cases in which the private financing of basic financing was very considerable, as we will see in section 2.6. This first system of distinctive features does not suppose more than a first approximation to our research object, which is technoscience. Macro-science is only one of its modalities, historically the first.
There is also a second objection, namely that all those peculiarities that we attribute to macroscience have already manifested themselves earlier in the history of science and technology, even if on a smaller scale. We would also accept this criticism, since, as we will see in section II.3, the attribution of these distinctive features will be a matter of degrees. It is possible to look for multiple historical examples in which the militarization of science had already taken place, its partial conversion into a company, the symbiosis between science and technology, the appearance of new management models and research management, etc. What is decisive is that at the time of the Second World War and in the United States of America all these transformations took place at the same time, and on a previously unknown scale, because of the military conflict. That is why we speak of macro-science: the high degree of realization of the six distinctive features above implies a quantitative change. But, in addition to all this, there was a systemic change: a new science and technology system emerged in the United States. Its progressive consolidation during the postwar period produced a change of structure in the scientific-technological activity. Therefore, it being true that the emergence of technoscience depended on an increase in scale or degree, it is no less true that this set of quantitative transformations generated a structural change, which resulted in the emergence of a new SCyT system. The constitution of the new scientific-technological system was a necessary condition for the emergence of technoscience in the 1980s. Unlike macro-science, the distinction between science and technoscience is not a question of size or scale, as we shall see in the next chapter . The macroscience arose at the same time as the SCyT system. The further development of this SCyT system allowed the progressive appearance of technoscience.
The third possible objection seems less relevant to us. It is possible to affirm that during all this time there were great changes in the scientific knowledge, not only in the scientific-technological practice. This is very true. But we already stated in the prologue that our purpose is to focus on changes in the structure of scientific activity, not on scientific knowledge. Philosophers and historians of science and technology who focus on this second aspect abound. For our part, we have chosen a different and much less studied subject. In the next section we will try to clarify this new perspective of philosophical analysis, opposing our theses to those of the defenders of the teleological conception of scientific rationality.
I.4: The objectives of the macroscience.
When reflecting on scientific rationality, many philosophers have tried to define it in terms of the objectives of science. Such is the case of Popper, Hempel, Lakatos, Goldman, Rescher, Newton-Smith, Levi, Laudan, Giere and many others 31. For Popper, for example, the ultimate goal of science is the search for truth. This was understood as a regulatory ideal, which is never achieved, but which can be approached gradually whenever a falsificationist methodology is used. If a theory has endured numerous and severe refutation attempts and has survived that criticism, we have reason to think that it is more plausible than another that has not been put to the test by the falsificationist methodological imperative. For Lakatos, on the other hand, the rationality of science is justified by the new and surprising facts that it is able to explain, as well as by the increase of its heuristic potentiality. For Laudan, the key to rationality lies in the ability to solve problems, which is why the goal of science is to propose and solve problems. Many other thinkers have defended different variants of this teleological conception of rationality, agreeing that the objectives of science justify their rationality, but then have differed between them when it comes to specifying what those goals or objectives are. For its part, most scientists have had to think that knowledge is a good in itself and that the search for knowledge (valid, contrasted, etc.) is the fundamental goal of scientific research.
The same applies in the case of technology. There have been thinkers who have encrypted technical rationality in the search for maximum efficiency. Others have made it depend on the objective of helping to satisfy human needs or to increase the level of well-being and adaptation to the environment. In both cases, the philosophers of science and technology based both modes of rationality on their respective ultimate goals, considered as internal to science and technology. Whatever they were, science and technology had their own ends, on the basis of which scientific and technological rationality was justified.
With the advent of macro-science, these theories of rationality have to be challenged. By using the Weberian distinction, the ends of science and technology cease to be ultimate values, to become instrumental values. Its achievement is desirable, but above them there are other objectives to be achieved. The Bush report makes this very clear, as we will see in the next chapter. The objectives of the macro-science are not only scientific, nor are they technological. Some of the goals of a scientific macroproject may be the advancement in knowledge, or the invention of more efficient artifacts, but on these objectives, others are the ones that give meaning to the financing and realization of the project: it may be about improving the defensive and offensive capacity of an army, it can be to win a war, you can try to improve the productivity of an industrial sector, or simply increase the prestige of a country, its level of security or its position in international markets. In the Manhattan project, for example, scientists were interested in calculating the critical mass in a nuclear fusion process, which they achieved. But, above them, the designers of the project wanted to have a weapon of mass destruction that could serve to quickly win the war or, later, as a deterrent against future attacks coming from abroad. The industries that collaborated in the project, meanwhile, generated wealth, economic benefits and, where appropriate, jobs.
The same can be said of the ENIAC project and most of the subsequent macro-scientific programs. Von Neumann wanted to design and operationalize a computer that could solve nonlinear problems, which would greatly contribute to the resolution of relevant physical and mathematical problems. Eckert, the project’s chief engineer, was passionate about the technological challenge posed by the construction of a machine capable of solving multiple computational problems. However, the Air Force financing the project was primarily concerned that the ENIAC calculated the trajectories of long-range projectiles with maximum precision and speed and that it simulated with sufficient approximation the processes of fluid dynamics that occur during an explosion. . All managed to meet their objectives, to a greater or lesser degree, but, as in the Manhattan project, the military purposes prevailed over the scientific-technological, both in designing the project and throughout its execution and, of course, to the time to apply the resulting innovations: the computer and the atomic bomb. Similarly, NASA’s space exploration program was carried out for reasons of national prestige in the context of the Cold War, notwithstanding that its realization also entailed important scientific discoveries and undoubted technological advances. The strictly scientific and technological objectives were subordinated in all these cases to the goals of another nature that had been defined by the promoters and financiers of these macro-scientific projects.
We will conclude that the macro-scientific actions have plural objectives, some of which are scientific and technological, others military, business or political. Very often, the latter are the most effective, despite being “external” to the scientific and engineering communities. This implies a continuous tension in the macro-scientific activity, which arises from its own structure, that is, from the diversity and heterogeneity of its objectives, as well as from the frequent subordination of epistemic and technical ends. Sometimes equilibrium points are achieved, so that all leave relatively satisfied, sometimes not. What seldom happens is that the “own” objectives of science or technology are the priority, however much there are scientific policy actions aimed exclusively at satisfying them. 32. The macro-scientific activity is systemic and each of the relevant actions of Scientific policy, including programs for the general promotion of knowledge, only acquires meaning based on the existence of many other scientific-technological policy actions aimed at satisfying other types of objectives, some of them without any publicity and with much greater funding. There are occasions in which the promotion of basic research is a pure adornment or complement of the scientific-technological policy system. Such is the case, for example, of the promotion of research in the field of humanities, with some exceptions, when research acquires strategic value.
Macro-science is not only done by scientists and engineers. These communities are part of a previously designed scientific-technological complex (SCyT system), in which many other agents intervene. All this affects the election and provision of the means to carry out the investigation. A seasoned researcher must be able to argue that, in addition to the scientific achievements of his research, other benefits may be derived, which are the ones that really interest the other agents involved in a system that promotes research, development and innovation. Macro-science is based on a complex network of interprofessional relations, not on the autonomy of scientific communities or on the Individual genius of some people. Faced with the model of instrumental rationality, where the aims of scientific and technological activity were clear and distinct, the goals and objectives of the macro-scientific activity constitute a complex structure, not free of internal and external tensions, because this activity is promoted by a plurality of agents with interests and objectives often found.
In our view, this tension is due to the existence of value conflicts in the macro-scientific activity. The plural subject of macro science guides its actions based on a plurality of values. In the Manhattan project, for example, a physicist could try to achieve properly epistemic objectives and an engineer technological objectives. But the military supported the project because of its enormous strategic importance and the industrialists who collaborated for economic reasons. Politicians, on the other hand, had their own objectives (to minimize their own losses through atomic bombs, to show the power of the US, to win elections, etc.). In order to properly analyze the macroscience, it is necessary to start from the hypothesis that scientific macroprojects are guided by a plurality of values and objectives, not by the search for truth or the increase of efficiency. In some phases values prevail, in others. There are stages in which the scientist or the engineer enjoy full autonomy. In others, however, they must strictly follow what is required of them. An axiological analysis of macroscience can not be monistic, but pluralistic, precisely because the structure of the macro-scientific activity is plural, and that is within the very bosom of the macroscience, not outside it.
1.5: The concept of “technoscience”.
The expression “technoscience” is controversial. Scientists who devote themselves to basic research often look at it with distrust, because it seems to prioritize technology and applied research. The philologists consider it a barbarism, when mixing two lexical roots of Greek and Latin origin. Many philosophers of science prefer to continue establishing clear lines of demarcation between science and technology, fearing that when speaking of technoscience the specificity of science will disappear, being devoured by technology. Others, on the other hand, affirm that technoscience is a reality since the 19th century, and even before 33. Some historians of science, on the other hand, tend to accept this expression 34 and sociologists of science such as Bruno Latour use it as a denomination technique. For our part, we believe that, once clarified conceptually, this expression is essential to try to understand and interpret some of the profound changes that have taken place in the scientific-technological activity over the past century 35.
The term “technoscience” was proposed in 1983 by Bruno Latour, in order to “avoid the endless expression of science and technology” 36. Latour posed the question “who really does science?” And tried to show that science does not only make it scientists, criticizing the internal / external distinction, widely used when reflecting on science. According to that distinction,
– scientists are active in science, that is, researchers, outside of it, politicians, businessmen, professors, lawyers, etc.
– science is done first of all in experimental laboratories and is perfected in congresses and scientific journals, where the scientific community discusses and agrees on the proposals that, coming from the laboratories, it considers acceptable and valid, even if only to conjecture title.
– once elaborated, this knowledge is disseminated to society and applied to solve practical issues. At this moment science generates technology, which is identified with applied science. This is when science comes into contact with society. Until then, the scientific activity has been internal.
According to Latour, this model of diffusion of science (37) is inadequate and the supposed border between the inside and the outside of science is fictitious: “all our examples have sketched a constant mixture, on both sides, between the outside world and the laboratory “38. Latour is right to criticize this model, and in particular to deny the identification between technology and applied science. Some philosophers of technology have also insisted that this identification is erroneous, 39 since historical examples abound in which technology has its own paradigms and technological trajectories, to use the names proposed by Nelson, Winter and Dosi 40. By our In part, we consider that science and technology have been autonomous from each other until the emergence and consolidation of technoscience, notwithstanding the fact that they have established very close ties throughout the industrial revolution.
The drawback of Latour’s thesis is that, determined to deny the identification between technology and applied science, as well as internal / external distinction, ends up confusing science, technology and technoscience. Reading his Science in Action, it would seem that all science has become technoscience, a thesis to which we strictly oppose. Neither the deployment of the Great Science prevented During the twentieth century, Small Science continued to be the nor the irruption of technoscience has devoured science and technology. Craft technique, science and technology continue to exist. What it is about is to analyze the new modality of scientific-technological activity, not to think that everything is technoscience. Such is, in our opinion, the main drawback of Latour’s theses on technoscience: they wipe out the nuances and differences between techniques, sciences, technologies and technosciences.
On the other hand, the problem does not lie in internal / external opposition. This distinction can be methodologically useful in some moments, although, from our perspective, it is preferable to talk about open technoscientific systems that interact with society in very diverse fields: laboratories, R & D offices, scientific-technological policy directions, classrooms, specialized publications, dissemination magazines, scientific press, telematic networks, etc. In general, it is convenient to talk about scientific-technological networks more or less consolidated and imbricated in societies, but never isolated in ivory towers. Do not forget that these networks are transnational, so technoscience is not immersed as a subsystem in a particular society, but affects several societies at once, and differently in each of them, depending on their peculiarities cultural and social As we have already indicated elsewhere, 42 another of Latour’s main shortcomings and the sociologists of scientific knowledge is that they use a very ambiguous notion of “society.” Of little use to say that the social is present in laboratories (which is obvious) or that science, technology and society are closely linked if the notions of “science”, “technology” and “society” are not minimally clarified . Sociologists of scientific knowledge have talked a lot about science, and more recently some technology, but very little about society. Reading their writings, it would seem that the notion of society they use is clear and intuitive, which is far from happening.
Another author who systematically uses the term “technoscience” is Gilbert Hottois 43. To introduce the notion of technoscience, Hottois relies on various authors, who, whether or not they used this term, had pointed out in the 70s and 80s this progressive convergence between Science and technology. Consider the following quotes to summarize this generalized trend:
H. Stork: “This distinction (between science and technique), apparently clear, is questioned by the growing intertwining of the natural sciences and technology, which manifests itself both as a technification of science and as a scientification of science. the technique “44.
W. Barret: “The new science is, by its essence, technological” 45.
J.J. Salomon: “Just as science creates new technical beings, the technique creates new lines of scientific objects. The border is so tenuous that you can not distinguish between the attitude of the scientist’s spirit and that of the engineer, since there are intermediate cases “46.
F. Gros: “The interdependence between progress in basic biology and pharmacology is total: pharmacology depends on all acquisitions in biology, medications are and will be, increasingly, a fundamental element for basic research” 47.
J. Ladrière: “Due to its deep roots, contemporary technological activity is linked to scientific practice. On the other hand, this union is all the more evident the more it is associated with advanced forms of technology “…” It seems, then, that there is a specific character in contemporary technology: its close interaction with science. This raises, immediately, two questions. On the one hand, it leads us to ask ourselves, considering the intensity of this interaction, if there is still a true distinction between science and technology and, on the other hand, to explain how this interaction is possible. Apparently, the frontier between science and technology fades more and more “48.
We could mention many other authors who have underlined this convergence between science and technology, coming to question the existence of borders between both. The more speculative and ontological these philosophers are, the more they tend to identify science and technology, regardless of differences. The reductionist mood is very common and in this case it is manifested taking the part by the whole. The growing link between scientific and technological activities is very true. But we must not forget that there are still scientific and technological areas where this process does not occur. Not everything is technoscience. There are important differences between science, technology and technology. The greatest conceptual risk consists of making the term “technoscience” omnicomprehensive, a defect in which many authors incur. Some place technoscience in Newton’s time 49, incurring a clear anachronism, that is, projecting the current models of technoscience onto the past.
Throughout this chapter we intend to clarify and clarify the concept of technoscience, distinguishing it from technology, science and technology. We will do it step by step, since this notion covers very different aspects, and if you want heterogeneous.
I.6: Methodological details.
It is important that, before proceeding, we make clear the conceptual framework in which the proposals and precisions that we are going to make are presented.
In the first place, we do not intend to define the notion of technoscience. We will limit ourselves to pointing out a series of distinctive features between science, technology and technoscience 50.
Second, those distinctions will be gradual, not demarcational. It is not about defining borders between science and technoscience, since the second is a particular type of science. Even so, the distinctive notes that we will propose will allow us to discern with sufficient clarity the one and the other, in most cases by the greater or lesser degree with which both satisfy said notes.
Third, we will not resort to the procedure of the specific difference, but to that of the distinguishing features or marks. 51. We are not interested in the difference between science and technoscience, but rather the open system of distinctive features between both. The differences are several, there is not one that is determinant of the others. In order to qualify an activity as technoscientific, many of these distinctive features must be satisfied to a greater or lesser degree, not just one. Once the concept of technoscience has been elucidated through this methodology, we will be faced with a clearer and more precise concept, without prejudice to the fact that the elucidation we are going to propose can be improved. In other words: in no way do we intend to investigate the “essence” of technoscience, for a simple reason. There is no such thing 52.
Fourth, our perspective is not reductionist. Although technoscience has emerged throughout the twentieth century, human beings continue and will continue to develop technical, technological and scientific activities. Therefore, throughout this book we will affirm that, in addition to technology, science and technology (plus art, which must also be taken into account in this debate), during the 20th century a new modality of human and social activity, technoscience, which has been consolidated sociologically and institutionally in the final decades of the previous century and only in some countries. Predictably, technoscience will have a great development during the 21st century. However, in no way do we think that this supposes the disappearance of science or technology. There is still art, science, technology and technology. In addition, there is technoscience. It is about analyzing this new activity, whose social importance is growing, without for that reason disregarding the others.
Fifth, the emergence of technoscience can be considered as a new type of revolution, which is not a scientific revolution in Kuhn’s sense or a technological revolution in the sense of Solla Price. Once the concept of technoscience is clarified, we will deal with the notion of a techno-scientific revolution.
Sixth, we will talk mainly about action and activity, more than scientific knowledge and technological artifacts. This is the main change we propose when studying the techno-scientific revolution. The philosophy of science of the twentieth century focused, with very few exceptions (Hacking, Rouse 53), on the analysis, reconstruction and, where appropriate, justification and justification of scientific knowledge. The sociology of scientific knowledge (Strong Program, EPOR, social constructivism, etc.) dealt almost exclusively with the social construction of scientific knowledge, although in the last decade of the 20th century there has been a praxiological turn (Pickering 54) and a certain interest in the sociology of technology, still very embryonic. Some historians of science (Franklin, Buchwald, Galison, etc. 55) have also become interested in recent years in scientific practice, especially in experimentation. As we have already stated elsewhere, the philosophy of technoscience must include first and foremost a philosophy of scientific and technological activity, 56 whose main reference will be techno-scientific actions, rather than scientific facts. In order to know the scientific facts, it is necessary to previously carry out diverse, typically scientific actions: observe, measure, calculate, experiment, conjecture, evaluate, demonstrate, etc. In the case of technoscience, all these actions are mediated by technology, to the extent that they can not be carried out or results can be obtained (observations, measurements, data, experiments, etc.) without having an instrument and without having various technical skills. There are no techno-scientific facts without techno-scientific actions and this is why we must begin with a philosophy of techno-scientific action. Technoscience is distinguished from science by that technological mediation inherent in techno-scientific actions. It is not enough with an epistemology and a methodology. Philosophy of science and studies of science and technology require a praxiology, that is, a theory of techno-scientific praxis. Techno-scientific revolutions arise due to a change in the structure of scientific and technological activity, which usually leads to a change in the structure of knowledge, but also many other transformations: political, economic, organizational, social, etc. This will be one of the basic theses of this book: technoscience has arisen by a profound change in the structure of scientific practice, not by an epistemological or methodological revolution.
Seventh, we will insist that, within that praxiology, we must develop an axiology of technoscience. The fifth chapter aims to lay its foundations, continuing the work done on the axiology of science 57. If we conceive science and technology as activities, then it is easier to compare them and to specify the differences between science, technology and technology. . That distinction can be established from many perspectives, but here we will focus on one: values. We start from the hypothesis that human actions are guided by values and by value systems. In addition, our approach to the axiology of technoscience will be systemic. Well, there are significant differences between the value systems that guide technical, scientific, technological and techno-scientific actions. Therefore, to distinguish between science and technoscience we will investigate the values underlying these two types of activity. Other authors will establish epistemological, sociological or other differences. On our part, we try to characterize the values of science to distinguish science from technoscience through axiological criteria.
A final methodological consideration, which will be further developed in section II.3. The philosophy of science deals with multiple sciences and for that reason it is usually distinguished between the philosophy of mathematics, physics, biology, social sciences, medicine, etc. When talking about technoscience, it will be necessary to explore the existence of different modalities of it: techno-mathematics, technophysics, technochemistry, technobiology, technomedicine, etc. The notion of technoscience will be concretized when we talk about its various modalities and analyze the various examples. Then it will be when the enormous changes brought about by the emergence of technoscience are perceived more clearly. The most classical scientific actions (demonstrate, observe, measure, experiment, etc.) have been radically modified by the effect of technoscience, and this has happened in almost all scientific disciplines throughout the 20th century, if not all. That is why we talk about technosciences, rather than technoscience.
I.7.- Characterization of technology and technology.
In his work Technology: a philosophical approach 58, Quintanilla tried to define entities as complex as technology and technology. Your proposal deserves a detailed consideration, although it seems improvable in some points. If we dedicate ourselves to the studies of science, technology and society (CTS) from a philosophical perspective, it is convenient to elucidate the concepts that we are going to use, as far as possible. The common use of words can make us believe that we know what science, technology or society are because we talk about them and we get to communicate and make ourselves understood. But the conceptual analysis allows to discover nuances and difficulties in the analyzed notions, that usually are hidden in the current use of those words. A thorough analysis of the multiple misunderstandings that result from speech acts would show that accuracy is a value in philosophy, which must be adequately met.
In this section we will comment on the definitions proposed by Quintanilla for the notions of “technique” and “technology”. Quintanilla recalls that: “specialized literature tends to reserve the term” technique “for pre-scientific artisan techniques, and technology for industrial techniques linked to scientific knowledge” 59. That is why it distinguishes artisanal or pre-industrial techniques and techniques. related to science, reserving the term “technology” for the latter. We will accept that distinction, although we have already indicated that many technological advances of the industrial age arose independently of science, interrelated with it later. To say that technologies are linked to science does not imply conceiving them as applied sciences. Given this precision, as an example, we will say that writing and printing are technical, the press, telegraph and photocopiers are technologies, and computers, electronic writing and hypertext are technosciences.
Then, Quintanilla introduces a second distinction between proper technique and realization or specific application of a technique: “techniques are abstract cultural entities, which may have different embodiments or applications and can be formulated or represented in different ways [.. .] and we could define them as the set of all possible technical realizations possible with that machine “60. Retaking the distinction of Amartya Sen between capabilities (capabilities) and realizations (or operations, functionnings), we would say that technology and technology induce new capacities of action, and in particular of repetition and reiteration of said actions 61. Each concrete case is a technical (or technological) realization. The notion of technique thus depends on how we define what a technical realization is:
Definition 1: “A technical realization is a system of human actions intentionally oriented to the transformation of concrete objects to efficiently achieve a valuable result” 62.
It is a very elaborate definition, which, in the case of technology, can be paraphrased in the following way:
Definition 2: “A technological realization (or application) is a system of human actions, industrial and linked to science, intentionally oriented to the transformation of concrete objects to efficiently achieve valuable results.”
Let’s distinguish each one of the notes that are included in this definition by assigning them letters, in order to be able to refer later to them:
(2a): system
(2b): of actions
(2c): human,
(2d): industrial
(2e): linked to science, (2f): intentionally oriented (2g): to transformation
(2h): of objects
(2i): concrete
(2j): to get
(2k): efficiently
(2l): results
(2m): valuable.
We will comment very briefly the notes 2a and 2b, in spite of being the most determining of the conception of Quintanilla. By virtue of 2a, his theory of technology is inserted within systems theory, as the author himself amply showed in the aforementioned book 63. This decision has multiple consequences, because it implies accepting that, rather than with isolated artifacts, we we have to do with technical systems, which we will call technosystems. These systems have an internal structure, that of their own subsystems, whose composition or assembly becomes indispensable for the subsequent realization of technical actions 64. The proper coupling between the various subsystems is the responsibility of the technicians, whose action is indispensable for the proper functioning of a technosystem. On the other hand, a system always interacts with a medium or external environment. The initial and contour conditions influence the operation of technological systems. Technologies are influenced by the societies that generate and drive them, for example the industrial society. Under certain conditions the systems may have emergent (or supervening) properties, as well as reach (or not) homeostatic equilibria. The choice of systems theory as a general framework for the philosophy of technology has many consequences, some of which we have just mentioned. In the next section we will see that this systemic conception is useful when looking for distinctive features for technoscience.
Under 2b, the philosophy of technology should not focus on artifacts or machines, but on the actions that can be carried out thanks to them. This philosophical option also has very important consequences, because it links the philosophy of technology with the theory of action: with it Quintanilla moves away from all forms of instrumentalism and technological determinism, underlining that the agents of technical actions are people, not the machines. In our view, here lies one of the great contributions of this definition, although we will not go into that point further. In the case of technoscience we will use the theory of action that we have already shown elsewhere. 65 As Aracil has pointed out, in every technological action it is “assumed that the agent has adequate representation of both the object on which he acts and of the objectives that are intended with the action “66. Precisely for this reason the previous design of the actions is usual in technology, unlike human actions in general. The existence of these designs, prototypes, representations or simulations is of great philosophical importance, as many authors have underlined, 67 because technological actions arise from more or less approximate representations of what is to be achieved. This phase of pre-action (and also of pro-action, since these previous designs are pro-active) requires a very characteristic type of instruments: sketches, diagrams, plans, models, scale models, simulations, etc. Not all of them are possible or feasible, so in technology we have to talk about possible action spaces. It is also necessary to take care of the composition of these schemes, which is normally done by subsystems, to proceed later to their assembly or subsequent integration. An engineer, an inventor and a designer previously conceive what they want to do and represent it (mentally, in writing, materially, etc.) before carrying it out. Well, we will insist that the emergence of technoscience has been made possible by the appearance of a new instrument of representation, or better, by a new formalism: information technology. That is why we say that technoscience is linked to the information society 68, rather than to the industrial society (which also, as it is technology). In any case, note 2b has numerous philosophical consequences, as briefly indicated above.
Note 2c “excludes from the scope of the techniques the actions carried out systematically, but instinctively, by some animal species, as is the case with the construction of nests, burrows or beehives “69. This assertion can be debatable in the case of techniques, but not in the case of technologies: as these are industrial and based on scientific knowledge, it is clear that only human beings they can carry out technological actions, or at most some machines built by the human beings themselves. However, Quintanilla’s use of the term “human” has an unintended consequence, as pointed out by López Cerezo70: it is hidden what groups or what people are the agents of these technological actions, when they are attributed to human beings in general. Likewise, technological actions carried out by automata are dispensed with, even though said automata have been designed by human beings to carry them out. This is one of the reasons why in our characterization of technological actions we always include agents (actors, doers, etc.) as the first component of said actions. Being true that technological actions are human actions, it is necessary to specify more the agents that promote or carry them out. In particular, the objectives of the same action can be different according to the agents, as well as the valuations of said action. In the axiology of technoscience we will find ourselves continuously with conflicts of values, and also with opposing objectives. Therefore it is necessary to clarify note 2c of the definition of Quintanilla.
Regarding notes 2d and 2e, we will accept them initially, although in the next section we will introduce an important qualification in relation to 2e. Nor will we analyze note 2f, because this would imply addressing the complex issue of intentionality, which falls outside the framework of this work. Note 2g has great philosophical importance: technologies do not try to describe, explain or predict the world, unlike sciences, but tend to transform it, be it the microcosms, mesocosms or macrocosms. This is one of the reasons why the philosophy of technology differs from epistemology and philosophy of science, and therefore we fully accept the note 2g. On the other hand, with regard to note 2h, we can make qualifications, as we have already explained elsewhere 71, as well as note 2i: techniques not only transform concrete objects (materials), but also abstract objects, for example mathematical objects . Algorithms, equation solving methods and scientific visualization techniques are good examples of technical actions that transform non-material objects, or if you prefer intangibles. There are also techniques that modify the habits of action and behavior. Sáez Vacas has called information and communication technologies (ICT) nootechnologies 72 because they transform information and knowledge, not just material objects. It is necessary to extend note 2h if we want to apply that definition to ICTs, which are one of the canonical examples of contemporary technoscience. On the other hand, these examples serve to show that technologies not only transform objects, but also relationships, actions, habits, etc. Therefore, we will say that technical and technological actions, being systemic, in turn transform systems, be they natural, social, economic or conceptual, or in turn small or large. In particular, one technological system can profoundly transform another, something that will happen everywhere in the case of technoscience.
Note 2j alludes to the objectives of technological actions, which must be distinguished from the intentions of their agents. The artifacts are usually designed to fulfill such and such objectives or functions, although later those who use them can Do it with very different intentions. This is one of the reasons why it is convenient to distinguish between the intentions of the agents and the objectives of technological actions. Regarding the note 2k, it can be eliminated, because not all technological actions try to maximize efficiency, contrary to what Quintanilla thinks, for whom the role of said value in technology is comparable to the value “truth” in the case of the science. As you will see in Chapter 4, efficiency is an important technological value, but not the only one, and sometimes not even the main one. For this reason, we prefer to eliminate the 2k note of the definition of technology, since it is redundant with the note 2m. If technological actions are efficient, they will be highly valued in relation to said value. But there are also highly inefficient technological actions, which do not stop being technological: for example, errors. On the other hand, we fully accept the importance of the notion of “results”, since if something is appreciated the technology is for its results. However, we should not limit ourselves to considering the immediate results of technological actions, but also their consequences and risks derived. Therefore, we will break down the concept “results”, including the consequences and risks that result from these actions.
Despite all the above, our main objective is to analyze the last note of the definition, 2m (valuable), for being central to the axiology of technoscience, without prejudice to the interest of the remaining points for our inquiry. From our perspective, it does not matter that the results are valuable. The agents, the actions, the objects on which they are carried out are also evaluated and, although not only they, also the intentions. Above all, the consequences and risks that could arise from the achievement of techno-scientific results must be evaluated. The moral dilemma that the atomic bomb posed for many nuclear physicists perfectly illustrates this requirement of not only assessing the expected results, but also the unforeseen consequences. To paraphrase Popper, you have to be a falsificationist in technology philosophy. Once we have assessed the favorable results, we must move on to consider the possible unfavorable consequences, including the risks that arise from possible errors in technological actions. The axiology not only includes values, also disvalores or counter-values. In summary, note 2m will acquire greater extension and relevance than in the Quintanilla proposal.
Carried by his interest in opposing his proposal to the artifactual conception of technology, Quintanilla did not include in his definition the instruments that allow to carry out technical and technological actions. We fully agree with his criticism of the identification of technology with machines, but this does not prevent to recognize that they also have a role in technological actions. Therefore, we will add a new note that reflects that instrumental component that always have the actions, both technical and technological. As we will see later, this will involve broadening the notion of an instrument. A mathematical notation and a computer program can also be technical instruments, so that our notion of an instrument will be wider than that of a machine. For example, we include technologies of social transformation (for example advertising) in our notion of technology. Surveys, statistical analyzes, etc., are also technical, and in many cases, technologies. In the case of computer science, which will have an important role when it comes to characterizing the notion of technoscience, it is necessary to take into account that info-actions are carried out by means of specific instruments, for example when making behavioral simulations. of the systems. The same applies to experimental actions, which are so relevant in macro-science. To forget the importance of the instruments of observation, measurement, experimentation and simulation in current scientific practice would be a clear conceptual insufficiency. For the axiology of technoscience, this is essential, because decisions are often made based on the instruments necessary to carry out techno-scientific actions, for example the assessment of their economic cost.
On the other hand, technological actions are usually regulated, particularly the use of instruments. We think of the instructions for use of any device, 73 but also of the legal norms that are frequently promulgated in this regard, for example, the highway code when driving a car. As a consequence of this we will add one more note, which refers to the rules that govern technological actions, some of which are norms or laws, but not all. Some of these rules are internalized by users after the learning process, so they become part of their tacit knowledge. However, this does not imply that they cease to exist as technical doing regulations. The domain of the rules of use is an important component in the theory of technical action. As we have already pointed out, technological actions can be inefficient, for example when an error is made for not having followed the rules of use of a device or the protocols for action. When systems are complex, as in the case of technoscience, it is necessary to explicitly specify the rules of action, for example to prevent risks. Therefore, it seems necessary to add this distinctive feature when characterizing the notion of technology, and much more that of technoscience.
Following this comment to the definition proposed by Quintanilla, we can provisionally accept the:
Definition 3: “A technological realization (or application) is a system of regulated actions, industrial and linked to science, carried out by agents, with the help of instruments, and intentionally oriented to the transformation of other systems in order to achieve valuable results avoiding unfavorable consequences and risks “74.
Once this definition is formulated, some qualifications must be made. In the first place, the difference between technique and technology will often be a distinction of degrees. The two distinguishing marks that we have accepted (scientific knowledge and industry) do not work as criteria for demarcation or separation. In the end, the boundaries between technology, technology and technology are not rigid or insurmountable, but gradual and permeable. This does not prevent, however, so that we can discern the three. The same is true of the distinction between science and technoscience, as we will see in the next section.
For this reason, we are not faced with an authentic definition, much less with a definition by gender and specific difference, but rather with a characterization of technology and technology. Nor do we rule out that more distinctive features of technology can be added. Broncano, for example, has insisted on the importance of technological design: “designs are the language that allows creating and producing technical objects” … “they are the very form in which technical objects are produced” 75. We ourselves We have previously suggested some additional features, derived from technological pre-actions and representations that allow us to imagine, project and design them, before carrying them out. From an axiological perspective, it is important to emphasize that these previous designs are always valued, first by the designer himself, then by the artisans or technicians who have to convert the design into an artifact. Therefore, the evaluation processes are prior to the technical actions, or if you want, concomitant to them. It should also be noted that technical designs usually take the form of diagrams, diagrams, etc. Unlike scientific knowledge, which is usually expressed through statements, laws or mathematical formulas, the design of technical artifacts is done through specific images and symbols. The technological representations are not linguistic, but ideographic. Hence the importance of computer science for the emergence of technoscience: computers not only represent statements, laws and formulas, but also images, diagrams and diagrams. The synthesis of scientific and technological knowledge occurs primarily through computer languages, which not only use bits, but also pixels. Therefore we affirm that informatics is the formalism of technoscience.
The characterization of the technological actions that we have just done is open: we can add new distinctive features to those considered in the definition 3. In any case, for our investigation it is important to have it. We will see that technoscience is characterized because scientific actions become technological actions, being included in a system of science and technology that constitutes one of the main social technologies of our time.
Chapter II Characterization of Technoscience
II.1: Distinctive features between science and technoscience.
Throughout history many definitions of science have been proposed 76. The same can be said in the case of technology, although the definition of Quintanilla that we have discussed in the previous chapter is one of the most elaborate. That’s why we take it as a starting point. It is now a question of specifying the features that distinguish technoscience from science and technology, based on the considerations already made in section I.4, regarding macro-science. There are differences in size and scale, but we will also propose qualitative distinctions. As a whole, the distinctive notes that we are going to propose configure a new framework for scientific-technological activity, very different from that of modern science or that of industrial technology. In this lies the uniqueness of technoscience, towards whose discernment this second conceptual approach is directed. The important thing is to have criteria to distinguish technoscience, science and technology, without implying a demarcation between them, since their respective borders are diffuse in some aspects. Since technoscience has a strong technological component, what was said in the previous chapter on technology is applicable to technoscience. It is now about adding other distinctive notes.
Technoscience can be considered as an evolutionary phase after the emergence of Big Science, after the crisis of the decade 1966-76. As we already said in the prologue, the continued growth of the macro-science in the US experienced a break from 1965, a date that marks the first crisis of macro-science, and in particular of the militarized macro-science. By then, this new form of scientific research had been consolidated in the US, the USSR, and was beginning to be established in some European countries (CERN, European Spacial Agency, etc.). The promotion of macro science in Europe and the USSR was also a governmental initiative, to a greater extent even than in the US. There were important differences between the science and technology system of the USA and, for example, that of the USSR, but the six characteristics of the macroscience that we pointed out in section I.4 are valid for Europe and the USSR, with the important difference that, in the latter case, the industries were exclusively state-owned and controlled by a political party. In the absence of rigorous studies on the structure of the science and technology system in the USSR, we will maintain the hypothesis that there was macro-science in the Soviet bloc, but technoscience was not taken, precisely because it lacked a business system and a market economy that would allow opening new sources of funding for techno-scientific research, apart from state ones.
Therefore, the six distinctive features continue to be valid, although with important nuances and differences, which should be underlined. But there are also new features.
In section II.2 we will put the accent on the latter. In the exploration carried out in section I.4 we had found differential notes of very different types: economic, sociological, political, etc. The indicators that many authors use to define macroscience have undoubted interest: size, rate of growth, economic percentage of investments in macroprojects, etc. However, our analysis starts from a philosophical perspective and focuses on axiology. As we expose these distinctive features we will make a brief axiological analysis of them, in order to show the deep changes of values that science has experienced in the 20th century. In chapter 5 we will deal exclusively with the axiology of technoscience.
(a): Private financing of research.
The macro-science emerged in the United States of America at the time of the Second World War and the main factor that prompted its emergence was a new policy of the Federal Government, more interventionist in scientific matters. The governmental initiative, in particular the military one, was the driving force behind the great projects of the 1940s and 1950s, notwithstanding the fact that in the 1930s some institutions would have been pioneers of American macro-science. From the point of view of financing, this policy remained stable until the middle of the 1960s, reaching its peak with the Kennedy 77 administration. From that moment, and coinciding with the failure of the Vietnam War, It produced a profound movement of distrust of science on the part of American society, which was directly reflected in the public budgets that were dedicated to it and in numerous student and social movements against the military applications of scientific research. 78. The military financing of the Basic research, for example, fell sharply in the period 1965-1975 79. The same happened with private financing, which fell by 36% between 1966 and 1972.
The scientific communities experienced this fall as an authentic crisis and even spoke of an irrationalist and anti-scientific movement 80. Many universities closed their research centers linked to Defense, or reconverted them. The situation began to change with the Ford Presidency, but especially with the Reagan Administration. In the 1980s, a new social contract with science was established, which can be considered as the basis for the emergence of technoscience. From the budgetary point of view, there was a rapid growth of private financing in R & D, thanks to a liberalization of the patent law and a new fiscal policy, which allowed to deduct 25% of private investments in R & D . The political priority became technological development and the presence of the private initiative as the driving force behind it. The Government did not stop financing basic research, but the main objective of its scientific policy was to make it possible for companies to increase this funding. This policy brought about a radical change in the framework in which scientific research was developed. Since the 1980s, private R & D funding has exceeded public funding, and since then it has continued to grow, reaching 70% of total R & D investment in the US. A similar process occurred in Europe, although much later.
Therefore, we will say that technoscience proper emerges in the 80s in the US, without prejudice to previous precedents of it. From the point of view of financing, it is characterized by the primacy of the private sector over the public. This change brought with it many other concomitant transformations, which should be analyzed separately. In general terms, it represented an important restructuring of the North American system of science and technology.
For example, the Stock Exchange became interested in investing in science and technology. In 1983, companies such as Merrill Lynch and Banca Morgan advised their clients to invest in R & D companies. Facing the financing of the macro-science, mostly state and military, technoscience found new ways of financing, apart from large corporations and government agencies. Small R & D companies proliferated, especially in the field of new technologies (ICT, biotechnologies). Many of them turned to venture capital financial entities and to the Stock Exchange to launch their research programs, which were not focused only on basic research and technological development, but above all on innovation. Since the 1980s, the size of the R & D companies, which had become R & D & I, was no longer the key. The important thing was its ability to innovate and penetrate the market of new technologies. A few years later, all this came together in the appearance of a new stock index, the NASDAQ, where techno-scientific companies found a new source of financing and market capitalization. Most of these small R & D & I companies perished or were absorbed by large corporations, but some of them survived and became large companies in the techno-scientific economic sector. There continued to be scientific macro-projects financed by the Government, so that macro-science continued to exist. But, apart from it, a new form of science emerged, whose research had as a priority the technological innovation. The size of projects, equipment and instruments was not relevant in the case of techno-scientific companies. It is one of the reasons why we distinguish between macroscience and technoscience. Some small companies (Apple, Microsoft, Intel, etc.) showed much greater innovative capacity than the large industrial corporations of the postwar period. Their growth rates were very high, although many of them were ephemeral. Technoscience became a sector where you could do good and fast business if technological innovations were achieved. Therefore, the stock market and private investors were attracted by the new sector, leaving the macroprojects for state agencies. Together, this new scientific-financial policy got the percentages of public and private research funding reversed. The primacy of private investment has since become a structural component of the North American SCyT systems, which many other countries try to imitate. Macro-science and technoscience are clearly distinguished by their financial structure.
From an axiological perspective, it can be said that with the arrival of technoscience the most characteristic values of capitalism entered the very core of scientific-technological activity. Rapid enrichment, for example, which had traditionally been alien to scientific communities, became part of the objectives of techno-scientific companies. Stock market capitalization and investor confidence became dominant values for many techno-scientific companies. Although the classical values of science maintained their presence at the time of research, the R & D & I companies did not aim to generate knowledge, but rather technological innovation and its capitalization in the market. The relative weight of technical, economic and business values increased considerably, while the political values of the time of the Second World War declined. On the other hand, many techno-scientific companies became multinationals, overflowing the North American market, so they began to be more sensitive to cultural, ecological and social values, whose adequate satisfaction was necessary to achieve greater penetration levels in international markets. Legal values also gained great weight, insofar as knowledge ownership, patent management and licenses for the use of technological devices had to be ensured.
(b): Mutual mediation between science and technology.
The relations between science and technology come from the industrial society and were considerably reinforced by the emergence of macro science. In the case of technoscience, the interdependence between science and technology is practically total. If technoscientists seek to produce new knowledge and undertake scientific actions for it (demonstrate, calculate, observe, measure, experiment, etc.), these actions are literally unviable without technological support. Reciprocally, technical skills and technological innovations must be strictly based on scientific knowledge, not only linked to it, because this increases the economic efficiency of technological actions. The design of the experiments and of the scientific research projects is technological, since it is necessary to enunciate previously some objectives, to specify a methodology and a work plan and to foresee the results that they intend to obtain, assessing their possible importance and usefulness, as well as the expectations of generating innovation. Reciprocally, the various technological actions must have a scientific basis. Science is a requirement of technology and science technology. This hybridization is a constituent part of technoscience, unlike industrial science and technology, where it was adventitious. With technoscience a mixture or fusion is produced, because both activities benefit one another. The greater or lesser degree of integration between scientific and technological activity is one of the indicators of the existence of technoscience, although, for practical purposes, it is sufficient to determine if each of them is indispensable for the other. The symbiosis between science and technology had already taken place at the time of the macroscience, but from the 1980s it was reinforced again, possibly with more prominence for the technologists.
This distinctive feature can be analyzed from multiple perspectives (institutional, sociological, economic …), but here we will deal primarily with its axiological interpretation. Being technology, technoscience not only seeks true (or credible, or testable, or falsifiable) knowledge, but also useful knowledge 81. But, being a science, it is not enough for techno-scientific actions to be useful or effective, but also it requires that they be scientifically justified. Hence, technoscience, despite having a very strong practical orientation, is always interested in theory, including the theory of artifacts applied 82. Truth, verisimilitude, generality, empirical adequacy, precision and coherence they are still relevant values for technoscience, but epistemic values are not the only ones. Technoscience incorporates a good part of its technical values (utility, efficiency, effectiveness, functionality, applicability, etc.) into its axiological core and, although it still maintains epistemic values, the second subsystem of values has a weight as great as the first. Technoscience and science are distinguished from each other by the greater or lesser relative weight of these two subsystems of values, notwithstanding that both incorporate epistemic and technical values to their axiological core. This first distinction is a matter of degree, but also of preponderant value systems. In science, epistemics predominate, technicians in technoscience.
(c): Techno-scientific companies.
The link between science, technology and business was intensified radically with the emergence of technoscience, to the point that the production of scientific and technological knowledge becomes a new economic sector, popularly called new technologies. Not only can we talk about techno-scientific industries, as happened in the case of macro-science, but a new market sector in which different types of companies compete (public and private, industrial and information, large or small). At the same time, laboratories and research teams struggle with each other to obtain public projects and contracts with companies, seeking niches in the financial market of technoscience. The obtaining, management and profitability of the patents resulting from research in R + D + i becomes a basic component of the techno-scientific activity, as important as the research itself. In addition, new forms of exploitation and profitability of the ownership of knowledge arise: user licenses, franchises, access and connection subscriptions, etc. Good part of the patrimony of these companies consists of the knowledge that they have in property, or that they are capable of producing, managing and commercializing. It begins to speak of intellectual capital, with what is implied that the investments in this type of capital must be profitable. On the other hand, it is no longer enough to produce knowledge, but it is necessary to know, both when proposing research projects that are promising and when presenting the results. The management and marketing of knowledge is part of the activities of a techno-scientific company. Whether it is public, private or mixed companies, business models of work organization and technoscience management are introduced, unlike classical academic communities, which are anchored in a way of producing knowledge that is outdated. As can be seen, the change is radical.
Additional consequence: techno-scientific results become merchandise and, instead of communicating freely and publicly in specialized journals, they become private property from the early stages of research. The greater weighting of economic values in the axiological core of scientific activity generates a systemic change in the values of technoscience. In the emergence phase of macro-science, this led to many conflicts, since “instead of exploring new phenomena, physicists found themselves spending more and more time investigating ways to achieve patentable ideas, for economic reasons, more that scientific “83. In contrast, from the 1980s these values are internalized by the scientists and engineers themselves, some of whom become shareholders of the companies where they work. R + D + i companies may be interested in scientific discoveries and that these are publishable at the time, because this is in favor of the prestige of the company; but much more interested in the development of research projects arise patents and leasing contracts, so that the knowledge is economically profitable. The arrival of private investment in technoscience brought with it the imperative of profitability of the knowledge. In most cases, “patentability” takes precedence over “publishability”, reversing one of the classic values of modern science. The potential achievement of patents is an evaluation criterion in the design of technoscientific projects, as well as their capacity for innovation, that is, the transfer of results to companies that act in the market. Technoscience not only assesses the epistemic impacts (publications, citations, etc.), but above all the economic impact of the resulting innovations, as well as the ability to obtain financing for the development of the projects. The techno-scientific culture has a strong business component, something that did not happen with modern science, with some exceptions.
We verify again that there is a profound change of values between technoscience and science. The technological communities had internalized to a greater degree the principles and business values during the industrial era. In the stage of macro science, scientists collaborated in large military projects for epistemic reasons (solving scientific problems), but also for political reasons (patriotism, defense of democracy, etc.). Now, on the other hand, the scientists themselves have taken on board the business values, without losing their specific epistemic values. Also in this case there are considerable differences of degree, since some techno-scientific companies tend to become large holdings, which are listed on the stock exchange or are integrated into financial groups. The marketing of technoscience becomes a common practice, whose design corresponds to experts in marketing, but scientists and engineers also emerge that stand out for their ability to “sell” or disseminate the product, rather than for their skills in the laboratory or with appliances. This process occurs first of all in the private sector, but also in science with public funding. The increasingly close links between universities and companies are a good indicator of it.
In summary, economic and business values permeate the techno-scientific activity and are integrated into the axiological core of research, teaching and the application of technoscience, acquiring a considerable relative weight. It is important to underline this fact, because it follows that the axiology of technoscience must always take into account, at least, three systems of values: epistemic, technical and economic. The current terminology to talk about them is: research, development and innovation, alluding in the latter case to the business components of the techno-scientific activity. Technoscience is always guided by economic values, which only happened occasionally in the case of science. Economic values are one of the three axiological components that guide technoscientific actions and their ex ante and ex post evaluations. Therefore, axiological pluralism is “connatural” to technoscience. Some classical sciences could be guided by exclusively epistemic, or predominantly epistemic, values. This does not happen in the case of technoscience and therefore we have a new axiological criterion to distinguish them: the existence of a subsystem of economic values together with the subsystems of epistemic and technical values mentioned above.
(d): Research networks.
If we look at the main scenario of modern science, the laboratory, technoscience brings significant changes. We saw that, in the case of macroscience, laboratories became factories of knowledge production. With the subsequent leap to technoscience, they take the form of network laboratories, interconnected thanks to information technologies. In front of the isolated laboratory of modern science, coordinated laboratories emerge, collaborating in the same project and dividing the tasks to be carried out. The same happens with research projects, in which different research teams, companies and countries usually collaborate. On the whole, the institutional atomism that characterized modern science has been replaced by a techno-science network, with all the consequences that this has for the organization of scientific activity and for research practice.
The Arpanet network, which connected several American universities and agencies in the 80s, can be considered as a first paradigm of network research, as well as the World Wide Web, designed by Berners-Lee to facilitate communication among researchers of the network. European CERN. To the laboratory formed by the physical enclosure where the investigators, the apparatuses and the objects investigated coincided, a laboratory-network was superimposed on him. The new space and military research programs of the USA, completely mediated by telematic networks, are two other great examples of this deep topological transformation of the main scenario where modern science, the laboratory, was developed. The remote access to large computers and equipment, the exchange of data, drafts and hypotheses through telematic networks and network research became from the 1980s a common scientific practice, notwithstanding that observations and experiments continue to develop. The objects investigated were computer representations, the empirical data became technodata and the research and testing teams were geographically dispersed, but connected by technology 84.
The name of technoscience is justified on the basis of this transformation of laboratories in network laboratories. Indeed, the most elementary scientific actions (obtaining and consulting data, performing calculations, testing hypotheses, exchanging ideas and provisional results, etc.) began to be mediated by the new information and communication technologies (ICT). . The scientists no longer kept the data in their desks or in the viewfinders of their instruments. To access empirical data and to obtain new data, the use of ICT is essential. Technoscience is characterized by the need to resort to ICT to develop the most routine scientific actions. The laboratory becomes a tele-laboratory.
The same applies to scientific publications, which have adopted an electronic format. The public communication of the results of the investigations began to take place in a technological scenario: at a distance and in a network. The verification and verification of data, observations, measurements, experiments and hypotheses, which was previously done through congresses, personal visits and prepublications, is now carried out on the Internet. Informal relationships among scientists, so important in consolidating the dominant currents in scientific communities, are developed through e-mail. A historian of twentieth century technoscience has to resort to documentary sources very different from the traditional protocols of laboratory to track the processes that lead to a discovery or techno-scientific innovation.
From an axiological point of view, this implies a reinforcement of technological values at the very core of scientific activity: the laboratory, the communication between scientists and the publication. The proper functioning of telematic networks is essential for network laboratories. It requires speed, reliability, robustness, compatibility, integrability, efficiency, good performance, etc. Not in vain has Internet2 emerged in the US when the use of the Internet has become widespread in civil society, creating operational problems in the telematic networks used by scientists. The generation, testing and improvement of scientific knowledge depends strictly on the proper functioning of telecommunications technologies, and this not only in relation to laboratory devices, but also to the other devices that allow access to data, its representation, its transmission and communication and scientific publication. A laboratory that is not connected to broadband networks is simply not a techno-scientific laboratory.
(e): Military technoscience.
From the first world war, and especially the second, scientists have been involved in military companies of a scale hitherto unknown in the history of mankind. The chemical war of 1915 was the first great example, 85 but the Manhattan project better illustrates what we have called militarized mega-science. The explosions of the atomic bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki gave rise to an authentic crisis of conscience in the scientific community, as well as in society. This crisis of values worsened further, because the development of nuclear energy generated enormous threats to the entire planet (greenhouse effect, waste, risks in nuclear power plants, etc.). In the following decades, there emerged forms of authentic militarized mega-science, such as the SAGE military network, put into operation by the US in the 1950s. Its main core was a computer network that controlled numerous radar devices, organizing the response and directing the fighters in case of a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union. The SAGE network inaugurated the saga of military techno-scientific networks, whose maximum exponent was President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, decisive for the consolidation of technoscience. This line of research led to a new form of warfare, the cyberwar, which has been implemented on a large scale in the Persian Gulf Wars, Kosovo and Afghanistan. As we have stated elsewhere, cyberwar implies a radical transformation of the concept of war 86, although here we will not expand on it.
Since the 1980s, collaboration between scientists and the military has once again been considered a priority in the US, and the crisis of the decade 1966-76 has been overcome. After the Vietnam War, the Pentagon began to claim that the US was losing its technological supremacy in relation to the USSR and that it was necessary to resume collaboration between scientists, engineers and the military, which had diminished considerably. Therefore, the new objective was to develop military technology, particularly in the field of ICT, remote-controlled missiles, microelectronics, lasers, artificial intelligence, robotics, new materials and new propulsion systems for weapons and ships. 87. As a result, the Ford and Carter administrations began to approve new funds to enhance basic research applied to defense issues. But also in this case it was the Reagan administration that took the most decisive measures: in 1986, the funds that the Universities could receive from military agencies increased by 16.5%. The novelty was that they were no longer research macroprojects. Although they continued to be used, a good part of the funds were used to finance small projects, provided that these offered expectations of innovation in military technologies. The private sector, for its part, also supported this initiative, investing in universities that had contracts with military agencies. The electronics sector, for example, grew 200% in fifteen years. Thus, the techno-war era, based on ICT, was inaugurated, unlike the war supported by heavy industries. Therefore, since the 1980s and in relation to militarized technoscience, it can be stated that:
e.1): The techno-scientific research, whether large or small, acquired a strategic relevance for the military powers. As a result of the priority accorded to military technologies, today we can speak of a new form of warfare, the infoguerra or cyberwar, based on technosciences, rather than the industrialized science of the early twentieth century. Latour goes on to state that “technoscience is part of a war machine, and must be studied as such” 88. This may be true in the case of some technosciences, not all of them. Above all, it is false when the term “technoscience” is used omnicomprensively, as Latour does, who assumes that science, technology and technoscience are the same, contrary to what we advocate here. On the other hand, Latour is right in stating that “today, no army is capable of winning without scientists” 89. Much of technoscience has great strategic importance for the military powers and for this reason innumerable technoscientific projects can be mentioned. that have been promoted, financed and developed by the armed forces of the USA. In other words, in addition to the links between scientists, technologists and entrepreneurs, technoscience is based on the establishment of very close relations with military power. This already happened in the megaciencia stage, but it was reinforced from the 80s decade. The Departments of Defense of the advanced countries have created their own Centers of scientific-technological research, whose innovations are essential for the development of new defense and attack weapons, as well as military telecommunications. Military technosciences are part of the basic structure of current military activity, including the work of information and propaganda, which is carried out through television and media.
e.2): One can speak, therefore, of a partial militarization of technoscience, which has multiple consequences in scientific activity, as well as in its results. Part of scientific knowledge and technological innovations become confidential and secret, breaking one of the basic values of modern science: the publicity of knowledge. They are not even registered in the patent registers. This does not imply that everything becomes secret. Public science and technology continue to exist. What happens is that, together with them, techno-scientific knowledge and innovations arise that are only transferred to civil society when they have been dismissed as confidential, because they have been overtaken by other innovations or by becoming obsolete. There are also many techno-scientific projects that never cease to be secret, because the documents related to them are destroyed. Using a military metaphor, we will say that the vanguard of technoscience is usually military, only the knowledge of the rear being made public. Civil society knows very little about what happens in the techno-scientific vanguard. Some projects never become known, because military values imply a will not to know everything that is planned or done, contrary to the scientific ethos that Merton talked about 90.
e.3): The sociological consequences of the above are considerable, since a considerable part of the technoscientists are at the service of the armies, directly or indirectly 91. This entails new changes in the technoscientific activity, to the extent that the discussion Free and critical of the hypotheses and of the options taken is radically juggled. Defending Popper’s critical rationalism in the context of militarized technoscience seems purely and simply an epistemological sarcasm.
e.4): Although we will not insist much on it, it is important to emphasize that knowledge and techno-scientific skills are not only creative, but also destructive. Destructive technoscience is an indispensable part of the new scientific activity, so it is difficult to continue affirming that knowledge is a good in itself, as many scientists usually say. It can be argued that destructive devices are constructed to defend themselves, or to dissuade, as Popper himself affirmed in relation to atomic bombs 92. But even if we accept that argument, we can conclude that the search for scientific knowledge becomes an instrument for other purposes, not an end in itself. The aims of technoscience are not those of science. As we have stated more than once, this subordination of the search for knowledge to other objectives (military, business, etc.) is one of the main differences between technoscience and science, at least as it has been theorized by the philosophers who conceive scientific rationality in terms of the objectives of science. If that theory of rationality is maintained, techno-scientific rationality differs radically from scientific rationality, since the objectives of technoscience have changed. The alternative is to advocate value or axiological rationality, as we will see in chapter 5.
These changes, and others that could be mentioned in relation to the links between technosciences and military power, including secret services, have a clear axiological transcript. In times of war there are profound changes in the values that guide scientific activity, without prejudice to the fact that there are scientists (the minority) who depart from that mainstream and try to maintain the purely epistemic values of science. Some of the military values (discipline, due obedience, patriotism or secrecy) enter the axiological core that guides scientific actions, not without conflicts or controversies, which are usually silenced. This is one of the reasons to affirm that the structure of scientific and technological activity changes radically in virtue of that close connection between technoscience and war. If we said before that the value system of technoscience has, at least, three subsystems (epistemic, technical and economic), we can now add a fourth subsystem, that of military values, since these are firmly embedded in scientific practice. We can conclude that a large part of the techno-scientific actions are guided in part by military values, and this is at the very core of them, that is, in the institutions and research companies, insofar as they are part of the military apparatus, although they are not are accounted for in the Armed Forces.
(f): The new social contract of technoscience.
Although in this case too many historical precedents could be pointed out, it can be affirmed that the notion of a scientific policy for times of peace arose in the USA during the Second World War. Since then it has been developed and disseminated by the most developed countries. A new type of techno-scientific action appeared: the design, discussion, approval, publication and putting into operation of Science and Technology Plans, with the subsequent creation of specific Agencies for it. Said plans are proposed by the Governments, and in their case debated and approved by the Parliaments. It is about political actions in the full sense of the word. Normally they are considered matters of State, around which a broad consensus among diverse social and political agents is sought. Through these actions the world is also transformed, but not the natural world, but a sector of the social system, namely: the SCyT scientific-technological systems of each country. The policy of science and technology (PCyT, for short) promotes, develops and transforms the context in which scientists will investigate and technologists to innovate. This context will be decisive in deciding which investigations are pertinent (or priority) and which are not. The actions for the provision of infrastructures and large equipment provide some equipment and research centers with the necessary equipment to carry out their activities. Calls for research grants and jobs for specific projects in universities, research centers and R & D companies generate human resources, without which specific techno-scientific actions would not be possible either. Calls for research programs and projects, as well as specific actions and major cross-cutting actions, allow the execution of techno-scientific projects by providing financing equipment and resources (consumables, temporary hiring, new instruments, etc.). The evaluation agencies institute procedures and criteria for these resource allocations and also allow the monitoring and ex post evaluation of the results. There are many other actions of scientific and technological policy apart from these four: for example the creation of new techno-scientific agents (research institutes, universities, technology parks, networks of excellence, etc.), or the definition of priority research lines and development, with the multiple consequences that result for the scientific communities. We do not intend here to deal in depth with the enormous complexity of the national systems of scientific-technological policy. For now, we merely point out that the establishment of these systems was a great novelty in the mid-twentieth century, which brought about a radical change in the scientific-technological activity, by creating new frameworks or contexts of action. Once again we are facing techno-scientific actions whose objectives are not to generate knowledge, but rather to create the conditions of possibility for research, development and innovation. The existence of technoscience depends entirely on these PCyT policies. In fact, technoscience has only emerged in countries where these types of policies exist, so that PCyTs have to be considered as a condition for the possibility of technoscience. Therefore, we are facing another of the distinctive features between science and technoscience. The first can exist and develop in the absence of previously designed scientific policies, the second does not. With more or less means, scientists have been able to drive research autonomously throughout history. Technoscience, on the other hand, requires an explicitly designed scientific-technological policy, be it public, private or secret.
The links between science and power predate technoscience, since they appeared at the end of the 19th century. The scientific communities have always sought to influence political areas, both to obtain funding for their activity and to show the social and political usefulness of their research (prestige of the country, modernization, solution of serious health, nutritional and industrial problems, etc.). This also applies to communities of engineers and technologists, who have become socially established as experts, advisors and professionals of great social prestige, in both political and business spheres. Thus, what Ron Ron has called the power of science was consolidated throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The American lobbies of scientists, military, technologists and large companies are the typical expression of this new power 94. After the Second World War, the changes were qualitative, because some scientists, starting with Vannevar Bush, were integrated into the very nucleus of political power. That is when what came to be known as scientific-technological policy with precision arises, as we will see in greater detail in chapter 4.
We have proven that the emergence of macro-science, its crisis, and the subsequent appearance of technoscience in the 1980s, were linked to important changes in US scientific policies. To defend their interests, many leading scientists have joined the agencies and committees that made the decisions, as well as directly advising the President of the United States. The period of the macro-science crisis coincides with the elimination by Nixon of the President’s scientific advisory council in January 1973 (Office of Sciece Policy), whose functions were transferred to the National Science Foundation. The rupture of the direct connection between the scientific communities and the Presidency was strongly criticized by the scientists, who spoke of a political counterrevolution against science 95. In April 1974, a Committee of the National Academy of Sciences recommended a “scientific presence and Technology in the White House “96. It is the time when the creation of agencies for the evaluation of technologies (Office of Technology Assessment) is proposed. Nelson Rockefeller, the Vice President of Ford, reversed that trend by creating an Office of Science and Technology Policy in the Executive Office of the Presidency. This allowed scientists to regain positions in the White House, although with much less influence than in the 40s and 50s. The restoration of political power by scientists continued with the Carter Administration, although some prestigious economists, such as Milton Friedman, they opposed that the Government and the White House returned to be involved in that type of questions. With the arrival of Reagan, the techno-scientific lobbies once again had great influence, contributing to the design of the policy of liberalization of patents and tax reduction for the aforementioned R & D companies. George Keyworth, Reagan’s scientific advisor, played a very important role in defining the new social contract of science, now focused on technological innovation. It must be said, therefore, that the changes in the scientific policy of the USA were decisive at the time of the crisis of the militarized macro-science and also in the emergence of technoscience.
From an axiological point of view, the change in values brought about by the insertion of scientists in the highest spheres of political power was enormous. The techno-scientific activity was imbued with political and legal values, since they are the ones that determine the framework in which the investigations will be developed and the way to present and carry them out, as well as the objectives. The priority lines are defined by governments and parliaments, as are the legal frameworks where techno-scientific actions can be deployed. Scientists and technologists who are inserted in the direction and redesign of the national systems of science and technology are obliged to assume legal, political and social values alien to their disciplines. For example, they must learn to propose balanced budgets, so that no scientific community or minimally powerful group feels damaged or excluded. This does not prevent them from strengthening some lines by increasing financing, through special actions or defining them as priority lines. An expert in scientific policy must master the budgetary and management arts, in addition to being very attentive to the systems of expenditure control imposed by the Parliaments and State auditors. Many apparently well-conceived scientific policy programs have failed because of poor management of them. Defining the National Science and Technology Plans, to use the terminology used in Spain, is one of the main techno-scientific actions, because the terms in which these plans are defined and the budgets assigned to each of the actions will be decisive when it comes to guiding techno-scientific development in one direction or another. Scientific and technological policy thus became a new discipline, which had to be mastered. The era of technoscience is characterized by the consolidation of scientific policy institutions and by the growing power of them. Those communities that do not have qualified representatives (and experts in the arts of politics) in these institutions usually have a black future. The traditional disdain of scientists by politicians disappears almost completely in the age of technoscience.
We confirm again the hypothesis of the axiological pluralism of techno-scientific activity and increase the number of subsystems of values that guide this activity. If not in the entire scientific community, at least some representatives of their corresponding elites have to fully internalize the procedures and values of political life. The political control of scientific research is one of the central topics of debate in the era of technoscience. In Reagan’s time, scientists managed to get these controls relaxed, recovering part of the management autonomy Vannevar Bush had achieved for them in the 1940s. Conflicts in this respect are continuous in the different systems of science and technology, for which also in this case we verify that the existence of conflicts of values are part of the core of the techno-scientific activity.
(g): Plurality of techno-scientific agents.
The transition from science to macro science changed the subject of science, transforming it into a plural subject. With the advent of technoscience, this change was consolidated and generalized. Today, it is assumed that a minimally important techno-scientific company, in addition to scientific researchers, engineers and technicians, must include other types of equipment: managers, advisors, experts in marketing and work organization, lawyers, allies in political fields. -military, financial support entities, etc. The techno-scientific agent has its own structure, because it is never formed by a single individual nor is it reduced to a group of scientists, engineers and technicians. Inside the techno-scientific companies, and as indispensable components of them, a great diversity of experts is included. All of them carry out essential tasks, although then it is the prestigious scientists who appear as spokespersons of said companies when it comes to publicizing their achievements, should they choose to make them public. Not only does the exterior of science change, as a new system of science and technology emerges. So important is the internal change. The interior of technoscience differs radically from within science, if we want to maintain internal / external distinction.
The philosophy of science debated at length about the objective character of scientific knowledge or, to put it in terms of Popper, about epistemology without subject. After a learning process, any human being could accept and make scientific knowledge his own. The minds of the individual scientists, the “men of science”, were the great reservoirs of knowledge, apart from the magazines, libraries and printed materials that were communicated to the rest of the scientific community. In the case of technoscience, on the other hand, complex and heterogeneous teams of people are required, as well as different types of media and instruments. The subject of technoscience is plural, not individual. Or better, it is not even possible to speak of the subject, but of agent, actor or maker. This is always plural, because it requires the collaboration of various types of experts and numerous artifacts so that a techno-scientific action produces acceptable results. From the individual subject of modern science (the genius) is passed to the research team with a whole business, administrative, political and legal support structure. For the results of scientific research to be fully acceptable, epistemic contributions are not enough. In addition, scientific knowledge is required to generate technological development and innovation, so that this knowledge is transferred to companies and institutions. Therefore, the very notion of acceptability is modified. To be so, techno-scientific companies have to internalize this change, organizing themselves in a different way.
From an axiological perspective, this implies that the actions of the subject of technoscience are guided by a plural system of values, since the very subject of technoscience is plural. Said subject can be visualized in the following way: it includes, at least, a scientist, an engineer, an entrepreneur, a soldier and a politician, although it can be broader and more varied, giving entrance to a jurist, an evaluator, an expert in management and an investor, without forgetting the marketing and administrative experts. Each of these agents acts according to their own values. Since all of them together make up the “subject of technoscience”, conflicts of values take place within that subject, because they are a plural subject. These conflicts will reach more or less stable equilibrium points, or not. In any case, we can conclude that conflicts of values are part of the structure of techno-scientific activity, contemplated from the axiological perspective in which we have placed ourselves.
II.2: Additional differences between science and technoscience.
Up to now we have taken into account the distinctive features presented in our analysis of the concept of macroscience, verifying that the differences between macroscience and technoscience are significant. This will be even clearer if, leaving aside our point of departure, we go deeper into the characterization of technoscience. In this section we will expand the list of differential notes.
(h): Technoscience and environment.
Some consequences of the emergence of technoscience have not yet been mentioned. One of them is its tremendous impact on the environment, particularly notable in the case of some technosciences, not in all. It must be said that the environment, including the social environment, is the patient subject of techno-scientific actions. Nuclear energy, with atomic bombs, reactors and nuclear waste, is a great example, but not the only one. Regarding the ecological impact of some techno-scientific advances, we must mention plastics, transgenic foods, genetic engineering, atmospheric waste generated by obsolete artificial satellites and many other examples that we will discuss throughout this work. It is not enough to take into account the immediate results of the research in terms of scientific achievements and technological innovations. It is also necessary to consider the environmental consequences of these actions, as well as their possible risks.
Some large impacts on the biosphere have generated considerable opposition to techno-scientific activity, insofar as it has great polluting effects on the natural environment. This pollution does not arise with technoscience, because industrialization had already generated tremendous environmental damage, both by the exploitation of raw materials and by the waste generated by industrial production (air pollution, global warming, industrial waste, etc.). . However, some technosciences (new materials, transgenic foods, etc.) transform the environment in such a way that they have impacts on large areas of the planet or on the ecosystem as a whole. 97. The emergence and consolidation of environmental movements, many of which activists have a high degree of scientific education, is one of the consequences of the transformation of science into technoscience. Since the crisis of macro-science in the 60s, a new relevant agent for techno-scientific activity has emerged: the environmental movement, whose strength is growing in the most technologically advanced countries. This current adopts multiple forms and modes of organization, depending on the countries and the problems addressed. In general, these are non-governmental organizations (NGOs), a name that expresses a clear distancing from the political institutions that have promoted macro-science and technoscience.
We are particularly interested in those environmental movements that have adopted some aspects of technoscience when it comes to acting, for example Green Peace. From our point of view, this organization is a more techno-scientific agent, although it intervenes from outside the SCyT system. The scientific education of its members and leaders is very high. In addition, many of their actions are carefully designed, so that they have a considerable impact on the media, and more specifically on television. Greenpeace uses some of the new information and communication technologies (television, Internet, etc.) in order to increase the social and political impact of its actions. He is able to negotiate with businessmen and politicians and is admitted as a valid interlocutor. Located on the periphery of the SCyT system, its actions have a great impact on its core, largely because some scientists and technologists, together with a significant part of society, share their ideas and morally support their actions. Greenpeace has found its source of financing in society, which allows it to have a minimum technological means to act. Its actions are thought to be contemplated in a technological scenario, for which it incorporates notable design techniques. Being a critical movement of technoscience, it has incorporated scientific knowledge and technology into its practice. That is why we affirm that it is a more techno-scientific agent, even though it operates from the counterpower.
These types of organizations have proliferated in recent years, for example, in opposition to GM foods, and achieve increasing social support. In some European countries (the most notable case is Germany) they have been constituted as political parties and participate in democratic governments, which allows them to influence decision-making in scientific policy. They have also obtained the approval of various laws, regulations and regulations that, although they are often not complied with, constitute a starting point for subsequent legal actions. In the 1990s, environmental issues have begun to be on the agendas of political power: Vice President Al Gore affirmed that “we must make the salvation of the environment the central organizing principle of civilization” and advocated a Marshall Plan for the environment, with financing of one hundred million dollars. The opposition of the Congress prevented him from starting the initiative, at least in the terms in which it had been designed initially, but it is significant that the maximum leader of the American scientific policy came to make these proposals, although they did not crystallize later.
Overall, the progress of the environmental movement during the last quarter of the twentieth century has been very significant, constituting one of the social movements of greatest interest in dealing with the risks and negative consequences of techno-scientific activity. Disasters like those of the Harrison and Chernobyl nuclear power plants, not to mention the opposition to the uncontrolled deposit of waste, or nuclear tests, are as many cases of study for the history of technoscience. The studies of science, technology and society should not only deal with the successes and successes, but also with the errors and failures of technoscience. In relation to the Gore environmental initiative, it would be worthwhile to study in detail the debates that took place in the Congress and in the scientific policy offices. It would be verified that the North American Government, which was the main agent driving macro-science at the time of the Second World War, has ceased to be so at the end of the 20th century, given the enormous power that private techno-scientific companies possess.
From an axiological perspective, we will say that the macroscience and technoscience of the 20th century have brought about the emergence of a new value system, ecological values. It is a value system reactive to technoscience, but little by little it acquires a certain weight in legal, political and social media, even becoming internalized by some techno-scientific companies. Initially, its defenders have interpreted this extension of the sphere of values as an extension of ethics, and that is why we talk about environmental ethics. In our view, it is not convenient to identify ethical and ecological values, without prejudice to their being interrelated. Traditionally, there has been a tendency to identify the sphere of values with ethics. One of the theses of departure in this book, already exposed in previous publications 98, affirms the specificity of the ecological values, in front of its habitual subordination to the moral values. Ecological values are not inserted, today, in the axiological core of technoscience, but their social presence is growing and little by little they are being internalized by many technoscientists. Many of the current controversies about technosciences have an ecological component, so it can be said that, even if only embryonic, the plural subject of technoscience tends to assume these new ecological values. If we add to the set of agents that we have just enumerated as components of the subject of technoscience an ecologist with good scientific and technical training, for example a representative of Greenpeace, we will improve our analysis of the structure of the techno-scientific activity.
In summary: the techno-scientific activity includes other value systems that, although they do not guide it, do seek to control and prevent its consequences and risks, serving as a counterweight to purely economic, military, political, scientific and technical values. The ecological values are a first example.
(i): Technoscience and society.
It also profoundly changes the relationship of technoscience with the public and society. In the case of science, the relationship between scientific communities and the public was first established through the context of education and dissemination. With technology, it focused on the context of application, considering citizens as potential users of technological innovations, once they are commercialized in the market. The gradual irruption and consolidation of technoscience has radically changed that relationship with the public, as there has been a crisis of confidence among citizens with respect to techno-scientific research and, in particular, with respect to expert reports or evaluations.
Opposition in the US to the Vietnam War and to scientific research for military purposes was the first example of this loss of credibility, which crystallized in the May 1968 movement. Protests on American university campuses not only chanted “no more research for the war “, but also attacked the” knowledge factories “that drove it 99. The same happened in relation to nuclear energy, which was finding increasing opposition in society, and not only by the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but also for the problem of nuclear waste produced by laboratories or the risks of accidents in nuclear reactors, some of which were part of the scientific macro-laboratories and were located on university campuses. Just as science had served to defend democracy in the 1940s, some investigations were now considered a danger to democracy, since they were exclusively used by military organizations. The partial militarization of the macro-science was criticized from multiple perspectives, penetrating criticism in society and reaching some scientists and academic leaders. Stanford University closed the Stanford Research Institute, which worked mostly for the Department of Defense. The MIT Instrumentation Laboratory completely changed its lines of research, orienting them to civil aviation. Only in the field of physics, projects financed by military agencies fell from 32 to 19% between 1971 and 1975, while the Department of Defense, which financed 20.1% of the total basic government investment in 1963, only he was in charge of 9 “3% in 1975. The effects of the crisis of the militarized mega-science were very real in the USA.
These protests had repercussions on an issue that would be central to the debate of the late 1960s: the demand for greater social and democratic control of scientific research. This was one of the pillars of the social contract of science established from the Bush report, according to which they left broad levels of freedom when choosing their research objectives. Even in military circles, the usefulness of basic research to manufacture new weapons began to be questioned. The famous Mansfield amendment (1970), which was approved by Congress and the Senate, not only required scientists to prove previously that their research would have real interest for the military institutions that financed them, but also instituted much more rigorous mechanisms of control of the expenditure, and even of the objectives of the research 100. This trend was not only shown in the USA, but also in other countries, such as Great Britain and France. On the whole, it can be said that in the 1960s some of the main postulates of the SCyT system that had arisen after the Second World War were questioned. With it emerged a new agent of the system, society itself, and did so in a distrustful and critical manner. The reorientation of research towards private companies in the 1980s was the way to avoid this social opposition to certain types of science, since the difficulties in the public sector began to be greater.
From the axiological point of view, this is the moment in which social values break out strongly in scientific activity, introducing new criteria for the assessment of technoscience. The crisis of the decade 1966-76 was the product of the emergence of new value systems, such as social, ecological and legal, which until then had had little relative weight in scientific media.
Let’s ignore what happened at the time of the crisis of militarized mega-science, waiting for more detailed studies, and let’s consider the relationship between society and technoscience today. Applying the distinction we usually use among the four contexts of techno-scientific activity (education, research, evaluation and application 101), it can be said that the relationship of citizenship with technoscience is much worse in the four contexts: many young people question more or less openly techno-scientific education, important sectors of society demand social control of techno-scientific research, distrust the reports and evaluations of experts in science and technology and, finally, openly answer some of the main techno-scientific innovations. In the background, a certain rejection of the new and growing power of technoscientists is being expressed. Social control and the democratization of science (in our case of technoscience) are two of the slogans that bring together those social forces that once looked at science with admiration, and today they contemplate technoscience with growing doubts, if not with a explicit rejection 102. This causes the techno-scientific communities, increasingly closely linked to economic, military and political powers, to concern themselves with the public image of science and technology, as shown by numerous programs of dissemination and dissemination of science and technology. technology in the US and in Europe. Technoscience has become a very important social power and it is not enough to techno-scientifically educate young people, as in the past. It is necessary to advertise science to improve the relationship between technoscience and the public. This is consistent with the business and marketing imprint that marks science and technology in our time. In short, public admiration for science has become a social concern for technoscience, with which the relationship with the public and society has radically changed. In many cases, this concern tends to turn into rejection, especially in those countries that are technologically dependent, that is, they do not have the human, financial or organizational resources to develop their own scientific policies. The gulf between the First and the Third World has an undoubted techno-scientific component. It is not strange that entire societies reject for the most part the expansion of technoscientific power to their countries, especially when this implies technological colonialization.
It is worth remembering that technoscience is not only oriented towards the control and domination of nature, as was the case in the Baconian sciences, but that it is primarily designed to control and dominate societies, as we have already pointed out above. This is the underlying reason why the relationship between technoscience and society is conflictive. In some cases, these transformations are well received by society. But in most cases there are reluctances, when not rejections. Some social sectors may support certain techno-scientific programs, to the extent that they expect to obtain benefits from them. Such is the case of the great biomedical (cancer, AIDS) or environmental research programs (anti-pollution products, bio-remediation, etc.). But many other lines of research and innovation raise doubts and distrust, if not outright rejection. Hence, techno-scientific companies have to include publicity and positive dissemination actions among their strategic lines. We are again faced with conflicts of values, whose resolution is not simple. Studies of social perception of science, qualitative or quantitative, are part of the techno-scientific activity, unlike modern science, which rarely paid attention to these problems. Knowing how to present technoscience to society in general, and not only to the upper layers of it, as was the case in modern science, is another requisite of techno-scientific activity, precisely because a large part of it is oriented towards the transformation of societies .
(j): Technoscience and international politics.
Macro-science emerged in the context of the Second World War and, as we will see in Chapter 4, was a purely national initiative, aimed at increasing US military, industrial, political and commercial influence. Its development in Europe in the first epoch of the postwar period was protected by the USA, reason why the scarce initiatives of European macro-science can be considered as an expansion of the North American macro-science. However, the consolidation of the USSR as a world power, increasingly opposed to the US, generated a strong scientific-technological confrontation between the two. At the time of the Cold War, there was no transfer of scientific knowledge between the two blocks, except in less important areas of research and through traditional academic channels. Until the 1960s, the separation between the two systems of science and technology was strict, considering communication of knowledge of strategic importance as a crime of espionage or high treason. This broke a venerable internationalist tradition of modern science, since macro-science was divided into two large blocks, practically isolated from each other. Scientists and engineers had to accept this situation, both on one side and on the other. Although in the era of modern science and industrial technology there had always been some secret areas in research, a situation like that of the 50s and 60s is unprecedented in the history of science. Therefore, we are facing another difference between science and technoscience, which should be briefly commented.
In the western bloc, the scientific and technological dependence of the old allies on the USA was strict during those years, as well as in the eastern bloc. Faced with the old rivalry between English science and continental science, or between German and French science, to mention two examples from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the postwar period generated a reorganization of international science, agglutinated in two blocks strictly hierarchical. Besides, practically excluded from scientific and technological advances, the Third World remained. The geostrategic structure of the world had a direct reflection in the SCyT systems. Internationalist values declined rapidly in the face of the political, military, diplomatic and industrial confrontation that characterized the Cold War. Epithets such as “capitalist science” and “communist science” were common in those times.
The Second World War was taken advantage of by the USA to attract a large part of the European scientists who fled the Nazi persecution. During the postwar period, that emigration continued, since North America was the only Western country that allowed the development of those investigations that required large equipment and strong financing. This was one of the benefits derived from the decision to maintain the alliance between politicians, military, industrialists and scientists after the war, instead of dismantling the device that had been created during the war. The consolidation of the US SCyT system in the 50s not only had an effect on North American science, but also on an international level, placing the science and technology system in a position of clear international leadership, with a whole series of consequences: recruitment of brains, training of future leaders of European science, channeling of cooperation through organizations of strategic interest (such as NATO), etc. The transfer of technology, particularly military, was used as a currency to achieve strategic, political, economic and commercial objectives. Likewise, part of the knowledge was transferred in exchange for participating in the financing costs of the macro-projects of research, as we will see later in the case of the Hubble Space Telescope. In short, the power of science and technology was also shown as an instrument for foreign diplomacy.
However, until the 1960s, US scientific policy had not been systematized in its international aspects. The incorporation of science and technology issues into international politics, Kissinger’s work in Nixon’s time, the creation of the Tricontinental (1973) at the initiative of Rockefeller and Carter’s attempt to found an Agency for Scientific and Technological Cooperation, oriented to the Third World, were important steps in this direction. The latter failed, largely due to the reluctance of the large American business corporations. But the agreements of scientific-technological cooperation with other countries began to be part of the international policy of the USA. The agreements that Kissinger signed with the USSR and the Reagan administration with China, although they were of limited scope, showed that scientific-technological cooperation could have an important function at the time of ending the Cold War. Both initiatives were made with a view to the future, thinking about the huge markets that both countries offered for US companies.
The large industrial corporations and, subsequently, the companies of new technologies, had much to do with this expansion of scientific policy to the international arena, but during the 60s and 70s the initiative always had the Government. With the progressive emergence of technoscience, the situation changed. Some large companies, for example in the field of ICT (IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Microsoft, etc.), develop their own international R & D & I policies, transferring part of the production processes of other countries around the world. new technologies, although never the direction or the design. This is how the era of globalization and of companies-network 103 begins, coherently with the structural characteristics of technoscience.
The international expansion of American technoscience would require extensive and specific studies, sector by sector. Here we will limit ourselves to pointing out that the differences between the internationalism of modern scientists and the internationalization of current techno-scientific companies, beginning with the North American ones, are very large. First of all because new technologies transform the societies in which they spread, by changing people’s habits of life and their ability to act. The expansion of European science throughout the world took place through the context of education and dissemination. Technoscience, on the other hand, spreads from the context of application, precisely because it is a transforming activity of the world.
There have been many who see in this expansion of American technoscience a new form of colonization, centered on the appropriation and commercialization of knowledge, not on the natural resources needed for industry. This was denounced by the group of 77, of which most of the countries of the Second and Third World belonged. The thesis is very plausible. In any case, we should speak of techno-colonialism, to distinguish it from the European colonialism of the scientific-industrial era.
(k): The management of technoscience.
It is necessary to organize the techno-scientific work and manage the available human resources, not only at the time of research, but in all phases and contexts of the techno-scientific activity. Epistemic authority and technical knowledge are no longer enough. The techno-scientific agent or entrepreneur must know something about science and technology, but, above all, he must have knowledge about management of human and economic resources. Marketing and propaganda are characteristics that distinguish technoscience, notwithstanding that in modern science there have been important precedents of these skills. Many leaders of research teams develop most of their activity outside the laboratory, seeking resources for research, making public relations, in a word, selling the product obtained from research. This characteristic converts some scientists and engineers into knowledge entrepreneurs, with the peculiarity that they manufacture a product of great historical prestige, knowledge, traditionally considered as a good in itself. Knowledge management models form an important part of scientific policy, be it state or business.
In general, technoscience produces a considerable hierarchy within the techno-scientific teams, since not only research is required, but also development and innovation. The ultimate goal is innovation, not advancement in knowledge. The latter is desirable, but instrumentally. In addition, there is a high degree of opacity in relation to the specific objectives of the research activity, a good part of which is confidential or secret. A scientist who works in a techno-scientific company can completely ignore the ultimate meaning of the research he is doing. Ascribed to a chain of knowledge production, it only knows a small part of the research project in which it collaborates, especially in the case of macroprojects. Faced with the classical scientist, who faced problems that he knew and tried to solve, the techno-scientist develops a research work in exchange for an economic retribution, becoming another employee. Consequence of this are the labor and personal conflicts within the techno-scientific companies, which usually adopt the disguise of conceptual or technical divergences. Managing human resources is a must for any medium-sized techno-scientific company. On the other hand, union values (stability in the workplace, salary level, possibility of a career as a scientist, etc.) are inserted within the techno-scientific activity, especially if it has public funding. Once again we are faced with structural conflicts, derived from the new mode of knowledge production. The struggles for a fixed position in universities and research centers are usually canonical manifestations of this type of conflict, of great interest for the sociology of technoscience.
The complex chains of control and evaluation of the production of knowledge generate a huge bureaucracy, to the point that much of the time is spent writing projects, reports and proposals, increasingly complex technically. Experts emerge in this type of actions and new rhetorical skills to write this type of documents. Apart from the experts in research, development and innovation, techno-scientific companies require experts in administrative tasks. A good manager can be as important or more than a good researcher. It is another aspect of the entrepreneurization of technoscience, which often impatients classical scientists. Together, these companies are characterized by a high division of labor, since very different skills are required for the company to progress. The main objective is the progress and good functioning of the T & C company, which requires knowing how to apply economic growth, stabilization and reconversion policies, as the case may be. All this was unthinkable in classical science, guided by the ideal of cumulative growth. Techno-scientific companies last less than scientific institutions, due to the great pace of change and innovation imposed by technoscience. This happens without changing the paradigms of knowledge. The dynamics of technoscience is much more complex than that of science and has to be analyzed from multiple perspectives. Purely epistemic analyzes, which are only fixed in the rate of advancement of knowledge, are insufficient. The economics of science becomes a fundamental branch of science and technology studies, consequently with the fact that the production of technoscience becomes a new economic sector.
The economic sector S & T is having a great development in recent years, and not only in state institutions, but also in the private sector. Some techno-scientific projects are financed by venture capital organizations and there are some large techno-scientific companies that use the Bolsa as a way to obtain financing. Nowadays, 70% of the investment in R + D + i in the US comes from the private initiative, leaving only 30% in charge of the State and public institutions. This implies a radical change in the economic structure of technoscience, as well as in the evaluation criteria of techno-scientific institutions and companies. Modern science was financed by the States and by some patrons. Contemporary technoscience, on the other hand, tends to seek funding in capital markets, like any other large company. Public funding continues to exist, but its role is to catalyze initiatives. The creation of incubator companies is increasingly common in technoscience, contrary to the institutional model that characterized modern science.
Without going into more detail, we can conclude that both from the financial point of view and from the labor perspective, science and technoscience are radically differentiated, and not only by size, but above all by their different economic and work structure.
(l): Technoscience and law.
The techno-scientific activity is legally regulated in several of its phases and, when developed in a competitive market, gives rise to numerous legal problems and lawsuits. One of the most characteristic is the property of knowledge, which is specified when patenting innovations. The legal terms by which a patent is registered in the corresponding state offices are of great importance for the further development of the projects and for the achievement of benefits, which is why researchers who have achieved patentable results must contact experts in the field. laws that adequately define the ownership of knowledge. It should not be forgotten that, in the case of both macroscience and technoscience, research projects require the collaboration of various agents, for example academic, industrial, military or institutional. Fixing the distribution of ownership of acquired knowledge is a legal issue first and foremost. There are many cases in which the greatest successes of a project depended on the success when registering and marketing the patents 104.
Therefore, techno-scientific companies must rely on the collaboration of legal experts, which is unprecedented in modern science, where conflicts were usually resolved by arbitration commissions made up of prestigious scientists. These conflict resolution practices continue to exist, but in many cases they appeal to other types of instances. Conflicts between rival techno-scientific companies, for example, often end up in court. The same can be said of the privatization of knowledge, as we pointed out earlier. The registration, maintenance and management of patents, as well as intellectual property problems, become basic problems for the management of techno-scientific companies. There are also labor and hiring problems within them, which have to be resolved according to the corresponding legislation. This without forgetting that some private R & D companies choose to settle in countries with very weak state power, precisely to avoid these legal problems, including tax taxes. All this was unthinkable in the era of modern science and technology, so this is a new distinctive feature of technoscience. Some universities and research centers, and of course the R & D companies, have based their economic income for years on the exploitation of a few patents, which has made it possible to finance the subsequent research and make the research activity profitable, including research. basic
On the other hand, publicly funded research has to comply with a series of legal norms, both when submitting projects and when carrying them out and justifying the expense. The principal investigators have to commit more and more frequently to respect a series of ethical and environmental principles, apart from the strictly legal regulations. Taken together, technoscience faces a series of constraints (constrictions, ligatures) that are very different from those of modern science. The legal restrictions of techno-scientific research are very effective in democratic countries, which is why some techno-scientific companies opt for extraterritoriality, locating their headquarters, and even their laboratories, in countries with less political and legal control. Like many other great financiers, those who hold intellectual capital resort to procedures of dubious legitimacy to avoid such controls. Therefore, also in this aspect the techno-scientific companies tend to behave above all as companies, contrary to modern science or the pure patriotism and democratic spirit of many scientists at the time of the emergence of technoscience.
(m): Technoscience and values.
From an axiological point of view, the situation we are describing can be summed up by saying that apart from epistemic, technical and economic values (and in the case of the military, when we talk about discoveries or inventions with strategic importance), technoscientific activity is present other various subsystems of values: ecological, political, social, legal, etc. Some of these values are being internalized by the technoscientists, although reluctantly. Many of them yearn for the time of axiological autonomy, when their specific values clearly prevailed. Therefore, as we have already pointed out, within the technoscience not only a plurality of subsystems of values intervene, but also there is a structural conflict of values that did not occur at the time of science and industrial technology, or at least to a much lesser degree. We will say that technoscience is characterized by the existence of conflicts of values, which can adopt different modalities depending on the countries, the moments and the disciplines. Do not forget that technoscience is still highly effective when it comes to transforming the world, or to dominate nature, if you prefer. The problem is that this second objective of Baconian science finds important counterweights in those other subsystems of values that, although they have not been assumed by technoscientific communities, have a growing predicament in society.
It may be interesting that until now we have not talked about moral values. To the extent that technoscience is a human activity, questions such as honesty, truthfulness or trust are raised again and again. Being, in addition, an activity that transforms the world, ethical problems arise in function of the transformed objects. And since the technical actions are intentional, the greater or lesser morality of these intentions gives rise to significant ethical aspects. Therefore, moral values also have a role in technoscience, especially in some disciplines and moments. However, from the axiological perspective that we have adopted, there are other value systems that are much more significant than the moral ones, without prejudice to the fact that they can prevail and be decisive when making certain decisions. The same can be said of other value systems, such as religious and aesthetic. We will see in chapter 5 that axiological pluralism requires taking into account many values, some of which prevail in a few moments, but not always. There is no omnipresence of a single value system, not even one that is determinant everywhere.
(n): Technoscience and computing.
Modern science relied primarily on mathematics, while technoscience requires an additional formalism, computer science. The change is important, because the computer allows to represent and simulate various types of actions, and this recursively. The operational capacity of mathematics is great, but that of computer science is much greater. The tremendous rise of computer science and the technosciences that derive from it (cybernetics, robotics, artificial intelligence, telematics, etc.) is not an incidental detail, but illustrates another distinctive feature of twentieth-century technoscience. The two main methodological pivots of modern science were mathematics and the experimental method. Computer science and simulations are the two major methodological innovations of the twentieth century, whose irruption, development and consolidation mark the transition from science to technoscience from the point of view of formal languages and methodology.
Mathematical models allow to analyze and discover new relationships between the objects studied. The same happens with computer science, with the difference that it is applied to very diverse systems, and in particular to the technological systems themselves, which can be computer simulated. As Aracil indicates:
“The computer has the virtuality of being able to be programmed so that its behavior is what establishes the program. By changing this, we have a new behavior. In this way, the computer can imitate or simulate the behavior of any machine; its possibilities, in this order of things, are immense “105.
Given any machine, we will call infomáquina to your computer simulation, if possible. In principle, practically all mechanical devices have their corresponding infomachines. The same happens with thermodynamic machines and, more importantly, with a new type of artifacts that emerged in the 19th century, one of whose examples is the Watt regulator. It was Maxwell who took care to theorize these centrifugal regulators and showed the importance of their valves, whose opening or closing gradually allowed to maintain the speed of the steam engine approximately constant. Therefore, some of its parts were not designed to generate energy, but to introduce information into the machine itself, so that it could work automatically. Watt’s regulator did it mechanically, but soon it was found that electricity was the ideal instrument to transmit information. This type of devices, whose function is to introduce information on the state of the machines, were essential for electricity distribution networks and telephone networks in the nineteenth century, as well as for the automatic control technologies that subsequently gave rise to Robotics 106. The servomechanisms also incorporate these information feedback loops, which are common in computer tools:
“It is known by feedback (feed back) the process by virtue of which when performing a global action, succession of partial actions, in order to reach a certain objective, information is continuously fed back on the effects of previous actions, so that the successive actions take into account the results of those past actions “…” The feedback mechanism consists of a successive chain of action – result (state) – feedback of information – analysis of the discrepancy with the objective – new action, in its case, and so on “107.
Computer machines can carry out these loops without any problem, because they are based on the continuous feedback of information through programming languages. This allows the actions to be iterated by modifying the initial and contour conditions, which gives access to a new experimental mode, based on computer simulations. In philosophical terms, the information technologies greatly expands the field of possible actions, which is very different from that of possible worlds. By modifying parameters and programming, it is possible to simulate many more actions and processes than with mathematical models. For example, you can represent the possible expansion waves of a bomb, the movement of several aircraft in an airspace, the possible trajectories of a missile, the destructive effects of a predator on a school of fish, the foreseeable evolution of a harvest , the situation of the upper layers of the atmosphere, the evolution of an economy based on macroeconomic or other data, the operating results of a company, etc. The computer allows a new type of experimentation and prediction, which is not deterministic but probabilistic. All this is essential when calculating the effects, consequences and risks of techno-scientific actions, both because there are no other analytical tools available and, above all, because the feedback of the data makes it possible to carry out multiple experiments of a virtual way Before operating and experimenting materially, computer simulations allow the analysis of multiple scenarios or possible states, which implies enormous savings in economic, ecological and time costs. Hence, computer science is the main instrument for investigating the domain of possible actions, including the actions of the multiple infomachines that reproduce the behavior of real machines. On the other hand, since the machines are a type of systems, the computer science also allows to investigate the evolution of other types of systems (physical, chemical, biological, economic, social, urban, etc., including the SCyT systems of scientific policy- technological). As Aracil points out, “we can make of it a potential replica of any system we try to study” 108. Since in this work we have opted for a systemic ontology when studying technoscience, it is logical that we attribute great methodological importance to the computer science, to the being the most suitable formal instrument to study the diverse systems, as much from a static perspective as dynamic.
The emergence of computer science in the second half of the twentieth century has a great philosophical and scientific importance, among other reasons because it allows to represent complex systems, which are not treatable by the resources of classical mathematics. Von Neumann designed the ENIAC and the EDVAC in order to solve nonlinear problems that, being very important for physics, were not approachable through the Differential and Integral Calculus, nor through the Algebra procedures. On the other hand, computer science has allowed the development of cybernetics (N. Wiener) and has generated very important models for simulation in systems dynamics (Prigogine). As indicated by Javier Aracil, by system is meant “a complex entity, consisting of properly coordinated interaction parts” 109. Now, “those parts have no meaning except in so far as they are integrated into the higher order unit that is the system itself” 110. Well, “to understand the functioning of a system is usually understood to know how the parts of which it is formed influence each other, so that the proper coordination of these influences gives rise to the global functioning of the system “111. This is possible thanks to the construction of computer simulations and models. Once analyzed the behavior of a system, the computer can build another artificial system (called model) that has the same components of the system studied and behaves similarly:
“The study of a concrete system, through the dynamics of systems, leads to the construction of a model that is susceptible to being programmed in a computer; in this way, in the latter there is a replica or copy of the concrete system under study: with the help of the computer, the evolution over time of the magnitudes considered relevant to the studied system is obtained “112.
Since science has been busy studying increasingly complex systems, computer science has become indispensable for scientific research. In section II.3 we will mention many examples of this omnipresence of information technology in today’s technoscience. Speaking in general terms, it can be said that the different computer tools generate a new representation of knowledge, on the one hand, and also of the change and evolution of physical, biological systems, etc., something that was not possible with traditional mathematics, centered on the continuous, not on the discrete. With greater or lesser precision and adequacy, computer science can represent systems of great complexity (physical, chemical, biological, social, economic, etc.), thus expanding the field of scientific research. The same applies to technological systems, which have been radically transformed by the emergence of information technology, especially as regards the control of their operation. The automation of the operation of the machines is the great achievement of computing, having been incorporated into the most diverse economic and social sectors. Well, the same happens in the case of scientific activity, most of which is now automated, and therefore controlled by automatic devices.
Computer mediation is one of the main requirements of the emergence of technoscience. Compared to the mathematized sciences (to a greater or lesser extent) of the modern era, the vast majority of technosciences are computerized, and therefore mediated by technology in the own representations of scientific knowledge, as well as in the operations that are carried out out with the data. Technoscience is based on a new formalism, apt to represent actions, not just knowledge. Unlike simple macroscience, technoscience itself requires the computerization of scientific and engineering activity. The notion of technoscience, understood as information science, or computer science) is more precise than that of macroscience, because it takes into account factors more relevant than simply increasing the size of science. In the step from science to technoscience not only changes the size. Also, and above all, the form. And not only the way of representing knowledge, but above all the way to act scientifically.
(o): Technoscience and the information and knowledge society.
Macro-science emerged as a development of society and, as we saw, meant the industrialization of scientific knowledge. Technoscience, on the other hand, is linked to a new form of society, which has begun to take shape in the last two decades of the twentieth century: the information and knowledge society. There are many differences between this and the industrial society, but the most important for our objective consists in the new economic status of validated and contrasted knowledge, and in particular of scientific knowledge.
Information and knowledge become a new source of wealth and power. Therefore, scientific knowledge becomes a basic good for large companies and power agencies. Instead of controlling, accumulating and manufacturing raw materials, in order to obtain benefits as a result, the economy information is based on the discovery, elaboration and commercialization of knowledge deposits. Basic science thus acquires an enormous economic and political relevance, since it is a great source of wealth and power. The economic, political and military powers tend to appropriate scientific knowledge, generating for it Agencies and Departments of research, development and innovation. The scientific and technological communities are capable of generating noo-riches, to use the terminology of Sáez Vacas 113. The development of industrial society and the great wars of the twentieth century clearly showed that this form of wealth is one of the engines of the economy and of society. The powers of the new type of society are clear that the production, management and profitability of validated knowledge is essential for their own interests, and therefore they are introduced in the field of noogies, until then cultivated basically by scientists and engineers.
The transition from macro-science to technoscience occurs with the emergence of the information and knowledge society. The research macro-projects, which are the engine of the informational economy, are still being maintained, but exploitation actions from smaller areas of the noosphere are also promoted. The new scientific-technological system, which had been configured around a few disciplines, is generalized to all areas of science and technology, be they small or large. Technoscience is not a matter of large scales. Small research and innovation projects become very important, as long as they are designed and managed according to the organization model of the activity we saw in the case of macro-science. Small knowledge mines can be just as profitable as large ones, and even more so. Technoscience is based on the systematic exploitation of scientific and technological knowledge reservoirs, to the extent that these veins, whether small or large, have considerable value in the information society.
From an axiological perspective, the novelty lies in the following: knowledge had been considered as an epistemic good. No scientist of the modern era had doubts about it. It is necessary to seek knowledge, because this is a good in itself, regardless of whether it is applicable or not, or that breaks with previous systems of knowledge. With the advent of technoscience, information and knowledge remain epistemic goods, but they become technological, economic, military and political goods. Put another way: scientific knowledge is valued in terms of new value systems. Consequently, doubts arise about the universal goodness of said knowledge. A scientific discovery with strategic value in the military field, for example, is an undoubted good for those who possess this knowledge, and at the same time an evil for those who do not possess it and bear the consequences of its application, once developed technologically and implemented for the battlefields. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs are a point of no return for those who naively believed that knowledge is always a good. In other words: techno-scientific knowledge has ceased to be a good in itself to be a good from some points of view and a bad from others.
II.3.- Plurality of technosciences.
Just as in the nineteenth century a plurality of sciences was differentiated, some traditional (mathematics, logic, astronomy, medicine, physics, chemistry, biology, geology), others new (economics, sociology, psychology, anthropology, etc.), On the basis of which the scientific building of the 20th century was organized, during the 21st century it will be necessary to distinguish between these disciplines and their corresponding technosciences: techno-mathematics, techno-logic, techno-astronomy, technophysics, technochemistry, technobiology, technomedicine, technogeology, techno-economics, techno-sociology, techno-psychology, etc. Since we have affirmed the emergence of a new modality of scientific-technological activity, it is necessary to check whether this change has occurred in the various disciplines, as well as when, how and where. This would require very detailed studies of the evolution of each scientific (and technological) discipline, a task that we do not intend to face.
In this section we will list multiple examples of specific technosciences, even if only in a very summary way. With this, the concept of “technoscience” will acquire an extensional determination, not only intensional, as it has been up to now. We will limit ourselves to briefly mention some of the main examples, without trying to systematize the study or the development of each of the technosciences.
(a): Tecnomathematics.
Although the macrociencia arose historically in the field of physics, we will begin our examination with the tecnomatemática, and this for three reasons. First, because the ENIAC project was one of the first canons of macro science. Second, because computer science can be considered as the main modality of mathematical technology. Third, because the passage from mathematics to techno-mathematics illustrates well the difference between macroscience and technoscience. Technological mathematics can be macro-, but also micro-, while being mediated by computer technologies. Since we have stressed the importance we attach to information technology in the development and consolidation of technoscience, its own emergence requires special attention.
Technological mathematics emerged as computing sciences, focusing on one of the most traditional tasks of mathematicians: the numerical and symbolic calculation. From the 30s there was a great effervescence in this field. In 1930, Vannevar Bush built a differential analyzer at MIT that solved important equations for the study of electrical circuits. The German Konrad Zuse devised a universal calculator, the Z3, completed in 1941. It was a small machine with a band reader, a console for the operator and two cabinets with 2,600 relays, which could do several mathematical operations, for example multiplications and square roots with 22-bit numbers. The initial values had to be entered by hand, so it showed important technical deficiencies. The users of these machines were scientists, but also military: Zuse Zuse was used in 1943 for operations against allied ships in the Mediterranean 114. Another great project that should be mentioned was the MARK I, initiated by Howard H. Aiken at Harvard in 1937. He introduced a record of the data, which would later become the memory of the computers. Funded by IBM, the MARK I was introduced in 1944 and offered immediately to military authorities for its calculation power. All these machines were electromechanical. The introduction of vacuum tube technology (Atanasof and Berry, with its ABC of 1939) made it possible to create the first electronic calculators, as well as the digital representation of numbers, as opposed to the decimal.
The ENIAC of the Moore School of Pennsylvania, started in 1943 and perfected in its design by von Neumann in 1945, managed to integrate several technical improvements that emerged during the 1930s. It was built by Eckert, an engineer, Mauchly, a consultant, and Goldstine, in charge military of said project, which was classified as secret (project PX of the Office of Ballistic Material). The ENIAC had 17,648 vacuum tubes, 70,000 resistors, 10,000 capacities, 1,500 relays and 6,000 manual switches, making it a large and complex machine, whose operation required many technical skills. If a single tube was damaged, the calculation was interrupted and we had to start over. It cost a fortune, 500,000 dollars from that time, but it worked at great speed and was both programmable and universal, that is, applicable to various types of calculations. Its consumption of electricity and its emission of heat was enormous, so it had to be continuously cooled. After the incorporation of von Neumann to the equipment, the design of the apparatus improved a lot, as well as its automatism 115. Thus EDVAC emerged, direct heir of the ENIAC, and after it a saga of computers designed according to the “von Neumann architecture”. Funded by the North American Army, it can be considered as the first computer in the current sense of the term, and therefore as the initial paradigm of macromathematics. The main novelty was that the program that ordered the execution of the calculations was recorded in the same machine, that is, the original idea of what we now call software: “the new machine, contrary to its predecessors, no longer calculated: it was binary information, which allowed it, indirectly, to perform calculations “116. It can be said that, if the ENIAC was the canon of macromathematics, the EDVAC foreshadowed what we call technomathematics, insofar as it was a machine designed to process information , not only to make calculations 117. Hence the importance that we attribute to the ENIAC-EDVAC project to investigate the origin of macromathematics and techno-mathematics.
We will not expand on historical details, which are now perfectly accessible. From the ENIAC-EDVAC project, we are interested in emphasizing, on the one hand, its enormous size and complexity, on the other hand, its great efficiency for quickly computing trajectories of projectiles and shock waves and, of course, its military project character, with an important industrial and engineering component. . But we must not forget the deep scientific knowledge that von Neumann contributed, both in the field of physics and mathematics and in the emerging theories of computation, some of them linked to neurophysiology. Significantly, after the end of the world war, important divergences arose among the members of the team that had designed and built it. Eckert and Mauchly wanted to market the machine: in fact, they ended up founding UNIVAC. The Army built new, more powerful prototypes for military use. Von Neumann insisted on using it first of all for scientific research and devoted himself to giving lectures all over the world to make the invention known. The conflict ended up in courts and later in a tough commercial competition between IBM and UNIVAC. Therefore, already at the dawn of the techno-mathematical appeared many of the distinctive features we have pointed out, although here we will not study them in detail.
In subsequent decades, this “techno-thematising” trend continued to develop. Relatively complex branches of mathematics such as Algebra and Differential and Integral Calculus were absorbed by the technomathematics. Today there are numerous mathematical packages (Macsyma, Reduce, Mathematica, SPSS, etc.) that allow you to perform automatically operations that mathematicians took centuries to master, such as solving algebraic equations, differential calculus, resolution of integrals or the statistical distributions. The same is true of Geometry, since computers make it possible to trace and solve geometric figures much more easily and quickly than with classical techniques. New modalities of geometry have also emerged, such as the Turtle Geometry, which can be rigorously called technogeometries (or infogeometries). All that mathematical software is based on the mathematical theories themselves, but it considerably increases the ability to operate and, above all, generates new mathematical objects, for example fractals. Computers carry out many mathematical actions better than people, which does not imply that everything can be done by computers. Technological mathematics does not imply the disappearance of mathematics. What happens is that a new way of doing mathematics has appeared.
The examples abound: in Theory of Numbers a new branch has arisen, the Computational Number Theory, that has great utility for the cryptography and to approach some classic problems, like the Riemann conjecture. Many of the problems of Elementary Algebra can be addressed through Computer Algebra computer programs, which does not prevent further investigation of other algebraic structures with traditional methods. The same is true of Mathematical Analysis, an area in which there has been great progress in computerization, without it being exhaustive, much less. One of the most significant examples of technomathematics was the demonstration of the theorem of the four colors in Topology, mainly because it introduced radical changes in one of the most typical actions of mathematics: the action of demonstration, whose result is demonstration. An important part of this demonstration can only be carried out by means of the computer, so that the technological mediation also reached the demonstrations 118. On the other hand, despite the efforts that have been made in artificial intelligence for the automatic demonstration of theorems, This is far from being achieved, except in simple cases. However, investigations related to the automation of geometric demonstrations, for example, have brought important advances in other areas of technoscience, such as robotics, machine vision or solid geometry 119.
A third canon of technomathematics was the creation in the 80s of a new mathematical language, TEX, designed by Knuth and widely spread throughout the world. Nowadays, mathematicians write in some of the different variants of TEX, maintaining a computer language common to all of them. That technique of mathematical info-writing has come to be added to the various sign systems used by mathematicians, not to eliminate them. A fourth example is infographics (Sutherland, 1963) and many more could be mentioned. The history of techno-mathematics remains to be done, insofar as it does not fully coincide with the history of computer science, although both have arisen from the same embryo.
Influence not only occurs in one sense, from technologies over mathematics, but also in the opposite direction. The enormous development of computer algorithms, for example, has generated new mathematical theories: Algorithmics, Theory of Recursive Functions, Theory of Computational Complexity, Artificial Intelligence, etc. Not only are there computer technologies, but also computer science. Technoscience not only generates new technologies (such as Robotics), but also new sciences and new theories. It is one of the reasons to call it technoscience, not simply technology.
Although in principle the technological mathematics required large computer equipment, something that continues to happen (CRAY computers, interconnection of multiple computers through the Internet to investigate certain mathematical problems, etc.), it is no less true that the technological mathematics are currently developed with relatively computer equipment. little ones. Therefore, size being a distinctive feature between science and macro science, it is not the main one between science and technoscience. Much more important is the profound change that computer science has brought about in mathematical activity, part of which would be unfeasible today without that technological mediation, beginning with the action of writing and publishing. Throughout history, whenever a new mathematical formalism has arisen, changes have been enormous in almost all sciences. This is the case of the emergence of new computer formalism, which has been the main factor in the emergence of the mathematical-mathematical system, together with the profound transformations that the mathematical communities have undergone, part of which have become techno-mathematical companies. Cryptology and artificial intelligence are two of the canonical examples, but many others could be provided, such as Statistics itself, whose development, application and teaching are impossible without computer help today.
(b): Tecnoastronomy.
It is another of the great examples of technoscience, especially since it affects one of the oldest scientific disciplines, together with mathematics and medicine. Just as the Galileo telescope revolutionized 16th and 17th century astronomy, so new technologies of observation, computation and data representation have radically modified our conception of the cosmos and, moreover, astronomical research. Throughout the twentieth century there has been a profound revolution in astronomy, both from the theoretical point of view and from the praxeological perspective. In our view, it is a techno-scientific revolution, first of all aroused by the changes in astronomical practice, and more specifically by observation devices, which are nowadays enormous equipment that explores space from sidereal distances.
The first branch of astronomy that took the step towards macro-science was radio astronomy 120. However, we will focus on optical astronomy, and more specifically on the Hubble Space Telescope program, because it better illustrates the passage from astronomy to macroastronomy, and then to technoastronomy. The great telescopes (Wilson, Palomar, etc.) existed before the Second World War, and it can even be said that there have always been telescopes in the history of astronomy. The techno-astronomy of the Hubble project does not depend on the size or cost of the instruments, both of which are very large, but on a profound change in the research practice, as we shall see below. We are also interested in the fact that said macroproject was driven by “external” instances to the community of optical astronomers, who were very skeptical at first, if not critical 121.
The techno-scientific agent that drove the Hubble project since 1970 was NASA, the North American Scientific Agency specializing in space research. The project was hard debated for three years and finally approved by the White House and the US Congress, although its development until 1990 suffered many vicissitudes, and in particular a budget stop in June 1974. The reason invoked was that it was not one of the four projects selected as priorities by the National Academy of Sciences. Indeed, in 1972 the Astronomy Committee of the Academy of Sciences had not considered it urgent for the decade of the 70, relegating its realization to the 80s, and as a second priority. There were other alternative projects, such as the space probe to Jupiter (Galileo project), which was of particular interest to planetary astronomers. However, a lobby formed by NASA, the companies involved in the construction of the space telescope and some concrete astronomers (Bahcall, Schwarschild and Spitzer, in particular the latter), managed to overcome the skepticism of the majority of astronomers 122, agreeing on some modifications in the initial project. The House of Representatives had demanded international co-financing, at which time the European European Space Agency (ESA) entered. From the scientific point of view, the initial design was oriented to stellar and galactic astronomy, of great interest for cosmology. A technical change, the replacement of the photographic detector initially foreseen by another one that was sensitive to the red areas of the spectrum, allowed that the design of the Hubble was more suitable for the observation of the planets of the solar system, condition required by another committee of the Academy of Science. Subsequent pressures in favor of the Galileo Project made it necessary to seek a compromise solution again. As we will see in chapter 2, this is one of the ways in which technoscientific controversies develop: by struggling for the priorities of one or other macroprojects among the various scientific sub-communities, which seek allies in government agencies, parliamentarians, politicians, committees , etc., in order to take forward the initiatives that interest them.
The space telescope was started by NASA in 1977, hiring most of the work to American private companies. It was launched into space in 1990 and since then it has worked reasonably well. Since the project of a space telescope emerged in the 1960s, the Hubble project completely covers the transition stage from macroscience to technoscience in the field of optical astronomy. The estimated cost of the first project (1965) was one trillion dollars. The real cost was much higher.
The main objective of the space telescope was to avoid interference from the atmosphere for optical telescopes and increase the degree of precision of the observations. Optical astronomy, unlike radio astronomy, had always been limited to the visible area of the electromagnetic spectrum. The space telescope, in change, can observe in the range of the spectrum that ranges from 120 nanometers to 1 millimeter, greatly expanding the observational capacity of the discipline. It was an important technological improvement that allowed to expand a capacity for scientific action, observation. Although Hubble did not achieve the observational capacity for which it had been designed, due to the appearance of a little-studied phenomenon, the spherical aberration in the enormous lenses it was provided with, however, considerably improved optical astronomy, contributing positively to the development of cosmology. Numerous scientific theories have been contrasted thanks to Hubble. Despite this, the scientific community, with some exceptions, did not see at first the need to carry out such a large economic investment, since terrestrial telescopes in good atmospheric conditions could be more powerful, although they had less capacity for resolution. In summary, the epistemic expectations raised by the space telescope did not justify, in the opinion of the optical astronomers, the enormous investment or the disadvantages derived from this dependence on a single device, which would then be very difficult to improve technically, because it is in space , not on land. On the other hand, no scientific institution, however powerful, was able to assume the high cost of the operation. The leadership of NASA was absolutely necessary for the project to be carried out. Already in the design phases of Hubble, NASA decided to turn Hubble into a “national facility”, that is, put the many data that Hubble would get when it was available to all American astronomers, and not just a few. institutions. This decision made the cost of the project on the Federal Administration and NASA itself gravitate, but it contributed decisively to the Hubble project, then called Large Scale Telescopy, having greater acceptance among optical astronomers, who were promised large amounts of data. for future research, including planetary astronomers. Optical macro-astronomy, then in the design phase, promised to generate new knowledge, as long as the technology worked. The project began to have more followers, compared to the tradition of land-based and fixed telescopes. As Smith underlines, “in the early years of NASA, research in space astronomy was the subject of a small number of principal investigators and their associated teams, located in a university or laboratory” 123. The Hubble project radically modified this an atomized research culture, forcing the creation of research networks with universities and research centers interconnected through Hubble.
Obviously, NASA had to solve the problem of data transmission from space to land, for which the creation of telematic networks was essential. In a word, from the observatory located in a certain institution, we went to the observatory-network, with a large number of astronomers connected to Hubble to access the data. The computerization of astronomical research was also necessary, as well as the signing of collaboration contracts with NASA by the universities and astronomical observatories beneficiaries.
We verified with this that this macro-scientific project was becoming technoscience in the full sense of the term during the phase prior to its realization, that is, during the construction of Hubble. In its design phase in the 60s and early 70s, Hubble and the other projected space telescopes were only macroscience. As the project was being configured, new needs emerged, not only scientific or technological, but also financing, collaboration and, in particular, changes in the organization of the activity astronomical A whole research culture was transformed thanks to the Hubble project. When the telescope was launched into space, the community of optical astronomers had been radically transformed. He had become part of a techno-scientific company, led in this case by a Government Agency. Similar processes occurred in other sectors of astronomy, although here we are not going to deal with them.
Hubble has been decisive for the astronomical research of the late twentieth century, for having generated a lot of knowledge, both observational and theoretical. Verifications, checks and falsification of conjectures have been the order of the day since Hubble was launched and was operational in the 90s. But the important thing is that, before new knowledge emerged, scientific practice had been transformed radically This is one of the main theses that we maintain. There are many works of cosmology in which the Hubble Space Telescope is mentioned again and again as a decisive instrument for obtaining astronomical knowledge. On the other hand, studies on the previous change in the structure of astronomical research, which had been caused by this project long before the apparatus was operational, are scarce. The techno-scientific revolution in optical astronomy was driven by the project of the space telescope, not by its epistemic results. Once that revolution was realized, great theoretical changes emerged. When we talk about technoscience it is necessary to analyze first the changes in scientific practice, which are what characterize this new type of revolutions. Regardless of the effect that the data from Hubble have had for the alternative cosmological models that were in dispute at the end of the 20th century, the techno-scientific revolution had occurred before in that discipline. The implantation in optical astronomy of a new mode of production of scientific knowledge is the distinctive sign of techno-astronomy as opposed to traditional astronomy.
It should be emphasized that large techno-astronomical projects, such as Hubble, not only generate new observation instruments, but also require new transport, telecommunications and information processing systems. The lenses of the current astronomers (who are called astrophysicists) are not fixed, but mobile, and are transported thousands of kilometers from Earth’s space by space rockets. This allows to improve the observation and access to astronomical objects that were previously unobservable, as well as to detect new phenomena. For this it is essential that the data obtained by the space telescope be sent to Earth in a fully automated way and through telematic networks. There is no possible Hubble or exploration of planets and galaxies without advances in the field of computing and telecommunications. ICT is one of the requirements of techno-astronomy, and in general of techno-scientific research. Therefore, classical astronomical actions and the data obtained from them are completely mediated by the different technologies that allow them to be obtained and transmitted to terrestrial computers. We are again facing a clear example of technoscience, which has brought with it a huge theoretical development, not only technical. It must be said that a good part of contemporary astronomy has become a techno-astronomy and that the various cosmological theories proposed by theoretical physicists are all based on technodata or empirical techno-evidence. The notion of empirical evidence is technologically mediated, and this necessarily, as well as the technical-mathematical demonstrations. A new argument, this time epistemological and methodological, to support the distinction between science and technoscience.
We must also highlight the transdisciplinary nature of techno-astronomical research. The construction and operation of the techno-observatories depends on a multitude of scientific and technological disciplines, but the results that derive from such a project not only affect astronomy, but also other branches of science and engineering. The transdisciplinarity and the symbiosis between science and technology is one of the distinctive features of technoscience, as opposed to the disciplinary compartmentalization of the sciences and technologies of the Modern Era. Technoastronomy provides multiple examples of this, as do other technosciences. Suffice it to think that, under the influence of techno-astronomy, the term “geology” is no longer the most appropriate, since it is now possible to make “geological” studies of objects that are not Earth: the planets and their satellites, comets, the stars, etc.
Technoscience also leads to rethinking some classical philosophical problems. We will mention an extremely simple example, which we think is sufficiently illustrative. Suppose the statement “there is water on Mars”. Is true or false? To elucidate this issue, technoscience is essential, and in particular the Hubble project, since spacecraft have to be moved near Mars, eventually depositing robots on their surface, completely automate the action of observing, transmitting the data obtained to Earth. through telematic networks, etc. This done, the astronomers, who will have to know in depth the techniques of computer representation of the data transmitted by the Hubble, will call the chemists to verify the truth or falsity of the statement and, where appropriate, study the composition of the Martian water. , which will have extreme interest for the “marteólogos” and for many other scientific communities. A new sample of the transdisciplinarity of the techno-scientific researches and of the radical change that technoscience induces on the notion of “empirical knowledge”, thanks to the previous change of the scientific practice.
(c): Tecnophysics.
Physics was the scientific field where macro science first developed, with the various Radiation Laboratories, the Manhattan project and the construction of cyclotrons. It was also a pioneer in the restructuring of scientific activity. The macroprojects of the 40s and 50s had a strong industrial component and, in terms of the links with scientific policy, many prestigious physicists dedicated themselves to it and ended up becoming real professionals. Some Departments and Research Centers of Applied Physics were the first examples of industrialization and entrepreneurship of science. As a whole, it can be said that physics abounds in macro-science and technoscience examples, both in the US and in other countries. An in-depth study of macrophysics and techophysics during the twentieth century would require several books, so here we will limit ourselves to briefly mention some illustrative examples, leaving for further research a more detailed analysis of the technophysical revolution of the twentieth century. We will focus on the first era, macrophysics, for having been decisive in the change of structure suffered by scientific research at the time of the Second World War.
The Manhattan project is the main example, which is why we will focus on it. From a financial point of view, it was the first great macro project of the 20th century, second only to the great programs of space exploration. It is estimated that in the period 1942-45 the US invested 2 million dollars from that time in its development, that is, more than 100,000 million dollars to the value of this currency at the end of the century. It was a most secret military project. In its development collaborated theoretical physicists, experimentalists, chemists, mathematicians, engineers and numerous industries. Developed at a dizzying pace, it experienced important changes in function of the scientific discoveries that were made as it was progressing. From the beginning we worked on two projects, one aimed at the manufacture of a uranium or plutonium fission bomb, the other towards an implosion pump. At first, the fission bomb had the priority. In 1944 the plutonium bomb was given a higher priority and research began on thermonuclear pumps whose possibility had been suggested by Teller, one of the physicists involved in the project. The final results were very satisfactory for the promoters of the project and for many of those who joined it. Scientific knowledge advanced enormously and innovative technological developments arose: nuclear physics has generated a new source of energy, unknown until the twentieth century. Some companies became millionaires thanks to the Manhattan project. The US military scored an undoubted success, which has marked the strategies of the armies throughout the twentieth century: owning the atomic bomb has been the goal of all the great powers. In summary, from the perspective of the promoters of the project and of the various groups that actively participated in it, the results were very satisfactory.
The valuation of these results changes completely if we place ourselves outside the core of the macro-science. The human, social and ecological damage in Japan was immeasurable with what every other weapon of war had produced throughout history. The further development of nuclear weapons by the USSR led to the balance of terror, a situation that has not been unprecedented in history, given the magnitude of the disaster that could have produced a nuclear war. The moral and religious valuations of the bombings were clearly negative, but they did not have any incidence, not even to stop the development of the arms race. The Manhattan project is a clear example of the de facto primacy of other value systems, apart from ethical and religious values. Few examples are so clear to show that macroscience and technoscience generate deep conflicts of values. The Kuhnian notion of incommensurability between theories is irrelevant when analyzing this new form of contradiction, which occurs in practice and with terrible consequences for people, countries and the environment. As we will see in the next chapter, the Manhattan project is one of the canonical examples of the new techno-scientific paradigm. Never has the human being demonstrated such ability to transform the world, in this case destructively. The techno-scientific knowledge irrefutably showed its enormous potential by taking the destructive capacity to hitherto unsuspected levels.
It is important to remember that Los Alamos was a military institution in which some civilian scientists had great power. It was the first practical example of the effects that the social contract can have among politicians, scientists, engineers, industrialists and the military. Internally, the structure of the various departments and teams was strictly hierarchical. The Laboratory Director, Oppenheimer, had the power to transfer scientists from one team to another, depending on the priorities of the project. Within each team, scientists and engineers collaborated closely. There was a Governing Council and another one of Coordination between the different Departments, which at the beginning were four: Theoretical Division, Chemistry and Metallurgy Division, Experimental Physics Division and Engineering and Ordnance Division 124. By its own denomination, it was clear the military nature of the research, as well as the type of scientific-technological personnel involved. Groves and Oppenheimer followed from the beginning a pluralist strategy: although the line dedicated to fission was a priority, alternative lines of research were also supported, provided that they could lead to result of producing an atomic bomb that, if necessary, could be manufactured in series. For this second objective, plutonium seemed preferable to uranium, because it could be manufactured in a nuclear reactor, whose construction in Chicago was hastily entrusted to the private company Du Pont. This great work of engineering was crucial for the development of the project, because thanks to the construction of said nuclear reactor, the phenomenon of spontaneous and relatively frequent splitting of plutonium (once a month) was discovered, which became a new topic of scientific research. The industrial production of plutonium, necessary for the Manhattan project, made possible the study of a new physical fact, hitherto unknown. As L. Hoddeson states in commenting on this discovery, “this spontaneous fission experiment is one of the most important case studies in the history of physics, because it illustrates how a purely scientific result could change the course of history” 125. minimum, changed the priorities of the Manhattan project research. The small group dedicated to studying the implosion bomb went from five members to fifty in a few months.
As explosives experts (Kistiakowsky), fluid dynamics (von Neumann), computation (IBM, ENIAC) or spontaneous fission (Berkeley group, led by Segrè) were needed, they were immediately signed up for project 126. Meanwhile , chemists worked on the separation of plutonium 240. Another feature of the Manhattan project was the parallelism between different lines of research. When there were still important problems to solve (theoretical, instrumental, industrial production of plutonium, previous tests, etc.), the other teams continued their investigations independently. The coordination of the stages and of the foreseeable achievements was fundamental for the success of the project, as well as the flexibility when modifying the priorities and keeping alive alternative lines of investigation, in case any of them failed. The final objective, strictly military, prevailed over the convictions that the scientists involved in the project could have about the most accurate theoretical assumptions and about the apparently most promising lines. Any theory was valid, provided that there was a glimpse of possibilities to achieve the main objective. Another clear sign of subordination of the epistemic objectives of scientists to the main purposes of the project, as well as the instrumentalization of scientific knowledge for the achievement of a military objective.
On July 20, 1944, the Managing Board of the Manhattan project announced that, from that date, “all the priority had to be given to the implosion program; at the same time, nothing would be left of the alternative program “127. As a third priority, Oppenheimer authorized Teller to investigate the question of thermonuclear bombs. As a consequence of this decision, two new Divisions were created in the Manhattan Project: the G (gadget), dedicated exclusively to the theoretical problem of the implosion of plutonium, and the X (explosives and complementary investigations on the implosion). Some scientists and engineers were transferred from the previous Divisions to the new ones, but without eliminating any. The new priorities did not imply the abandonment of the previous ones, as has been usual in subsequent scientific policies. The weighting of the different lines of research through budget allocation and the allocation of equipment and human resources is the golden rule of techno-scientific rationality, in other words: scientific policies are structurally pluralistic, since they finance in parallel different lines of research, and even opposed. Effective evaluation criteria are evident when analyzing this type of indicators and strategies. This is one of the reasons why the axiology of science, based on indicators and evaluation protocols of the projects, constitutes one of the appropriate ways for the analysis of technoscientific activity.
From that date, many other scientific, technological and industrial contributions were produced. It should not be forgotten that, in addition to designing the bomb and demonstrating its theoretical possibility, it had to be built and tested 128. We will not go into these details, so as not to extend too much in the description of the Manhattan Project. What has been said up to now is enough for our objectives in this section. We are facing one of the great paradigms of the macroscience, with all the specificities that we have attributed to it in section I.4, apart from many others that are specific to the Manhattan Project. Building the pump was a matter of great technological, industrial and financial complexity, but the final technoscientific actions (Hiroshima and Nagasaki) would not have been possible without the strict dedication of great scientists to the project, coming from several disciplines. The plurality of agents needed is one of the most notable aspects of the Project, as well as the total primacy of a military objective, for which enormous financial, human, technological and industrial resources were mobilized. As Hoddeson stresses: “to solve the difficult and complex problem of implosion before the end of the Second World War, it was necessary to develop a new and powerful way of research, in which scientists, engineers, metallurgists and artisans worked closely together, appropriating and others from others’ toolboxes “129. To a greater or lesser degree, this is one of the typical characteristics of macrophysics projects.
From a methodological point of view, pluralism was also very considerable. The success of the Manhattan project can not be attributed to changes in theory (although there were some) or to new scientific methods. On the other hand, the radical transformation experienced by the scientific and technological practice throughout the project is a causal factor of its success, as those who have thoroughly investigated the development of it have underlined. Without the huge funding of the US Government, without the militarization of research, without the collaboration of large industrial companies, some of which had incorporated new methods of production and organization and without the strict discipline to which the scientists and scientists were subjected. the engineers, the atomic bomb could not have been manufactured in such a short period of time. The emergencies derived from the warlike activity were decisive for this first great example of macrophysics to be successful. Subsequently it became a canon of how to act in macro-scientific research. That is why we take it as one of the starting points of the techno-scientific revolution.
The analysis of other examples of macrophysics would lead us to similar conclusions, although, of course, with nuances and significant differences. The same could be said of the properly technophysical projects, such as the large particle accelerators (Brookhaven, CERN, etc.) 130. As we said earlier, a careful study of the development of macrophysics and its transition to technophysics would require much more space. broad and, in addition, the confluence of different types of analysis. The philosophy of science is not enough to study this type of case. In order to thoroughly analyze the changes in the structure of scientific practice, the collaboration of different experts in science and technology studies is required.
As a conclusion, and always as hypothesis to be empirically investigated, we will conclude that technologies and very diverse scientific disciplines intervene in technophysics, but practically always the computer technologies, as well as in the technomathematics and technoastronomy. The calculation of the critical mass of enriched uranium or plutonium needed to blow up an atomic bomb would not have been possible without the help of the computers provided by IBM and the new numerical calculation techniques provided by these machines, as well as the ENIAC in the final phase of the Manhattan project for simulations in fluid dynamics. The same applies to the calculation of projectile trajectories, the movements of particles in large accelerators and in general of nonlinear physical systems. The resolution of this type of problems was the main reason that led von Neumann to get personally involved in the ENIAC and Manhattan projects. The same could be said today of many other branches of physics: meteorology, wind tunnels, aeronautics, etc. But the clearest example is research in small particles, which depends entirely on the construction of large particle accelerators and the information technology essential to process the data. Having one of these technophysical laboratories is a necessary condition to investigate in this field and detect new particles. The same applies to current nanotechnologies, which are a hybrid between physics, molecular biology, engineering and information technology. It is no exaggeration to say that technophysics is the vanguard of research in physics, notwithstanding the fact that there are still theoretical physicists who, based on the technodata, construct concepts and propose laws according to traditional scientific methodology. The technophysics not only generates discoveries, also inventions and new theories. The important thing is that it generates them from a previous research practice that requires a deep hybridization between scientists and technologists, as well as the support of other technoscientific agents that have their own objectives and goals.
(d): Technochemistry.
Since the industrial revolution, chemistry has been closely linked to business activity. Therefore, it is not surprising that the first chemical macroprojects were developed by private companies, specifically the Du Pont Company. In order to diversify the sources from which technoscience comes, in the field of chemistry we will focus on the R & D policy deployed by this company throughout a good part of the 20th century, because it shows very well that the macrochemistry and macro-sciences can also arise thanks to private initiative. As Hounshell points out, the term Big Science usually refers to “scientific projects financed by the Government that involve massive expenditures on large equipment around which large teams of researchers work” 131. However, private companies have developed some macro-scientific projects according to their respective R & D policies. In the case of technoscience, it is the most common, since private investment in R & D exceeds public investment in the US since the 1980s. Therefore, it is convenient to analyze in a certain detail the way in which macro-science emerges in a private company.
The Du Pont Company created its first R & D laboratory in 1902, following the ideas of one of its founders, Pierre S. du Pont, for whom investments in basic research were part of its corporate strategy:
“In our Experimental Laboratory we should try to have at all times some research whose hope of success is very great, although in parallel they may have a high cost for their development, requiring prolonged research, even several years, as well as the use of considerable resources . I raise this policy for two reasons: first, because it will make it possible to have a group of well-trained people whose stable employment is insured. Second, and more important, because in this way the value of the Laboratory will eventually be much greater “132.
This business policy had as a paradigmatic result the invention of nylon in 1940, not only because its commercialization produced enormous benefits to the company, but above all because the organizational model that led to this discovery became canonical for Du Pont, as well as for the Manhattan project and other macroprojects in the 40s and 50s. Du Pont was called to collaborate with the Los Alamos project for this reason, attributing the important responsibility of directing the production of plutonium, which he did with great efficiency in the famous Clinton factory from the outskirts of Chicago. Therefore, we will focus on these two examples of macro-science, of the many that could be found in the Du Pont firm.
In the 30s, Du Pont was a company that intervened in very different businesses: paints, plastics, explosives, chemical products, synthetic ammonia, cellophane, etc. Charles Stine, the head of the central research office, created in 1927 in Wilmington, Delaware, a basic research group, arguing that it could be useful for several production sectors of the company at the same time. One of the scientists he signed was Wallace H. Carothers, a Harvard chemist, whom he put at the head of the polymer research group, with the explicit mandate to do basic research in chemistry. The initial team of Carothers was not very numerous (9 researchers), so we can not talk about polymer mega-science in the 30s. But the unexpected discovery by this group of neoprene, the first synthetic fiber, and especially nylon, a polyamide, greatly reinforced the basic research group. In 1934, the Du Pont R & D Department employed 850 scientists and engineers dedicated to basic and applied research. Bolton, the successor of Stine in the direction of the basic research laboratory, introduced a new organization in the research activity, which over time became the main organizational model of R & D in the company. This organizational change is what turned the small science and applied research into the industry that Du Pont promoted since the beginning of the century into an authentic macro-scientific organization, and with techno-scientific time.
First, the Department of fundamental research began to work closely with two other Departments of the company, oriented to applied research. This led to the link between scientists, engineers and marketing experts. In addition, Bolton created a steering group, which he named the Steering Committee, which brought together the leaders of the various investigative teams along with those responsible for the direction of the investigations. There were two weekly meetings and attendance was mandatory. The function of the Committee was to coordinate the investigation. Meetings were held to review the research carried out by each group, in which researchers or groups presented the results they were obtaining. They also organized the nylon project in parallel, without waiting for each group to have obtained the expected results to start up the other research teams. In summary, a coordinated research model was created, directed and continuously supervised by management, dividing the research into components, starting up all of them and planning the progressive syntheses and convergences between the respective results. The industrial plant for the manufacture of nylon was built when the investigation was still in progress. The same can be said of the studies carried out to launch the synthetic fiber to the market, which indirectly influenced the orientation that had to be given to the research activity. In total, the company spent more than 15 million dollars on the nylon project, an unusual amount for the time, because it exceeded that of some government departments. The commercial success of the launch, aimed exclusively at female bras, was enormous. From the 40s, Du Pont oriented its production towards other garments and objects, but the important thing was that it attributed the success of the nylon project to the close collaboration between scientists, engineers and marketing experts, as well as the management model of I + D that Bolton had designed.
The success of nylon contributed to the prestige of the company throughout the US and its R & D management model became canonical. In 1942, Arthur Compton contacted Du Pont to commission the design, construction and commissioning of a plutonium production plant, provided that the deadlines for this were minimal. Unlike uranium, plutonium could be produced in large quantities, which is why the designers of the Manhattan project always opted for two possible routes for the construction of atomic bombs, one for uranium and the other for plutonium. The efficiency of Du Pomt in fulfilling the order received was decisive for the development of the Manhattan project, as we saw above. The company inspired confidence for its long tradition in R & D, but above all for the organizational model it had put into operation for the nylon project.
It should be said that at this moment is when the company Du Pont is really involved in a macro-scientific project. The nylon project was a prelude to that. At the beginning it was a classic industrial research project. But the incorporation of basic scientists and the new organizational model transformed it into one of the great forerunners of privately financed technoscience. We can conclude, therefore, that the company Du Pont provided one of the distinctive features of technoscience, notwithstanding that its organizational model was modified and corrected in subsequent decades. The scientists who worked on it lost the traditional autonomy that characterizes academic science. The priorities, the concrete objectives and the deadlines to achieve them were given by the Committee that directed the investigation. Some of the members of this Committee were relevant scientists, but as R & D managers they assumed other values and priorities, apart from purely epistemic ones. This transformation is a constant in the passage from science to technoscience. In this case the strategies of the company prevailed, in others those of NASA or those of military institutions. The technoscience always implies a mixture between specialists with diverse formations and interests, as well as a pre-established scientific policy and new models of organization of the research activity.
(e): Tecnomedicine.
The relationships between medicine and biology have always been very close. In addition, a good part of the research in these two sciences has been based on the contributions of physics, chemistry, pharmacology, etc. In this section we will make brief allusions to some of the macro-scientific developments in medicine. Other aspects will be considered when we talk about technobiology.
The emergence of macrophysics at the time of the Second World War strongly influenced medicine, both in scientific and technological aspects. The development of nuclear physics induced the creation of physiological markers of radioactive phosphorus, which began to develop at the Radiation Laboratory of Lawrence in Berkeley. In general, radioisotopes supposed an important technological improvement in medicine, contributing to the appearance of a new discipline, nuclear (or atomic) medicine. In 1936 the first clinical uses of these new techniques were produced.
However, macromedicine itself emerged after the war as a derivation of the Manhattan Project. The Medical Division of this project put into operation several laboratories in the period 1942-45 (Chicago, Rochester, Berkeley, Columbia and Washington) in order to study the effects produced by the exposure to radiation emitted by radioactive materials, as well as the toxicity of the chemical materials that were required to process the uranium. After the war, the members of that Division, with the physicist Warren at the head, were clear that this line of investigation should continue. They also thought that nuclear medicine could bring an authentic revolution in biology and medicine. 133. Penicillin (1940) was the medical breakthrough of the Second World War, but the investigation of nuclear energy opened a wide and novel research field, that attracted physicists, chemists, doctors and biologists, with the indispensable collaboration of engineers and technicians. In 1948, Stanford Warren, who was Nobel Laureate in Medicine, led the development of the new specialty, occupying key positions in the various institutions that were created.
The Atomic Energy Commission took over from the Manhattan Project and maintained its interest in medicine. Warren advocated that all the discoveries that had occurred during the war in the field of medicine and biology cease to be secret. It also fostered the creation of research laboratories of the Faculties of Medicine, the connection with hospitals and the creation of a Radiobiology Society that will bring together the emerging scientific community. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) adopted the Warren plan and the Universities that had collaborated in the Medical Division of the Manhattan Project continued to receive funding similar to that of the war period, with other academic and hospital institutions joining the nascent radiobiology. This was one of the ways in which macromedicine and macrobiology emerged, directly influenced by the Manhattan project. The University of California at Los Angeles, for example, signed a contract (GEN-12) very important with the AEC in 1947, for an amount of $ 250,000 per year. This allowed boosting biophysics, radiology and nuclear medicine. Subsequently an Institute to investigate cancer was created. Overall, Warren was the promoter of a large multidisciplinary project and had the success of connecting it with teaching (Medical School) and with the clinic (Wadsworth Hospital, Birmingham Veterans Hospital), which allowed to train specialists in the new subjects and apply the new knowledge immediately. The same happened at Berkeley (Donner Foundation, specializing in cancer research), Rochester and other American universities.
According to the Bush Report, the new structuring of scientific activity came fully into medicine, both in the context of research and in the context of application and education. Obviously, this only happened at some universities, not at all. Emerging macromedicine coexisted with classical medicine, although not without conflicts when it came to apportioning the budgets of the National Health Institute. Overall, it can be said that macromedicine emerged in the US immediately after the Second World War and as an extension of the Manhattan project in times of peace. We thus verified the enormous importance that this project had when it came to restructuring the North American system of science and technology. Obviously, the industry collaborated actively in the task, manufacturing the new precise instruments. The interdisciplinarity of research is one of the aspects that stand out most in emerging macromedicine from 1946-47.
Another very important initiative was the Isotope Distribution Program, designed by the National Science Foundation and executed by the AEC. It was directed by Paul Aebersold for twenty years, moving the laboratories from Los Alamos to Oak Ridge, with the status of National Laboratory. The creation of this type of national facilities has characterized the scientific policy of the USA during the 20th century and, as we have already seen, constitutes one of the distinctive features of macro-science. In the case of large laboratories, very expensive in their construction and maintenance, the only way to make them profitable was to make them available to numerous universities and research centers. This requires sound management and, among other consequences, forces cooperation and coordination between teams that are scientifically competitive. The Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies was used by scientists from various disciplines, including biologists and physicians. The separation between the scientific communities was broken, since they collaborated in fact in multidisciplinary teams financed by the Government and its specific Agencies. This Institute is a good example of a macro-scientific industry, in this public case, whose functioning and organization is completely different from that of academic communities and laboratories. One of its objectives was to stimulate the industrial and medical uses of nuclear energy. 134. The aim was to disseminate the knowledge that had been obtained during the war and that which was still being obtained by basic and applied research laboratories, but not only through the classrooms and scientific publications, too, but transferring this knowledge to industries and hospitals, that is, in what we call the application context. The end of the war meant the return to normal academic activity in the US, but also the emergence of a new model of scientific practice, which had specific precedents before the war, but which now arose as a result of a pre-engineered scientific policy and systematic Although the autonomy of these macro-scientific industries was very large, behind them was the Federal Government, insofar as it had been involved in the task of promoting research and development.
Many other great examples of macromedicine could be mentioned, such as the war against cancer that the Nixon administration promoted in the 1960s, but the brief mentions that we have made can be enough to outline the main lines of change, which also occurred in the field of Medicine. Of course, new disciplines appeared and important scientific advances were also made. But in this work we are concerned only with the transformation of scientific practice, and this also happened in medicine. The first large companies specializing in radioisotopes (Tracerlab in Boston, Abbott Laboratories in North Chicago) were created in the late 1940s. The goal of scientific policy was not only to create knowledge, but also to generate industries and immediately apply scientific and technological advances in the improvement of the sanitary level of the country. If we analyzed only the progress in knowledge, we would understand only part of the objectives of post-war scientific policy. The Oak Ridge Institute manufactured radioisotopes (scientific factory) and then distributed them freely to relevant scientific, industrial and hospital agents at a rate of $ 300,000 per year (1949). It also trained experts in radioisotopes, contributing to the dissemination of knowledge and the creation of a community of professionals, who were then to be inserted in industries, hospitals and research centers throughout the country. Subsequently, the acquisition of radioisotopes was subsidized, as the industrial sector grew. The Oak Ridge Center functioned as a knowledge factory, but also as an engine in the health macro science sector, within the North American S & T system.
The Atomic Medicine Program, which had funds of 500,000 dollars per year, was decisive for the emergence of industrialized macromedicine. The 12 units of radioisotopes of 1949 became 33 in 1953. A medium laboratory had a considerable area (between 1200 and 3000 square feet) and a good part of them were in hospitals. The important thing is that these laboratories were coordinated with each other through Oak Ridge, since this Center was the matrix of all of them. Medical laboratories were transformed throughout the country, according to a new laboratory model designed by experts in scientific policy, built by industrialists and used by scientists and technicians.
The privatization of laboratories and hospitals, together with computerization and other factors, subsequently transformed macromedicine, converting it into a technomedicine. In this work we will not deal with this new phase, leaving it open to further investigations.
(f): Technobiology.
When we talked about technomedicine, we saw that the first developments of macrobiology arose as a consequence of the Manhattan project. However, the great biological macroproject is the Human Genome, which was launched in the 90s. It is a properly techno-scientific project, in the sense that we give to this term, and therefore we will consider it as the canon of the technobiology. Before commenting, however, it is worth mentioning the transformations experienced by biology in the 50s, and specifically genetics. At that time, technobiology began, although not with the scale it acquired at the end of the 20th century.
The change in biology does not come from macrophysics, but from what we have called technomatemática. During the war, the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) had funded projects on computational issues of interest to ballistics. Norbert Wiener collaborated on these projects. From this arose his first proposals on servomechanisms and physiological homeostasis, made jointly with Bigelow and Rosenbleuth. In the final stage of the war, Wiener and von Neumann promoted studies on digital automatic control, which later became the origin of cybernetics 135. Both worked in biology as of 1945, starting from a computational model: machines that self-reproduce. The biomedical community with which von Neumann came into contact encouraged him to develop these models as a heuristic tool to investigate genetic actions. In 1948, Wiener published his famous book Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the Animal and Machine, in which automatons and biological organisms were compared. Wiener agreed with von Neumann in thinking that amino acids make up protein chains through combinatorial procedures and applied mathematical models to the reproduction of genes and viruses. Both introduced a new paradigm in genetics, in the Kuhnian sense of the term.
That same year, Claude Shannon published an important article on his mathematical theory of communication and the following year he disseminated those ideas in collaboration with Warren Weaver, director of the Rockefeller’s Foundation Natural Science Division and the molecular biology program of the Foundation. Shannon was involved in questions of cryptanalysis and code theory, and introduced concepts such as redundancy and binary coding, always in the field of communication between machines. As a result, cryptology and electronic computers (specifically MANIAC, continuation of von Neumann’s EDVAC) began to be used to analyze genetic codes. Altogether, the impact of the ideas of Wiener, von Neumann and Shannon was enormous, to the point that genes began to be considered as biological machines that communicate with each other using encrypted codes, and not only as biochemical organisms. The notion of genetic code was widely accepted and used, as well as the computational methods to investigate and decipher it. Henry Quastler took on the task of rethinking biology as an information science. His writings were highly commented, so that when Quastler organized a major symposium on Information Theory in Biology at the Control Systems Laboratory at Brookhaven (1952), the new paradigm found an emerging scientific community to develop it. Quastler proposed estimates of the amount of information that exists in a human organism (5×1025) and from this he calculated that the genetic description of a human being could contain 5×1021 pages of information. What he called the genome catalog would have about a million bits.
In short, just before Watson and Crick published in 1953 his famous article on the double helix of DNA, a new paradigm had been installed in the field of biology, and more specifically in genetics. The discovery of the double helix by Watson and Crick was typically scientific, based on observing photographs of which Watson inferred the existence of helical structures in the genes. However, prior to this, a new paradigm had been established in genetics, which required the use of powerful computing tools when investigating, given the magnitude of the magnitudes of information considered. In addition, the new paradigm transferred to biology a series of concepts from computing sciences and the theory of artificial systems. The current genetics is not only based on the double helix, but also on the notion of genetic code and derived concepts. Therefore, we affirm that, unlike Mendelian genetics, the genetics of the second half of the 20th century had a strong techno-scientific component, which was further reinforced with the introduction of recombinant DNA techniques and, above all, with the Genome project Human.
In the 50s there was an authentic proliferation of combinatorial models, all proposed in order to decipher the genetic code, a notion that by then had been fully consolidated among researchers. Crick himself, modifying a proposal by George Gamow (diamond code), proposed in 1956 the famous code without commas, which subsequently proved inadequate. Teller suggested a sequential code. And other scientists (biologists, physicists, mathematicians, engineers, etc.) proposed other models. The central problem of genetics at that time was to investigate the transfer of information from nucleic acids to proteins, always starting from the hypothesis of coding and resorting to the most powerful computers of the time for empirical research, given the magnitude of bits that were handled. For its part, Watson began to talk about inter-bacterial information, for example, expanding the new paradigm to other fields of biology, apart from genes. The new infobiological (or info-genetic) paradigm advanced rapidly in the 1950s, attracting the best researchers, always in collaboration with mathematicians, engineers and computer scientists. Do not forget that in his seminal article of 1953, Watson and Crick already said clearly that:
“It follows that in a long molecule many permutations are possible and therefore it would seem that precisely the sequence of bases is the code that translates the genetic information” 136.
This stage supposed the emergence of computational biology, one of the most important technobiology modalities. An in-depth study of it would provide data of great interest, but with what has been said so far is enough as a first introduction. Of course, parallel biochemical investigations continued. But the infobiologists, so to speak, had constituted a new community, which can be described as techno-scientific, according to the distinctive features that we have pointed out in the previous sections. Some of these investigations were supported by military institutions, as well as by companies.
The Human Genome Project is a continuation of this line of research, although in the midst there were relevant contributions, to which we will not refer, for the sake of brevity 137. By the end of 1966 the entire genetic code had been deciphered and could be closed the first stage of informational or computational genetics.
The origin of the Human Genome Project (HGP) has to do with the relative success of the war against cancer program promoted by the Nixon administration in the 1940s. In 1986, the Italian Nobel Prize winner Renato Dulbecco published an article in Nature stating that there was to change strategy, promoting a large-scale research program instead of the gradual approaches that were being made. That is to say, he proposed a macroprogram of genetic research, which, as he said:
“In importance it would be comparable to the conquest of space and should be undertaken with the same mentality. And it would be even better if it were an international company, because the sequence of human DNA is the reality of our species and everything that happens in the world depends on its sequence “138.
Independently of the genetic determinism that underlies this proposal, and which constitutes one of the main conflicting points of the HGP, Delbecco’s proposal was well received. It transferred some postulates of the macroscience to the genetics. Not in vain the Genome Project is often called “the Manhattan Project of Biology”. On the other hand, the North American Department of Energy revolved at that time to a similar idea, through the Director of the Office of Health and Environmental Research of said Department (DOE, as of now). Indeed, Charles de Lisi had organized a small symposium on the subject in March 1986, in which the idea was accepted, but it was questioned whether the DOE was the appropriate agency to promote such a project. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) was an obvious candidate to do so. There were also private companies that caressed similar ideas, such as the Genoma Corporation, although it had to renounce the project because it did not find sufficient capital. Private financing was not large enough to undertake macroprojects, although smaller techno-scientific projects. Incidentally, we note with this an important difference between the simultaneity of discoveries in modern science and in technoscience. In the latter case, the most frequent is that two or more techno-scientific companies (public or private) simultaneously imagine or design alternative research projects on the same subject, not that a fact is discovered simultaneously in a laboratory. In technoscience companies compete with each other and the key point is to start the projects at the right time, in addition to finding the right financing for it. The design of the projects is of fundamental importance when it comes to obtaining acceptance and support. Hence the importance of techno-scientific pre-actions, that is, the design and planning of what is intended to be carried out. It is assumed that, once a project like the HGP has been started, the scientific facts will emerge in addition.
Since within the Government Agencies there were at least two willing to undertake the HGP, the DOE and the NIH, the National Science Foundation mediated, creating a special Commission to study and design a possible Genome Project, as well as the institutions that could take it to cape. This Commission advised that it be an international project, although led by the United States. Instead of sequencing the DNA, which was extremely expensive, at least until important technological advances were made, the Commission proposed to first map the human genome, as well as characterize the genomes of other organisms (mouse, fruit fly and some yeasts and bacteria). At the same time, research had to be financed to improve the technologies that would allow for cheaper sequencing 139. On the other hand, there was no pronouncement on the Agency that could be responsible for the project, the DOE or the NIH. Congress approved the initiative in principle, so the DOE and the NIH went on to budget it. Two government agencies competed before Congress to achieve the concession of a macroproject for research, in the same way that university teams and research companies compete with each other in public calls for scientific policy. The DOE’s first budget (1988) came to 12 million dollars. But the Director of the NIH, James Wyngaarden, considered that some 50 million were required so that the objectives could be truly fulfilled. This gave more reliability to the second project, after the corresponding evaluation. The final endowment of the project was 3,000 million dollars for several years. The subsequent problem was to find a person with sufficient prestige and political capacity to manage a project of such magnitude. In the end, James Watson was appointed Director of the HGP, a position he held from 1988 to 1992, date on which he resigned, due to strong dissensions with the new Director of the NIH.
This appointment is of great interest to us, for several reasons. In the first place, because it confirms the idea that prestigious scientists are essential for techno-scientific companies when it comes to directing macro-projects. However, these scientists are not asked to contribute theories or to investigate in laboratories. What they demand is that they manage the project, design strategies and, above all, have good relations with various scientific-technological communities and with experts in scientific policy. If, in addition, your image inspires confidence in the public and potential investors, so much the better. Scientific merits are necessary, but they are not enough to be placed in this new scenario of technoscience: the management of a macro research project. This type of selection process is based on several value systems and manifests the effective values of technoscience.
Secondly, one of Watson’s first decisions was that 5% of the HGP would be dedicated to investigating the ethical, legal and social repercussions of the new project. As we will see in chapter 5, this decision implies the explicit recognition that social, legal and moral values are also relevant in macro-scientific research, at least to study its consequences, something that would have been unthinkable at the time of the Second World War. , when values and military objectives prevailed over any others, including economic ones. Thus arose the ELSI subprogram (Ethical, Legal and Social Implications), which has had great importance as a model to follow in scientific policy. Even if peripherally (5%), legal, moral and social issues began to have a certain presence in the design of the macroprojects.
Third, a new research center was created to develop the program: the National Center for Human Genome Research, following the Bush model of scientific policy, but in this case with Watson at the head. There are no great techno-scientific actions without new institutional or business agents, which are inserted into the national systems of science and technology. In this case, the project went beyond national borders, since important centers in the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Japan decided to collaborate with NCHGR, providing funding, human resources and equipment, among other things. The coordination of the project was international, which made telematic networks indispensable to interconnect the various participants in the techno-scientific consortium. The New Center was designed as a laboratory-network, in the sense that we have attributed to this term in section II.2.
Fourth, a strong conflict of values between the Scientific Director of the Project, Watson, and the financial and political management (represented by Bernardine Healy, appointed Director of the NIH by George Bush in April 1991), eventually forced the resignation of Watson:
“Healy had strongly supported the controversial decision of the NIH to apply for the patent of the hundreds of gene fragments identified by its scientist Craig Venter, if only for the patent office to be defined on the possibility of patenting genes without any known function. Watson censored Venter’s investigation and was very outraged by Healy’s decision to go ahead with the patent application. To make matters worse, Healy asked Venter to advise her on the future of human genome research at the NIH while telling Watson to refrain from expressing more criticism in public “140.
Already in this first skirmish of the PGH we can verify that it is not enough to be a great scientist to be a good scientific manager. The appropriation of knowledge, in this genetic case, is part of the structure of technoscience, unlike science, in which knowledge is a common good that is made public, with exceptions. Even working for the NIH, Venter represented the technoscientific entrepreneur who later came to be when founding Genome Celerics and defended business values alongside traditional values of science, such as knowledge advertising. The map of the genome, and especially its subsequent sequencing, is not only an epistemic good. In the era of technobiology, first of all it is an economic good, or to put it more clearly, a new form of capital. The Reagan administration had already decided in the previous decade that the government should be replaced by the private initiative to lead scientific research, whenever possible. It is not surprising that the Bush administration retakes that policy, despite the enormous national and international prestige of Watson.
Watson was succeeded by Francis Collins, although Venter was increasing his prestige. Starting in 1986, he introduced the automatic sequencing method, using one of the few then existing sequencing machines, which allowed the analysis of hundreds of genes at the same time, while the other researchers studied them one by one. a decisive step towards the conversion of genetics into technogenetics. As of that date, all the investigations of Venter had great computer equipment. In 1991, Venter and Adams conceived a new method of sequence, the EST (expressed sequence tag), which opened the controversy of patents in the PGH. Craig Venter culminated his career in 1998, when he informed Collins, Watson’s successor, that he was going to create a new company that would sequence the genome before 2005, the date initially planned for the PGH project. For this, I was going to resort to a new sequencing technique, to hundreds of sequencing machines and to one of the most powerful supercomputers. This purpose was publicized in the press, in order to attract funding. The creation of Celera Genomics forced PGH to increase its funds in order to compete with Venter in the techno-scientific career. For two years, the technogenetic contest took place in laboratories, financial offices and the media. The mediation of President Clinton put an end to this “techno-scientific controversy”, with both teams reaching a pact in June 2000. In the end, the public and private teams were able to announce 2002 the culmination of the work.
However, Celera Genomics had introduced important novelties in the research practice, which were quickly imitated by other technobiology companies. Apart from those already mentioned (patents, mass use of computers, communication campaigns in the mass media, etc.), there is a derivation that we are interested in highlighting, because it illustrates very well the link between technoscience and the economy of information and knowledge .
In 1992, Reid Adler, Director of the Office of Technology Transfer of the NIH, had attempted to patent the first 2,500 partial gene sequences obtained with the EST method. After a great controversy around the world, in which Vice President Al Gore intervened (apart from John Watson, of course), the US Patent Office rejected the request, largely because it tried to patent not only the partial sequences, but also the underlying genes, many of which were still to be identified. After a second attempt with 4448 EST, the NIH declined to request more patents. By then, Venter had stopped working for the NIH, because a request from him for a $ 10 million research project had been rejected. He went on to direct the Institute for Genomic Research (TIGR), a non-profit organization funded with $ 70 million by a sponsor, Wallace Steinberg. The Institute was equipped with 30 ABI 373A automatic sequencers, 17 ABI Catalyst stations and a relational database installed on a high-powered Sun SPARC Center 2000 computer. The immediate objective was to multiply the EST production rate by 10, which is why the Institute became a great techno-scientific factory, with the peculiarity that it only produced sequences, that is, information. In the long term, the scientific goal was to investigate evolution by comparing the sequences of the different species. It was, therefore, a strictly infogenetic macroproject, where all the instruments were information and communication technologies. Therefore, we will consider the TIGR as the main canon of technobiological enterprise of the late twentieth century.
But the news did not end there. To recover his investment, Steinberg created a company associated with the Institute, Human Genome Sciences (HGS), and gave 10% of the shares to Venter, for having co-founded it. The subsequent success of TIGR among scientists, and the parallel business success of HGS, made Venter one of the first scientists to become billionaires. The technogenetic research could not only be profitable for the entrepreneurs who financed it, but also for the researchers themselves.
Beginning in 1993, HGS became a pharmaceutical company. Its strategy was to sell the access to the EST database to companies in the sector. In May 1993, a British company (SmithKline-Beecham) paid $ 125 million for 7% of the shares of HGS along with the exclusive right to market the ETS. The scientific knowledge of the TIGR database had become pure and hard capital, which began to be highly profitable for Steinberg and Venter. The latter and the President of HGS, Haseltine, came to occupy the cover of Business Week magazine: a way of doing business with scientific knowledge had emerged. The relational database of the TIGR became a real mine of knowledge, which was generated by Venter and his team of scientists with the help of new computer equipment, increasingly powerful. The techno-scientific revolution in Biology thus found one of its most outstanding examples, in the Kuhnian sense of the term. The scientific practice was radically transformed, because research was superimposed on a novel and profitable business strategy.
The scientists received this change with significant samples of rejection, but similar companies began to proliferate around the world and there was no shortage of researchers working on them. Venter himself ended up founding his own company, as we saw. In any case, it can be said that the most radical transformation of the structure of scientific practice in biology occurred in the 90s in the TIGR, being Craig Venter and his partners who led that techno-scientific revolution in biology.
There would be many more questions to discuss, but we have already expanded sufficiently on the PGH and its subsequent privatization as HGS, and subsequently as Genome Celerics.
To summarize this first analysis on the emergence of technobiology, we will say that informatics and the disciplines that emerged from computing sciences have played a very important role in the transformation of biology, and in particular of genetics. The sequencing of genes is primarily a technological operation, which requires considerable means and technical skills. The data obtained (the map of the human genome, for example) are strictly computerized, so that they can only be represented with the help of powerful computers. The enterpriseization of the research activity is very common in genetics. On the other hand, we have verified that the Genome Project ended up generating authentic knowledge banks, which produced considerable economic benefits. On the whole, also in the case of biology, it can be said that at the end of the 20th century a technobiology with a strong computer and business imprint emerged. The advances in knowledge that it has raised are undoubted, but it is also evident the profound transformation of the scientific practice that has taken place throughout the second half of the 20th century, and above all in its final decade.
(g): Technogeology.
Observation satellites and computer technologies have profoundly modified the way of making the geological planes of the Earth, the Moon or Mars, completely transforming geological knowledge and practice. Some observation instruments allow the detection of concrete objects or substances several meters deep. The traditional probes were mechanical, the current ones are telematic. Once again, this is a clear example of technoscience.
In this case, too, computer technology plays a basic role, for example, using three-dimensional representation techniques. We will limit ourselves to mentioning how the geologists themselves conceived this technogeological, or infogeological, revolution, as it could also be called: “At present, geologists are participating in a technical revolution that has greatly expanded the possibilities of visualization and scientific interpretation through use of sophisticated techniques of three-dimensional presentations “142. These techniques are essential to simulate geological processes, that is, to represent computer science knowledge. It should be noted that this type of technology has been strongly promoted by oil companies, obviously interested in the advancement of technobiology and technobiology. The research departments of these companies usually use the most powerful computers on the market (CRAY I and II, etc.), so in this case we can also say that technobiology has been widely developed in the last quarter of the 20th century. Even so, experts in the field affirm that “one of the axioms of computer simulation processes is that computers never provide the computing power that would satisfy the needs of geologists” 143. Having large computer equipment is a necessary condition for research in geology and to apply this knowledge to the petroleum industry.
The new information and telecommunication technologies are also used for geological remote sensing and for the simulation of the great cataclysms that occur in the terrestrial globe: volcanoes, earthquakes, tidal waves, etc. The same can be said of marine geology, whose progress is closely linked to new technologies. On the whole, technogeology has developed enormously in recent decades, which does not prevent the existence of classical geology, based on the traditional methods of technoscience. Also in this case it is necessary to distinguish between geology and technogeology, without prejudice to the fact that both have a common juncture, because the second comes from the first. The synthesis between science and technology constitutes, in this case, the most outstanding note. But it is also observed the close connection with the big companies, in particular the oil companies.
(h): Social technosciences.
The application of statistics completely transformed sociology, which became a strictly empirical discipline. The important thing is to emphasize that also in this case, given the complexity of societies, technology is an essential requirement to obtain empirical data, as well as to process them, store them, compare them with each other, etc. Opinion polls are a good example of what we say, as well as the elaboration of censuses. The use of automated optical readers to process the raw data shows again that in the case of sociology, obtaining empirical data would be impossible without recourse to various technological tools. The same applies in the case of the economy, whose researchers resort again and again to computer simulations to model the situation of the economy in the different countries. Nowadays it is impossible to have a representation of the economic state of a country without resorting to the tools that allow the processing of data and the elaboration of simulations to make prognosis on the economic evolution.
The examples could be multiplied, but it is not worth dwelling on. We understand that this brief tour of various sciences (natural and social) sufficiently illustrates the emergence of technoscience and, in many cases, its relevance within each specific discipline. Note that in all these cases the computer plays an important role, notwithstanding that other technologies also intervene. That is why we say that informatics is the formalism of technoscience, to the way in which mathematics was the main formalism of modern science. The science wrote the empirical data, the technoscience the infoescribe. The processing and transmission of these data is also carried out via computer and telematic means, as well as the presentation of the results obtained from them. Scientific visualization techniques, on the other hand, allow converting these data into images and scientific models. The construction of scientific models, usually mathematized, has been one of the distinguishing characteristics of the knowledge of scientific knowledge. From these models hypotheses were issued and empirical contrasts were carried out. In the case of technoscience, this type of model is not enough and it is necessary to resort to computer models, whose management requires specific technological equipment and skills. That is why the techno-scientific research teams have to be composed of scientists and technologists. To carry out these investigations, both types of knowledge are required. It is another reason we argue to talk about technoscience, and not just about science.
As a conclusion of this section, we will say that the test of specific technosciences offers satisfactory results. Although not all science has become technoscience, it can be said that in all sciences the emergence of this new form of science has taken place. The many distinctive features that we have proposed in sections II.1 and II.2 are in principle worth distinguishing science from technoscience. In the rest of this book we will take them as starting points for our inquiry.
Chapter III
The techno-scientific revolutions
III.1: The Kuhnian conception of scientific revolution.
Kuhn’s work has had a great influence, above all in philosophy, history and sociology of scientific knowledge. In this chapter we will start with your proposals, in order to examine them critically in the light of the changes experienced by science in the second half of the 20th century. According to Kuhn, “the essential characteristic of scientific revolutions is their alteration of the knowledge of the intrinsic nature of language itself” 144. The techno-scientific revolutions to which we are going to refer do not fall under that characterization, neither in regard to knowledge, nor to nature, or language. Contrary to Kuhn, we will keep the techno-scientific revolutions:
1.- They do not alter only the knowledge, but above all the scientific and technological practice. Knowledge is one of the results of techno-scientific actions, not the only, or sometimes the most important. On the other hand, there is no techno-scientific knowledge without previous actions, so it is convenient to analyze the actions first. During the twentieth century, the main scientific theories have continued to be accepted. Except in some sciences (cosmology, genetics, etc.), there has been no crisis of the main paradigms. However, another type of transformation has taken place, affecting primarily scientific practice: the emergence of macro-sciences and technosciences. To explain this transformation, traditional epistemology is insufficient, including the Kuhnian epistemology. The techno-scientific revolutions are praxiological, not epistemological or methodological. Although they generate new theories and new scientific disciplines, this is an effect derived from the great transformation in the structure of scientific activity.
2.- The technosciences modify the social world, not only nature. The main thing is the transformation of the world they produce, and in particular of the social world. Scientific knowledge is a means to modify the correlation of forces in a war, to obtain economic benefits in the market, to improve the health of a country, etc. This transformation is achieved by developing (R & D) the results of scientific and technological research through companies, military organizations, political institutions, etc., which are the ones that produce social transformation by basing their actions and strategies on the results of the technoscience The epistemological changes provoked by techno-scientific revolutions are instrumental. If they do not generate technological development and innovation, they are not techno-scientific changes, but only scientific ones. Technoscience does not follow the Baconian program, knowing nature well to be able to master it better, but it is oriented towards transformation, control and in some cases the domination of societies and human beings. Technoscience is a new form of power, which is embodied in the organization of science and technology systems in different countries. Therefore, it is closely linked to political, economic and military power.
3.- The techno-scientific revolutions involve a profound change in the scientific and technological language, but this transformation does not concern the relations of meaning between language and nature, which are what Kuhn worried about. According to him, scientific revolutions “alter the language with which nature is described” 145. It is about what Kuhn had called in many of his writings “change of meaning” and that in the essay What are scientific revolutions? he again characterized as “a change in the way in which words and phrases relate to nature, that is, a change in the way in which their referents are determined” 146.
Later we will indicate more differences between scientific and techno-scientific revolutions. For the moment, we will dwell on the question of language, where our opposition to Kuhn is based on a very important nuance, which should be made clear.
When Kuhn refers to scientific language, think of a referential relationship between words and nature. The problem that occupied him most was that of scientific concepts and their changes in meaning when scientific revolutions occur, as well as the appearance of new concepts. In the case of techno-scientific revolutions, new languages also emerge: the computer languages of each discipline. But the function of these languages is not that of natural languages or that of scientific languages (theoretical terms, observational terms, statements of laws, formulation of explanatory hypotheses, etc.). Although they may refer to things and objects, this is secondary.
First of all, computer languages order actions. A programming language is based on commands for a machine to carry out certain actions when a series of previously fixed conditions are met. Said more intuitively: when we press a computer keyboard, a mouse or a touch screen, we order that a previously programmed machine executes an action that we want to carry out. If the resulting action is not as expected, or we have wrong to operate, or the machine does not work well or is not well scheduled. In techno-scientific actions, mistakes, blunders and mistakes are of paramount importance. These are technical errors that radically affect the results obtained. Therefore, the first thing to check is that the machines work well and that the actions have been well carried out. The correction of the actions is a necessary condition, although not sufficient, of the validity of the results. At a later stage, these results (data, images, models, simulations) must be compared with the world. In this second stage we enter the field of semantics and relations of signification, typical of science. But in the case of technoscience, technical mediation is essential, as well as the correction of actions, both when they are performed and, above all, in their previous design. That is why we are facing a new form of science, technoscience, where the first is the correction, control and verification of technical actions by an expert and then performed by an operator, or sometimes by a machine, when the design involves automatism. Semantic issues are relevant in technoscience, but the design, adaptation and correct execution of actions is a prior and different problem to that studied by Kuhn. To put it in terms of Hacking, first we intervene, then we represent 147. By reducing philosophy to the problem of linguistic and conceptual representations of knowledge we are forgetting what we have done previously to obtain the data we represent.
From the above, important philosophical consequences derive. In the first place, there are no techno-scientific facts without previous actions. The facts are not given by nature, are not offered to our immediate experience, arousing our curiosity. On the contrary, they must be obtained after deploying enormous observation and experimentation devices, which must work well. For example, when physicists use a particle accelerator, they carefully design the experiments they will perform. These experiments are very expensive and therefore have to be projected with care and precision. If, after having carried out a concrete experiment, it is believed to have discovered a new elementary particle, its existence is always inferred from the data offered by the accelerator and the other instruments that implement it. Any error of the devices or operators, however minimal, completely invalidates the experiment. Therefore, techno-scientific research involves continuous controls, repetitions, checks that there were no errors, etc. It is a necessary condition to continue, which does not guarantee success, but whose absence ensures failure. Once the correctness of the design and the execution has been verified, the data obtained by the accelerator become scientific facts, after repeating the experiment and subsequent verification by other operators. From there the classic scientific methodology can be applied, elaborating hypotheses, interpreting the facts, trying to explain them (or even predict them), formulating laws, etc. But those semantic and epistemological questions are empty words if a small error is discovered in some action, or a malfunction of the devices, or some unforeseen factor in the design of the experiment. These prior technical demands raise important philosophical questions, for example the need to have a theory of correct action, not just justified or valid knowledge. The history of science is plagued with false facts, derived from incorrect actions on the part of the experimenters, including the inadequate design of the experiments.
It is also necessary to compare the actions planned and those actually carried out, to see the degree of adequacy between them. In this case we are facing a problem of correpondence and adaptation between actions, which has nothing to do with the truth as an adaptation of the classical philosophers, but with the problem of intercorrespondence between actions independently of the operator that carries them out. When researching scientifically, different operators repeat the same actions over and over again, sometimes with different devices, being able to obtain slightly different results among them, as is frequent. All these problems are praxiological and, of course, prior to the epistemological problems that later, because technoscience is a form of science, are also aroused. We will say therefore that the notion of truth as correspondence, typical of modern science, is subordinated to the previous correction of actions. We will see later that, in Kuhnian terms, the most serious problem of technoscience consists in the incommensurability between the practices of some operators and others, especially if this incompatibility is produced by machines built by rival techno-scientific companies. In such cases, the first problem is the reliability of the instruments. Some of these technical antinomies already arose in modern science 148, but with the emergence of technoscience they have become pre-solving issues before addressing semantic problems. The technological systems that support scientific research today are so complex that the control of actions and instruments is absolutely essential if we want to accept a certain result as a scientific fact.
In the techno-scientific revolutions there is a radical change in language. Infolanguages or computer languages are one of the distinctive features of technosciences. We operate with computers and other techno-scientific devices producing signal changes (data, images, sounds, etc.). This is where computer languages intervene, to mention only the canonical techno-scientific language. The same happens when it is not the human being that acts, but the changes of state in the systems studied are detected by the machines (detectors, sensors, robots, search engines, automatic translators, space probes, satellites, etc.), causing automatically the actions of the devices. Then, and as an effect of these actions, we will have images or data of various objects (natural, social, artificial) in the various screens and data records. We will be in a referential or meaningful relationship again. But, when this happens, we are no longer using the info-language. We use it when pressing the key, clicking with the mouse or operating the remote control. Before we get to use natural or scientific languages, we have already carried out technological actions based on programming languages. Technolanguages, to put it generically, are an indispensable requirement for technoscientific actions to take place. Even the natural and scientific languages themselves (descriptive, referential, significant, etc.) are transformed by the influence of technosciences, becoming technolanguages. On the other hand, new techno-languages emerge, unknown before the techno-scientific revolution: the TEX of mathematicians, scientific visualization and genetic info-languages are good examples, as we saw in section II.3. The latter are codes and the important thing is the syntax, not the semantics.
In short, and not to dwell too much on this point, the techno-scientific revolutions involve a very important change of language, and in this we agree with Kuhn. But technolanguages are not referential and do not refer to nature, at least in the first instance. The references of the computer languages are not natural objects, but info-objects. The data and the hypothesis are contrasted in this new semiotic space by means of computer simulations, modification of parameters, etc. The Kuhnian characterization of scientific revolutions is insufficient for technoscientists, because computer technolanguages are of a very different nature from classical scientific languages.
III.2: The scientific paradigms, according to Kuhn.
Recall briefly Kuhn’s main proposals on scientific revolutions. The most relevant philosophers of science of the mid-twentieth century (Carnap, Popper, Hempel, etc.) had focused their reflections on scientific theories, which were considered as the basic units for the philosophical and historical analysis of the sciences. Toulmin and Hanson raised the first criticisms of this “teoreticist” model, but it was Kuhn who managed to put it radically in question. He proposed the notion of paradigm to designate that common framework that brings together and agrees with scientists and that is much broader than theories, understood as sets of statements. As Pérez Ransanz has indicated, Kuhn uses that term in two differentiated senses:
“1) Paradigm as an example of a successful (and surprising) solution to certain types of problems, which is recognized by the entire relevant community,
and
2) a paradigm as a set of commitments shared by a community of specialists” 149.
This general proposal, as well as its subsequent concretions (distinction between normal science and revolutionary science, anomalies, crisis of a paradigm, scientific revolution, etc.), were exposed in the book Structure of scientific revolutions, which was published in 1962 150, and then nuanced in the Postscript of 1969 and in his Second Thoughts on Paradigms 151. In this review, Kuhn started from a sociological criterion for the identification of paradigms: “a paradigm is what the members of a scientific community, and only they , they share “152. Next, they asked about these shared commitments and proposed a new expression to refer to paradigms as a set of shared commitments: disciplinary matrices. Scientists not only share theories, but rather more broadly, the disciplinary matrices, which have at least four components: symbolic generalizations, models, values and exemplars. In any case, the different meanings of the Kuhnian notion of paradigm are always linked to the existence of scientific communities.
In contrast, technosciences are not made by scientific communities, but by more complex entities, techno-scientific companies. From a theoretical point of view, the members of these companies share far fewer things than the scientific communities. In particular, they do not share the same languages, the same values or the same objectives, which does not prevent them from collaborating in the same research company. In some cases they do not even share scientific knowledge, except very briefly: scientific and technological knowledge is something instrumental for some relevant members of techno-scientific companies. For example, the director of an R & D company can first of all have a managerial or company director training, provided that he has a good scientific and technological adviser at his side. The same can be said of the experts in scientific policy, the Directors of government agencies or the military advisers specialized in R & D. These people are interested in scientific knowledge, but not as an end in itself, but as a means to better achieve their own ends. In some occasions this type of techno-scientific agencies are directed by scientists or engineers with high knowledge in the matter, in others it is enough with a very shallow knowledge of the theories and knowledge that allow research and innovation. There have been no lack of humanities experts who have effectively assumed the leadership of important techno-scientific agencies. Therefore, in the techno-scientific companies, a shared knowledge is not required, much less the acceptance of a certain epistemological paradigm. Even opposite paradigms can be used, in order to prove which of the two offers better results from the point of view of innovation. In fact, in order to carry out a macro-research project, it is not uncommon to finance research teams that work in parallel from different theoretical and methodological perspectives. The important thing is the achievement of the objectives of the project, not the epistemic beliefs of the researchers. A director of a research macro project can have groups whose hypotheses, procedures and working methods are very different, and even incompatible. In fact, it is often the case, as we saw in the case of the Manhattan project. The techno-scientific companies put the different teams of scientists and engineers to compete with each other and what counts is the achievement of the intended objectives, not the greater or lesser likelihood of the theoretical hypotheses of departure. The scientific paradigms are contrasted in practice, depending on the results obtained. Whoever decides the rivalry is not the scientific community, but the techno-scientific agent (military, business, political) that has commissioned and contracted the realization of these investigations with two teams that compete with each other. The same can be said in the case of R & D companies. The managers of these companies are interested in the knowledge that generates development and innovation. The plausibility of the starting theories does not concern them at all, as long as they serve to generate new products that are competitive in the market.
The notion of the scientific community, as conceived by Merton and developed by Kuhn and others, is insufficient to analyze technoscience and to identify the possible “technoscientific paradigms”. All this in the assumption that the term “paradigm” is adequate to talk about technoscience, which remains to be seen. For the moment, we will talk about technoscientific companies that instrumentally use one or other paradigms (or theories) in order to obtain valuable results. In technoscience we are dealing with technical actions, as these were defined in the first chapter. If a basic research laboratory is inserted into a techno-scientific enterprise, even its investigations become technical actions, because they are part of a more complex system in which the scientific theories and hypotheses themselves have a purely instrumental function. A scientist can make very important findings from the scientific point of view, but if those achievements do not contribute to the development of the techno-scientific project in which he is inserted, he will be cornered, and ultimately excluded from said project. He will remain a scientist, but he will not have become a techno-scientist. To be, it is necessary to subordinate the epistemic interests to the general objectives of the project. The history of technoscience is full of examples where the discomfort of scientists in the face of the new situation is manifested, for example when priority is given to obtaining industrial patents as a result of research. Those scientists who assume the plurality of technoscience values, on the other hand, become true technoscientific entrepreneurs, as we saw in the case of Craig Venter.
On the other hand, for a techno-scientific company to develop its activities well, it is necessary to clarify which is its most appropriate organization, assigning tasks, responsibilities and functions. A scientist or an engineer who works as a researcher in a techno-scientific company may completely ignore the ultimate meaning of their actions, which was not the case in classical laboratories. The “techno-scientific” paradigms, if any, have to be very different from the Kuhnian paradigms, because, above the scientific and engineering communities, a new modality of techno-scientific agent has emerged, the public or private company of I + D + i, whose actions make sense within the framework of a network of techno-scientific companies. A public techno-scientific company (for example, an Agency or a National Laboratory – or multinational, such as CERN) differs radically from a private techno-scientific company because of its objectives, sources of funding, management procedures, legal constraints and criteria for evaluating the results that derive from their activity. Then they will compete with each other, for example in the Genome Project, but that competence not only concerns knowledge, but above all, patents, applications, implementation in the market, publicity of results, etc. In particular, techno-scientific companies compete with each other when it comes to integrating the best scientists and engineers into their templates. The competition between paradigms acquires a completely different meaning in the case of technosciences.
III.3: Components of the paradigms.
Let’s go back to Kuhn, analyzing the various components of his paradigms. Symbolic generalizations are the formal components of the paradigms: sometimes they are presented as mathematical formulas (f = m.a, I = V / R) and sometimes they are expressed by words: “the action is equal to the reaction”, for example. According to Kuhn, “the power of science, in general, seems to increase more often than not with the number of symbolic generalizations that its practitioners have at their disposal” 153. They usually express laws of nature, but not only that: they also work “As definitions of some symbols they enumerate … laws are often correctable gradually, but definitions, being tautologies, are not.” 154. Therefore, paradigm shifts usually imply the redefinition of basic concepts: “I suspect that all revolutions involve, among other things, the abandonment of generalizations whose force was, until then, that of tautologies “155.
The second component is the models, which: “provide the group with preferred analogies or, when deeply held, with an ontology. On the one hand, they are heuristic: the electrical circuit can be considered, profitably, as a hydrodynamic system in a stable state, or the behavior of a gas like that of a collection of microscopic billiard balls in random movement. On the other hand, they are the objects of metaphysical commitment: the heat of the body is the kinetic energy of its component particles, or, more obviously metaphysical, all perceptible phenomena are due to the movement and the interaction of qualitatively neutral atoms, in a vacuum ” 156
The third component is the values, understanding as such what we call epistemic values, among which Kuhn explicitly pointed out precision, coherence, amplitude, simplicity and fertility, as well as utility, although this as an additional or external value To science. These values “are usually shared among different communities more broadly than symbolic generalizations or models. And they contribute much to giving a sense of community to natural scientists as a whole “157. Therefore, this axiological component is transdisciplinary, because those values are not only shared by each scientific community, but by all of them, or at least by all those who are dedicated to the natural sciences. This qualification is important, since it shows that the values of science are transversal to their different disciplines, as also happens in the case of technosciences. Although in other places we have already commented extensively on Kuhn’s thesis about the values of science, 158 we will pause for a moment in his conception of these shared values, postponing the analysis of the fourth component of the disciplinary matrices, the exemplars, which “are solutions of concrete problems accepted by the group as paradigmatic in the usual sense of the term “159.
Kuhn maintained that those values shared by natural scientists “work at any time”, although “their particular importance arises when members of a particular community must identify crises or, later, choose between incompatible paths in which they practice their discipline” 160. That is, values emerge explicitly when paradigms enter into crisis, as well as in scientific revolutions. In the times of normal science no questions of values arise, and it may even seem that science is value-free, as many positivist philosophers argued. According to Kuhn, this is not the case. Science has its own values, then called epistemic (Putnam) or cognitive (Laudan). These values are transdisciplinary and play a very important role precisely in times of crisis and scientific revolution. Because they are transparadigmatic, the values of science will be one of the criteria that scientists will use to assume (or not) that a paradigm has entered into crisis (for example, because it has ceased to be fruitful, versus another less precise and rigorous but more fertile) or to choose individually between several alternative proposals. Although Kuhn does not say it as clearly as we are doing, the axiological component of disciplinary matrices plays a key role in scientific revolutions, precisely when the definitions of basic concepts, models and exemplars are called into question.
This does not imply that the science value system provides a decision algorithm to choose between alternative theories when a paradigm enters into crisis. Kuhn denied again and again the existence of an axiological decision algorithm. For our part, we fully agree with him on this point, as we have already argued in the book Science and Values. However, according to Kuhn, even in times of crisis the values of science remain, although their application or weighting by each individual scientist can change. “There are values that are used in the prosecution of all theories,” explicitly stated Kuhn 162. The theories alternatively proposed to solve an enigma or an anomaly “must allow, first of all, the formulation of the enigma and its solution; they should be, as far as possible, simple, self-consistent, and with respect to other commonly held, compatible and plausible theories (I think now that a weakness of my original text is the little attention given to values such as internal and external compatibility when considering the sources of crisis and factors in the theoretical alternative). There is also another kind of values – for example, science should not (or does not need) to be socially useful – but the preceding indicates what I mean “163. Although it is in passing, we call attention to this last statement, because it constitutes a common place among many scientists who are dedicated to basic research. Traditionally, technology and applied science had to be useful. Pure science, on the other hand, was guided by strictly epistemic values. Kuhn clearly expresses this topic, which has changed radically with the emergence of technoscience, although already in the era of modern science, many scientific institutions adopted the value “utility” (Royal Society, American Philosophical Association), even if only at a level of principles.
Despite the enormous interest aroused by his structure of scientific revolutions, these passages of Kuhn have hardly been commented, probably because at the time they were published (1970) the empiricist dogma of the strict separation between science and values continued to prevail . However, they have a great importance for the axiology of science and, as far as technosciences are concerned, they will be very useful in order to clarify some of the differences between science and technoscience.
Let’s see it In the first place, it is clear that rigor, coherence (internal and external) and simplicity play an important role when evaluating theories, even when these theories are incommensurable from the point of view of knowledge, that is, in the cases of crisis of a paradigm and scientific revolutions. Being transparadigmatic, these values, and others that could be mentioned (such as fertility, taking up the thesis of Lakatos), can be decisive to guide the individual decisions of scientists: abandon or not a paradigm, choose one or another alternative theory. Unlike Feyerabend, for Kuhn not everything goes. There are axiological criteria that, even in the middle of a crisis of the paradigms, guide the judgment of the scientists and, what is more important, their actions. A theoretical proposal that is imprecise, incoherent, incompatible with other theories that are not in crisis, inane, etc., will normally be rejected by scientists, and this at the height of a scientific revolution, when normal science is falling apart. The values bring a certain stability to science even in the revolutionary epochs. The Kuhnian thesis of incommensurability is thus tempered by the axiological components of the disciplinary matrices.
However, at such times the values are not applied equally by all scientists, but different valuations are produced. For some, coherence will prevail (think of Berkeley criticizing the Infinitesimal Calculus for being contradictory), for others fecundity (Euler barely bothered about the foundations of Calculus and brilliantly used the new mathematical technique to solve multiple physical and mathematical problems), for others the novelty or the amazement at the surprising and promising of the new proposals (case of the Einsteinian program against the Lorentz one, or the subjective attitude of the Cantor himself before the demonstration of the biunivocity between the integers and the rational ones). The values of science continue to be shared at such times, but the axiological priorities of scientists diverge, or at least their respective weights. Kuhn always complained that, when he alluded to the values of science and its different subjective application, he received an avalanche of criticism, accusing him of subjectivism, if not irrationalism. However, his position on this problem, which is one of the most delicate of the philosophy of science, was always the same, although its nuances were not understood at that time:
“Values can be shared by men who differ in their application to a greater degree than other kinds of components of the disciplinary matrix. Accuracy judgments are relatively stable, though not entirely, from one time to another, or, in a particular group, from one member to another. But the judgments of simplicity, compatibility, plausibility, etc., often vary enormously from one individual to another “…” And most importantly, values would often dictate different alternatives in these situations where different values should be applied , taken in isolation.
One theory may be more accurate but less compatible or plausible than another; again the old quantum theory gives us an example. In short, although the values are widely shared by scientists and even when the agreements regarding these values are something profound and constitutive of science, the application of them is sometimes affected considerably by the characteristics of the personality individual and by the background of the scientist, what individualizes and differentiates the members of the group “164.
We extract some consequences of these theses of Kuhn, that seems to us correct:
1.- Values are constitutive of science, not alien to it. Obviously, Kuhn alludes to epistemic values, among which, it must be emphasized, he never mentions the value “truth”, or even “verisimilitude”.
2.- The values of science constitute a system, they are not considered in isolation. In our own terminology, Kuhn is opposed to axiological monism and prone to a joint consideration of several epistemic values before issuing a judgment on the acceptability or rejection of a theory.
3.- The scientists apply some or other evaluation criteria to the theories. For our part, this point is very important. The values have to be characterized as functions in the freigo sense of the term.
4.- It is not the same to share a definition, a mathematical formula, a model or a paradigmatic example that share a system of values. In the first cases, these components are accepted or not, which are part of the “hard core” of the theories. In the case of values, they are also shared, but not 100%. Its application is a matter of degrees. This is one of the reasons why we strongly affirm the gradual nature of values.
5.- In such cases, rationality does not consist in emitting coincident judgments based on a single valuation criterion, but in weighing and debating the various valuation criteria, that is, in weighing more or less the various values. The axiological rationality differs considerably from the rationality based on the attribution (or not) of properties to things, as Kuhn’s text shows and as, for our part, we have emphasized more than once 165. It is a deliberative rationality and plural, and this necessarily, because it is subject to several requirements of acceptability, not to only one.
In the case of technosciences, the situation is structurally different, because the subject of technoscience is plural and the various agents that compose it do not even share the same value systems. Hence, conflicts of values are inherent to techno-scientific activity, unlike science, where they only manifest themselves in times of crisis and revolution. The axiological issues do not seem to exist in the normal science epochs, precisely because there is a system of shared values whose respective weighting has been normalized, to a greater or lesser degree. In the case of technoscience, this is not the case, because not a single community intervenes, but several, each with its own subsystem of values (epistemic, technical, economic, military, political, social, ecological, etc.). Paraphrasing Kuhn: Techno-sciences in normal times also present conflicts of values, because heterogeneous communities intervene actively in technoscientific activity, usually represented by concrete agents that embody their respective values and, where appropriate, interests. Therefore, conflicts of values are “connatural” to the techno-scientific activity. Different question is the way to solve them, or to reach at least points of equilibrium. On this we will return later.
To conclude with this brief comment to Kuhn, we will mention another passage about the values of science. It deals with the debated question of the subjectivity or objectivity of values. Contrary to those who tried to banish all traces of subjectivity in the valuations of scientists, Kuhn considered that this recourse to the subjective can be very beneficial in times of paradigm crisis:
“Individual variability in the application of shared values can serve as an essential function of science. The points where the values should be applied are also, invariably, those where risks are taken. Most anomalies are solved by normal means; Many proposals for new theories turn out to be wrong. If all the members of a community responded to each anomaly as a source of crisis, or admitted each new theory promoted by a colleague, science would stagnate. If, on the other hand, nobody reacts to the anomalies or to the theories of recent edition in highly risky form, there would be few or no revolutions. In matters such as these, recourse to shared values rather than shared rules that direct individual choice may be the way for the community to distribute risks and ensure the success of its long-term activities “166.
Kuhn does not reject subjective evaluations because he thinks they can contribute to improving intersubjective values, or at least their application. Although he never developed an axiology of science, limiting himself to making these kinds of considerations, we can interpret that he perceived very well the differences between epistemology, methodology and axiology, then established by Laudan and his reticular model 167. The methodology could consist of a set of rules that, applied systematically, lead to certain and certain results. The axiology does not work like that. The axiological functions can be applied differently by the evaluating agents, or if it is preferred by the scientists who decide to opt for one or the other theory. With several evaluation criteria, the problem of finding the result of this plurality of evaluation actions arises. Faced with the monistic conceptions of rationality, based on the maximization of a value (truth or verisimilitude in the case of science, efficiency in technology), Kuhn can be considered a precursor of plural axiological rationality that we We advocate 168. We will return to the debate in the fourth chapter.
After this excursus on the Kuhnian conception of the values of science, we have left to comment the fourth and last component of its paradigms, the exemplars, that is, the solutions of problems that have been accepted as valid solutions by the scientific communities. In the case of technoscience, these specimens have a technological specification: a certain algorithm that solves a computational problem, an apparatus that improves the accuracy of observations or measurements, a great equipment that increases speed, the ability to calculate or the possibilities of experimentation, a company that fully assumes the new structure of scientific practice, etc. In a word, although the construction of these specimens is based on several scientific theories, we are dealing with technological resolutions of the problems, not with theoretical solutions. There are no properly scientific specimens, but techno-scientists. Some take the form of apparatuses, others, on the other hand, are models of organization and functioning of a techno-scientific company that has offered good results in a certain country or area of knowledge and that, immediately, is imitated and considered as an organizational model that solves first of all problems linked to scientific practice. The canonical specimens of technoscience are artifacts, some of them physical, others intellectual, others of social organization and management of the techno-scientific activity. In any case, they solve problems of scientific practice, rather than theoretical problems.
III.4: The techno-scientific paradigms.
After this brief review of the Kuhnian conceptions, it is now a question of exploring to what extent they are valid for technoscience, not only for science. From what has been said up to now it can be inferred that the Kuhnian model for scientific revolutions has to be expanded and modified in several points to try to apply it to the techno-scientific revolutions. Kuhn distinguished between symbolic generalizations, models, values and exemplars of a paradigm. In this section we will explore whether these concepts are still valid in the case of technosciences.
In this regard, it is worth remembering one of the differences between science and technoscience: the latter implies, above all, changes in scientific practice, not only in knowledge. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between symbolic generalizations, models, values and exemplars from two perspectives, theoretical and practical. In this way, the notion of paradigm is extended, because it includes both dimensions.
With respect to symbolic generalizations, scientific languages still exist, but they are superimposed on a new modality of language, technolanguages or infolanguages. Scientific concepts and terms, whether theoretical or observational, continue to perform their referential and semantic functions. Technoscience maintains a linguistic component when it is formulated, since it is still science. However, classical scientific languages are superimposed on technolanguages, which are the most commonly used in research practice. The multiple software variants that are used to control the functioning of scientific instruments are a good example of symbolic generalization necessary for techno-scientific practice, since many of the activities (calculate, observe, measure, experiment, even demonstrate) are not possible without those computer tools. Normally, they are very different according to the disciplines and the research lines. Mastering them is an indispensable requirement to be able to investigate, because the data, hypotheses and results are expressed according to technological formats. In some subjects powerful computing instruments are used, in others it is essential to master the techniques of scientific visualization. Taken together, technolanguages can be considered as symbolic Kuhnian generalizations of technosciences. Note that these technolanguages can also be used for organizational, management and evaluation issues. Computer languages affect all phases of techno-scientific activity, not only in research.
The new structuring of scientific practice generates new formal instruments that, as they become national or international standards, can be considered as symbolic generalizations that order the scientific practice itself. We saw that techno-scientific companies are much broader and more complex than the observatories, laboratories and cabinets of classical scientists. In addition to laboratory protocols and articles for scientific journals, technoscientists must be able to properly complete other types of documents: forms to request research projects, evaluation reports, spreadsheets, patent contracts, etc. This second type of symbolic generalization is not scientific, but economic, administrative and legal, but we have already seen that bureaucracy and management are a fundamental part of techno-scientific companies. Its existence and its generalization in a country or in a certain discipline reveal the implantation of technoscience.
Normally, this type of demands are tedious for researchers, although they are essential to carry out, given the current structure of scientific activity. It is common for large research teams to include people specialized in this type of skills and abilities, which do not concern scientific knowledge, but rather practice. There are also frequent cases in which the researchers themselves have to learn to competently use this new type of instruments, which are not observation or experimentation, but management. The establishment of scientific policy systems always leads to the creation of standardized instruments for the management of science and technology. Although they may seem less important than classical scientific instruments, the fact is that in technoscience they are fundamental, due to the very structure of science and technology systems, which require all the research teams to use these protocols at the same time. make proposals, issue reports and present results. In a word: the management and administration of techno-scientific companies generate new symbolic generalizations, usually computerized: the EXCEL calculation sheets, the computer platforms for presenting and evaluating projects, etc. This new modality of symbolic generalization was unthinkable in the era of modern science, but today it consumes a good part of the efforts of technoscientists. The mastery of these techniques is an indispensable requirement for an investigation to be successful, to a degree no less than the mastery of traditional scientific languages. The systems of science and technology indicators, essential in the scientific policy cabinets, can be considered as another modality of symbolic generalization. The analysis of these indicators and, above all, the changes they undergo, provides a good indication of the existence of dominant paradigms in techno-scientific practice.
As regards the theoretical models, there are no great variations, except in some concrete sciences, such as cosmology and biology, in which scientific revolutions have taken place in the Kuhnian sense of the term, in addition to the praxeological revolutions to which we refer to On the ontological level, technoscientists ascribed to the same paradigm share a basic ontology, as do scientists. The omnipresence of computing privileges computer models, but this is comparable to what happened in modern science, when mechanicism was a predominant ontology. Evolutionary models are also dominant, as shown by the fact that the computer tools themselves are distinguished according to generations, as well as many other techno-scientific devices. Systems theory is another of the great ontological models of technoscience, for example in the case of cybernetics and in the technosciences that derive from it.
However, as far as the practice is concerned, other types of models appear: the so-called “good practices”, which quickly become canonical for other institutions and techno-scientific companies. Benchmarking is a common practice in techno-scientific companies, which allows the configuration of authentic models for scientific practice: ways of organizing research activity, managing patents, establishing networks of laboratories or consortiums between libraries and research centers, etc. In section II.3 we had occasion to refer to some of these models of technoscientific practice.
The biggest change between science and technoscience refers to values, as we saw in the previous section. There are still values that guide techno-scientific actions, but these are not shared by all agents, which is why axiological conflicts are continuous. In addition, the value systems that guide techno-scientific activity are much more complex and plural, so a proposal or result has to overcome several instances of evaluation to be considered as a contribution of interest. That is why we attach so much importance to axiology when it comes to distinguishing between science and technoscience, as we will see in greater detail in chapter 5.
Finally, the Kuhnian notion of copies is still valid, although with the nuances that we have already seen. These specimens take the form of technological artifacts that have proved extremely useful for solving problems, becoming canonical for scientists, but also for society itself. Sooner or later, many of the canonical artifacts used by scientists are transferred to civil society, adapting them to the new uses that it requires. The most novel are those that deal with the organization of scientific activity, as we have indicated previously. They are techno-social artifacts and are often studied by social technosciences. Structured systems of science and technology are a typical example.
We can conclude, therefore, that the notion of “paradigm” can continue to be used in philosophy of technoscience, although with nuances and significant variations, if we compare it with the Kuhnian notion. Generally speaking, it can be said that techno-scientific paradigms overlap with scientists, introducing new components, such as ways of organizing and managing the processes of obtaining knowledge. In the same scientific discipline there may be people who, accepting the same scientific paradigm in regard to theories and methods, differ completely in terms of techno-scientific paradigms. Not all physicists are technophysical, nor are all biologists technobiologists. Agreeing on the basic postulates of their respective sciences, they may be radically at odds with the way of designing and organizing the research activity.
III.5: From scientific revolutions to techno-scientific revolutions.
The Kuhnian notion of “paradigm” must be expanded, nuanced and modified. The same can be said in the case of scientific revolutions:
1.- The techno-scientific revolutions suppose a deep change in the scientific and technological practice, that affects the structure of both. Just as the philosophers of science emphasized the existence of a structure in scientific knowledge, in order to investigate technoscience, it is necessary to clarify the structure of technoscientific activity in the first place. The techno-scientific revolution is not, prima facie, an epistemological or methodological revolution (methods and scientific knowledge continue to exist and apply), but above all a praxeological revolution.
2. Throughout the twentieth century, macro-science and technoscience have produced numerous theoretical changes, and even revolutions in the Kuhnian sense of the term. This has happened in cosmology, in biology, in chemistry and in many other scientific and technological disciplines, some of which are new. However, when analyzing the techno-scientific revolutions we should not focus on those theoretical or methodological changes, but above all on the praxiological changes. The important thing is to locate the changes in the scientific practice and in its organization, as well as the insertion of sectors and groups of the scientific communities in diverse techno-scientific companies, be they public or private, civil or military. These transformations occur first in very specific universities and research centers, for example at MIT, Stanford or Berkeley in the 1930s, or also in some industrial companies that create R & D departments (such as Du Pont in the 30s). This would be the pre-revolutionary phase, in which the new techno-scientific paradigm is emerging, in this case macro-science. During the Second World War this process became widespread. That is why we date the first techno-scientific revolution in this era. But what was decisive was the consolidation of this new structure of scientific practice, which is achieved with the creation of a new science and technology system in the US in the immediate post-war phase. The maintenance after the war of a scientific practice based on the close collaboration between scientists and engineers, in the appearance of R & D companies, in the subordination of the purely scientific or engineering objectives to the objectives indicated by the financiers of the macroprojects, etc., is the key to determining the moment in which the techno-scientific revolution took place. When this new structuring of scientific and technological activity was transferred to other countries, always starting with specific centers and companies, it was when the techno-scientific revolution spread to these countries, without prejudice that there might be precedents in some European countries (Great Britain, Germany, France) of this new way of doing science. The same can be said of the Soviet Union, where a detailed historical study would have to be made in order to clarify the way in which the techno-scientific revolution took place there after the Second World War. It can be said, in any case, that the emergence of centralized and coordinated scientific policies in various countries, together with the creation of large national science and technology agencies, are institutional signs that the techno-scientific revolution was beginning to take place.
3.- Since the notion of the scientific community is basic to the Kuhnian reflection on revolutions, it can be affirmed that the greatest insufficiency lies in that notion. In the age of technoscience, the scientific and engineering communities are superimposed on another type of social agents (political, military, business, etc.) that play a decisive role in techno-scientific activity. Generically speaking, the emergence of techno-scientific companies is one of the signs that mark the arrival of technoscience. Wherever a university department or a research center becomes a company, public, private or mixed, and is acquiring forms of organization and clearly operating business, it should be noted that the transition from science to technoscience is taking place, without prejudice to that these organizational mutations may fail later. This regardless of the discipline in which such a transformation occurs. Technoscience implies, above all, a new way of organizing scientific and technological activity. The personal evolution of scientists like Vannevar Bush, John von Neumann, John Watson or Craig Venter illustrates this thesis well.
Observe that the object of study for the history and philosophy of science changes radically. In the case of the Kuhnian scientific revolutions, one had to be alert to the emergence of new theories and new methods, because they were epistemological and methodological revolutions. Techno-scientific revolutions, on the other hand, are first and foremost praxiological. It is about investigating the moment in which the new structure of scientific-technological practice is imposed in a university, research center, company or country. The appearance of Big Science was a change of this type, and for that reason it has to be considered as the first emergence of technoscience. In the last decades of the twentieth century there was a second techno-scientific revolution, characterized by the widespread introduction of computer technologies in laboratories, observatories and research centers. That is why we distinguish these two types of techno-scientific revolutions in the 20th century, without prejudice to the fact that a more detailed historical study could make it possible to discern other forms of emergence of technoscience.
III.6: From the incommensurability between theories to the incompatibility between techno-scientific systems.
Our divergences with Kuhn point to the core of his conception of scientific revolutions, which ended up focusing on the problem of incommensurability between paradigms, and in his later writings in a linguistic version of incommensurability, based on the notion of untranslatability: “affirm that two theories are incommensurable means to affirm that there is no language, neutral or of any other kind, to which both theories, conceived as sets of statements, can be translated without remnant or loss “169. Kuhn called local incommensurability to this last version of his thesis, which so many rivers of ink has made since the publication of his book Structure of scientific revolutions. It is a semantic incommensurability, in which the terms used by one or other scientists do not mean the same thing. In the case of techno-scientific revolutions, it is preferable to speak of incompatibility between technological systems than of incommensurability between theories:
1.- The incompatibility between technosystems affects above all the scientific-technological practices, including the agents, instruments and objectives of their actions. results that are derived from them. Although they later converge in terms of knowledge, the “rival techno-scientific paradigms” differ radically from each other in procedures, techniques, styles of action and the organization of scientific activity. There is “practical incommensurability”, not only theoretical, and this gives rise to opposing and incompatible techno-scientific cultures. For example, there are techno-scientific companies in which the secret and the principle of hierarchy prevail. It is the most frequent in the case of investigations of a military nature. Others, on the other hand, are much more open and cooperative. Both compete hard against each other when it comes to obtaining financing, obtaining prestige, exploiting patents and achieving the primacy in the market of derivative techno-scientific products. If a thorough study were to be made, the contrast between Soviet and North American macro-scientific research during the Cold War would illustrate these differences well.
2 .- As argued by the defenders of the semantic conception in philosophy of science (Suppes, Sneed, Moulines, Van Fraseen, Giere and others), scientific theories are not sets of linguistic statements, but classes of models, in particular models mathematicians In the case of technoscience, this non-linguistic conception of the theories and results of research is literally essential. Technoscience also has a very important theoretical component, which is usually expressed in the form of computer models and technological artifacts that are “exemplary” (in Kuhn’s sense) of “techno-scientific paradigms”. Many techno-scientific innovations do not even take the form of more or less credible theories from an empirical point of view. They are apparatuses, software, action techniques and organization. The techno-scientific incommensurability is very different from that of scientific theories and therefore it is preferable to speak of incompatibility between alternative or rival technological systems.
3.- Both mathematical and non-mathematical formulations of scientific theories, however incommensurable they may be, can be expressed in the same computer language. This does not imply that the incommensurable terms or concepts among themselves come to mean the same thing. However, the digitalization and computerization of the data requires the existence of common standards and protocols, without which the computer representations are strictly incompatible with each other. The serious problem arises when the computer and digital representations are incompatible with each other. The techno-scientific incompatibility opens a greater abyss than the incommensurability between theories because it affects practice and actions, not only theories and images of the world.
III.6: From the incommensurability between theories to the incompatibility between techno-scientific systems.
Our divergences with Kuhn point to the core of his conception of scientific revolutions, which ended up focusing on the problem of incommensurability between paradigms, and in his later writings in a linguistic version of incommensurability, based on the notion of untranslatability: “affirm that two theories are incommensurable means to affirm that there is no language, neutral or of any other kind, to which both theories, conceived as sets of statements, can be translated without remnant or loss “169. Kuhn called local incommensurability to this last version of his thesis, which so many rivers of ink has made since the publication of his book Structure of scientific revolutions. It is a semantic incommensurability, in which the terms used by one or other scientists do not mean the same thing. In the case of techno-scientific revolutions, it is preferable to speak of incompatibility between technological systems than of incommensurability between theories:
1.- The incompatibility between technosystems affects above all the scientific-technological practices, including the agents, instruments and objectives of their actions. results that are derived from them. Although they later converge in terms of knowledge, the “rival techno-scientific paradigms” differ radically from each other in procedures, techniques, styles of action and the organization of scientific activity. There is “practical incommensurability”, not only theoretical, and this gives rise to opposing and incompatible techno-scientific cultures. For example, there are techno-scientific companies in which the secret and the principle of hierarchy prevail. It is the most frequent in the case of investigations of a military nature. Others, on the other hand, are much more open and cooperative. Both compete hard against each other when it comes to obtaining financing, obtaining prestige, exploiting patents and achieving the primacy in the market of derivative techno-scientific products. If a thorough study were to be made, the contrast between Soviet and North American macro-scientific research during the Cold War would illustrate these differences well.
2 .- As argued by the defenders of the semantic conception in philosophy of science (Suppes, Sneed, Moulines, Van Fraseen, Giere and others), scientific theories are not sets of linguistic statements, but classes of models, in particular models mathematicians In the case of technoscience, this non-linguistic conception of the theories and results of research is literally essential. Technoscience also has a very important theoretical component, which is usually expressed in the form of computer models and technological artifacts that are “exemplary” (in Kuhn’s sense) of “techno-scientific paradigms”. Many techno-scientific innovations do not even take the form of more or less credible theories from an empirical point of view. They are apparatuses, software, action techniques and organization. The techno-scientific incommensurability is very different from that of scientific theories and therefore it is preferable to speak of incompatibility between alternative or rival technological systems.
3.- Both mathematical and non-mathematical formulations of scientific theories, however incommensurable they may be, can be expressed in the same computer language. This does not imply that the incommensurable terms or concepts among themselves come to mean the same thing. However, the digitalization and computerization of the data requires the existence of common standards and protocols, without which the computer representations are strictly incompatible with each other. The serious problem arises when the computer and digital representations are incompatible with each other. The techno-scientific incompatibility opens a greater abyss than the incommensurability between theories because it affects practice and actions, not only theories and images of the world.
4.- We do not enter into the debate about translation. For the moment, it is enough for us to make possible a transliteration of the different systems of scientific and technological signs to the binary system. 170. Well, this is one of the main virtues of computer languages. Not only the transliteration between natural languages or the translation of speech to signs written by means of automatic voice recognition techniques, but also the automatic transfer of data, sounds and images to each other. The great methodological novelty of technosciences lies in the possibility of resorting to computer simulations, for example by representing formulas and databases through images and sounds, and reciprocally. Diagrams and Cartesian representations of mathematical functions are possible, but, in addition, it is possible to represent non-linear functions informally, so that scientists have images and data that were not accessible by traditional mathematical techniques. The digitalization and computerization of natural languages, mathematical formulas, scientific tables, images, movements and sounds is one of the engines of the techno-scientific revolution, because it considerably increases the capacities for scientific action. In Kuhnian terms: we can speak of new symbolic generalizations (infosymbolic, in this case), although these are very different to those that characterized the paradigms of modern science. In our own terms: the most developed technosciences are infociencias, just as the mathematized sciences supposed an advance with respect to the unmathematizable in modern science. Of course, the mediation introduced by technolanguages is very different from the mediation of the natural and mathematical languages in which the sciences are expressed.
III.7: From scientific controversies to techno-scientific controversies.
Since Kuhn defined the notion of scientific paradigm and affirmed his disputed thesis about the incommensurability of alternative paradigms, philosophers, historians and, above all, sociologists of science have paid much attention to scientific controversies. Previously to Kuhn, those episodes were considered as lamentable incidents inside the scientific communities. From Kuhn, however, controversies illustrated the confrontation between paradigms and therefore had to be studied and analyzed in depth.
If we accept that part of contemporary science is technoscience, we will have to ask ourselves about the differences between scientific and techno-scientific controversies. In this section we will try to show that the distinctive features pointed out in sections II.1 and II.2 offer us a good guide to differentiate both types of controversies. We will say therefore that:
a): Since technology tends to transform the world, not only to know what it is like, a techno-scientific controversy implies two or several alternative ways of transforming the world. American and Soviet science after the Second World War are two good examples, and this in several areas: nuclear energy, exploration of space, development of weapons and defense systems, industrial research, etc. The competition between alternative computer systems (for example Windows and Linux) constitutes a more recent example, as does the race between the public PGH and the Celera Genomics company to map the human genome. Since the oppositions between alternative techno-scientific paradigms are not purely discursive, but are developed by transforming the world through effective practices, the term “controversy” has to be replaced by “conflict”. In some cases, these conflicts do not go beyond the scope of scientific policy. In others they develop in the market, in the form of competition between rival techno-scientific companies. But we must not forget the links between technoscience and military activities. Examples of competing macro- and ten-scientific projects abound during the Cold War, and even in battlefield operations. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs are the first example, but not the only one. Therefore, there are occasions when techno-scientific “controversies” become military conflicts, which are resolved according to the greater or lesser capacity of destruction of the devices manufactured by the enemy, be they airplanes, submarines or telecommunications networks. When the power of technoscience is destructive, whoever possesses the greatest capacity for destruction wins.
b): The rival techno-scientific paradigms struggle in particular to transform science itself. One of the central points of opposition is to show that the new techno-scientific paradigm radically improves scientific practice and promises enormous advances in terms of knowledge. It always insists on the enormous possibilities that each techno-scientific paradigm opens for science, and in its case for society. Frequently a kind of universal salvation is promised, a promised land if the nascent paradigm is duly promoted against the previous one. This happened with nuclear energy, with the conquest of space, with computers, with techno-statistics in the social sciences, with the Internet, with the genome project, with genetic engineering, etc. In each and every one of these cases, the new paradigm promised immense advances for science and for society. At the same time, it generated concern about the consequences that could arise, and therefore opposition. Techno-scientific controversies often arise in terms of technophilia and technophobia, especially when they reach society. We have affirmed that technoscience not only transforms nature, but also society. The conflicts that stem from that attempt can be considered as another kind of techno-scientific controversy.
c): The techno-scientific activity requires great equipment to develop, which is why controversies usually take specific forms: some try that such and such large equipment be financed and built, others oppose it, considering it an economic waste whose benefits are to see, and support alternative projects, always insisting on their highest priority. The debate in the US on Supercollider Supercomputer is a canonical case. These controversies go beyond the scope of academic and scientific discussion, taking place in scientific policy offices, in the R & D departments of companies, in parliaments and, where appropriate, before the courts. Frequently they divide the scientific communities, but not for epistemic reasons, but praxiological ones. Therefore, techno-scientific controversies do not occur in scientific journals and books, but in offices and agencies where they struggle to obtain adequate financing for macro-projects and the new institutions that would have to be created to develop them. They are resolved in favor of one or the other through scientific policy actions and decisions (public or private), not through a methodological or epistemological debate. It is interesting to note that many of these contests are about the priority issue, but not in discovery, as in modern science, but in funding. Many conflicts occur before the investigations are launched, that is, in the pre-action and design phase. The cost of projects is usually an important factor to take into account when arguing for or against, regardless of the scientific excellence that may arise from one or other projects.
d): Techno-scientific controversies always have an economic aspect, often the most important one. The establishment of priority funding lines is often decisive between rival techno-scientific paradigms. We will say therefore that this type of controversies always have a budgetary reflection. The numerous failed techno-scientific revolutions (for example, high-definition television) leave a trace of economic waste. They are significant cases to study. In any case, there is no techno-scientific revolution without strong and decisive economic support, that is, without substantial investments. It was one of the characteristics of macroscience, but it continues to be so in technoscience, to a greater or lesser extent.
e): Instead of circumscribing a conflict between scientific and technological communities, revolutionary changes are usually carried out by companies or by government agencies that operate according to business models of management. A technoscientific community that intends to promote an important change will have to look for public or private funding sources for it and introduce new models of allocation and management of resources. The expectation of further benefits (economic, social, political, etc.) plays a very important role, notwithstanding the fact that epistemic and technological benefits can also be expected. A techno-scientific revolution is never made out of pure love of science and knowledge. Other value systems are always involved, particularly economic ones. According to the entrepreneurial nature of the techno-scientific activity, a revolution of this kind requires some type of marketing, be it political, business or social. Without these skills, a techno-scientific revolution does not triumph, independently of the fact that epistemic contributions (discoveries) and relevant technological innovations are also required. The novelty is that the great changes in knowledge are not enough to provoke a revolution.
f): The subject that carries out the techno-scientific revolutions is not an individual subject (like Einstein or Mendel), but a set of social agents. The bonds that hold them together are diverse, but the existence of stable ties and strategic alliances between diverse unions (scientists, technologists, politicians, businessmen, military, etc.) are an indispensable factor for the progress of a techno-scientific revolution. These links are transdisciplinary, unlike scientific revolutions. According to what was said in the previous paragraph, they include agents who are experts in the communication of knowledge to society, or at least their leaders. Hence the crucial importance of the dissemination and reception of techno-scientific innovations, which is manifested in the market, on the one hand, but also at the level of opinions and attitudes of the various social sectors.
g): The public plays an important role in techno-scientific controversies, and not only for the favorable or unfavorable image that is made of the new proposals, but above all as a future user of the innovations that result. Sooner or later, the conflict between two or more techno-scientific paradigms is mediated by the greater or lesser acceptance of the public to their derivative proposals. In most cases this translates into technological artifacts that compete in the market. Since these technological innovations transform the capabilities of human action, the greater or lesser acceptance by society of these modifications becomes one of the criteria for the elucidation of disputes. Note that, since there are different types of public and companies, techno-scientific innovations may have a greater or lesser degree of acceptance and diffusion in one or other societies. The most important technological revolutions (rail, automobile, household appliances, etc.) crystallized in the context of application, when these technologies acquired wide diffusion in several countries. In the case of technoscience, the public is only one of the instances of partial resolution of controversies, together with political, business, institutional, etc. But its role is usually important in the case of the most important techno-scientific innovations.
h): From an axiological perspective, techno-scientific controversies always involve value conflicts in several axiological subsystems, not only in the subsystem of epistemic values. This is because technoscience transforms the world, and more specifically societies. Therefore, techno-scientific changes often have social, political, ecological, legal, etc. consequences, not only epistemic, technological or economic. In some cases they have military derivations and moral and religious implications. On these occasions, techno-scientific controversies tend to be radicalized (military conflicts, refusal to act technoscientifically on the basis of religious beliefs or moral principles). They are the most interesting examples for an in-depth axiological analysis, because they involve different value systems and different agents that promote or prioritize one or other subsystems of values.
i): The fact that technoscience is based on information technology means that, in general, techno-scientific controversies are manifested in the form of opposing and alternative computer proposals. Therefore, in order to choose case studies, it is convenient to look at those controversies that manifest themselves in the form of incompatible computer products (configuration, processing, navigation, storage systems, etc.). Information technologies are a very suitable field for the study of techno-scientific controversies.
On the whole, techno-scientific controversies overflow the notion of controversy: they are contentions, sometimes in the literal sense of the word (military combat), sometimes in a figurative sense: political, economic, social, legal conflicts, etc. They develop in markets, in companies, in institutions, in political media, in society, in the media, and sometimes also in the field of Mars. In such cases, techno-scientific agents are military, for example, states that fight to be great powers and therefore invest heavily in research and development. In general, techno-scientific contests are fought by conglomerates of social agents (lobbies). Therefore, a techno-scientific community that seeks to promote a new paradigm has to ally with other types of social agents. It is no longer enough to control scientific societies or academic power to impose a controversy, as in Newton’s time. Techno-scientific contests develop in many other scenarios and permeate society, sooner or later. Hence, the social component, along with the economic, technological and epistemic, are the four minimum facets to be considered in these controversies. When these controversies become military conflicts, their resolution in the battlefields is usually particularly dramatic and destructive, both for the environment and for the societies involved in the conflict.
In all these cases, we are facing technological systems that are incompatible with each other, in the sense of non-integrable, non-compostable. This would be the techno-scientific transcript of what Kuhn called incommensurability between techno-scientific paradigms. Note, however, that this initial incompatibility is usually alleviated with the course of the
weather. It is also important to emphasize that in the case of techno-scientific contests, the defenders of one or the other paradigm have no qualms about spying on innovations, copying them and appropriating them or using benchmarking strategies. The business impregnation of technoscience results in the combat between techno-scientific paradigms resorting to tactics and strategies very different from those used by the scientific communities in their polemics.
What has been said above must be considered as a first contribution to the subject of techno-scientific controversies. It is about opening a new field of research to science and technology studies, be they philosophical, historical, sociological, political, economic, social, ecological, moral or otherwise. The previous proposals have to be confronted with case studies from the different technoscience modalities. These case studies will allow to correct and improve the preceding suggestions.
Chapter IV
Techno-scientific systems
IV.1: Structure of the techno-scientific practice.
The philosophers of twentieth century science have thoroughly analyzed the structure of scientific knowledge, distinguishing theories, laws, hypotheses, concepts, facts, etc. The inherited conception focused on the linguistic expression of this knowledge, both in natural languages and in mathematical formalizations. The semantic conception continued accepting that theories are the keys of vault of the scientific knowledge, although it happened to analyze them like classes of models, more than like linguistic entities. In recent years new trends in the philosophy of science have emerged: some emphasized the social component of scientific and technological knowledge, including theories, others pointed to the importance of experimentation in obtaining scientific knowledge, criticizing the primacy of theoretical aspects and showing the relevance of experimental tradition in the history of science. Of course, there are many other remarkable trends, which is not the case here listed 171, both in the strict field of philosophy of science and technology and in the more general science and technology studies.
In this chapter we propose to open a new topic for philosophical and interdisciplinary research: to analyze the structure of technoscientific activity. It is a complex issue, because it concerns very different spheres of science and technology, as we have seen in the first two chapters of this book. The proposals that we are going to make next will necessarily be provisional. They will focus on the elucidation of two concepts that we think are necessary for the philosophy of technosciences: techno-scientific systems and techno-scientific actions. These actions are produced within the framework of various techno-scientific systems, so it is necessary to know the structure of the latter to analyze the structure of the techno-scientific activity. We do not doubt that further research will improve these proposals without difficulty and will add other important concepts that are not considered here.
We will only deal with the first epoch of technoscience, as it was configured in the USA at the time of the Second World War. An analysis of the establishment of the system that started and then sustained the macro-science, even if it is superficial, will allow us to delimit several structural components and analyze some relationships between these components. We will start from a systemic conception of technoscience, and therefore holistic. Technoscience requires the constitution and consolidation of science and technology systems (SCyT), of which many other subsystems are part (institutions, companies, agents, equipment, innovations, etc.). But, in addition, we will add an analytical methodology, based on the distinction of basic components of the SCyT system and its integrated subsystems, as well as the techno-scientific actions that are carried out in these systemic frameworks. This analytical system will be concretized in the axiology of technoscience, which will be dealt with in the next chapter.
The progressive implementation of the SCyT system offers several variants depending on the countries and disciplines. This system generates a new form of culture, the techno-scientific culture, which enters into a relationship (and sometimes a collision) with previously existing cultures, including modern scientific culture 172. The components that we are going to distinguish present different variants according to disciplines and systems. SCyT of each country. Even so, there is a general structure that is common to all of them, to a greater or lesser degree. The aim is to elucidate the basic components of this structure, in order to present a first analysis of it, which will subsequently have to be refined and improved, contrasting these conceptual proposals with the specificities of each specific scientific-technological system.
With these caveats, there are several tasks to be carried out. In the first place, it is necessary to define the framework in which the techno-scientific activity takes place. Secondly, it is necessary to specify who are the most relevant techno-scientific agents and what are the characteristic actions of technoscience. Third, we need a theory of techno-scientific actions: we will start from the proposals we have made in the book Science and Values 173. There are other structural components to be distinguished, but the study of these three first ones (S & T system, basic agents and types of actions) together with this theory of action will allow us to clear something of the structure of techno-scientific practice. We will analyze and comment on some of them, not all of them. The topic we are dealing with is very broad and it is about taking some first steps in your study, not reaching the end, much less exhausting it.
IV.2: The emergence of scientific policy.
We saw in Chapter 1 that the macro-sciences arose at the time of the Second World War in the USA. Other countries (Germany, Great Britain) were oriented in a similar direction, although the war prevented the consolidation of the technosciences in them. We also saw that they arise first in the field of physics and mathematics, based on the needs of basic research (cyclotrons, computers) or military activity (radars, trajectories of projectiles, atomic bombs …). These first macroprojects were successful and enabled the development of many others. The alliance between scientists, technologists, military and industrialists proved mutually beneficial, without prejudice to the conflicts that arose, reason why the US Government decided to institutionalize and politically lead said alliance, converting it into a strategic alliance. To this end, the American scientific and technological system was remodeled.
It is usually attributed to Vannevar Bush and his 1945 report, Science, the Endless Frontier 174, the basic design of the North American SCyT system. For our part, we believe that the approval and implementation of the guidelines of this report synthesize the initial phase of macro-science well, despite the fact that authors such as Greenberg have ridiculed the myth of the “creator” of the new science and technology policy, providing some arguments against this founding myth 175. It is true that some North American universities (MIT, Berkeley, Stanford) had already taken steps in that direction. But the extension of this model to the whole country, together with its parliamentary approval for the post-war period, were decisive steps for the consolidation and development of what had already been tried before.
The Bush report interests us as a design of a new framework for scientific and technological activity in the postwar period and also as a theory about the influence of science on society. The design phase, by the way, was complicated and conflicting. The defenders of the previous scientific-technological tradition in the USA (priority of the States before the Federal Government, distrust regarding the intervention of the Government in scientific matters, search of private patrons to support the Universities and research centers, etc.) They opposed considerable resistance to the new ideas, so Bush needed strong political support to be able to carry out his proposals. Even so, Truman took more than four years to implement them. It is important to underline that, once published, this report was a very important macro-scientific action, although it was not done in a laboratory, but in a new scenario of macro science, the scientific policy office and its environment, that is, the White House, the House of Representatives and the Committees that advised Bush 176. The objective of this action was not to generate specific knowledge, but to create the conditions of possibility for it, transforming scientific practice and introducing important changes in its institutional, political framework , financial and social. It was a macro-scientific action because its objective was to transform the structure of American science as a whole. In addition, the Bush report formulated a new theory of scientific practice, which Bush had been assessing from his long experience as a scientist in the first place, and then in top institutional positions at MIT, the Carnegie Institution and the Office of Scientific Research and Development, of which he was director during the Roosevelt presidency.
In the end, the Bush report was assumed politically, after multiple controversies, debates and criticism, which did not cease after the war. Not everything proposed by Bush became a reality and, in addition to what he advocated, many other things were done. But the Bush action initiated a profound transformation of American science and technology, and this on many levels. In the immediate term, it had important institutional effects, since several of the actions suggested, such as the creation of a Scientific Council attached to the Presidency of the country and the creation of a National Coordination Agency (the National Science Foundation, as it was called) were carried out and produced lasting effects. In Kuhnian terms, the creation of the NSF (or those of NASA, the NIH, etc.) can be considered as exemplary achievements of the new techno-scientific paradigm, insofar as it transforms scientific practice. They are not the only canonical exemplars 177. If we compare this institution and its objectives with the creation of the Royal Society in the seventeenth century, we could infer many distinctive features between the scientific revolution and the techno-scientific revolution.
One of the main ones was the emergence of scientific policy, a point that Bush emphasized insistently in his report:
“We do not have a national policy for science. The government has barely begun to use it for the welfare of the nation. There is no body within it responsible for formulating or executing a national scientific policy. There are no standing congressional committees dedicated to this important issue. Science is behind the scenes. It would be necessary to put it in the center of the stage, because in it lies a great part of our hope for the future “178.
This was the main goal of the Bush report: to convince President Roosevelt and Congress of the need to design a post-war scientific policy. The text offered a theoretical foundation for this initiative, as well as a set of strategic actions to implement it.
IV.3: The Bush report.
It is important to remember that Bush, Director at that time of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, who had contributed so much to the promotion of large macro-scientific projects in times of war, wrote his report at the request of the President of the United States. In his letter of November 17, 1944, Roosevelt indicated to Bush four specific points to which he had to answer:
“(1) What can be done in a manner consistent with military security and with the prior approval of the military authorities, to make known to the world as soon as possible the contributions that we made to scientific knowledge during our war effort?
(2) With special reference to the war of science against disease, what can be done today to organize a program in order to continue in the future the work done in medicine and related sciences?
(3) What can the government do today and in the future to support the research activities undertaken by public and private organizations?
(4) Can an effective program be proposed to discover and develop the scientific talent of American youth, so that it is possible to ensure the future continuity of scientific research in this country, at a level comparable to that achieved during the war? “179 .
With this script, Bush focused on the natural sciences, including biology and medicine. The techno-scientific revolution began in the field of physical-natural sciences, taking many decades to reach the social and human sciences. The central thesis of his report was expressed in his letter of reference, as well as in numerous passages of the text:
“Scientific progress is an essential key to our security as a nation, to improve our health, have higher quality jobs, raise our standard of living and progress culturally” 180.
It is well understood that, when Bush talks about scientific progress, he refers above all to what is now called basic research in the field of physical-natural sciences. The second guiding idea, possibly the most novel one, was to affirm that “science can only be effective for the national welfare as a member of a team, whether in conditions of peace or war” 181. It was consecrated at the theoretical what was being the usual practice in the US during the military conflict: the scientists worked closely with engineers, military, businessmen and politicians in their research, leaving the traditional ivory tower of academic science. Bush’s first postulate has been criticized from several points of view, as we will see later. However, almost nobody has dealt with the second. In our view, this “teamwork” has contributed powerfully to modify scientific activity. The daily mestizaje between the diverse subcultures that conform the macroscience and the technoscience modified the habits, the customs and, in part, the values.
Bush affirmed with great energy that the American traditions in science and technology were insufficient to maintain the leadership that the USA had shown throughout the war. Taking medicine as an example, he pointed out that:
“The traditional sources of support for medical research, largely income from donations, grants and private contributions, are decreasing and there is no immediate prospect of a change in this trend. In the meantime, the cost of medical research has risen. If we intend to maintain in medicine the progress that marked the last 25 years, the government should extend its financial support to basic medical research in medical schools and universities “182.
This will be the main answer to Roosevelt’s four questions. The important thing is that the Federal Government leads scientific research providing important budgets. During the war it had been like this, but only in the areas that interested the Department of Defense. It was necessary to extend this new financial structure to all the physical-natural sciences. Said in our own terms: Bush proposed that the government become the main techno-scientific agent of the country. This was the case in the era of macro-science. The Government and Congress created scientific policy commissions and reserved a budget chapter to encourage research and development. It was about deeply involving the executive and legislative branches in the promotion of scientific research. This political-financial turn was Bush’s central proposal to Roosevelt. For our part, we consider it as the first major structural change, imitated by other countries.
Turning to the defense chapter, Bush pointed out that modern warfare was “a combat of scientific techniques”, giving as an example the battles against German submarines, radar and other newly developed weapons. The defense and attack capacity of a nation depends strictly on scientific knowledge. Therefore, he concluded, “there must be more – and more adequate – military research in times of peace” 183. Civil scientists had to continue collaborating with the military:
“The best way to achieve this is through a civilian control organization with close ties to the army and the army, but with direct financing from Congress and explicit powers to initiate military investigations that will complement and strengthen those carried out directly under the control of both forces “184.
The armies would maintain their own research centers, but also proposed to create an organization that would institutionally link the scientists and the military, always under the financial dependence of the Congress, that is, with a specific chapter of the state budget. Bush again insisted that the Government and Congress had to be the main techno-scientific agents, notwithstanding the fact that military agencies dedicated to research still existed.
The design of the new science and technology system was completed with the industrial chapter. For there to be full employment – reasoned Bush – “we must make new products, better and cheaper”. For that, there should be:
“A multitude of new and vigorous companies. But the new products and processes are not fully developed. They are based on new principles and new conceptions, which in turn result from basic scientific research. This is the scientific capital. On the other hand, we can no longer depend on Europe as an important source of this capital. It is evident, then, that more and better scientific research is an essential element for achieving our goal of full employment “185.
The syllogism is forceful and is at the basis of what has subsequently been a linear model of science and social progress. Full employment and the progress of a society can not be achieved without competitive companies. These are not competitive if they are not able to manufacture and sell new and cheap products. Commercial and industrial innovations will only arise if there are technological developments and scientific advances. Therefore, scientific research is the basis for business progress and full employment, just as it was for health and defense. We could criticize more than one of these inferences, but our objective in this section is not criticism, but analysis. We will see that the Bush model is underlain by other postulates, which should be elucidated before proceeding to a critical comment. It is obvious that Bush assumes a market economy and defends a position of economic liberalism. However, there are other budgets that are even more decisive, as we shall see below.
What is remarkable is that Bush speaks of basic scientific research as a new form of capital, scientific capital (or knowledge, as it would now be said). Until the Second World War, the US imported scientific knowledge from Europe and then implemented it technologically, industrially and commercially. After the tremendous war, Europe was going to be decapitalized from the point of view of knowledge. Many of its scientists would die or emigrate, the industry would be devastated and there would be no sources of funding to promote basic research, since European countries would have other priorities, such as the reconstruction of citizen and industrial infrastructures. Therefore, it was essential that the US take over and take control of this new capital market. In fact, he was already doing it, by hiring the best European scientists in their emigration service. The aim was to reaffirm an existing practice, consolidating it for the future as a general strategy. Generally speaking, it can be said that one of the great successes of the US in the twentieth century has been its ability to attract intellectual capital to the country, coming first from Europe, then from other countries. Nowadays, that policy is maintained. The USSR also practiced it but, after its disappearance as a State, the scientific capital market is almost completely dominated by the US, despite the efforts of Canada, Europe and other countries to attract “brains”, as they say.
We are only commenting on the summary that Bush himself made of his report, knowing without a doubt that a president was not going to read the entire text, but the summary. There are, very clearly synthesized, the driving ideas of the scientific policy that Bush proposed to create. The basic pivot is always scientific research, based on a very important and highly innovative reason for the time, at least at those levels of interlocution. Money, natural resources and industries are important forms of capital, but there is a new one that has been cultivated in Europe and not in the US: science. Assuming the risk of incurring an anachronism, we will say that Bush anticipated some of the basic theses of what is now called the knowledge society, understood as a new form of wealth and power:
“How do we increase this scientific capital? In the first place, we must count on many men and women trained in science, because the creation of new knowledge as well as its application to practical purposes depends on them. Second, we must strengthen the basic research centers that are mainly faculties, universities and research institutes “…” Only they devote almost all their efforts to expanding the frontiers of knowledge “186.
Apart from the industrial factories, we must be aware of other types of factories, those that generate knowledge and expand the borders of the noosphere, to put it in terms of Sáez Vacas 187. These are the scientists, with their faculties, universities and research centers. investigation. Investing in science means increasing the noocapital, provided that these investments are directed by competent people in the field. The Scientific Council proposed by Bush was a kind of Board of Directors of scientific capital, which, with government funding, had as its main task to accumulate and increase the new form of capital. In our view, here lies the great theoretical change that underlies, with relative clarity, the Bush report. Scientific knowledge is no longer a good in itself, but an economic good, and in particular a capital. Some commentators have claimed that this terminology was purely metaphorical and that it had been introduced taking into account the possible readers of the report. That rhetorical ability is true. But it is no less true that, in affirming these ideas, Bush was prefiguring one of the most important distinctive features of the techno-scientific revolution: the conversion of scientific knowledge into economic capital and of scientific communities into techno-scientific enterprises. Obviously, he did not take this last step. He limited himself to advocating the close link between academic science and the business world, as indeed occurred in the US during the era of macro-science. But it should be emphasized that Bush anticipated in 1945 one of the basic tenets of current technoscience, which clearly distinguishes it from modern science: knowledge is an economic (and military, and social, and sanitary) good, not just an epistemic good. In our view, this is the main postulate of the Bush theory and the techno-scientific revolution. That is why we affirm that technoscience implies a radical change of the values of science, starting with its main value, scientific knowledge.
Bush also indicated the possibility of promoting scientific research in companies through an adequate tax and patent policy, actions that were put into practice forty years later by the Reagan administration and that, in our opinion, were decisive in the emergence of the technoscience proper, which is based on the privatization of noocapitals and their subsequent profitability through patents, licenses for use, knowledge transfers, stock investments, the sale of techno-scientific companies, etc. Being a staunch supporter of the government’s primacy as a techno-scientific agent, Bush advised “to create a permanent advisory board on science, to advise the executive branch and the legislature on these matters.” 188. On our own terms, political power should to be the main manager of the new capital, scientific knowledge, promoting its creation and its transfer to companies, hospitals, the military sector and, ultimately, society. Although he did not develop the thesis that science greatly increases the cultural level of a country, there is no doubt that it depended on the promotion of science education among young Americans. The launching of a powerful action to grant scholarships for research personnel and the organization of a system of dissemination of scientific knowledge, apart from the classical academic journals, were two other proposals of Bush, in response to the fourth question of Roosevelt:
“The speed or slowness with which we move any scientific frontier will depend on the number of highly qualified and trained scientists who explore it” 189.
And a little later:
“The real ceiling of our productivity of new scientific knowledge and its application in the war against disease and the development of new products and industries, is the available number of trained scientists” 190.
Note that the ultimate goal always consists of expanding the frontiers of knowledge. This is the new form of capital. To increase it, it is necessary to train scientific researchers through scholarships, so that the source of knowledge does not run out. People are those who generate new knowledge, provided they have a good previous training and adequate tools. To the extent that said capital grows in a country, it will be more militarily powerful, healthier, more productive and more cultured, apart from approaching the goal of full employment. The endless border that gave title to the report is the new frontier of knowledge, which the US had to conquer. The project had enough time to serve as the basis for a lasting scientific policy, as it has been, with the logical ups and downs and changes in orientation. The research and development programs promoted by the US government have been changing according to the needs and ideologies of the successive administrations, but the basic structure of the system has remained intact, at least until the mid-1960s.
There would be many more things to comment on in the Bush report, but the ones above are enough for our purpose in this book. We are no longer dealing with specific macro-scientific initiatives like those of the 1930s at Stanford, MIT or Berkeley, some of them with the participation of Vannevar Bush himself. We are faced with a theory of scientific practice, and even more, with the foundations of a new political economy of science. Economically it is inspired by capitalism. Politically in the democracy and in the belief that the political power must lead the conquest of the new frontier of knowledge, because it will bring benefits for the whole country. On the other hand, it is a clearly nationalist theory, or if you prefer Americanist. For Bush it is clear that the US must take over from Europe in the cultivation of scientific knowledge and that it must do better than the Old Continent, closely linking basic research and technological development. The SCyT system is designed as a system created by the USA, for the USA and in the USA. The brief paragraphs that Bush devotes in his report to the international diffusion of scientific knowledge accumulated throughout the war are the weakest in the entire report. Until the 70s there was no scientific policy with international objectives. It is the phase of technoscience, in which the transfer of knowledge and technology to other countries became an instrument for diplomacy and the signing of agreements of interest to American companies.
From the axiological point of view, there is also a central postulate: the freedom of investigation. Bush insists on her again and again throughout the text. He stressed that “internal control of policies, personnel and the method and scope of research in the hands of the institutions in which it is carried out should be left” 191. These institutions were universities and research centers, which Bush considered as “the springs of knowledge” 192. During the war had to impose rigid controls on the production of knowledge, but once the military conflict was over had to return to full investigative freedom. Bush made a true song to the freedom of investigation when affirming that:
“Scientific progress on a broad front results from the free play of free intellects, who work on issues of their own choosing, and according to the way their curiosity about the exploration of the unknown dictates. In any government support plan for science, the freedom of investigation must be preserved “193.
This was the most controversial point of his report at the time of passing it to the approval of the North American Congress. According to Bush, each researcher should be free to choose their own research topics. This contradicted the recent practice, in which the Directors of the macroprograms strictly defined the objectives and programming, as we saw at the end of the second chapter. On the other hand, many parliamentarians believe that the funds that the Congress devoted to research should be subject to the same legal and procedural rules as the rest of the public investments, something that Bush tried to avoid as far as possible, attributing the responsibility of the management to the addresses of the federal agencies and, through them, to the North American Government. It is not easy to foresee in detail the expenses that will arise when developing a research macro project. The scientific discoveries and technological advances that may occur modify the financial needs again and again, normally upwards. That is why Bush wanted science to have the least legal and political obstacles. The conflict between the freedom of research and the social control of science is at the origin of technoscience. Throughout the twentieth century it manifested again and again, especially in the crisis of the 1960s. Bush tried to make the relations between science and society the traditional ones: let the experts do it. However, he affirmed at the same time that the Congress and the Government had to become the main driving agents of the investigation. How will not finance the research, unless it acts for philanthropic reasons, as a patron? The congressmen, the military and the businessmen always tried to impose their own criteria and priorities, contrary to the autonomy of the science that Bush claimed. The tension between freedom and control is one of the conflicts of values typical of technoscience.
IV.4: New techno-scientific agents.
We will dispense with the historical details of the constitution of the North American system of science and technology to analyze its basic structure, as it was configured at the time when technoscience appeared, that is to say at the beginning of the 1980s (see table 1). We can distinguish six main areas of action, with different agents in each of them.
(a): The White House had its Scientific Council, as Bush had advocated in 1945. In addition, the Executive Office of the President had its own scientific-technological policy office, linked to the National Academy of Sciences and Congress. Both the Senate and the House of Representatives had their S & T Committees, usually with the presence of scientists and engineers, apart from the politicians themselves. In addition, the Congress had the famous Library of Congress, an Office of Evaluation of Technologies and another Office that was in charge of Accounting Control. The Patent Office, created years before, traditionally depended on the Department of Commerce, which had been one of the most active in the 1930s when it came to financing scientific research. We can summarize the structure of this first area of the SCyT system by saying that there is an alliance, not without problems, between the executive power, the legislative power and the emerging power of scientists and engineers. There would not have been macro-science in the postwar period without the insertion of prominent scientists at the heart of executive and legislative power. Obviously, this politicized science. Maintaining the axiological neutrality of science from the Second World War is a remarkable ingenuity. Interestingly, it is the time when many philosophers and scientists insist on the strict separation between science and values.
(b): The Federal Agencies dedicated to science and technology were many. Each one of them was in charge of some great programs, although there were also conflicts between them, such as the Genome project. The NSF, NASA, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Institutes of Health and the agencies of the Departments of Defense, Trade, Energy, Agriculture, Labor, etc. stood out. All these federal agencies maintained close collaborative relationships with universities, governmental research centers, independent research centers and, of course, industries, with their laboratories and their R & D departments. The Patent Office began to resemble a knowledge bank, at least with regard to R & D. The Library of Congress played a similar role in terms of traditional scientific knowledge. The private foundations completed the map of the North American S & T system, contributing to the financing of specific programs, to the incorporation into the system of outstanding scientists or to the provision of large equipment. This was the basic map of the second level of the North American S & T system. Of course, some of these institutions and corporations also brought together complex structures. These include the management departments and the advisory committees. Scientists and engineers began to compete with each other for having a place in these commissions and decision instances, not only for making discoveries in the laboratories and publishing them quickly in the most prestigious journals.
(c): The military organizations dedicated to R & D continued to exist after the war and its growth was continued, except in the decade 1965-75. It should be noted that since the 1980s their budgets have increased rapidly, so that the militarized technoscience forms a third sector of the North American SCyT system. This third area is apparently separate from the others, especially the market and society, but in fact maintains very close links with many civil and industrial techno-scientific agents. A reflection on technoscience and on techno-scientific systems that does not take into account the technical-military sector is clearly insufficient. Specifying its internal structure is not usually easy, due to lack of public information. However, there are enough case studies to analyze military technosciences.
(d): A fourth area is the business itself. At first it was strictly industrial. In the last quarter of the century it was evolving towards the economy of information and knowledge. Until the 60s, it intervened complementing the initiatives of the government and federal agencies, as well as signing research contracts with universities and research centers, as in the industrial era. From the 80s, techno-scientific companies began to be the protagonists in research, designing their own R & D policies. The State continued to play an important role in the SCyT system, but rather as a catalyst rather than as an engine, with the exception of some macroprograms, which continued to be the responsibility of federal scientific institutions. At this time two major developments occurred in this area of the SCyT system: the emergence of new sources of funding (venture capital entities, stock exchange, etc.) and the incorporation of some scientists to the Boards of Directors of these companies, with the consequent conflicts of interest. In section II.3 we had the opportunity to comment on these changes.
(e): The fifth area of the SCyT system is the market, in which techno-scientific innovations conveniently redesigned for civilian use are marketed. This is the case of radars, computers, telecontrol systems, robotics, synthetic fibers, polymers and some commonly used devices, such as television, telephone, microwave or aircraft. From that moment, the acceptance by consumers of new techno-scientific inventions becomes a decisive criterion for the evaluation of techno-scientific actions. Research and development are not enough, it is also necessary to consider innovation. The design of the S & T policies of private companies not only includes scientific and technological aspects, but also financial and mercantile ones. In the end, you have to sell the knowledge, it is not enough to produce it. This is the era in which macro science is giving way to technoscience proper, which is characterized by the greater role of private initiative. Knowledge is not only a capital, but also a commodity in the market. There began to be large private deposits of knowledge, not just public deposits such as libraries and patent offices. Overall, since the 1980s this fourth area of the SCyT system began to be the main one. That is why we speak of a systematic privatization of knowledge, which breaks with the traditions of modern science.
(f): The sixth and last area that we are going to distinguish is society. Traditionally, the relationships between science and society had been channeled through educational systems, and in particular through universities and their teaching and transmitting knowledge function. We already saw that Bush recommended reinforcing institutions of higher education, which was done. American universities became the best in the world in the post-war period. It also supported the dissemination of scientific knowledge in society, which was also carried out, although through new communication channels, which are specific to technoscience. It is the moment in which large platforms emerge to present the techno-scientific novelties (Nature, Science, etc.) as well as magazines, magazines and supplements of quality disclosure. Cinema and science fiction literature also played an important role throughout the 20th century.
As a whole, the traditional educational system was superimposed on a second system to disseminate knowledge, based on the new means of information and communication. From the 80s, the presentation of the great scientific and technological advances through the mass media became a new techno-scientific practice. Apart from the great researchers, good disseminators and communicators of techno-scientific knowledge began to be appreciated. It is a new structural change, which replaces the presentations of scientific advances with notable people, typical of modern science, by media campaigns to launch such novelties, in order to quickly reach the whole of society. Scientific and technological knowledge is disseminated more and better, but society is conceived as a passive entity, that is, as a simple receptor of information and knowledge. We have already seen in chapter 2 that, since the mid-1960s, society had abandoned that passivity and began to be critical of some aspects of the SCyT system, beginning with its dependence on military organizations, and continuing with the environmental impacts produced by some innovations. techno-scientific Since then, it can be said that the conflicts between technoscience and society are part of the structure of SCyT systems.
This first sketch of the basic structure of the North American system of science and technology shows the profound transformation that took place after the war, following the master lines of Vannevar Bush’s plan. The scientific-technological research was strongly promoted by the Government and the Congress through the federal agencies, most of which had very considerable budgets to develop their R & D activities. Subsidiarily, many other agents collaborated with this scientific policy. This new design of the SCyT system led to profound changes in scientific practice, among which we will mention the following:
1.- Very considerable budgetary allocations for R & D. Federal support grew by 14% per year in constant dollars between 1953 and 1961. As Bruce LR Smith points out, “growth was both a condition and a part of the doctrine,” 194 as it allowed discrepant scientists to silence and favor to the enthusiasts. Budgetary policy is a basic component of S & T systems, both for the Government and the Congress and the Federal Agencies.
2.- Creation of Commissions for the design of scientific policies and for decision-making in Congress. This new techno-scientific agent, the Advisory Commissions, is of enormous importance in the new SCyT systems. Their functions can be very diverse, depending on the institutions or companies they advise, but they always meet three: guarantee the presence of scientific communities in decision making, propose new initiatives and resolve conflicts that may arise between different agents of the system SCyT. The presence in these Commissions entails power. The struggles to access them are commonplace, and not only between research lines that compete with each other, but also between scientific disciplines.
3.- Promotion, financing and development of strategic projects from the National Science Foundation and other Federal Agencies. This began the tradition of priority research lines, which has deeply marked the structure of techno-scientific activity. Like the Government and the Congress, the various Federal Agencies defined their objectives, indicated and financed their priority lines and developed specific programs to achieve those objectives. Through these actions there was a strong interrelation between the scientific and engineering communities and the new agents of the S & T system. In addition, the initial conditions that would later make scientific-technological advances possible were created. In the age of technoscience, the greatest advances in knowledge occur in those areas that have previously been chosen as priorities. We are facing a progress directed, and even planned, with the peculiarity that the direction does not always correspond to the scientists. As we saw in chapter 2, those scientists who assume these functions experience a mutation as scientists. The scientist-manager brings a new form of scientific subculture.
4.- Promotion of projects and research contracts, making the research teams compete at the federal, not state, level. This forced the scientists to make a previous design of what they wanted to do (state of the matter to be investigated, starting hypothesis, objectives to be achieved, deadline for this, human and economic resources needed, methodology to be applied, work plan, results expected scientific and technological, etc.). The Universities and Public and Private Research Centers that wanted to advance in science or technology had to adapt to the Government’s policies or make proposals that would be interesting for the NSF and the other Agencies. Not without rejections, research became heavily mediated by scientific-technological policies. In addition, there was a standardization of how to make research proposals, generating protocols and forms that represent authentic symbolic generalizations of techno-scientific practice. Instead of proposing hypotheses, theories, etc., the scientists have had to first propose research projects, some of which are acceptable to the Agencies, others not. Mastering these new forms, which are not mathematical or conceptual, but practical, became a new requirement for scientists. With the advent of technoscience, all these formats have been computerized and telematized. A significant part of the researchers’ work time is currently dedicated to completing these forms. From the point of view of modern science, it may seem a minor work, compared to the excellence of work in the laboratory.
However, to be techno-scientific you have to be an expert in these new symbolic generalizations, which are as important as traditional scientific languages. In fact, the evaluations of the applications are carried out in the first place for reasons of form (having completed the templates well). Only when this threshold has been passed do questions of scientific content begin to be analyzed.
5.- Creation of new professions, such as advisors and experts in scientific policy management, as well as in the evaluation of science and technology, recycling some scientists and engineers. The weight of these new techno-scientific agents grew as the techno-scientific system consolidated, giving rise to the dreaded macro-science bureaucracy. Today, technoscience has generated an immense info-bureaucracy. The multiple WEB pages are a new scenario of techno-scientific activity, as it happens in other sectors of social life.
7.- Extension to the research projects of the anonymous and peer evaluation system, traditional in the scientific communities to publish in the journals. The creation of Agencies for the evaluation and follow-up of research led to a revolutionary change in terms of scientific practice, as the evaluation processes became standardized and formalized. But more important still is the change in the structure of evaluation committees, especially in private techno-scientific companies. In this case, the evaluation criteria are never only epistemic. The axiological plurality of science is manifested empirically in the various evaluation protocols used to make decisions, choose among alternative proposals, allocate funds, hire people, establish categories within the research staff, etc. Technoscience has not only modified the context of research and application, but also that of evaluation.
8.- Promotion of patents and the transfer of knowledge to industry, always through economic incentives. Roosevelt’s question to Bush about how to publicly disseminate the secret knowledge that had occurred throughout the war pointed to a central theme of technoscience: the dissemination and dissemination of scientific knowledge.
We could continue to enumerate specific changes in techno-scientific practice, especially if, apart from the public sector, we dealt with the private sector of R & D, but the previous seven are more than enough to give us an idea of the profound differences between technoscience and science. traditional science Of course, we do not intend to claim that the seven previous points come directly from Vannevar Bush’s report. Nor that there were no precedents for this type of action 195. What we try to characterize are the differences between concrete techno-scientific systems and academic science prior to the Second World War. This plurality of subsystems was gradually established and consolidated during the second half of the twentieth century, but here we are not so interested in the steps that were taken for this, but the joint structural change. Today, SCyT systems, with all the subsystems imbedded in them, are consolidated in many countries. Although they always evolve and change, they maintain a series of invariants that allow them to be characterized with a certain degree of precision. In any case, there is no doubt that the current SCyT systems show very important structural differences when compared with the scientific institutions of the modern era. Then there was an academic science. Nowadays it is possible to affirm that we are before a post-academic science, as Ziman says 196, although this denomination does not seem to us the most successful to understand the background of the transformations that have taken place throughout the 20th century.
IV.5: Bush’s linear model as a theory of science.
Given these details, let’s return to the Bush report, since it not only provides a series of proposals for action to transform the S & T system, but also a theory of science, which has been called the linear model. It is not a philosophical theory, because it does not focus on scientific knowledge, but on the social function of science, and more specifically on basic research. The Bush theory has served as the basis for the new scientific policy and the changes in the structure of scientific activity that were made throughout the 20th century and that we have just enumerated and commented very succinctly. Technoscience has not had a logical, epistemological or methodological foundation, as many philosophers tried to give to science throughout the 21st century. Its justification has been praxeological, or if you want pragmatic, and more specifically economic, political and military, which is a new difference between technoscience and science, of great significance for philosophy.
The Bush theory can be criticized from many points of view. It is not a rigorous theory, nor precise. Nor is it appropriate to the data offered by the history of the relationship between science and technology. As many authors have stressed, it is not true that basic research always generates technological development. Very often the opposite happens: technology comes first, and then scientific theories come. But the truth is that the Bush theory has been useful and effective, since it has contributed considerably to transform the world, in this case the science and technology system itself. It is a technological theory, not a scientific theory. It’s social engineering, to put it in terms of Popper. Despite all its inadequacies, it remains operational and effective, since many scientists, technologists and experts in scientific politics continue to accept it as if it were enunciating the fundamental “laws” of techno-scientific practice. The criticisms and “refutations” of historians, philosophers and sociologists have had very little effect on the theory, and this for reasons that can be easily understood: they have not been made from the techno-scientific paradigm itself and therefore have not even been addressed. Neither have provided alternatives, so, in general, have been ineffective, as well as uncomfortable. The “Sokal affair” and the recent “wars of science” show the rejection of the hard core of technoscience with regard to this type of criticism, which is made from the periphery of the system, if not from the outside. From an argumentative point of view, the scientific ignorance of the critics is insisted on. But the function of these debates is to reinforce the basic structure of the SCyT system and renew its fundamental postulates, which have their origin in the report by Vannevar Bush.
We saw that Bush advocated a new independence from Europe, not political, but scientific 197. The very title of his report, the endless border, touched the foundational fiber of the US of America. Science was the new gold mine, where the foundation of economic capital and the basis of military, sanitary and commercial progress can be found. As he explained his thesis, he was proposing a strategy of political-scientific action with clear nationalist connotations:
“Today is more true than ever that basic research is the one that marks the step to progress. During the nineteenth century, the naive mechanical talent of the Yankees, based mainly on the basic discoveries of European scientists, made the technical arts advance a lot. Now the situation is different. A nation that depends on the others in its new scientific knowledge will be slower in its industrial progress and weaker in its competitive position in world trade, regardless of the mechanical abilities it possesses “198.
The good situation of the US in terms of technology was not enough. It was required to go to the very core of technological, economic and military progress, which lies in scientific knowledge, which is only obtained by promoting basic research. This becomes the main economic engine. We are facing what we can call the basic tenets of techno-scientific activity, or if you want the first formulation of the metaphysical commitments of the techno-scientific paradigm, to use Kuhn’s terminology. Note that laws of nature are not being formulated, even if they are invoked. Unlike Newton, Bush is enunciating the metaphysical principles of a new social philosophy, not a natural philosophy. These principles have become models (in the sense of Kuhn) of the progress of a society, and not only heuristic, but ontological. We have verified that the techno-scientific revolution generated new symbolic generalizations (indicators, scientometrics, impact indexes, quantitative studies on science and technology, etc.) and also gave rise to exemplary actions (foundation of the NSF, establishment of a competitive system for obtaining funds for research, the creation of techno-scientific companies, etc.), subsequently imitated in the successive countries that were adhering to the new paradigm. Many of the components of the techno-scientific paradigm, at least in relation to its first epoch, that of macro-science, have their expression in the Bush report, and for that reason we consider that text as the first theoretical expression of the techno-scientific revolution.
Although Bush alludes again and again to scientific knowledge, the “principles” he enunciates and the consequences or laws that derive from them are all related to scientific-technological activity. Bush is not analyzing the structure of the physical, chemical or biological world, but that of a very specific sector of social life: science. The practical principles he enunciated (his social metaphysics) generate laws, but not laws of nature, but laws for society (budgetary, fiscal, economic), which had to be approved by Congress and the Senate and put into practice by the Government and its Agencies. As we have insisted throughout this book, technoscience does not pretend to dominate or transform nature, but society. Bush has no doubt that knowledge of the laws of nature and basic research are the most appropriate instruments to transform and improve society, understanding as such the American society. His social metaphysics focuses on this thesis. From it emanate their recommendations and proposals, always with a view to two objectives:
1.- The predominance of the US over others, both in terms of military power and industry and trade. This primacy had been achieved in the war. It had to be consolidated in the post-war period.
2.- The health and the internal economic progress of the country.
Bush does not advocate knowledge for knowledge, nor the search for truth. These are not the objectives of technoscience, but instrumental means to achieve the new objectives. Nor is he a follower of the Baconian program: knowing nature in order to master it better. The technoscience that it institutes and theoretically bases has other ontological commitments and, of course, other objectives. Half a century later, when the techno-scientific revolution has triumphed and spread through other countries, although US dominance remains clear, it can be said that these objectives have been achieved, especially the first, which was the main one. We are not saying that the victory of the US in the Cold War against the USSR and its current scientific, technological, military, political, industrial and commercial hegemony is a direct effect of the solid establishment of the techno-scientific revolution in that country. of the Second World War. This is just one of the factors that have influenced the change of power relations worldwide, but it is certainly one, and very important. The important thing is to be clear that the objectives of the Bush action are about power and practice, not about nature and knowledge. For technoscience, scientific knowledge is a means, not an end. This is one of the basic differences between technoscience and science.
The Bush action was based on a theory, which we will now analyze in more detail. It is usually called a linear model, and we have already mentioned that it has received multiple criticisms. For our part, we could also express our total disagreement with this model, which does not correspond to reality, but with it we would achieve nothing, except to satisfy our good conscience. Therefore, our perspective is different. In the first place, we are interested in analyzing the main postulates of this theory. In the second place, we intend to show that there are non-explicit postulates, or if they prefer to be hidden, and that they are determinants for the further development of techno-science and the scientific-technological policies that have driven this development.
In the studies on science and technology, various schemes have been proposed to synthesize the general structure of the Bush report, based on which the techno-scientific system was built in the United States. One, which fits well with the text of the report, insists on its socio-economic aspect and distinguishes six links:
Basic Research -> Applied Research -> Technological Development -> Productive Development -> Economic Competitiveness -> Social Progress 199.
It is important to note that Bush’s original theory was this. Social progress depends on the creation of jobs, business and trade, which in turn depend on the invention of new products and therefore on technological innovations, which only arise if there is applied scientific research and, as a foundation of it, basic research. These are the initial postulates.
Another of the proposed schematizations to reconstruct the linear model is made from a more technological perspective. It adds an important facet, on which we will return later, the use of technological products:
Basic Research Applied Research Technological Development Product Development Production Use 200.
In our view, we can introduce some improvements in both schematizations to collect more aspects, on the one hand distinguishing other links in the chain, on the other introducing additional lines of chaining. From the outset, we will replace the term “product development” with the term “innovation”, nowadays more common. Innovation means a technological development that is going to be launched on the market. Therefore, it incorporates other factors, such as financing and marketing. Also, between the production and the use it is convenient to introduce intermediate stages, namely, the distribution and sale of the product. In order not to complicate the scheme much, we will summarize these phases by means of the term “commercialization”. On the other hand, it is assumed that the use of technological products satisfies the needs of people and generates well-being, one of the basic components of social progress. Therefore, we will choose to combine both schemes and use the following linear model as a starting point:
Basic research Applied Research Technological Development Innovation Production Marketing Use (or consumption) Social Progress.
This would be the general scheme underlying the Bush report. However, Roosevelt asked him specific questions, and one of them referred to the relationship between science and military institutions. In this case we would have a quite different scheme:
Basic research Applied Research Technological Development Innovation Production Weapon capacity Use (or dissuasion) Military power.
Well understood that, apart from those who use techno-scientific weapons, there are those who suffer its effects, namely the victims. This type of “users” must also be taken into account, since military techno-scientific actions can produce goods for some, but they certainly generate evil for others.
A third variant of the scheme represents the impact of science on business activity, an issue explicitly considered by Bush in his report and central to our inquiry into technoscience:
Basic Research Applied Research Technological Development Innovation Business Competitiveness Production Marketing Consumption Economic Benefits
A fourth referred to health, and Bush’s proposal can be summarized as follows: Basic research Applied Research Technological Development
Innovation Production Clinical use Health.
We could propose other specific lines, both from the Bush text and from further developments in American science policy, for example in relation to the environment. Overall, more than linear, we are facing an arborescent model, where basic scientific research is always at the root and technology constitutes the trunk. The branches of the tree are some social sectors (society in general, defense, industry, health, etc.) which are directly influenced by techno-scientific innovations, and therefore the basic research that sustains them. It should be emphasized that all ramifications are based on scientific research and technological innovation. One more reason to talk about technoscience. It should also be noted, as far as the axiology is concerned, that the assessments that can be made of techno-scientific actions depends very much on the place where the evaluator is located. For example, if he is the one who suffers a military action or who is injured by a medical intervention, his assessment of technoscience will be highly negative, as is logical. We will conclude from this that technoscience is not perceived (or valued) equally from one place in the structure of the science and technology system than from another. This does not imply a relativism, but a structural perspectivism. Since there are different structural components, the assessments made will be coherent with the place of the system from which they are carried out. Therefore, dissensions and value conflicts are guaranteed in technoscience.
These early schematizations, although incorporating more analytical nuances, have two important drawbacks. In the first place, they do not represent the role of the Administration and its scientific policies to set the system in motion. Therefore, new components must be incorporated:
Departments of Technoscientific Policy Parliament (budgets, laws, control) Government (actions of techno-scientific policy, Agencies, appointments) Financing Basic research Applied Research Technological Development Innovation Transformation (of armies, companies, industry health, societies, etc.).
In our view, this last outline makes explicit the important role of governments in the techno-scientific development, through their scientific-technological policy services, during the first epoch of technoscience. It also synthesizes the last links of the previous models in the general concept of transformation of the world, which seems key to us to talk about technoscience. These transformations can be positive or negative, of course.
But, secondly, we must not forget that at the stage of technoscience itself, another type of agent emerged, the techno-scientific company, which tends to replace government as the engine of the SCyT system, except in the case of scientific macroprojects. It is the moment when large multinational companies are emerging that design and implement private scientific policies, as well as small companies that do the same. In such cases the scheme is still valid, but small changes have to be made:\
Departments of Techno-Scientific Policy Board of Directors Scientific Management Financing Applied Research Technological Development Innovation Commercialization Economic benefits.
The main novelty is the disappearance of basic research (although some funds can be devoted to it) and the prioritization of applied research and innovation. Assuming that governments assume the task of encouraging basic research and that the results of the same are made public, private techno-scientific policies prioritize technological innovation and the market, while privatizing techno-scientific knowledge. It should not be forgotten that since the 1980s private financing in R & D exceeds public financing, at least in the US. That is why we say that the appearance of this new motive agent of technoscience characterizes the second epoch of technoscience, nowadays in full expansion.
So far the first formal improvements that could be made to the linear model. In all of them there is a constant component: financing. Basic research requires financing, be it public or private. Without economic resources to enhance it, the machinery does not start up and science does not generate the social benefits (military, business, etc.) that Bush assumes. Therefore, the financing structure of scientific research is decisive when analyzing an SCyT system. A technoscience financed exclusively by the State, as in the USSR, is not the same, a technoscience financed 50% by the State and companies, as in the US in the 1980s, or a technoscience financed at 50% by companies and 50% on the Exchange. This last financing structure is the most typical of American technoscience at the end of the century, while macro-science is distinguished by basically state funding.
Leaving aside budgets and ideological criticism, there is another important formal flaw in the Bush model: the linearity itself or chaining of the various components. The model improves if we consider it as arborescent and introduce new components, but even so its linearity does not correspond to real techno-scientific practice. It happens rather that many of the components that we have distinguished and sequenced affect each other. For example: users are a continuous source of innovation, especially in the field of technology; From the society emerge new lines of scientific policy action, for example from environmental groups and NGOs. Although it is represented linearly, the model is more complex. It would be necessary to opt for models in which the various components influence each other, although in varying degrees and with asymmetries. A possible scheme would be the following:
Scheme 2
We distinguish several relevant sectors in a SCyT system such as the North American: the political, the financial, the scientific-technological, the business, the legal, the military, the market and society. The flows and interactions can occur between all of them, although the greater or lesser relevance of one or the other flow arrows allows to distinguish between different types of S & T systems. For example, in the era of macro-science, the main flow comes from governments and their agencies. On the other hand, in technoscience, private companies and financial entities are the ones that take the most prominence. Within each of these sectors there may be different relevant agents, so it would be necessary to analyze the structure of said agents in each country, in each discipline and in each historical moment. From our point of view, it is fundamental to include society among technoscientific agents, not only because ultimately the majority of actions are directed to it, but also because society is not passive with respect to technoscience. In a representative democracy, it may prefer one or the other politicians (rulers, parliamentarians) depending on their respective scientific policies. It can also generate NGOs that criticize and influence in part on technoscience. The democratization of science would mean a greater flow from society to the instances where decisions are made about technoscience. Finally, in society are the end users of techno-scientific products, whose valuations and innovations of use are of great importance for an advanced S & T system.
This model does not correspond to Bush’s conceptions but tries to correct some of its defects. Here we will limit ourselves to propose it, without developing it and without showing its potentialities to represent schematically some of the great changes of the techno-scientific system after the crisis of the Bush model from the 70s and the advance of the techno-scientific companies, based on a new contraro social science, as we saw in chapter 2. A more refined analysis would allow us to distinguish additional sectors. In chapter 5 we will propose some improvements, although only in the field of values. We presuppose that the different technoscientific agents have their own value systems, so the interactions between them involve a certain axiological miscegenation. The value system of technoscience is composed of several subsystems of values that are not hierarchical to each other, at least in principle. De facto, there is always some subsystem of values (military, business, political) that prevails over others.
In any case, we deny that basic research is the engine that draws the other nodes of the system. In some cases it can happen like that, but generally not. There are occasions, like the Second World War, in which the main engine of the system are military institutions. In other occasions they are the companies, or the politicians, or even the jurists. Legal reform such as the liberalization of a patent system can have an impact on the entire SCyT system. Scheme 2 is purely formal and should be implemented in each specific case, pondering the greater or lesser influence of each of its components. The interesting thing is to analyze the changes in structure experienced by technoscience throughout the 20th century, as well as to propose new structural changes in current technoscience. We will not get to much in this work, but at least we will take some steps in that direction.
IV.6: Plurality of techno-scientific agents.
The investigation of the new framework for techno-scientific activity has shown us many things, among them the existence of new agents and new types of actions in technoscience. Classical scientific actions were reduced to observe, measure, experiment, demonstrate, formulate conjectures, contrast them empirically and theorize, and then publish, disseminate, apply, teach, etc. According to the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification, the philosophy of twentieth-century science was exclusively interested in the results of such actions, that is, in observations, measurements, experiments, demonstrations, conjectures , tests, theories, publications, applications, etc. The philosophy of science should only deal with scientific knowledge, and not even its elaboration, dissemination and learning, but only its formulation. It was a positivist philosophy of science in the strong sense of the word, because it only interested the results, not the processes that led to those results and rejected others.
These philosophical assumptions are inadequate for technoscience. The techno-scientific revolution is characterized by a change in the structure of scientific activity. It also transforms knowledge, but these modifications are not as significant as the transformations of scientific practice. As we have been checking throughout this work, the technosciences incorporate new agents and new actions. Returning to Latour’s question, who does science ?, we will say that technoscience is not only made by scientists and engineers, but also by governments, companies, experts in science policy and in science and technology management, the military, the jurists who define the legal frameworks for the techno-scientific activity, the ecologists who answer some actions and results of the technoscience, the financiers and patrons who support the investigations, etc. The techno-scientific enterprise is an activity that covers a spectrum of professions much wider than that of the scientific-technological communities of modern science. Even citizens and users, although they do not do science directly, can influence techno-scientific activity. Some countries systematically measure the opinion and attitudes of citizens with respect to technoscience. The rejection or doubts of society regarding the experts in science and technology, previously unquestioned, is one of the most important problems of technoscience. It tends to transform societies, as we have stressed time and again, but societies have ceased to be passive and are not easily transformed, let alone dominated by technoscience. The social power of technoscientific devices, for example the military, is enormous, but it raises more and more criticisms and dissents.
Philosophically speaking, it is necessary to affirm the plurality of techno-scientific agents, or in more classical terms, the plurality of the subject of technoscience. However, not all of these agents are equally relevant. Therefore, we distinguish between agents integrated in the core of technoscience and peripheral or orbital agents. In the case of military macro-science, the core includes at least five types of agents: military, political, scientific, engineering and industrial. The civil macrociencia dispenses with the first, but includes managers and even experts in law. In the case of techno-scientific companies, financiers, entrepreneurs, managers, lawyers, scientists and engineers are part of the core of technoscience, although political and institutional support should also be available, if necessary, and a good social reception. The latter can manifest itself in the market (consumers), but also as public opinion. Hence the enormous importance of the social perception of technoscience. On the periphery of technoscience are the environmental groups, the media, foundations and intermediation companies. In specific disciplines we must also count on cultural, moral and religious factors, since they have a great impact on public opinion, and may even have it in the market. The internal equilibrium of the plural agent of technoscience is difficult to achieve, as shown by the existence of continuous conflicts, both in the nucleus that directs techno-scientific actions and in the periphery. What must be ruled out is the existence of a subject of technoscience that is autonomous and coherent, in the manner of the Cartesian or Kantian subject. The structural complexity of the techno-scientific activity is immediately reflected as the complexity of the techno-scientific agent. Hence the importance of equipment (research, management, financial support, etc.). When Bush told Roosevelt that scientists had to team up with other social agents, he foreshadowed one of the main structural features of technoscience.
IV.7: Techno-scientific actions.
A philosophy of technoscientific activity can advance very little if it does not have a theory of action, and also uses it. In section I.7 we discuss the definition of technology proposed by Quintanilla and add some improvements. It is now a matter of applying those ideas to techno-scientific actions, previously specifying the notion of action, which in this definition was not analyzed.
In this section we characterize technology as a system of regulated, industrial actions linked to science, carried out by agents, with the help of instruments, and intentionally oriented towards the transformation of other systems in order to achieve valuable results avoiding consequences and unfavorable risks. That definition is still valid for technoscience, but it must be completed with the various distinctive features that we have established in sections II.1 and II.2. Therefore, the term “industrial” has to be eliminated, because we saw that technoscience is linked more to the informational society than to industrial society, unlike macro-science. This does not mean that it does not have industrial components, but that informational ones predominate. Therefore, we will replace “industrial” with “informational”.
Secondly, technoscience is not only linked to science, but also to engineering, politics, business and, where appropriate, military organizations. This implies a new modification in definition 3, which should be left open, without closing the number of agents involved in the core of the techno-scientific activity, because we see that this nucleus can include more than five basic agents, depending on the type of techno-scientific company that we are studying.
Third, we are interested not only in technical or technological achievements or applications, but also in more complex entities, the science and technology systems (SCyT). According to the theory of systems, the SCyTs integrate a great diversity of subsystems, for example the diverse agents that we have distinguished in the inner section. A government agency, an R & D company, a university, a laboratory, a particle accelerator, a computer equipment, an advisory or evaluation board, etc., are subsystems of the SCyT system. Each of the components of the SCyT system is in turn a system, which can be political, business, military, scientific, technological, etc. On the other hand, also objects investigated by technoscience are systems, be they mathematical, cosmological, physical, chemical, medical, biological, geological, economic, social, technological or otherwise. Our basic ontology is systemic, since we accept that the framework in which techno-scientific activities are developed, the SCyT system, affects the other subsystems that are part of it, giving meaning to concrete techno-scientific actions. Therefore, we are interested not only in technological achievements or applications, but also in technological systems, whether small or large. We will replace the term to be defined by the notion “technological system”, meaning the SCyT system and all its subsystems, which are many and very diverse.
The rest of definition 3 is still valid, so we can propose as a provisional characterization of technoscience the following:
Def. 4: “A techno-scientific system is a system of regulated, informational actions linked to science, engineering, politics, business, armies, etc. These actions are carried out by agents, with the help of instruments and are intentionally oriented to the transformation of other systems in order to achieve valuable results avoiding unfavorable consequences and risks “.
We emphasize again that it is not a definition in the logical sense of the term, but simply an initial characterization, which allows us to clarify minimally the concept of “technoscience”, as opposed to “technology” and “technique”. Regarding the differences between science and technoscience, sections II.1 and II.2 were sufficiently explicit.
Successful or not, definition 4 is an analytical instrument that can be useful to develop a philosophy of technoscience, as was our initial purpose. We insist from the beginning that this philosophy is oriented to scientific activity, rather than to knowledge. Therefore, we have to clarify minimally the concept of action that we use, always from a philosophical perspective.
In this regard, in a previous book we have proposed some rudiments of action theory 201, which, with very few modifications, we will continue to assume and use when talking about techno-scientific actions. With this, both notions are clear, that of “action” and that of “technoscience”. The point is now to show that this conception of techno-scientific actions is broad enough to reflect the great diversity of aspects of techno-scientific practice.
That theory of action distinguishes several components, one of which is the results of the actions, but not the only one, and sometimes not the most important one. There are at least twelve components of techno-scientific actions: the agents, the actions, what is done, the entities that are acted on, the instruments, the context or situation, the initial and contour conditions, the intentions, the objectives, the results, the consequences of the action and the risks that could arise from it. Therefore, the actions are represented by n-uplas of twelve or more components, A = Ai, some of which will be more relevant than others when analyzing a techno-scientific action A. The actions take place along the time, A (t) = Ai (t) , which does not imply that we conceive them as linear processes or sequences of events. The components can change and feed each other. That is why we speak of systems of actions, not isolated actions. For example: the initial results of an investigation may require the incorporation of new agents (as in the Manhattan project), of instruments (as in the ENIAC project and the Genome project), of different initial conditions (a new legislation for patents, the reduction of R & D activities, new financing …) and even objectives (the space telescope became an instrument to observe the planets, not only the galaxies). Techno-scientific actions are developed over time and its components are changing in that direction: a certain result, for example the discovery of the spontaneous fission of plutonium in the Manhattan project, can radically modify the direction of research. The project remains the same, but there is a change in the agents, the instruments, the initial and contour conditions, the objectives, etc.
On the other hand, we must not only deal with classical scientific actions (observe, measure, experiment, publish, present a project, publish, patent, etc.), but also pre-actions, that is, the design of experiments, the presentation of projects, their realization, their results, etc. We will not enter into these questions here, because they have been widely exposed in the book Science and Values. In conjunction with definition 4, we will use that theory as an instrument for our analyzes of technoscience. Being very general, it can be applied to experimental actions in laboratories, to communicative actions in scientific communities (congresses, magazines, telematic networks), to scientific-technological policy actions, to the industrial implementation of techno-scientific innovations, to the dissemination of knowledge in society, etc. The usefulness of these two conceptual instruments with which we have endowed is worthy of consideration: given a large techno-scientific system or action, for example a scientific macroproject, we can analyze one by one the different types of actions necessary for its development, as well as the components of their actions.
Instead of only dealing with what is done in laboratories or the knowledge that emerges from them (facts, measurements, experiments, hypotheses, theories), we will also have to study what happens in other technoscience scenarios: scientific policy offices , committees of the Congress, committees of evaluation of the pre-projects, companies interested in its development, etc. Contrary to what is usually thought, these new scenarios are part of the interior of technoscience and it is necessary to study them with philosophical, historical, sociological, economic tools, etc. Technoscience is a much broader and more complex system than modern science. Science and technology studies must be able to analyze it in all its scope and complexity. We think that the two conceptual instruments that we have proposed are valid for this.
There is a key aspect in the theory of action that we use, namely: all its components are evaluated again and again, according to systems of values differentiated according to the components. The enormous complexity of the notion of “techno-scientific action” does not prevent the existence of a path of analysis common to all the components: axiology. Although the concept of technoscientific action may seem intractable due to the great diversity of notes and distinctive features of technoscience and action, in the aforementioned work we introduced two instruments of axiological analysis, matrices and evaluation dimensions, both strictly formal. The agents, the actions, the instruments, the situations, the objectives, etc., are very different according to the techno-scientific actions, but all of them can be analyzed through the formal representation A (t) = Ai (t) and subsequently evaluated by the expression cijk (t) vijk (Ai (t)) Cijk (t). In chapter 5 we will explain in more detail the usefulness of matrices and levels of evaluation for the philosophy of technoscience. For the moment we limit ourselves to pointing out that, given two techno-scientific actions A and B, for example two research projects, as well as their respective Ai and Bi components, the evaluation matrices allow formalizing the selection processes of one or the other. To do this, the proposing agents (knowledge, curricula, technical capacities), the actions to be carried out (work plan, strategy, phases), the required instruments (financing, equipment, additional human resources), the initial conditions (previous achievements) are valued of said team or company, state of affairs), the boundary conditions (collaborating institutions, co-financing), the methodology to be followed, the objectives, the expected results and, where appropriate, the risks that may arise from the investigation. Projects A and B are compared component by component, scoring in each case the valuation assigned to each component. If the nuclear values are not satisfied above their minimum level (or the disvalores below the maximum level), the project is rejected. By successive iterations, and resorting to various value systems, the evaluation process culminates and can be adequately represented through a succession of matrices and levels of evaluation. Therefore, the changes that can be made during a selection process or in the decision making in favor of a macro project in relation to an alternative one can be formally represented. This is true in principle for any type of technoscientific actions or proposals, so that axiology provides an instrument of analysis of great interest. If, instead of having to select between two or more research projects, it is about naming a person to direct a macro project, or to chair a commission, or to manage a techno-scientific company, the evaluation process is very similar to the one before described, although the evaluation criteria and the objects assessed are heterogeneous. The great advantage of distinguishing formal components in a notion, be it “action” or “technoscience”, consists in the fact that we can then compare heterogeneous entities with each other, as the various evaluation processes that occur in the activity techno-scientific In chapter 5 we will return to these questions.
To finish this section, we will return to some of the considerations made in the previous chapter. We saw that scientific revolutions and techno-scientific revolutions are differentiated by the agents that carry them out. Sociologically speaking, Kuhn identified the paradigms with the scientific communities that advocate, develop and institutionalize them. The scientific community also participates in the techno-scientific activity, but not only it, as we saw in Chapter 2. Some techno-scientific revolutions can be promoted by companies, others by military agencies or by environmental groups, others by politicians … Neither scientists nor Engineers have a monopoly to promote techno-scientific changes, even if they are necessary to carry them out. Well understood that this plurality of techno-scientific communities is made up of individuals, who are the ones who ultimately perform techno-scientific actions, usually in groups. Unlike the groups of scientists Kuhn talked about, techno-scientific companies are always transdisciplinary, so they have to be able to integrate and harmonize, even partially. In general, the subject of technoscience is a plural agent, formed by representatives of the diverse communities that participate actively in the development of the techno-scientific action A = Ai. Note that these agents can be relieved, that is, they can be replaced by others over time. The first component of techno-scientific actions, therefore, is variable over time, as will others. There is no timeless subject of technoscience, nor of science, on the other hand. Of course, pace Popper, there is no technoscience without a subject, because of the eminently historical character of it. The difference is that the subject of technoscience is structurally plural. There is no Newton or Mendel in the case of technoscience.
Having a plural subject can not be inferred that technoscience is a subjective issue. Throughout the techno-scientific activity we must distinguish between moments of subjectivity, which also exist, moments of intersubjectivity and what we might call moments of objectivity: when an artifact works or not, when an atomic bomb explodes or breaks down nuclear reactor, when a satellite arrives or not at the intended target, etc. The effects of the atomic bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for example, were objective, regardless of whether they were also intersubjective and subjective. Note that objectivity is predicated in the first place on the actions (whether they were carried out or not) and only in the second place of their results, among which are the facts. In a philosophy of scientific practice the problem of the objectivity of technoscience shifts from facts to actions.
IV.8: Technoscience and cultures.
Since Snow spoke of the two cultures (1962), humanistic and scientific, science has changed a lot. One of the most important issues to face is the relationships between technoscience, society and culture. We do not intend to address it here, but it is appropriate to make a few considerations, in order to highlight some of the major changes that have occurred in this regard at the end of the 20th century.
First, technoscience affects several societies, not just one. When sociologists subsume science in society they forget this problem, which is not trivial, far from it. Today’s technoscience is expanding throughout the planet, due to the fact that the application context of science and technology has surpassed the national borders. Techno-scientific companies are organized as network companies and develop their strategies in several countries. Such is the case of pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, as well as information and communication technology companies. The same applies to the classic industries (construction, metal, transport …), which operate in an increasingly wider market. The emergence of technoscience coincides over time with the expansion of the market, which was one of the structural components of SCyT systems. Therefore, there is no subsumption of technoscience in a society, not even in the United States, but impacts of technoscience on several societies, which must be analyzed separately. On the other hand, the technoscience itself shows different characteristics depending on its places of origin, although it must be redesigned for each specific market. The new techno-scientific culture is international in its structure (networked techno-scientific enterprises) and not only clashes with traditional scientific and humanistic cultures, but also transforms local cultures, with consequent conflicts.
The relationships between technosciences and cultures have to be analyzed contextually, case by case, which will not be easy to do. To reduce the problem to the debate between the two cultures, the humanistic and the scientific-engineering, and to try to solve it with a third culture that synthesizes the other two, supposes an enormous simplification, in which the existence of a plurality of technosciences and cultures is forgotten.
When we say these things, we are not thinking only of multiculturalism, understood as a function of the countries and regions of the planet, but of the radical differences that exist between the military, business, legal, scientific or technological cultures. All these social sectors are embedded in the core of technoscience and provide very different cultural traditions. The clash between cultures occurs within the bosom of technoscience, not only when it transforms societies. This is why we are primarily interested in the internal conflicts in techno-scientific companies, as well as the disputes between competing companies, insofar as they embody different cultural and organizational models. Technoscience is not only the work of scientists and engineers, but also of many other agents who act according to very different cultures and values. The social component of technoscience is undoubted, but this is very little to say. The important thing is to specify the different social agents relevant to the techno-scientific activity and analyze the problems that this multiple (or plural) agent has when developing its activity. Who subsumes the science in society is like who subsumes the multinational companies in societies. Just as macro-science emerged in a strictly national sphere, techno-scientific companies design their strategies thinking in global markets. The important thing is to analyze their respective practices, as well as the confluence of these practices in various scenarios, some of which are traditional (laboratories, publications, scientific-technological institutions, patent registrations, etc.), others new. As we have pointed out above, one of those new scenarios of technoscience are the scientific-technological policy cabinets, whether governmental or business. Another is the market, which tends to be global, especially in the case of techno-scientific innovations. The practices, the conflicts, the arguments and, where appropriate, the consensuses, are very different in each and other scenarios.
Thus raised the problem, opens a wide field of research. For our part, we will only deal with conflicts of values, understanding that values are an essential component of cultures. In particular, we will be interested in those conflicts of values that show a greater universality, because they are internal conflicts to the technoscience itself. For example, the distinction between public and private technoscience is a structural difference, which makes technoscientific activity very different. The agents, the organization of the actions, the underlying interests, the objectives, the evaluation criteria and a good part of the practices differ considerably in one case or another. It is of little use that, from the point of view of the results of the research or innovative activity, the results coincide, or are comparable to each other. The race between a public and private team to establish the map of the human genome is a good example in this regard. The practices are different, and above all, the values that guide these practices are different. Bearing in mind that the dominant techno-scientific paradigm gives private companies a large part of the chain links mentioned in the previous section (technological development, innovation, production, marketing, etc.), private agencies (companies, consultants, etc.) predominate to a great extent over public ones in technoscience, despite the fact that the latter assume the strategic direction and a good part of the financing. The business culture has an increasing weight in technoscience.
In order to thoroughly analyze the relationships between technosciences and cultures, much more detailed research would be required. The suggestions we have outlined here are only a first sketch of that study. The comparison between the policies of specific techno-scientific companies, some public and others private, would be of great interest for the studies of technoscience. We leave this investigation open, after having sketched some of its main lines.
Chapter V Axiology of technoscience
V.1: Technoscience and values.
The techno-scientific practice can be studied from many perspectives: one of them is the axiological one. The evaluations of the scientific-technological actions are produced continuously, including those of their results. If we maintain the distinction of four contexts in the scientific-technological activity, the one of education and diffusion, the one of investigation and innovation, the one of application and the one of evaluation, the axiology is nuclear in this last context. In this chapter, we will focus on the context of evaluation of technoscience and its relationships with the contexts of research and application, given that in other publications we have already dealt with values in the context of education 202.
We do not intend to value technoscience as a whole. As León Olivé says, “it is not possible to morally evaluate science and technology in general or in the abstract” 203. However, “concrete technical systems are subject to moral evaluations and are not ethically neutral” 204. It is important to take into account account this when talking about the axiology of technoscience. It makes no sense to ask, except on a subjective basis, whether technoscience in general is good or bad, dignified or unworthy, just or unfair, solidary or unsupportive. On the other hand, we can assess specific techno-scientific systems, understood as systems of human actions and not as sets of artifacts, as we saw in section I.7. We will focus on the assessment of techno-scientific actions, including their results, their consequences and their risks, following the line opened in the book Science and Values, whose basic hypotheses continue to be developed in this work 205. In some cases, such evaluations can be made from an ethical perspective. Some techno-scientific actions raise important moral problems, both in the scientific-technological communities and in society in general. But not all. The axiology is broader than the moral. Apart from ethical assessments, techno-scientific activity can be judged from many other points of view. The epistemic, technical, economic, political, legal, ecological, social values, etc., are also relevant to the axiology of technoscience. Therefore we will devote section V.2 to distinguish the different types of values relevant to technoscience.
On the other hand, the axiological actions are very different according to the different contexts of the techno-scientific activity, as well as according to the agents, the evaluated, etc. Let’s see it briefly, applying to the act of evaluating the theory of action that we have proposed previously.
In the context of education and dissemination there are different evaluating agents. On the one hand the scientific-technological community, represented by the professors of the different educational levels and the directors of centers. A teacher not only teaches, he also evaluates. They are two very different actions. At the same time, the teaching activity is evaluated, as well as its final and intermediate results. In addition, textbooks and teaching instruments are evaluated, as well as schools, universities or the education system as a whole. As we consider more axiological actions in the context of education, we find that scientists and engineers are not the only ones who carry out evaluations. Although it is based on more subjective criteria and through non-standardized procedures, parents also evaluate, as well as the students themselves. The society in general, and more specifically the States, usually institute their own evaluation systems: revalidations, tests of selectivity and access to universities, quality agencies, cost analysis, etc. The evaluation context interacts everywhere with the educational context through very different agents, processes and evaluation criteria. The good / bad dichotomy is only one of the criteria to be taken into account. You can also evaluate the competence, efficiency, cost, utility, social integration through education, advances in the level of literacy of a society, etc. Regarding the diffusion of science and technology, the main actions are carried out by other agents and with other media: scientific dissemination magazines, radio and television programs on science and technology, books, web pages on the Internet, museums of science and technology, etc. When a visitor to a science and technology museum fills out a survey questioning his impressions after the visit, he is doing a user evaluation. The experts in electronic documentation have developed very sophisticated systems to assess the quality of Web pages. In general, the various actions of techno-scientific dissemination are always valued, and not only in the market, depending on the audiences or sales indexes, but also through other instruments: surveys on the perception and attitudes of society to science and technology, impact and influence indexes, quality indicators, economic cost / benefit analysis, etc. In the context of education and dissemination there are many evaluations. All of them have axiological interest and, of course, not all are of a moral nature, much less. There are subjective evaluations (for example those of a student, those of a parent or those of a teacher), intersubjective (average grade in a course, academic record, …) and objective, meaning the latter those that are carried out through standardized evaluation protocols, so that the results do not depend on the evaluating agent, at least in principle. Some of the results of the evaluations are made public, others remain in private, or even intimate. In summary, given the great complexity and variety of axiological actions in the context of dissemination, it is essential to analyze and distinguish the types of axiological actions, as well as the kinds of values, agents, situations, results, teaching tools or informative, etc. This is how the theory of action exposed in the previous chapter is applied to the context of education and dissemination. Our axiology of technoscience will be analytical and empirical, as we have already advocated in the book Science and Values.
In the research context something similar happens, but corrected and increased. Modern science has created a specific system of evaluation of scientific publications, the peer system review system, which is one of the most unique characteristics of science from the point of view of evaluation. This system has been expanded to various disciplines and different countries, which is not to say that it prevails everywhere. In fact, one of the quality indexes of a scientific publication depends on the existence of an anonymous and peer evaluation system. Subsequently, this evaluation model was implemented in other areas of the research and innovation context. One of the distinctive features of public technoscience consists in the comparative evaluation of research projects, requests for infrastructure, organization of congresses, appointments, allocation of jobs, technological innovations, etc. To this end, various Science and Technology Evaluation Agencies and Committees were created. The context of evaluation of science has its own institutions (doctoral thesis tribunals, commissions for competitions and university competitions, commissions for allocation of public funds, hiring commissions, etc.), which make decisions on the excellence of researchers, the suitability and reliability of the equipment, the quality and prestige of the universities and the research centers, etc. In some cases ethical problems arise (falsification of data, plagiarism, dishonesty), which are usually solved by scientific communities based on deontological rules that the communities themselves establish 206. However, apart from ethical problems, in scientific research There are many other value conflicts. Not only epistemic conflicts occur, such as the incommensurability between rival paradigms, or the contradiction between hypotheses, theories and predictions, or the imprecision of observational data, measurements or experiments, or the lack of rigor of some proposals, nor not only conflicts between technical values, such as utility, efficiency, applicability, robustness or good or bad performance of the devices, but also conflicts that depend on economic, social, political, legal, ecological or military values. Therefore, in the research context there are many other evaluation processes, apart from the anonymous peer system. Governments have their own political-economic criteria, and in their strategic-military case, to evaluate the techno-scientific programs and the institutions dedicated to research. The same applies to large companies and their R & D Departments. Since innovations compete with each other in the market, this can be considered as an important valuation agent: it is the one that assigns value to said innovations, in the economic sense of the term “value”. Other social groups also make their own estimates, showing greater or lesser confidence in scientific research and in the judgment of experts. Although the system of evaluation by pairs is very important and has become generalized, it is not the only system to be taken into account. From an axiological perspective, technoscience is distinguished from science and technology by the greater plurality of value systems involved in evaluation processes. Instead of asking the vague question of whether technoscience is good or bad, we must analyze it case by case, based on empirical data and using previously designed and standardized evaluation criteria. All this as far as possible, of course. In the context of research and innovation we can also distinguish between purely subjective evaluations, which exist, and are very frequent, although little attention is paid to them, intersubjective evaluations (which imply consensus processes between different evaluating agents) and objective evaluations. In the objective evaluations, standardized evaluation protocols are used: at least in principle, they offer similar results regardless of who the evaluating agent is. The objectivity of some evaluation processes does not imply axiological neutrality. The myth of neutrality and value-free science must be eliminated from the reflection on technoscience. The instruments used by scientists and engineers to evaluate their own research instruments, the reliability of the results, the impact of the results, etc., are loaded with values, at least of epistemic and technical values. In the case of technoscience, they are also usually loaded with economic, business, military, political and legal values, as we saw in the second chapter.
Objectivity is a value, a core value of technoscience, which is part of a value system and only acquires meaning in that systemic framework. On the other hand, in the context of research and innovation there are public evaluations, but not all of them are. Many of them are produced in private areas, including the private forum of the various techno-scientific agents: scientists, engineers, technicians, businessmen, politicians, etc. This plurality of value systems and evaluating agents is much broader and more complex in the case of technoscience than in that of science and technology. Therefore, we affirm that value conflicts are an integral part of techno-scientific activity, because they derive from the axiological structure of scientific-technological practice. In the science and technology of the industrial age they also existed, but in many cases they could be solved within the scientific-technological communities. In the case of technoscience, this is no longer possible, as we saw in section III.6, when referring to techno-scientific contests. The subject of technoscience is structurally plural and therefore is in conflict with itself. The scientific and technological communities have an important role in the conflicts of technoscience, but not only them. Both during development and in the eventual resolution of conflicts, many other agents intervene, whose value systems are neither epistemic nor technical. Therefore, it is essential to analyze the different kinds of values relevant to technoscience. As we said in the previous chapter, the values characterize the various subcultures that are integrated into the techno-scientific culture.
What we have just said about the research context is even more valid in the context of application. Techno-scientific discoveries and innovations not only apply to nature, but above all to the transformation of societies and the lives of people. Wars based on technoscience are the clearest example, but there are many others: genetic engineering, pharmacology, technomedicine, information and communication technologies, advertising, behavior modification techniques, surveys on voting trends, macroeconomic models, etc. When societies and human beings become the object of techno-scientific actions, then necessarily reactions arise, or if you want critical responses, acceptances, oppositions, etc. The context of application of technoscience is, above all, society, so there is no point in trying to separate the techno-scientific activity from social life. The plurality of values and evaluating agents increases exponentially in the context of application, and with it acceptances and conflicts. It is literally impossible to elucidate whether technoscience is good or bad for society, in the first place because there are many societies and many technosciences, but first of all because the diversity of value systems is much greater in the context of social application of technoscience. Some technoscience, such as an intelligent missile, or a synthetic drug, will do very well. To others very badly. Most of the assessments in the context of application are subjective and intersubjective (for example cultural), few can be classified as objective. One of them is the voting system following the rule of the majority, which is applied again and again in the techno-scientific activity for the resolution of conflicts: for example in courts, in the commissions that assign projects, or in the parliaments that approve laws and science and technology plans. Another is the evaluation by experts, according to a previously established procedural rationale. The main problem is to establish protocols and standardized and public evaluation procedures, which must be done before starting the evaluation processes. To achieve this, it is necessary to reflect on the action of evaluation and on the instruments that facilitate it. A parliamentarian who works in a science and technology commission, like any other commissioner, must have procedural rules and instruments to carry out his task, apart from his own criteria as an evaluating agent. We can conclude, therefore, that the definition of technoscientific action that we proposed in section IV.7 also applies to evaluation actions. Evaluating technoscience is (must be) a techno-scientific action. Hence the importance that we attribute to evaluation instruments, which are not reduced to the good or bad judgment of the evaluating agents.
It should not be forgotten that, since the origin of technoscience, many “controversies” between rival programs were solved by way of military contention. The main purpose of this book is to propose civil methodologies for the resolution of value conflicts in the context of the application of technoscience. These civil methodologies are not based on the theory of rational decision or instrumental rationality, which are the two forms of rationality that prevailed in the industrial era. This purpose is difficult to achieve, since it is not enough to find a possible social methodology for the resolution of these axiological conflicts. A trans-social methodology is required, since we have already stressed that technoscience affects several societies at the same time, not one. We will return later on these problems, which are very arduous, but we can anticipate that in the context of the application of technoscience the existence of very diverse cultural and social values can not be rejected. It is about configuring a minimum system of shared values to civilly solve the various conflicts generated by technosciences. Some will think that it is an impossible task. But there are precedents of similar axiological actions, such as the Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which instituted a system of basic values to guide political-social life. Given the growing importance of technoscience in contemporary societies, it is about establishing a social contract for technoscience based on axiological pluralism, and not on the predominance of certain business and political values that allowed to reformulate the report of Vannevar Bush after its crisis In the 70s.
The preceding paragraphs show the scope of the challenge. We insist that the axiological perspective in which we situate ourselves is not the only possible one: the praxiology of technoscience is not reduced to the question of values, and we must not forget that epistemology, history, sociology and economics of technoscience continue to have great importance in science and technology studies. However, we consider that it is one of the lines of philosophical research that can contribute most today to the studies of science, technology and society (CTS), which are the framework in which this book is located. Briefly recalling the emergence of the philosophy of science at the beginning of the 20th century, it can be affirmed that the appearance of CTS studies is a consequence of the very emergence of technoscience after the crisis of macroscience in the decade 1965-1975. The Philosophy of Science and the History of Science were constituted as academic disciplines in the first decades of the 20th century, to our understanding as a consequence of the great changes and revolutions that had taken place at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century in the field of Biology (Darwin, Mendel), Mathematics (non-Euclidean geometries, set theory), Physics (theory of relativity, quantum mechanics) and social sciences (Experimental Psychology, Mathematical Economics, Empirical Sociology, etc.). The Naturphilosohie of the German Universities proved insufficient to think those great scientific changes and for that reason a Philosophy of Science of logicalist, empiricist and positivist orientation arose. Well, at the end of the twentieth century there was a change no less important in scientific activity: what we have called the techno-scientific revolution. As a result, in the 70s emerged the two main lines of what are now called CTS Studies: the North American school (Mitcham, Durbin, etc.) and European (Strong Program, ethnomethodology, etc.). The analytical philosophy of science and technology was unable to assume that science itself had changed and continued to maintain its basic program, focused on the analysis and reconstruction of theories and scientific knowledge, without any attention to practice. The Praxiology of science and technology still does not exist as a discipline, nor does Axiology, although in this there have been important advances in recent years (Laudan, Rescher, Longino, etc.). Well, CTS studies are children of technoscience and come to fill the gap left by the philosophy of science, which, except for honorable exceptions, remains focused on modern science, without even accepting the emergence of technoscience. The axiology that we advocate is a philosophical contribution to the interdisciplinary studies of science, technology and society, rather than to the philosophy of science in the strict sense of the word. Let’s see what are the bases on which it sits.
V.2: Types of values.
In this section we will analyze the different value systems that affect the techno-scientific activity. For this we have to face two delicate problems: what are the values and what kind of values are there? With regard to the first question, we have already expressed our position 207 widely: we do not consider values as essences or entities, much less as timeless, but as functions (in Frege’s sense) applied by evaluating agents to systems of scientific actions , technological or techno-scientific. With respect to the second, different criteria can be introduced to classify the different types of values. On our part, we follow an empirical criterion, based on the observation of the techno-scientific practice, as it has been described in the previous chapters. Other authors propose more systematic classifications, some of them very interesting, such as the one recently presented by Juan Ramón Alvarez Bautista 208. However, in this work we will continue to focus on the distinction of twelve relevant subsystems of values for the axiological analysis of techno-scientific practice , as indicated in the book Science and Values:
1.- Basics
2.- Epistemic
3.- Technological
4.- Economic
5.- Military
6.- Politicians
7.- Legal
8.- Social
9.- Ecological
10.- Religious
11.- Aesthetics
12.- Morales
Each of these subsystems groups different values. Not all of them affect the different disciplines, neither in each historical moment, nor in each specific techno-scientific action. However, all these types of values can be significant when jointly evaluating techno-scientific actions and their results. The evaluation processes are usually iterated, and even recursive. The linear model of Bush presupposes that scientific discoveries are valued first, based on exclusively epistemic criteria. Next, their applications and technological implementations are evaluated, based on technical values. Once these criteria have been met, the product design phase is passed, in which other types of estimates are already taken into account, as well as in the subsequent stages of the production, marketing and use of the devices. Finally, the market makes its own valuations, as does society. In the sixth field of SCyT systems, military organizations also have their own criteria for evaluating techno-scientific innovations. At the periphery of the system, other value systems (ecological, moral, aesthetic, religious) can be distinguished, some of which may be very relevant in specific circumstances and areas, for example in a fundamentalist state that seeks to promote technoscience. The same is true of users, who can make their decisions based on aesthetic criteria or subjective reasons, assuming that the products they have to choose from have exceeded the minimum thresholds for nuclear values, and therefore have been disseminated in the market.
From the axiological perspective, technoscience is characterized by a mixture of heterogeneous values, since it arises from a stable alliance between diverse social agents, whose actions are guided by different value systems. Many investigations are promoted because of their possible military, economic or political interest: epistemic and technical evaluations are secondary in this case, although they also exist, but not as an objective, but as a necessary requirement. The Manhatan project, for example, was not designed and driven for epistemic or technical reasons, but primarily for political-military needs. The undoubted scientific and technological advances that it generated were subordinated to the objectives of this project, as we saw in section II.3. The same is true of the ENIAC Project, the exploration of space or the Genome project. For their promoters and financiers, the epistemic advances that they provoked were instrumental. In general terms, and contrary to what Bush affirmed: if techno-scientific companies finance basic research, it is not to advance the frontier of knowledge, but to try to achieve its ends, which tend to be much more prosaic than the search for truth. Scientific knowledge is an instrument for techno-scientific companies. Investors do not invest in R & D for scientists to propose new theories. These advances are welcome, but only because they suppose prestige for the corresponding corporation or institution, which can contribute to alleviate public distrust, to gain the confidence of private investors or to guarantee public financing. The example of the TIGR Institute, created by Rosenberg under the sponsorship of a nonprofit Foundation, but with a company created to commercially profit from the gene sequencing of Craig Venter and his team, illustrates the axiological plurality of the techno-scientific practice and the subordination of epistemic values to business values. In other cases, the subordination of advances in knowledge occurs in relation to the military or political objectives that underlie most techno-scientific actions, especially if they are of great importance.
If we want to have a general theoretical framework for the axiology of technoscience, it is necessary to consider at least those twelve subsystems, since they all play a role in the design and evaluation of techno-scientific proposals. Next, it is necessary to empirically explain in each case what is the order of effective application and the relative relevance of one or other subsystems. All this without prejudice to the fact that some other subsystem could be added, for example by breaking down the subsystems of epistemic, political, moral values, etc. In general, when we study specific cases of technoscience we will not have to consider the twelve subsystems, but a few. The techno-scientific activity almost always involves epistemic, technological, economic, political and military values. In some cases, ecological values are added, in other legal, social, moral or religious values. There are occasions in which aesthetic values are very important, inclining the decision in favor of one proposal or another according to their aesthetics. The same can be said of legal values, or of ecological values. In summary, of these twelve subsystems we will have to select a few to carry out the case-by-case study of technoscience from an axiological perspective. The axiology of the technoscience that we advocate is analytical and empirical. The first thing that must be specified is the order of the evaluations and the specific weight of each subsystem or value, instead of presupposing a stable hierarchy in the value system that guides the techno-scientific actions. In some cases the utility will prevail, in others the precision or the expected economic benefits. The axiological functions are applied by the different evaluating agents according to different weights, which have to be determined empirically in each case. This does not prevent, of course, that the empirical analysis show the absence of certain values, or their relative relative weight when approving or rejecting certain actions. Faced with an abstract critique of technoscience, typical of lazy rationality, the axiologists of technoscience must take the trouble to analyze the values at stake beforehand, in order to intervene in the debate introducing new evaluation criteria or modifications in the relative weights of the values actually intervening. The moral condemnation of technoscience is very satisfactory from the point of view of good individual conscience, but completely imprecise and ineffective when trying to modify techno-scientific practice.
By distinguishing these twelve subsystems we are proposing a classification of the values of technoscience. This classification is provisional and improvable. Other classifications are much more systematic, such as the one proposed by Alvarez Bautista. This author distinguishes between communicative, economic and social values, on the one hand, and, depending on a second criterion, between liberating (desiderata), eliminatory (demands or duties) and nuclear values. His proposal is of great interest, but commenting on it thoroughly would take us a long way, so we will keep our own classification for now, which has to be understood as an open table with internal feedback. There are values, such as freedom, that can be understood from very different meanings: as a basic, epistemic value (freedom of investigation, freedom of education), political, legal, business, social, etc. Therefore, the twelve subsystems are not authentic classes of equivalences, but subsystems that interact with each other in concrete situations. Hence the importance of the initial and contour conditions when carrying out evaluations. The information available, for example, is decisive for the results of the evaluations to be one or the other.
The various classifications of values presuppose philosophical conceptions and ours is not an exception, although in pureness it is not a classification, as we have just pointed out. Before proceeding, it is convenient to make explicit two of its fundamental assumptions.
In the first place, we chose a systemic perspective when studying the values of technoscience. Instead of considering each value separately (axiological atomism) and accepting that it has a meaning per se, we start from the hypothesis that the values are applied together, so that when evaluating an aspect we also put other values into play. This systemic character, which we have already referred to elsewhere 209, implies affirming the existence of various subsystems of values Vj in technoscience, varying the subscript j from 1 to 12 (or more), since we have distinguished twelve subsystems of values . Each subsystem Vj in turn includes a plurality of interconnected values Vjk. For example, in order to calibrate the likelihood of a hypothesis, it is necessary to assess its internal and external coherence (that is, also in relation to other credible hypotheses in said scientific discipline), the precision of the observations and measurements that allow corroborating or refuting it, the realizability of the experiments that could confirm or refute it, etc. A certain epistemic value is co-implicated with other epistemic values, as well as with other non-epistemic ones. Therefore we speak of systems and subsystems of values, rather than elementary or atomic values that could be grouped into twelve or more equivalence classes. The same value can be included in several subsystems, although, if this happens, it will not be applied in the same way in either case. In other words: this value does not have the same meaning as it is integrated into one or another subsystem.
This does not suppose any “paradox of the meaning”, as the philosophers of the science of the inherited conception used to say (received view), since the values, depending on axiological functions, only acquire meaning when said functions are applied to evaluate an action or a specific component. The existence of a plurality of subsystems generates an internal tension to the value system of technoscience, which manifests itself in the form of conflicts of values, as we have emphasized more than once. Although our axiology is analytical, it aims to analyze the “dialectic” internal to the value systems of technoscience. It is one of the main peculiarities of our approach. In other words: the axiology of technoscience is dynamic, not static. The important thing is to elucidate the systems of shared values at a given moment, independently of the fact that in such systems there are conflicting values among themselves.
Secondly, concrete values are emerging, that is, they arise over time and from the evaluation processes, starting from initial values. One of the most notable characteristics of twentieth century technoscience was the progressive emergence of a new subsystem of values, ecological values, which had barely been taken into account in modern science, but which in the second half of the century have been acquiring a relative weight of certain significance in scientific and technological activity. Nowadays, a scientific laboratory worries about the problem of the elimination of the residues of its experiments, which was not usual at the beginning of the XX century, much less before. Although ecological values are not the most relevant in the research context (something more in the application), they have a certain role when it comes to assessing techno-scientific research. Therefore, they must be considered as a specific subsystem, whose relative weight grows gradually. The same could be said of business or legal values, which have been gaining increasing weight in technoscience throughout the 20th century. The values of technoscience are not consubstantial to it, although there is always an axiological core composed of values without whose minimum satisfaction the proposals and techno-scientific actions are simply rejected, as well as their results. Both the concrete values and subsystems have been emerging throughout history, have impregnated to a greater or lesser degree the scientific and technical actions and, thanks to their repeated interactions, they have been consolidating as such values or subsystems of values of the science. Faced with many philosophers of values that have tended to think of them as ideal entities, our axiology recognizes the historicity of values, their systemic character and, in addition, affirms the existence of emerging values in said systemic interaction. On the other hand, in the technoscientific activity there are transfers of values from other social activities to it, and reciprocally. This is one of the main ways of changing values in technoscience.
Everything we have been saying will be clearer if we enumerate some of the values belonging to the twelve subsystems that we have distinguished. By basic values we understand those that are common to human beings, although in some cases the origin of these values in the animal world could be traced. To clarify what we are talking about, use the following list, for whose presentation we resort to the alphabetical order, in order not to enter into the tremendous debates about the priority of one or other basic values:
1.- Basic values: joy, love, well-being, ability, sanity, creation, growth, happiness, fertility, strength, fortune, strength, joy, greatness, interest, maturity, need, normality, permanence, pleasure, power, prudence, neatness, health, safety, good sense, seriousness, sympathy, luck, survival, life, etc.
In this first enumeration the lax sense in which we apply the concept “basic value” is clear, since we include values, virtues and goods in the list, independently of the fact that these three concepts can be distinguished 210. Many of the mentioned values are strictly subjective, others no. Some are relevant to technoscience, others less. Our purpose is to illustrate through the examples the concept of “basic values”, since in this work we will not try to elucidate it. These observations also apply to the following enumerations, including the most significant characteristic of the sphere of values: the existence of opposites, that is to say of disvalores. It is important to keep in mind that values have their opposite, or disvalues. and that the evaluative or axiological rationality is based on the rule of increasing the degree of satisfaction of positive values and diminishing that of negative values, as we will see in the following section. Several of the terms that we have included appear in the list due to the relevance of the corresponding disvalue for human beings (sadness, hatred, discomfort, disability – or disability – madness, destruction, unhappiness, infertility, misfortune, weakness, suffering, smallness , disinterest, immaturity, abnormality, volatility, displeasure, impotence, imprudence, filth, illness, insecurity, insanity, irrisoriness, antipathy, misfortune, annihilation, death, etc.) and the same will happen with the other types of values that we are going to mention within each type.
2.- Religious values: authority, charity, devotion, divinity, hope, faith, grace, hierarchy, mystery, obedience, piety, purity, respect, sacredness, sacrifice, salvation, holiness, supernaturality, etc.
3.- Military values: authority, duty, discipline, fidelity, hierarchy, heroism, honor, loyalty, magnanimity, command, obedience, patriotism, peace, secret, courage, victory, triumph, etc.
4.- Moral values: altruism, friendship, autonomy, benevolence, good, kindness, compassion, duty, dignity, fidelity, happiness, generosity, gratitude, honesty, cleanliness (in the sense of fair play), prudence, respect, responsibility, sincerity, solidarity, tolerance, truthfulness, virtue, etc.
5.- Aesthetic values: harmony, beauty, clarity, correctness, creativity, delight, elegance, balance, grace, lightness, neatness, originality, simplicity, sublimity, subtlety, etc.
6.- Social values: seniority, cooperation, diligence, stability, excellence, success, fame, fraternity, gender, equality, privacy, freedom, merit, nobility, order, peace, prestige, privacy, professionalism, roots, recognition, security, solidarity, etc.
7.- Political values: autonomy, authority, control, democracy, stability, hegemony, governability, equality, independence, justice, freedom, majority, order, peace, power, power, prudence, public (res publica), representativeness, respect, tolerance, etc.
8.- Legal values: autonomy, clarity, fairness, formality, durability, stability, guarantees, impartiality, independence, justice, legality, legitimacy, freedom, publicity, representativeness, security, transparency, universality, etc.
9.- Economic values: benefit, quality, marketability, competitiveness, cost, development, efficiency, generosity, freedom, maximization, property, profitability, wealth, etc.
10.- Ecological values: biodiversity, conservation, equilibrium, cleanliness (no pollution), minimization (of environmental impacts), renovation, sustainability, etc.
11.- Technical values: applicability, competence, correctness, durability, efficiency, reliability, flexibility, functionality (in the sense that something works), skill, innovation, integrability (or compositionality), speed, robustness, simplicity (of use), utility, versatility, etc.
12.- Epistemic values: adequacy (empirical), clarity, coherence, contrastability, fecundity, generality, ingenuity, intelligibility, originality, precision, publicity, repeatability, rigor, simplicity, truth, verifiability, verisimilitude, etc.
As can be observed in these lists, several values are trans-systemic, because they can be considered from different meanings. None of the enumerations is intended to be complete and more than one inclusion is debatable, as well as the assignment of some values to one or other subsystems. We do not affirm the existence of types of fixed and immovable values, since, as already mentioned, the values are transferred from one social subsystem to another. Put another way: there is no “natural” typology of values. By classifying them in this way we are carrying out an axiological, or rather meta-axiological, action. It is not about proposing an immovable table of values. We intend above all to show the enormous variety of axiological issues that, with greater or lesser frequency or relevance, arise in the techno-scientific activity and, of course, also in other social activities. Some of those values (or virtues, or goods) are strictly subjective, others not. Therefore, our proposal could be refined and improved by introducing other criteria. Even so, the distinction of twelve subsystems of values relevant to technoscience is extremely useful for axiological analysis, apart from introducing a principle of clarification in a subject of enormous complexity. As for the order in which the twelve subsystems have been proposed, it could be modified. We have put the epistemic and technical values in the last places of the list on purpose, last but not the least. Initially, the value systems that have traditionally exhausted reflection on values (basic, religious, moral and military values) have been placed, but not because we consider them as the main ones for technoscience, but because they maintain a certain historical order. Even so, we have already said that ecological values, which should not be confused with moral values, no matter how much we talk about environmental ethics, have been the last to be configured as a system. Its impact on techno-scientific activity is still scarce, at least in some scenarios, but it is growing, so they should be considered as a specific subsystem.
After this brief presentation of what we consider as potential values of technoscience, it is interesting to underline the “ontological” assumptions from which we started 211. We consider values as functions (in Frege’s sense) applied to systems of actions by different evaluating agents. , obtaining as a result of the action of evaluating a valuation, and in some cases a judgment. Said in classical philosophical terms, which we will not normally use: the “faculty” of valuing is much broader than the “faculty” of judging. For this reason, the evaluation context is much broader than the justification context of Reichenbach and the positivist philosophers. The latter were only interested in epistemic justifications. This does not work for technoscience. Many techno-scientific actions are justified on the basis of economic, political, military or social criteria. Epistemic values are important, but they have lost the monopoly of the “justification” of scientific-technological activity. It is another reason why the classical philosophy of science is not valid to analyze and reconstruct technoscience.
V.3: Application of evaluation matrices to techno-scientific practice.
In the work Science and Values we introduced the notion of the evaluation matrix as a basic instrument for the development of an analytical, empirical, formal, pluralist, systemic and meliorist axiology 212. This axiology is based on the existence of a plurality of values that govern the scientific, technological and techno-scientific actions. These values are not a simple list, but are organized into systems and subsystems. That is why we can talk about epistemic, technical, economic, political, military, social evaluations, etc. In general, we can speak of a system V of values relevant to the techno-scientific activity, V = Vj, where Vj represents one of the twelve subsystems of previous values, so that Vj = vjk. Each value of the previous list, vjk, is applied to technoscientific actions to evaluate them based on very different estimation criteria. Since in these actions we had also distinguished twelve components, A = Ai, the action of valuing is represented in general by the axiological expression vijk (Ai), which can be a value statement or judgment (the scientist Ai is competent, the Ai instrument is accurate, the Ai theory is plausible, etc.), but also a number or score, when standardized protocols and evaluation scales are used, or, in the most frequent case, a preference or option for an alternative versus another: the scientist Ai has a better curriculum than Bi, the engineer Ai is more competent than Bi, the instruments Ai are more accurate than the Bi, the theory Ai is more general than the theory Bi, etc.
As we already indicated in the book Science and Values, in which the peculiarities of the evaluation matrices are widely discussed, inequations are the most usual representations of valuations: vijk (Ai) vijk (Bi). This expression means that component j of action A is preferable (or better) than the corresponding component of action B, based on the vijk endpoint. Since the evaluations of technoscience are processes that take place in time, not specific judgments, the axiological inequations adopt the general form vijk (Ai (t)) vijk (Bi (t)), which represents the situation of preference for a proposal or techno-scientific action at a specific moment, always in relation to the vijk criterion. This does not imply a definitive assessment, since nothing prevents that at a later time Bi is preferable to Ai. An article sent to a journal can improve in a second writing, like the formation of a person, the presentation of a research project or the quality of an institution. Our axiology is melioristic, since it locates the advances or improvements in relation to each valuation criterion: greater precision, greater efficiency, more profitability, less economic costs, lower environmental impacts, better social reception (or in the market), greater competitiveness, etc. The axiological inequations that we have proposed allow us to represent the different evaluation situations, and this for the different values (or disvalores) that we are considering.
When, instead of considering a single vijk value, we take into account several evaluation criteria, it is necessary to introduce an additional parameter to represent the weighting factor pijk that the evaluating agent assigns to each of the vijk values. If all the values were equalized, the evaluation matrix would be: (vijk (Ai (t))). As this does not happen in real evaluative practice, but there are more and less relevant values in the opinion of the various evaluating agents, the most general form of evaluation matrices is: (pijk .vijk (Ai (t))). That is to say, it is a sequence of matrices closely linked to each other, a matrix. To give an example: this formal expression would represent all the value judgments issued over a time interval by a determined evaluator E that applies the vijk valuation criteria to the Ai component of a techno-scientific action. Throughout time there may be changes of criteria in the same evaluator. Some will consider this as a serious inconvenience, but they are wrong. The relevant values for the scientific practice can change, and in particular their respective weights. The important thing is the dynamics of evaluation, not the metaphysical belief in the timelessness of values or their eternal hierarchy. Axiological changes form an important part of the dynamics of technoscience, although these changes only affect the relative weights, not the system of values itself.
On the other hand, the evaluator E can be a scientist, an engineer, an entrepreneur, a merchant, a general, a politician, a jurist, an ecologist or any citizen. You can also be a bishop, a professor of ethics or an expert in aesthetic matters. To the extent that action A affects the lives of people, the evaluator E will be a normal person, that is, a user, or if someone who cares about the consequences and risks is preferred over him, his family or its environment could have the techno-scientific action A. Our axiology is not only pluralistic because it recognizes the existence of a plurality of values, but also because it starts from a plural agent, that is, from a plurality of agents more or less integrated in a system concrete techno-scientific Conflicts of values are inherent to the techno-scientific activity. This does not imply that we opt for the subjectivist theory of values 213. The question is more complex, or if you prefer more plural. There are subjective, intersubjective and objective evaluations. All of them have to be taken into account by the axiology of technoscience. Objectivity and subjectivity function as epistemic values, so they are part of a concrete subsystem of values. In addition, like the vast majority of values, they are gradual. There are irrational subjectivisms, others based on subjective reasons, others where there is a considerable degree of intersubjectivity (for example in cultural values) and we can also speak of other valuations that, being subjective in their origin, have finally been recognized as objective. Reciprocally, there are greater or lesser degrees of objectivity. Our axiology is based on the graduality of the values and this includes the concepts of objectivity and subjectivity, when they are used as a criterion of evaluation, which frequently happens in the techno-scientific activity.
The difficulties for the axiological-formal analysis of technoscience arise when we admit the existence of a plurality of evaluating agents, not only of a plurality of values. Many of them can be solved. In any case, the axiological functions of which we speak are not timeless entities or devoid of subject that applies them. The important thing is to clarify what are the shared values, especially if they come to constitute an axiological system, as is the case of technoscience. Although the different evaluating agents rank the values differently, that is, although they do not weigh them equally, they can arrive at common evaluations, whose results are intersubjectively accepted. In the case of technoscience (unlike science and technology) this happens even with heterogeneous agents, which represent and embody the subsystems of values of different social groups. We deal with situations that can be conflicting, and not only from a discursive or argumentative point of view, but from the perspective of the action. Not only are there opposing judgments, but also opposing actions. It is necessary to represent the evaluation processes, not just the specific assessments. Throughout a process of evaluation, shared value systems can be formed, notwithstanding the fact that tensions continue to exist. When a situation of axiological consensus is reached, standardized evaluation protocols and systems of procedural rules can be created to settle disagreements. This happens again and again in the techno-scientific practice, in which the rule of unanimity does not rule, much less that of the universality of Aristotelian science. The prior acceptance of procedural rules and, in many cases, the adoption of standardized evaluation protocols, is part of the evaluative rationality. In the following section we will see how these intersubjective evaluation protocols can be considered as specific evaluation matrices.
We have mentioned some of the difficulties encountered by the axiology of technoscience. To face them, it is necessary to have a more refined and precise conceptual framework than what has been said up to now. Let’s see it in more detail.
(a): First, it must be emphasized that the formal expressions we are using are valid for any axiological action: value judgments, preferences, choices, rejections, indecisions, etc. Although the evaluation criteria of agents E will vary a lot, and will usually be opposed to each other, the formal representation is the same for all of them. The evaluation matrices allow the introduction of a common protocol for the various assessments, which allows the comparison between them, however heterogeneous they may be. Above all, they allow detecting the existence of shared values, although the respective weights are different. When a set of shared values becomes stable throughout various evaluation processes, which is detected by analyzing scientific practice, the axiology can affirm (hypothetically) the consolidation of a system of values V, whose structure and modes of application must be analyzed. Said system V is one of the structural components of the corresponding techno-scientific “paradigm”, insofar as it guides the evaluation actions.
(b): Second, our axiology is based on the notion of satisfaction. When the evaluating agent E uses the vijk criterion to evaluate the component Ai of a techno-scientific action (for example, the results derived from it), what it does is to determine whether Ai satisfies or not the vijk value, and in its case in which case degree satisfies him. To the question: does Ai satisfy the vijk valuation criterion? Evaluator E can only respond in some cases “yes” or “no”. On such occasions the evaluation vijk (Ai) can be represented by “1” or “0”. We would be using a cardinal scale to represent the result of the evaluation by numbers. In other cases, the evaluator E is able to elucidate the degree to which, in his opinion, the component Ai satisfies the value vijk, or its disvalue vijk. This is what happens when someone awards a score to the vijk value. In this case it can be said that vijk (Ai) = gijk, where gijk is the assigned score, that is, the degree to which Ai satisfies the vijk valuation criterion in the judgment of an evaluator E, which can be individual, collective or institutional. This is the case, for example, when a teacher qualifies from 1 to 10, when a citizen completes an opinion poll, when a referee scores an article sent to a scientific journal or when a contest between large techno-scientific companies is resolved to award an important contract . This procedure is the most usual in the evaluation practice and allows to represent the results of a valuation action in ordinal scale.
However, at other times the evaluation has greater precision and can be represented on a scale of intervals or even on a metric scale (with a unit of measurement). This is very common when assessing scientific instruments, economic costs, impact rates or the price of a techno-scientific product in the market. In such cases the valuation vijk (Ai) is represented by a number and can be operated with it. The evaluation matrices are matrices in the mathematical sense of the word, so that various algebraic operators can be introduced to operate with the estimates made by E and other evaluating agents. This is where it makes full sense to talk about weights. For this reason we will reserve the expression pijk.vijk (Ai) for situations in which scales of intervals or metrics 214. can be used. In such situations, for example, it is possible to find the arithmetic mean of the evaluations issued by different agents, as well as to introduce other mathematical and statistical operators. The procedure for resolving the differences in valuation can also be instituted by referral to a third instance, for example a higher ranking arbitrator. Or, what is more frequent, the two alternative proposals can be promoted, leaving it to be time, the market or society who grant their favor to one or the other. This is usual in the phases of product development and commercialization. The higher level of penetration or sales of various techno-scientific innovations, once placed on the market, works as a rational criterion for conflict resolution. It is not the only procedure, of course.
The axiology that we advocate is formal, or formalizing, and adopts mathematical and computer-based representations without problems. Valuations E (pijk.vijk (Ai)) do not have to be represented only by value judgments, as in natural languages, but also as magnitudes, using different scales of measurement. By empirically analyzing the evaluation processes, agents and scenarios where conflicts between alternative proposals are resolved are also detected. The scientific and technological communities are one of those scenarios, but not the only one, and in most cases not the most important one either. The technoscience assessment criteria are mixed. Scientific communities were those that formerly determined what is acceptable in science and what is not. With the emergence of technoscience, they continue to play a role in this respect, but they do not have a monopoly on evaluation. Put another way: the evaluation context of technoscience is inter- or trans-communitarian. The military, businessmen and politicians introduce new evaluation criteria, in addition to the epistemic and technical ones. The society and users of techno-scientific devices also have an important role in the evaluation processes of technoscience. For the defenders of the autarky of science, grouped under the slogan that only those who know science (or technology) can value technoscience, this produces scandal. However, it is a necessary consequence of the structure of techno-scientific practice, and more specifically of its axiological structure.
(c): Third, the divergences between the evaluating agents are the rule, not the exception. That is why we say that the subject (or agent) of technoscience is plural. The generation of shared value systems, the processes of consensus and the establishment of procedural rules to resolve differences and conflicts, if necessary before courts, are some of the most relevant issues for the axiological analysis of techno-scientific activity 215. usually it happens that the proposals overcome some phases of the axiological screening, but not the rest. For example, a research project can be very well posed from the scientific and technological point of view, but it can be rejected later because it has no military, business or commercial interest. The evaluation processes are iterative: that is why we speak of axiological screens. The techno-scientific proposals are passing successive thresholds of valuation, but they have to pass them all to become effective. Each evaluating agent incorporates its own criteria and can differ completely from other agents that had considered an appropriate proposal to be excellent. The axiological pluralism entails a sequentiality, with feedback between the various phases of the project. Although we represent the whole process through an evaluation matrix, in reality we have to distinguish several sub-matrices, each of which expresses the diversity of value systems that intervene in technoscience.
(d): Fourth, the axiology that we advocate, because it is empirical and formalizing, is not limited to locating the various evaluating agents over time, but also clarifies and makes explicit the values actually used in these evaluations. To the extent that standardized protocols and evaluation matrices (or derivations of such formal instruments) are used, the final results of the evaluations can be analyzed and justified, including divergences and conflicts. Faced with the concealment of the real evaluation criteria, typical of subjective judgments, the evaluation matrices increase the degree of intersubjectivity, and in the best case of objectivity of the evaluation processes. Before proceeding with a valuation, each evaluating agent must publicly declare the criteria that he or she wants to apply, and, where appropriate, also the relative weightings. As a result of this pre-evaluative phase, the evaluative action is subject to rules, like any action, instead of being governed by the free will of each evaluator or of the one with the most relative power. Evaluation matrices, when applied, contribute considerably to the normalization of evaluation processes, increasing the degree of objectivity of their results. Of course, the evaluation processes are not linear, as we already pointed out. The possibility of using the results of an evaluation, of having it repeated with different agents, etc., improves the evaluation processes and their results. All this introduces an important legal component in the techno-scientific activity: the performance of the evaluation committees must be subject to rules, and in the case of public actions also to laws. The same applies to the registration of patents or lawsuits that techno-scientific companies may have among themselves. Judicial bodies are the last link in an evaluation process, but no less important.
(e): Fifth, the axiology of technoscience based on the use of evaluation matrices favors criticism and intervention. It is enough to compare, for example, two evaluation matrices used by two evaluators E and E ‘to detect absences and axiological biases in the practice of both. This applies to individual evaluators but also to evaluations carried out by groups, commissions or institutions. The indicators of scientific-technological activity are only one of the expressions of what we call evaluation matrices here. They are usually economic (spending on R & D), professionals (human resources available), bibliometrics, patented and technological innovation. Recently, social indicators have been introduced (RICYT 2001). The absence of ecological, legal or ethical indicators show the defective structure of the evaluation matrices effectively used in said processes. When analyzing the evaluation criteria effectively used, as well as their respective weights, the criticisms cease to be ideological and become formal improvements. Of course, the proposed improvements have to specify the values to be included and the weights that must be modified. The controversy and the debate take place before evaluating, which improves the evaluation techniques and increases the degree of intersubjectivity and objectivity of the assessment instruments that are going to be used. Put another way: the evaluation criteria themselves that are going to be used have to be evaluated, both ex ante and ex post. This improves axiological actions, by perfecting the instruments with whose help they are carried out. Do not forget that we consider valuations as actions and, therefore, subject to the theory of action that we have mentioned repeatedly. In our view, the evaluation matrices and their derived developments suppose a considerable improvement of the technoscience evaluation processes. This does not prevent those instruments also have shortcomings and shortcomings. The important thing is to institute the principle of meta-evaluation (or control of evaluations), according to which one must evaluate the axiological actions themselves, and therefore their agents, their instruments, their initial conditions and contour (for example, pressures to the evaluation committees), their results, their consequences and their rules. Formulating prior procedural rules for evaluation processes is one of the net improvements to be considered, because it reduces the degree of discretion of the evaluators. Observe that what we are saying does not contradict our previous acceptance of a certain degree of subjectivity in the evaluations of techno-scientific activity. Subjectivity in evaluations can reach a certain degree, but it must never be the dominant criterion. The subjective assessment could even be weighted, combining it with the remaining assessment criteria. The important thing is that this weighting factor was explicit and prior, instead of being implicit and manifested in times of conflict, as is often the case. When hiring researchers, for example, the letters of support that the candidates receive from scientists, personalities or prestigious institutions are usually weighted. This is a factor to be taken into account, not the only one. Properly weighing these subjective judgments is part of the construction of an evaluation matrix.
(f): Sixth, evaluation matrices are very useful when comparing different techno-scientific areas and systems, favoring the transfer of values between them and the axiological change in broad areas of technoscience. Let’s take a very trivial example: the degree of computerization of the techno-scientific practice itself, whether in the context of research, application or education. Or even in the context of evaluation, which is an indicator of great relevance to analyze the evaluation practice. Or also: the percentage of the Gross Industrial Product that some countries dedicate to scientific-technological research, or to education, or to innovation. If a country compares its investment in R & D with that of another country that is more technologically advanced, it can reshape its budget policy and set the objective of gradually increasing this percentage of investment in R & D. The same applies to the priority value: priority lines are quickly imitated by other countries or techno-scientific agents. From our perspective, this transfer of values would be facilitated and specified with the systematic use of evaluation matrices, regardless of the format they adopt in each case. What is said is not only valid for public technoscience, but also for private technoscience. The matrixes would also allow to compare both types of technoscience, with all the consequences that would derive from it.
(g): Seventh, it should be emphasized that evaluation matrices are not proposed in order to try to define deterministic algorithms for decision making nor are they based on the maximization of utility functions 216. Except in very exceptional cases there are no such algorithms 217. One of the main reasons is that axiology usually works with ordinal scales and inequations. Our proposals are inserted in the line of work initiated by Herbert Simon, based on the notion of satisfaction versus the maximization of values and constitutive of what is now called bounded rationality. In general, each value vijk or disvalor vijk have associated a minimum level cijk of satisfaction of a positive value, below which it is said that the techno-scientific proposal is rejected, and a maximum level of dissatisfaction of the disvalue, Cijk, above of which the proposal is also not accepted, for exceeding the maximum tolerable threshold of said disvalue. These levels may vary throughout an evaluation process, and in general over time, being one of the main indicators of the progress of scientific activity in relation to this value and disvalue pair. In formal terms, for a techno-scientific proposal or action not to be rejected, it is necessary that i, cijk vijk (Ai) Cijk, and that both at a given moment and over a period of time. The scientific theories themselves support a certain number of anomalies, as Kuhn showed, provided they are not excessive and provided that, in addition, these theories have a sufficient number of empirical tests to support their possible validity. A technological device can have a certain number of faults, or a foreseeable period of obsolescence, but if those disvalores are manifested in excess the corresponding device is replaced by another, or withdrawn from the market. This type of bounded rationality is the one that also prevails in political, social, ecological and military spheres, and even in legal environments, although in this case with a lesser degree of flexibility. Not so in economic circles, where the “maximizing paradigm” has been implemented with force, becoming even a model for the analysis of social action, through the theory of rational action. As we have already said, in economic valuations it is easier to use metric scales, due to the existence of money as a unit of measurement. This has generated a reductionist tendency: many theories of rationality have accepted the maximizing paradigm. However, even in economic theory there are strong tendencies against it, starting with Simon and ending with Amartya Sen. Regardless of the clarity, simplicity and utility that maximizing techniques may have in the social sciences, they are empirically inadequate and technically biased in the case of the axiological analysis of technoscience. On the other hand, the existence of minimum levels of satisfaction and maximum satisfaction is one of the “symbolic generalizations” most characteristic of bounded rationality. We will return to this question in later publications.
(h): In eighth place, we not only use the distinction between the twelve subsystems to analyze the axiological structure of technoscientific activity. We also distinguish between central and peripheral (or nuclear and orbital) values. By core or nuclear values we mean those whose dissatisfaction (vijk (Ai) cijk or vijk (Ai) Cijk) implies the immediate rejection of a component of a techno-scientific action, and therefore that of the action itself, until such a component does not be modified. There are core values in each of the twelve subsystems: for example, incoherence or lack of empirical adequacy (epistemic values), uselessness or dysfunction (technical values), disproportion or lack of profitability (economic values), indiscipline or cowardice (military values), etc. The peripheral or orbital values, on the other hand, do not entail the automatic rejection of the component or of the action, although they raise doubts about its suitability. From our perspective, the five values that Kuhn considered as permanent of science (precision, rigor, coherence, generality and fertility), are nuclear values of science. This does not mean that they have to be satisfied to the fullest. What is essential is that they do not fall below certain levels of satisfaction (changing according to values, situations and times), or that they exceed the maximum levels of tolerable dissatisfaction. In the case of science, the axiological core is composed exclusively of epistemic values. In the case of technology by technical values. To the extent that science and technology were involved in industrial production, axiological nuclei were transformed, giving entry to some economic and business values. In the case of technoscience this trend has become more acute, and in many directions. In general terms, we will say that the axiological core of the various technosciences always includes epistemic, technical, economic and political values, and very often military and legal values. Ecological values, today, are on the periphery of technoscience, as well as aesthetic, moral and religious values. This does not mean denying the existence of cases in which these values are nuclear, or could be, especially in some countries and cultures. As for the basic values, some of them are part of the axiological core of some technosciences (for example, the technomedicine), but not all. For example, the technomathematics is hardly affected by the basic values. In summary, the distinction between central and peripheral values is a formal distinction, whose effective concretion has to be investigated with case studies. It is not possible to affirm an axiological nucleus common to all technoscience modalities, although we should not rule out that this nucleus ends up being conformed as the technoscience develops and consolidates, as it happened historically with science and technology.
(i): Finally, it is necessary to clarify the notion of the value system of technoscience, V. So far we have talked about the various possible subsystems and we have just introduced the structural distinction between nuclear and orbital values 218. We have also affirmed that the system V values that govern a certain techno-scientific activity is never formed by a single subsystem (epistemic values, technical values), as was the case of science and technology. Of course, this also applies to other subsystems. No matter how militarized a techno-scientific activity may be, military values are never the only relevant ones. The epistemic, technological and economic values always have a presence in any techno-scientific activity, and not only in the periphery, but in the axiological center. Therefore, a V system is always a mixed system. Just as the techno-scientific agent is plural, because it is composed of a set of members, each of which represents, embodies and defends this or that subsystem of values, so the evaluation matrix that defines said system V is structurally heterogeneous, that generates the existence of submatrices within it. Each of the submatrices represents the nuclear values from each of the twelve subsystems we are considering, usually four or five. The same happens with the peripheral values, which are also organized by subsystems and are represented by submatrices 219. The V systems can be very different according to the different technosciences, contexts and situations. For example, they differ radically according to whether we are in the context of education, research or application. Therefore, each V system is associated with a field of techno-scientific activity, which must be empirically solved. These systems arise, develop and consolidate in the techno-scientific practice itself, generating in some cases stable V systems with standardized and generalized evaluation protocols. In such cases we will say that this activity is a mature technoscience. Although we have not said so far explicitly, both “scientificity” and “techno-scientificity” (if we are allowed the word) can be used as terms of value, and therefore are a matter of degrees. Macro-science is in an intermediate degree, or if you prefer, it was a transition from science to technoscience. The existence of V systems of values, stable, normalized and generalized in a scientific-technological system, as well as the integration into V of several subsystems of different values, express the degree of advancement and implementation of technoscience. If we apply the evaluation matrices to a specific technological system, it becomes possible to analyze the structure of the system V of values, and therefore part of the structure of the techno-scientific practice.
V.4: Technoscience and power.
One of the most marked characteristics of technoscience is its connection with various forms of power: economic, military and political, in particular. Although some authors, such as David Noble, have considered technoscience as a new religion 220, the truth is that the relations between technoscience and religious powers are rather scarce, if not conflictive. The current debate about stem cells is a good example of this. Religious values have an impact on technoscience, but usually in contrast to many of the techno-scientific innovations. What does happen, however, is the insertion of techno-scientific power at the very core of the traditional great powers. Entrepreneurs, politicians and the military, depend on technoscience to increase their power.
Numerous authors have studied from a historical point of view the progressive consolidation of the power of science and the establishment of links with other classical powers, in particular with military and economic power 221. For our part, to explain the emergence of techno-scientific power we will a more philosophical approach, introducing the notion of capacity for action, inspired by some ideas of Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize in Economics (1999) 222. His proposals in economics can be a good source of inspiration in philosophy of science, as he has pointed out J. Francisco Alvarez 223. In our case, we will not take them literally. We will freely reinterpret Sen’s thesis on the space of capabilities, in order to explain the continued increase in the power of technoscience throughout the twentieth century.
We will say that, just as science has increased the cognitive capacities of human beings, techniques have increased their action capabilities, using machines as body prostheses. The same can be said of industrial technologies, thanks to whose use enormously increased productive capacity, as well as energy capacity (electricity) and the means of transport of people and goods, making possible the appearance of large factories and metropolises industrialized The emergence of technoscience has meant a qualitative leap, both in terms of knowledge and action. Computers, radars, atomic bombs, particle accelerators, synthetic materials, spacecraft, artificial satellites, television, telematic networks and many other canonical examples of technoscience coincide in one fundamental property: they make possible actions that were impossible before. From this comes a first deep relationship between power and technoscience, to the extent that it affects the sphere of the possible. The nuclear winter is the clearest example, since, if it occurs, it would radically alter the face of the planet, including the disappearance of a large part of the human species and the radical transformation of the eventual survivors. Technoscience completely transforms the space of capabilities Sen speaks of. If politicians, the military and businessmen are interested in techno-scientific artifacts, together with the public that uses them, it is because these artifacts revolutionize the scope of what can be done. Technoscience places us before a space of radically new possible actions, both individually and collectively. The reason for the close relationships that have developed and consolidated throughout the twentieth century between macro-science and the great powers is that techno-scientific artifacts open up new capacities for action, and this at a qualitatively higher level than the technologies of industrial era.
With the advent of technoscience proper a new type of machines emerged, the infomáquinas, which allow to simulate and control the operation of various types of artifacts. Technoscientific devices operate primarily on other types of machines, automating and controlling their operation. This is clearly manifested in the case of new weapons, guided by remote telecontrol, but also in industry, by automating production, in trade, by enabling the purchase and sale through telematic networks and, finally, in the own society, when our offices and our computer equipment houses are populated. The manual operator has been replaced in many productive sectors by the computer operator, multiplying the rates of production and distribution. By directly influencing governments, companies, military organizations, the market and society, technoscience has modified the six major areas of SCyT systems that we distinguished in the previous chapter. Its success does not depend on the new scientific knowledge it has generated, but above all on the modification of human activity, which is increasingly dependent on a whole plethora of techno-scientific artifacts that are nowadays used daily.
The set of capabilities of a person can be defined as the set of possible and valuable actions for it, giving by understood the draft theory of action with twelve components that we have summarized in the previous chapter. As we saw when commenting on the definition of “technical realization” proposed by Quintanilla, the technical actions are closely related to what the technical agents consider valuable. Therefore, they are part of the space of human capacities, such as Sen 224 understands it. We will say then that, just as classical philosophers defined the human subject by their notes or properties, techno-scientific agents are characterized by their capacities for action, including the positive or negative evaluations of them, that is, the values and disvalores. As an agent, the human being has in each moment a set of action capabilities, valued by the subject, but not only by him, but also by the other agents that carry out similar (or opposite) actions. This capacity space is extended or reduced throughout life, depending on the states through which the agent passes. Human agents have an associated space of action capabilities whose actual or potential realizations not only depend on them, but on the other components of each action. The situations, the means and instruments with which they are counted, the possible risks or simply the initial conditions work as constrictions of that space of possible actions. Some of these components do not limit, but enhance the capacity for action. Such is the case when the agent-subject is inserted into a techno-scientific system and is competent in the use of the corresponding instruments. Reinterpreting Sen, we can say that, in this case:
1.- Possessing scientific knowledge (theories, facts, methods) is not only an epistemic good, but also economic, military, political, social, etc. From the perspective of the subsystem of epistemic values, having knowledge of the various scientific theories, a good curriculum and prestige as a researcher, professor, disseminator or professional of technoscience is equivalent to having epistemic assets. Scientists try to make theirs and increase those assets, because they provide them with epistemic well-being. However, this knowledge, once implemented technologically and applied to the market, is an undoubted advantage for those who own it, because its capacity for action is increased. The symbiosis between scientific knowledge and other social agents has radically transformed the system of epistemic values. These continue to exist, but they are systemically linked to other value systems. The interaction between the episteme and the polis brings mutual benefits. Knowledge remains an epistemic good but, in addition, it becomes intellectual capital. This was the great contribution of Vannevar Bush’s report.
2.- The instruments for research and large equipment are in turn technical goods. They are highly valued by scientists and engineers, because without them they can not act. The technological component of scientific research increases the capacity for scientific action, that is, the ability to compute, observe, measure and experiment. We will call technological goods to this component of the techno-scientific activity.
3.- For the techno-scientific entrepreneur, on the other hand, both the knowledge of the scientists he hires or finances and the skills and abilities of the technicians are first of all economic goods, which we must try to make profitable. In the case of public research companies, profitability does not have to be strictly monetary. The increase of knowledge or technological progress can also be profitable, due to its subsequent repercussions on society, health or the market. In the case of private R & D & I companies, the benefits are usually monetary, but neither are they the only ones: consolidation and expansion in the market, for example, is usually as much or more important than realizing benefits. . From our perspective, these strategic objectives are perfectly rational, by increasing the capacity of these companies to act. Having a certain market share means delimiting (or increasing) the capacity for business action: greater production, greater commercialization, greater economic activity, as they say. The scientists themselves are usually sensitive to this type of economic valuation, although it is not the main one for them. The financing obtained, the jobs available and the salaries that are charged are important aspects for techno-scientists, since they not only have epistemic or technological interests, but also economic ones. The sociologists of scientific knowledge have insisted a lot on the importance of the interests of scientists. They are right, but with a very important nuance: just as we have distinguished several subsystems of values relevant to technoscience, so we must distinguish as many meanings of the term “interest”, or the term “good”. The technoscientific goods and interests have many facets, given the plural structure of the techno-scientific agency and the value systems V that guide it.
4.- The same can be said of the military, who form a considerable part of the techno-scientific enterprise. Most military actions are today techno-scientific actions, at least in the most advanced armies, which coincide with those that have increased their capacity for action and intervention. These actions are also valued as assets by the strategists, or if you like as interests. The defense of the strategic interests of a country justifies a war, even preventive, like that of Iraq, not only in response to an aggression. The scientific-military lobbies promote techno-scientific research in order to increase the capacity of action of the armies, whether offensive or defensive. It is not its only objective, of course, but its high value of technoscience and its institutional imbrication in it come from the impact that technoscientific research has in the space of military action capabilities.
5.- Even with significant differences, the interest of politicians for technoscience has similar roots. Not in vain the leit-motif of political propaganda is: facts, not words. These facts are always the result of political actions, for which technoscience makes very important contributions. The Bush model of scientific-technological policy, as we saw, is based on the postulate that basic research and technological development are the great engines of progress in the politically strategic fields: security, economy, health, education, defense. Subsequently it was shown that the transfer of knowledge and technology is an excellent instrument for diplomacy. Technoscience is one of the great pivots of contemporary states, unlike the science of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which played a subsidiary role. Therefore, the techno-scientific power constitutes one of the great powers of the State. Articulating a scientific-technological system that enables the development of this new form of power, as well as its balanced integration with classical powers, is one of the great problems of contemporary states. Technoscience is inserted in the hard core of political power, as it had previously done with military and economic power, because it is one of the main factors of transformation and control of societies, without prejudice to its domination over nature, which keep exercising. Put another way: its progress is a political good and is part of the interests of the State. That is why the scientific-technological policies are usually questions of State. The assessment that politicians make of technoscience is very different from that of previous techno-scientific agents, but no less positive for that. The evolution of contemporary societies throughout the twentieth century has shown that those countries that have promoted techno-scientific activity have acquired a much greater weight in the international arena, and this in the main areas of interest of the States. Therefore, it is chosen to promote and regulate it legally, according to different models that, yes, usually have a strong ideological and party component 225.
So far there are no doubts. As a whole, technoscience is a good, although there are preferences for some or other lines of research, depending on the respective interests and values. We have already said that, although it is mainly developed by scientists and technicians, the techno-scientific activity is always supported by other social agents that are integrated into the science and technology systems in order to enhance their own capacities for action in the market, society, international relations and battlefields. Jurists also participate in the SCyT system, even if it is subsidiary. Simplifying a lot, we could say that, for all these techno-scientific agents, own technoscience is always a good (at least at the beginning) and therefore it must be promoted and developed. The notion of well admits very diverse meanings, as we have already mentioned. Conflicts of values arise because each agent promotes its own conception of the good, without there already being a supreme good to which the various subsystems of values are subordinated. In general, these principles are usually resolvable through agreements and multiple transactions, which are established in the techno-scientific practice itself. The threats come from the technoscience possessed by the enemy, opponent or competitor. If it is better, either you have to make it your own or you have to improve it. The competition between armies, companies and States is the main engine of technoscience. Since, generically speaking, technoscience increases the capabilities of action (business, political, military), to overcome the adversary it is necessary to overcome it in techno-scientific development. The fundamental principle of technoscience, as we saw in chapter 4, is pragmatic: it is the source of economic, political and military progress. It is not a law of nature, but a principle for strategic action in a competitive framework.
In other words: technoscience generates power because it increases the diverse capacities of action. Since, in philosophical terms this time, increasing the capacity for action is good, technoscience is a business, political and military good. The main good is not knowledge, but the capacity for action. We are simplifying a lot, but thanks to this we can contrast the basic principle of modern science, the knowledge (and domain) of nature is a good, in front of this new basic principle of technoscience. The search for physical-natural or other knowledge has not ceased to be a good: technoscience is based on science. But the difference is radical, since now this increase in knowledge, including basic research, is only a means to increase the capacity for action, in this case political, military and business. With this we come to one of the conclusions of this book: knowledge is a means to action, not an end in itself. For that reason, philosophical theorizations about the goals of science are not valid for technoscience. The philosophy of science has to change because science has changed, and in particular its objectives. Even the endless search for truth, to remember the venerable Popper, becomes an instrument to increase the capacity for action. This is the reason why we have been insisting that the philosophy of science should focus on scientific activity, rather than on knowledge. If there is one, which will have to be studied in depth, the rationality of technoscience is practical.
Therefore, it is essential to choose one or other models of practical rationality, but not in the ethical sense of expression (although ethics also plays an important role in studies on technoscience), but in the sense of rational action. We have already expressed our criticisms of the instrumental conceptions of rationality, which are still valid in technoscience (knowledge is a means), as well as our option for evaluative or axiological rationality. The debate on this will be long and this option for bounded rationality versus the maximizing rationality of the rational decision theory is a first step in that direction.
But what happens with the other six subsystems of values, of the twelve that we have listed, and with their corresponding axiological agents?
Problems and conflicts already existed among the promoters of technoscience, but at the end of the 20th century they have become more acute. If we take into account the representatives of social, ecological, aesthetic, religious or moral values, and much more to the representatives of basic values, which are people in general, it is logical that conflicts of values manifest more frequently. For these social sectors, undoubtedly majorities, it is doubtful that technoscience is a good. In many aspects it is an evil, because it transforms them, sometimes positively, but sometimes negatively. In any case, the six types of agents remaining are much more attentive to the consequences and risks of techno-scientific actions than to the immediate results of them.
The reasons why this happens are not conjunctural, but structural. Let’s see some of them:
6.- As far as the societies are concerned, it is logical that concern should arise, because we must not forget that the transformation of societies is one of the main objectives of techno-scientific activity, unlike modern science and technology. industrial. The new information and communication technologies (ICT) are a good example. ICTs generate a new social space (the electronic space, or third environment) in which a new form of society, the information society and, for some, of information and knowledge can be formed and developed 226. ICTs are producing tremendous impacts on societies, not only on politics, armies or companies. Being one of the current paradigms of technoscience, since they have radically transformed the actions of scientists and engineers, ICTs show the extent to which technoscience is oriented towards the transformation of societies, not of nature. The same could be said of advertising technologies, pharmacology, design drugs or cognitive technosciences (or knowledge engineering, such as robotics or artificial perception). It is about transforming people and societies. It is not surprising that the transformaturi have something to say about it. From this structural conflict arise numerous social movements of criticism to technoscience, starting with the CTS studies in which this book is located. From a philosophical point of view, one of the central problems is risk. In the first place, dangers derived from errors in techno-scientific actions, whose consequences can be catastrophic, because technoscientific devices control the operation of many other systems and machines227. Second, as a clash between the techno-scientific culture and other cultures.
The technoscientific power is separated from society and can hardly be controlled by it, because the current control procedures are mostly techno-scientific. From this conflict arises a permanent tension between the freedom of techno-scientific research, which tends to be conceived as an unlimited freedom of action, and the social control of technoscience, for which there are no effective mechanisms today, given the strategic alliance that techno-scientific companies have established with political power. For this reason, movements for the democratization of science (Budapest Declaration of 1999) emerge, which should rather be called democratization of technosciences. Techno-scientific power has been closely linked with traditional economic, political and military powers. It is not surprising that counter-power movements arise, above all because of the scarce presence that, today, social values have in techno-scientific activity. It is not our intention to address these issues in this book, because our aim has been to analyze and clarify the concept of technoscience, but we do not doubt that this will be the main structural problem of technoscience in the coming decades. The presence of users of technoscience in the instances of evaluation, design and decision making is, in our opinion, a first step in this regard.
7.- The same happens with the ecological values and the axiological agents that advocate them. Although one of the main differences between science and technoscience lies in the latter’s willingness to intervene in societies (will to power, it could be said in Nietzschean terms), this does not prevent technoscience from maintaining the classic objectives of science and modern technologies. In this regard, biotechnologies are the canonical example (transgenic foods, genetic engineering, cloning, artificial reproduction). But we must not forget the devastating effects of some techno-scientific actions on the environment as a whole (nuclear waste, Chernobyl type accidents, threat of atomic war, greenhouse effect, etc.). The actions of numerous NGOs (such as Greenpace), summits such as Rio (1992) or the recent one in South Africa (2002) and, above all, innumerable small actions in defense of the environment, must also be considered as technoscientific actions, although the they carry out agents located in the periphery of the SCyT system that defend values that are not yet in the axiological core of technoscience.
8.- The aesthetic values and the social agents that promote them (artists, architects, filmmakers, models, singers, musicians, some sportsmen, videogame designers and Web pages, etc.) are rapidly entering the techno-scientific activity. We can talk about techno-art in this case, as it is one of its usual names, without forgetting the scientific component of the new instruments and artistic formats. Some creators of science fiction, coming from the counter-cultural movements of the 70s, have had a very important anticipatory function. From an aesthetic point of view, cinematographic images like those of Hal, Blade Runner, Robocop, Terminator or Matrix, to name some of the most famous, have perfectly reflected some of the aspects of technoscience, precisely the most worrisome. We should also write the artistic history of technoscience throughout the twentieth century, but not having knowledge or competence for it, we just point to this possibility, which, to the surprise of some, would become part of the studies on technoscience , in this case artistic studies. All the speculation about cyborgs, promoted at times by avant-garde artists, is an excellent example of the presence of aesthetic values in techno-scientific activity. In some cases, this presence is peripheral, in others it is not. There are branches of technoscience, for example scientific visualization, or video games, where aesthetic values are part of the axiological core, always along with other types of values:
technological, economic, socio-cultural, scientific and even military (or rather warrior), at least if one takes into account the heavy burden of violence of most of these techno-images.
9.- In general, religious values clash strongly with technoscience, especially in those countries where there has been no separation between religious power and state power, or in those cultures where the dominant power remains the religious, as is common in many areas of the Third World. The holders of religious power, especially if they hold it absolutely, see in technoscience an enemy to fight, if not the devil or the incarnation of the evil that their respective mythologies have produced. Therefore, far from being integrated into the scientific-technological-political-military-business alliance that is at the origin of technoscience, religious powers tend to fight against it, or at least deeply distrust it. They have good reasons for this, since we have already said that technoscience arises to transform societies and religion is a basic component of almost all social structures. These conflicts are minor in countries where there are non-denominational states, and especially in those where religious activity takes place mainly in private or intimate areas, but they do exist. Techno-scientific power is a dangerous adversary for religious power, as it was once enlightened scientists. The analysis of this type of conflict would make it possible to fine-tune these quick comments that we are making here.
10.- We come to ethics, or moral philosophy. It may seem disappointing, but we will say little about it, since, as we have already said, axiology covers a much broader field than ethics. As regards the presence of moral values in techno-scientific activity, it does occur, but in no way in the axiological core, except in exceptional cases. In general, ethical assessments of technoscience are secondary, or subsidiaries. It is true that very serious problems of conscience arise in some scientists (the Punjab movement that opposed the atomic bombs is a good example) and that, as in any human activity, ethical issues arise continuously (honesty, friendship, enmity, dignity, duty, etc.). But technoscientists usually fix themselves with specific deontologies, following the example of Hippocrates and the medical profession. There are exceptions, of course: bioethics is one of them, as manifested in the fact that Bioethics Commissions have been created in the hospitals of the techno-scientifically developed countries, or also in the existence of Committees and Foundations of Bioethics and Infoethics. But when we talk about the Genome project of the ELSI project associated with it, the budget weight that was assigned to the ethical, legal and social aspects of the Genome Project was 5%. This gives a clear idea of the relative low weight that these issues have when investigating the consequences of large techno-scientific research projects from a moral or social perspective. Technomedicine is one of the technoscience modalities where applied ethics can have a nuclear presence, but even in this case the technological, scientific and economic values prevail over the strictly moral ones. Once again we are faced with an issue that deserves a more in-depth study, which we can not undertake here.
11.- Finally, we will briefly talk about the basic values and the conflicts they generate in technoscience. This is another of the central problems, although here we will devote a very brief attention.
Summarily stated, what is at stake is the technification of people, not just their way of life, because this has already happened. Health and pleasure are increasingly mediated technologically, not to mention entertainment, joy, pain or feelings, which have their best field of expression and development in television, advertising, phones, video games and the Internet. The convergence between various mentioned technologies, such as those just mentioned, implies the emergence of a new social space, whose functioning and development is strictly mediated by these technosciences. Apart from agrarian societies and large metropolises and industrial states, information and communication technosciences enable the emergence of a new modality of person, the e-person or electronic person, understanding the term “person” in its etymological sense of mask. The society of information and knowledge implies a radical transformation of the human being. In addition to the physical and citizen identity, people are acquiring a third identity, the electronic identity. Techno-scientifically marked by chips and access codes, the transforming power of technoscience is reaching the ultimate components of societies. In this case, too, the predominant values are those that make up the axiological core of technoscience, and first of all the technological and economic values, not to mention the military values, which run at ease through a large part of the electronic space. In the new social space there is no constituted political power. Therefore, we consider it as the techno-scientific space par excellence. In the absence of polis, there are no citizens, only customers, users and consumers.
In our view, this is a third phase of the techno-scientific revolution of the twentieth century. Its evolution will mark the main social transformation of the 21st century.
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