LOCAL AND GLOBAL:
THE MANAGEMENT OF CITIES IN THE ERA OF THE INFORMATION
from The Multicultural City
Jordi Borja and Manuel Castells
Our world is ethnically and culturally diverse and cities concentrate and express this diversity. Faced with the homogeneity affirmed and imposed by the State throughout history, most civil societies have historically constituted from a multiplicity of ethnicities and cultures that have generally resisted bureaucratic pressures towards normalization cultural and ethnic cleansing. Even in societies such as the Japanese or the Spanish, ethnically very homogeneous, regional cultural differences (or nationals, in the Spanish case), territorially marked traditions and forms of specific lives, are reflected in diverse behavior patterns and, sometimes, in intercultural tensions and conflicts (1). The management of these tensions, the construction of coexistence in respecting differences, are some of the most important challenges that all societies have had and now face. The concentrated expression of that cultural diversity, with it’s resulting tensions and the wealth of possibilities that diversity also contains preferably in cities, receptacle and melting pot of cultures, are combined via the construction of a common citizen project.
In the last years of the twentieth century, the globalization of the economy and acceleration of the urbanization process have increased the ethnic and cultural plurality of cities, through migration processes, national to international, that lead to the interpenetration of disparate populations and ways of life in the space of the main metropolitan areas of the world. The global is local, in a socially segmented and spatially segregated way, by human displacement caused by the destruction of old ways and the creation of new productive activity centers. The territorial differentiation of the two processes, that of creation and destruction, increases the uneven development between regions and between countries, and introduces a diversity growing in the urban social structure. In this article, we will analyze the process of formation of ethnic-cultural diversity in its new manifestations and the consequences of such diversity for the management of cities.
Globalization, migration and urbanization
The acceleration of the urbanization process in the world is largely due to the increase in rural-urban migrations, frequently due to the expulsion of labor from agriculture due to sectoral modernization, is also the consequence of the processes of industrialization and of growth of the informal economy in the metropolitan areas of the countries undergoing development (2). Although statistics vary by country, estimates offended for a number of developing countries indicate that, on average, while in 1960-70, the contribution of rural-urban emigration turban growth was 36.6%, in 1975-90, it increased to 40% of the new urban population. The contribution to metropolitan growth, in both cases, was even greater (3). In almost all countries, the incorporation into the cities of emigrants from rural areas significantly accentuates cultural diversity and, in ethnically diverse countries, such as the United States or Brazil, ethnic diversity.
Africa
Globalization has also caused significant population displacements between countries, although international migration presents a pattern complex that does not follow stereotyped visions of public opinion. So, almost half of the 80 million internationals around the world are concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East (4). About 35 million migrants are in sub-Saharan Africa, representing 8% of their total population. These migratory movements in Africa are of two types: on the one hand, migrations of workers, aimed at the countries of greatest economic dynamism, particularly to South Africa, Ivory Coast, Gambia and Nigeria. On the other hand, large displacements of hunger refugees, the war and genocide, in the Sahel, in the horn of Africa, in Mozambique, in Rwanda and Burundi, among other areas: in 1987 alone they were estimated at 12.6 million people displaced by wars or catastrophes in Africa (5). In Asia, Malaysia is the country with the highest immigration, with almost one million foreign workers, generally from Indonesia. Japan counts also with close to a million foreigners and several thousand illegal workers whose number is increasing rapidly, although the most foreigners are Koreans living in Japan for several generations. Singapore has about 300,000 immigrants, which represents high proportion of its population, and Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan, with Quotas below 100,000 each. However, to the extent that that the development of these countries be accentuated and the demographic pressure increase in China, India and Indonesia, an increase in migration is expected international, in addition to the increase in rural-urban migration throughout Asia. Thus, Japan in 1975 had an annual immigration of about 10,000 foreigners, while in 1990, that figure had increased to about 170,000 per year, mostly from Korea (6).
Latin America
Latin America, land of immigration during the twentieth century, has become a place of emigration. During the 1950-64 period the region as a whole had a net balance of migrations of + 1.8 million people, while in 1976-85, the balance was negative: – 1.6 million. The most significant changes were the drastic reduction of immigration in Argentina and the sharp increase of emigration in Mexico and Central America, particularly to the United States. Latin American immigration movements at the end of the century come generally from other Latin American countries. Thus, in Uruguay in 1991, of total of resident foreigners, 40% were from Argentina, 29% from Brazil and the11% of Chile. The highest proportion of foreign population occurs in Venezuela (7.2%), followed by Argentina (6.8%).
In more developed countries, in Western Europe and in the United States, there is a feeling among the population of an unprecedented arrival of immigrants in the last decade, of an authentic invasion in the terminology of some media outlets. However, the data shows a reality different, variable according to countries and historical moments (7).
Uneven development worldwide, economic and cultural globalization, and transport systems favor an intense transfer of populations. Then add the exoduses caused by wars and catastrophes, as well as, in Europe, the pressure of populations of the countries of the East that now enjoy freedom of traveling while suffering the impact of the economic crisis. But the immigration controls, strengthening borders between the countries of “them” and the rest of the world, the reduced creation of jobs in European leads to growing xenophobia in all societies. They represent obstacles formidable for population transfer that could result from trends alluded to. Let’s see, then, what is the real profile of recent migrations from the South and East to North and West.
U.S
In the United States, a society formed by successive waves of immigration, has effectively produced a significant increase in immigrants in absolute numbers since the immigration law reform in 1965, authorizing immigration by family reunification. But still, the current immigration levels are well behind the historical point reached between 1905 and 1914 (year when 1.2 million immigrants arrived in the United States). Moreover, in terms of proportion of the population, in 1914 those 1.2 million were equivalent to 1.5% of the population, while the total of 1992 immigrants represented only 0.3% of the population. Now what has changed substantially is the ethnic composition of immigration, which instead of coming from Europe and Canada, it now comes, for the most part, from Mexico, the Caribbean and other Latin American countries and Asia.
A similar phenomenon has taken place in the other two countries that are characterized, together with the United States, for having the highest proportion of foreign immigrants in its population, Canada and Australia. In Canada, in1992, more than 40% came from Asia, in particular from Hong Kong, and only a2.8% of the United Kingdom. Vancouver, the third largest Canadian city, has been transformed in the last decade by the arrival of 110,000 Chinese from Hong Kong, raising the proportion of Chinese population to 27% of residents of the city. Incidentally, such immigration has meant an influx of $4,000,000 per year in the local economy. As for Australia, in the 1990s, 21% of the population was born abroad and 40% have at least one parent was born abroad. Of the new immigrants arrived in Australia in1992, 51% came from Asia.
Europe
Western Europe presents a diversified picture in terms of migration movements. Using the percentage of population as an indicator foreign resident over the total population and observing its evolution between 1950 and 1990, we can verify, for example, that France and England had smaller proportion of the foreign population in 1990 than in 1982, while that Belgium and Spain had hardly varied (from 9.0 to 9.1%, and from 1.1 to 1.1%). Except the anomalous case of Luxembourg, the only European country whose foreign population exceeds 10% is Switzerland – also a special case because of the high degree of internationalization of its economy. And the average for the total of the European population is only 4.5% of foreigners. Increases significant during the eighties were mainly in Germany, Austria, Holland and Sweden, mainly due to the influence of Eastern European refugees. But also this influence seems to be much more limited from what Western European countries feared. So, for example, a European Commission report in 1991 estimated that 25 million citizens of Russia and the Soviet republics could emigrate to Western Europe before the year 2000. And yet, in the mid-1990s, it estimates that Russian emigration oscillates around 200,000 people per year, despite the horrific economic crisis that Russia is experiencing. The reason, for those they know the mechanisms of emigration, its simple: emigrants move through previously established contact networks. That’s why it’s the colonial metropolis that receives waves of immigrants from their former colonies (France and the Maghreb); or countries that deliberately recruited handoff cheap work in selected countries (Germany in Turkey and Yugoslavia) that continue to be the destination of emigrants from those countries. Instead, the Russians and ex-Soviets, having been banned from traveling for seven decades, lack support networks in emigration countries, with the exception of Jewish minority – which is precisely the one that emigrates. So, leaving family and country and launching into a hostile world without a support network is something that is only decided on a massive scale when a catastrophe forces it (famine, war, Nazism).
Now, if the data indicate that immigration in Western Europe does not reaches proportions as massive as those perceived in public opinion, why then that feeling? And why the social alarm? What really is happening is the increasing transformation of the ethnic composition of European societies, from imported immigrants during the period of high economic growth in the sixties. Indeed, the rates of fertility of foreigners are far higher than those of their European countries of residence (except, significantly, in Luxembourg and Switzerland, where the most foreigners are of European origin). For demographic reasons the fertility differential will continue to increase over time. This is the true source of social tension: the growing ethnic diversity of a Europe that has not yet assumed such diversity and is still talking about immigrants when, more and more, they are actually nationals of non-European ethnic origin. The population increase in the United Kingdom between 1981 and 1990 was only 1% for whites, while it was 23% for ethnic minorities. Even so, whites are 51,847 million, while minorities only represent 2,614 million. But there exists a clear awareness of the inevitable process of setting up a society with important ethnic minorities, like the American model. Something similar happens in other European countries. Two thirds of foreigners from France and three quarters of those from Germany and Holland are of non-European origin. To this we must add, in the case of France, the growing proportion of population of non-European origin born in France that have the right to nationality upon reaching 18 years. It can also happen, as is the case in Germany, that the law denies the right to nationality to those born in the national territory of foreign parents, a situation in which hundreds of thousands of young Turks find themselves They never knew a land other than Germany. But the cost of such defense of notions of native nationality is the creation of a permanent caste of not-citizens, which can be used an infernal mechanism of social hostility. An additional factor is important in the perception of an ethnic diversity that goes far beyond the direct impact of immigration: the spatial concentration space of ethnic minorities in cities, particularly in large cities and in specific neighborhoods of large cities, where they reach constitute even the majority of the population. The spatial segregation of the city based on ethnic and cultural characteristics of the population, is not inheritance of a discriminatory past, but a feature of increasing importance, characteristic of our societies: the era of global information is also that of local segregation.
Ethnic diversity, social discrimination and urban segregation
In all societies, ethnic minorities suffer economic, institutional and cultural discrimination, which usually results in segregation in the city space. Income inequality and discriminatory practices in the housing market leads to the disproportionate concentration of ethnic minorities in certain urban areas within metropolitan areas. On the other hand, defensive reaction and cultural specificity reinforce the spatial segregation pattern, to the extent that each group ethnic tends to use its concentration in neighborhoods as a form of protection, mutual help and affirmation of its specificity. There is thus a double process of urban segregation: on the one hand, of ethnic minorities with respect to the group dominant ethnic; on the other hand, of the different ethnic minorities among them. Naturally, this spatial differentiation must be understood in terms statistical and symbolic, that is, as a disproportionate concentration of certain ethnic groups in certain spaces, rather than as residence exclusive to each group in each neighborhood. Even in borderline situations of urban racial segregation, as was the apartheid regime in South Africa, we can observe a strong socio-spatial differentiation, in terms of class, to from the moment the mandatory segregation is dismantled Institutionally imposed.
The best known and most studied urban ethnic segregation model is that of the American cities, which persists throughout the history of the United States and that has been reinforced in the last two decades, with the location of new immigrants in their corresponding segregated minority ethnic spaces, constituting true ethnic enclaves in the main areas metropolitan and thus denying in historical practice the famous myth of melting pot that is only applicable (and with limitations) to the populations of European origin (8). For example, in Los Angeles County, 70 of the 78 existing municipalities in 1970 had less than 10% of residents belonging to ethnic minorities. In contrast, in 1990 the 88 municipalities that by then made up the county had more than 10% ethnic minorities, but 42 municipalities had more than 50% ethnic minorities in their population (9).
Spatial concentration
The complete study by Massey and Denton (1993) on racial segregation urban in North American cities shows high levels of segregation between blacks and whites in all the big cities. Out of an index of absolute segregation of 100, the average is 68.3, which rises to an average of 80.1 for the northern metropolitan areas. The three main areas are they are also among the most segregated: New York, with an index of 82; Los Angeles, with 81.1; and Chicago with 87.8. Also the insulation index of blacks, which measures the interaction between blacks and other black groups (100 being the level of absolute isolation) reflects high values, with an average of 63.5, which rises to 66.1 in the northern areas and arrives to register in Chicago a 82.8 index.
The spatial concentration of disadvantaged ethnic minorities leads to creating true black holes of the urban social structure, which mutually reinforces poverty, deterioration of housing and services urban, low occupancy levels, lack of professional opportunities and criminality. In his study on segregation and crime in urban America, Massey (1995) concludes that the coincidence of high levels of poverty among blacks and high spatial segregation rates create ecological niches in that there are high rates of crime, violence and risk of being a victim of such crimes… Unless there is a movement towards desegregation, the cycle of violence will continue; however, the perpetuation of violence paradoxically it makes desegregation more difficult because it makes it beneficial for whites to have isolation from blacks. Specifically, by isolating blacks in segregated neighborhoods, the rest of society is isolated in relation to the crime and others social problems resulting from the high poverty rate among blacks. So in the 90s have declined, in general terms, crime rates in the North American main cities. Between 1980 and 1992, the proportion of number of American households that have suffered some form of crime has reduced by more than a third, but at the same time, the probability for Blacks of being victims of a crime have increased extraordinarily. Black teenagers are nine times more likely than boy’s targets of being killed: in 1960 they died violently 45 / 100,000, while that in 1990 the rate had gone to 140 / 100,000. In his study on the relationship between segregation of blacks and homicide of blacks in 125 cities, Peterson and Kirov found that spatial segregation between whites and blacks was the statistically most explanatory factor of the homicide rate of all the variables analyzed, much more important than poverty, education or age (10). Whoever is nearby is killed, and when a society, breaking with its liberal traditions and with its laws of racial integration, adopts the attitude cynical of locking up their impoverished racial minorities in more and more deteriorated ghettos, it exacerbates the violence in these areas. But from that moment the ethnic majority is doomed to live entrenched under the protection of the police and must allocate a large budget to police and prisons instead of education, as is the case in the state of California.
Racism and segregation:
While racism and urban segregation exist in all societies, not always are their profiles as marked nor their consequences as violent as those that occur in American cities. Likewise, Brazil is a multiracial society, in which blacks and mulattos occupy the lowest levels of the social scale (11). But, although ethnic minorities are also spatially segregated, both between the regions of the country and within the areas metropolitan, the dissimilarity index, which measures urban segregation, is far inferior to that of the North American metropolitan areas. Thus though economic inequality is influenced by ethnicity, institutional and social barriers and prejudices are much less entrenched than in U.S. Thus, two societies with an equally slave-like past evolved towards different patterns of spatial segregation and racial discrimination, based on cultural, institutional and economic factors that they favored the mixing of races and social integration in Brazil and made it difficult in the United States: a comparison that invites analysis of historical variation of a human nature that is not immutable.
Now, what seems to be established is the tendency to segregate ethnic minorities in all cities and in particular in the cities of the world more developed. Thus, as European societies receive new groups of immigrants and see their ethnic minorities grow from groups established in the last three decades, the segregation pattern is accentuated urban ethnicity. In the United Kingdom, although London only accounts for 4.7% of the population, it’d concentrated with 42% of the ethnic minorities population. These minorities, particularly concentrated in some districts, are characterized by a lower level of education, higher unemployment rate and an economic activity rate of only 58% compared to 80% of whites (12). At London’s Wands worth district, with about 260,000 inhabitants, about 150 different languages are spoken. To that ethnic-cultural diversity is joined by the doubtful privilege of being one of the English districts with the highest rate of social deficiencies. In Goteborg (Sweden), 16% of the population is of foreign origin and its residence is concentrated in the northeast of the city and on the island of Hisingen Zurich, which has seen its population of foreigners increase (especially Turks and Yugoslavs) from 18% in 1980 to 25% in 1990, 44% of this population is concentrated in the industrial areas of the urban periphery. In Holland, the foreigners are only 5% of the total population, but in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht said proportion ranges between 15% and 20%, while in the old neighborhoods of these cities it goes up to 50%. In Belgium the proportion of foreigners is 9%, but in the city of Anderlecht reaches 26% and in the neighborhood of La Rose, the most deteriorated, foreigners they represent 76% of its 2,300 inhabitants (13). In sum, European cities they are following, to a large extent, the urban segregation path of ethnic minorities characteristic of American metropolises, although the spatial form of urban segregation is more diverse in Europe. While the French banliues configure peripheral metropolitan ghettos, Central European and British people tend to concentrate minorities in the city center, in a space model similar to the North American, which can contribute to the decline of urban centers if the living conditions of ethnic minorities in Europe. Moreover, the importance of gangs and the flourishing of criminal activities is less accentuated in Europe than in North America. But if the tendencies of social exclusion continue to worsen, it seems reasonable to assume that situations similar will lead to similar consequences, except for the cultural and institutional differences. The multicultural city is a city enriched by its diversity, as Daniel Cohn Bandit pointed out in his introductory intervention to the Frankfurt Colloquium sponsored by the Council of Europe on multiculturalism in the city (14). But, as it also remained manifest in this colloquium, the segregated city is the city of rupture of social solidarity and, eventually, of the empire of urban violence.
Floating populations in cities:
The variable geometry of the new world economy and the intensification of migratory phenomenon, both rural-urban and international, have generated a new category of population, between rural, urban and metropolitan: population floating that moves with economic flows and according to the permissiveness of institutions, in search of their survival, with temporalities and spatial variables, depending on the countries and circumstances.
Although by its very nature the phenomenon is difficult to measure, more and more current extensive research provides data on its importance and on the consequences it has for the operation and management of cities (15). Perhaps the society in which the floating population reaches largest dimensions is China during the last decade. For a long time, the control of population movements regulated in 1958 in which each citizen Chinese was registered as a member of a hook (household) and classified on the base of said residence. Under said regulation a change of rural residence to urban was extremely difficult. The trips required prior permission and the rationing system forced one to present in stores or restaurants coupons assigned to the place of residence and work. Thus, the hook system was effective method of controlling space mobility and reducing rural-urban migration (16). However, with China’s economic liberalization during the eighties immobility became dysfunctional for the allocation of resources humans according to a dynamic partially governed by market laws. Furthermore, the privatization and modernization of agriculture increased productivity and then expelled tens of millions of peasants from the land who turned out to be surplus labor (17). Unable to meet the needs of this economically displaced rural population, the Chinese government chose to raise restrictions on population movements and / or apply them less strictly, according to the regions and the moments of the political situation. The result was the generation of massive rural-urban migrations in the last decade, especially towards the big cities and towards the industrial centers and South China exporters. But those cities and regions, despite their extraordinary economic dynamism (in fact, the centers with the highest rate of economic growth of the world in the last decade) could not absorb stable workers by the millions, nor provide them with urban housing and services, so many urban immigrants lived without a fixed residence or in the rural periphery of the metropolis, while many others adapted a pattern of seasonal migrations, coming and going between their villages of origin and metropolitan centers (18). So Guangzhou (Canton), a city of about six million inhabitants, accounted in 1992 a total of 1.34 million temporary residents to which 260,000 were added daily. In the whole of Guangdong province they were estimated at minus 6 million the number of temporary migrants. In Shanghai, at the end of the 80s, they had 1.83 million floating, while in 1993, after development from the industrial district of Pudding, it was estimated that one million more were floating. They had arrived in Shanghai in that year. The only reliable migration survey of the last decade, carried out in 1986, estimated that on that date 3.6% of the population of the 74 cities surveyed were temporary residents. Other National estimate, evaluates the number of floats in 1988, between 50 and 70 millions of people. What seems undoubted is that the phenomenon has increased Beijing Central Railway Station, built for 50,000 daily passengers, go through it currently between 170,000 and 250,000,according to the periods. The Beijing municipal government estimates that each increase of 100,000 daily visitors to the city consume 50,000 kilos of grain, 50,000 kilos of vegetables, 100,000 kilowatts of electricity, 24,000 liters of water and uses 730 public buses. This number of visitors causes 100,000 kilos of garbage and generates 2,300 kilos of sewage waste. The living conditions of this floating population are much lower than those of the permanent population (19) and are, at the same time, easy prey for crime and shelter for criminals, which increases prejudices against them among the population resident. Although smaller than in China, the phenomenon of a floating population is characteristic of most of the developing world and particularly from Asia (20). So in Bangkok, of the emigrants arrived in the city between 1975 and 1985, 25% had already lived in three different cities and 77% of the respondents did not plan to stay in Bangkok for more than a year, while that only 12% of migrants had registered regularly in their Bangkok residence, indicating an existence on horseback between its areas of origin and the different urban labor markets. In Java, the World Bank estimated that in 1984 25% of rural households had at least one member of the family working in an urban center for part of the year, which it was equivalent to 50% of the urban active population. Similar trends have been observed in the Philippines and Malaysia (21). The extent of the phenomenon, and its diffusion in other areas of the world, it makes the distinction between rural more and more inoperative and urban, to the extent that what is truly significant is the plot of relations that are established between the dynamism of the big cities and the population flows that are located at different times at different times and with different intensities, according to the rhythms of articulation between global and local economy.
In the cities of developed countries there is also an increase in floating population of a different type. So, Guido Marinetti, in an interesting study (22) has insisted on the importance of visitor populations that use the city and its services without residing in it. Not only coming from others localities of the metropolitan area, but of other regions and other countries. Tourists, business travelers and urban consumers form on a given day in the main European cities, (but also North American and South American) a considerable proportion of urban users who, however, do not appear in the statistics nor are they accounted for in the tax base and institutional of urban services that, however, they use intensively. There are three main problems caused by floating populations in urban management. In the first place, its existence provokes a pressure on the urban services greater than the city can assume, unless received special assistance from the higher levels of administration, in line with its real population and the effective use made of its infrastructure. In second, the lack of adequate statistical accounting of said population floating, as well as the irregularity of its movements, prevent a planning adequate urban services. Third, a distortion is created between people present in the city, and citizens capable of causing various problems and the city government. This is negative for the floaters, devoid of rights and, sometimes, outlawed, as for residents who they see broken the solidarity of the citizenship by the existence of differences of status legal and community belonging within the real population of the city. Thus the development of floating populations, directly related to the globalization of economic and communication flows, constitutes a new urban reality for which cities still have no answer.
Multiculturalism and urban social crisis:
In May 1991 there was a meeting in Frankfurt, under the auspices of the Council of Europe. Representatives of different European municipal governments converged to deal with the municipal policies for the multicultural integration of Europe. In the statement published at the end of that meeting (23) it was found that the European countries, as a result of decades of immigration and emigration, had twisted, multicultural societies. Also, to the extent that immigrants and the resulting ethnic minorities concentrated on large cities, immigration treatment policies and respect for multiculturalism constituted an essential component of the new municipal policies. They concluded by stating that only a genuinely democratic Europe was able to carry out a policy of multiculturalism that can make stability a factor in the world and can effectively combat economic imbalances between north and south, east and west, which lead to disorderly emigration (p.167). A similar finding can be made in American society and in relation to the world in general. And yet xenophobic reactions in all countries and the increase in racism and religious fanaticism around the world does not seem to augur an easy treatment of the new urban reality. Immigrants and ethnic minorities appear as scapegoats for economic crises and social uncertainties, according to an old, historically established reflex, regularly exploited by irresponsible political demagogues. Even so, the stubborn new reality of interdependent global economy, socio-economic imbalances and there production of ethnic minorities already residing in more developed countries they make multiculturalism and multiethnicity inevitable almost everywhere in the world. Even Japan, one of the most culturally homogeneous societies in the world, is experiencing a rapid increase in its foreign population, while the growth of the Yoba (casual workers without employment or fixed residence) and its temporary spatial location in ghettos urban, like Amagasaki in Osaka. There are those who think, including authors of this book, that multiculturalism and multiculturalism are sources of economic and cultural wealth for urban societies (24). But even who are alarmed by the disappearance of social homogeneity and social tensions that this causes must accept the new reality: our societies, in all latitudes, are and will be multicultural, and cities (and especially large cities) concentrate the highest level of diversity. Learn to live in that situation, know how to manage cultural exchange to starting from the ethnic difference and remedying the inequalities arising from the discrimination are essential dimensions of the new local policy in the conditions arising from the new global interdependence.
(1). Carlos Alonso Saldivar and Manuel Castells (1992) “Spain, End of the century”, Madrid: Editorial Alliance 1992.
(2). G. Papadimitriou and P. Martín (ends) (1991) “The Unsettled Relationship: Labor Migration and Economic Development “, Westport: Greenwood Press.
UNDIESA (United Nations Department for International Economic and Social
Affairs) (1991) “World Urbanization Prospects: Estimates and Projections or urban and rural populations and of urban agglomerations “, New York: United Nations.
John Kasarda and Allan Parnell (eds) (1993) “Third World Cities: Problems, Policies and Prospects “, London: Sage Publications.
(3). Findley, 1993. In Kasarda and Parnell, op. cit.
(4). Duncan Campbell “Foreign investment, labor immobility and the quality of employment “, International Labor Review, 2, 1994.
(5). Sharon Stanton Rusell and others “International Migration and Development in Subsaharan Africa “, World Bank Discussion Papers 101-102, Washington DC: World Bank, 1990.
(6) Peter Stalker (1994) “The work of strangers. A survey of international labormigration “, Geneva: International Labor Office.
(7). Peter Stalker, op. cit.
(8). Ed Blakely and William Goldsmith (1992) “Separate societies”, Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
(9). Robert Bullard, Eugene Gribsby and Charles Lee (1994) “Residential apartheid: the American Legacy “, Los Angeles: UCLA Center for Afro-American Studies ..
(10) Ruth Peterson and Lauren Kirov (1993) “Racial Segregation and black urban
homicide “, in” Social Forces “, 71. (eleven). Neuma Aguiar “Rio de Janeiro plural: um guide for social policies by genro e raça “, Rio de Janeiro: IUPERJ, 1994.
(12). Trevor Jones (1993) “Britain’s Ethnic Minorities”, London: Policy Studies
Institute
(13). Council of Europe (1993) “Europe 1990-2000: Multiculturalism in the city, the integration of immigrants “Strasbourg, Studies and Texts, n 25, Council of
Europe, 1993.
(14.) Council of Europe, op. cit.
(15.) Sidney Goldstein (1993), in Kasarda and Parnell, op. cit. Linda Wong (1994) “China’s urban migranst-the public policy challenge”, in”Pacific Affairs”, v. 67. n3, autumn.
(16). Cute Wong, op. cit.
(17). Richard Kirkby (1985) “Urbanization in China”, London: Oxford University Press
(18). Lincoln Day and Ma Xia (eds,) “Migration and Urbanization in China”, Armonk, New York: ME Sharpe, 1994.
(19). Sidney Goldstein (1993), in Kasarda and Parnell, op. cit. (twenty). Lincoln Day and Ma Xia, op. cit. (twenty-one). Corner, 1994.
(22). Marinetti, G. “Metropoli. La nuova morfologia sociale della citt”. Il Mulino, Bologna, 1993.
(23) Council of Europe, op. cit.
(24). Aleksandra Alund and Carl-Ulrik Schierup (1991) “Paradoxes of multiculturalism “, Aldershot: Avebury.
